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Bertrand Russell 1872-1970.
Some book reviews by Raeto Collin West, 'Rerevisionist'.

BR's publication date order. These reviews have been separated from big-lies.org/reviews (that file is too large).

v. 19 August 2024


New (June 17 2023 ) summary of my opinion of Russell's social theories. For the avoidance of doubt, I take the view that Russell adopted the family tradition of working for the admittance of Jews into Britain, and in so doing helped them cause the 'Great War', which Russell deplored, putting the blame on non-Jews, human nature, the impulsive need for excitement, and so on. He continued to work for Jews in Russia, and for the Second World War. He worked for Jewish science frauds and the prolongation of Jewish 'social science' and 'religious' frauds, if they can even be called that. To put it simply, he was a gullible clown, unable even in extreme cases of violence to put the blame where it belonged. And his philosophical and mathematical work accomplished little.

It's saddening to read his autobiography: He is unblithely unaware of the huge evils of Victorian times, such as the viciousness against India and China, and the US Civil War horrors. He shows little grasp of the reach of aristocratic families in Europe and its provinces, such as Russia and the Americas. His work on nuclear weapons is now clearly entangled with Jewish lies. His work on Vietnam (during which he was corralled by Jews, though to what extent is not known by me)—as usual, Jewish concealment was as effective as they could make it. Possibly he was used as a ridiculable front in the worldwide dislike of American atrocities.

My revisionist review of Russell's life and work:   Bertrand Russell: Dupe of Jews which is not in this page, but included in the 'nuke-lies' part of my site.

1952 film of Russell at home (black and white; 30 minutes; opens in a new tab). Disappointingly, shows Russell aged almost 80, in a staged conversation at home in (I think) Richmond—film being expensive and needing lighting and several cameras—in which it's clear Russell knew nothing of Jewish ambitions, the 'French Revolution', the slow perversions of thought against Germany in Britain and Britain in Germany, the 1913 Federal Reserve and 1914, Jewish mass murder under 'Socialism', Hitler, US ignorance, 'nuclear weapons' and other Jewish frauds, and many other topics. Russell regards 'Asia' as requiring to shoulder its responsibilities. He had no idea that Jews were and are 'supremacists'. He lived before the vast population expansions of black Africans, and the practical implementation of Coudenhove-Kalergi's plan, of which he was aware.
      It doesn't say much for Victorian historians that they left huge questions over the 'French Revolution', as Russell demonstrates with his comment (for example in Dear Bertrand Russell), on inevitable Bonapartism. He was as bad on the USA Civil War, and Franco-Prussian War, and of course Jewish assassinations by anarchists and others. Sinn Fein is another.

Russell shows his unawareness of Jewish maleficence in his attitude the Jewish view of 'truth'.   In his 1918 book Roads to Freedom, essentially a propaganda piece for Jewish ideas on harming the white world to make leading Jews feel happier, he wrote:–

The great majority of men and women, in ordinary times, pass through life without ever contemplating or criticising, as a whole, either their own conditions or those of the world at large. They find themselves born into a certain place in society, and they accept what each day brings forth, without any effort of thought beyond what the immediate present requires. Almost as instinctively as the beasts of the field, they seek the satisfaction of the needs of the moment, without much forethought, and without considering that by sufficient effort the whole conditions of their lives could be changed. A certain percentage, guided by personal ambition, make the effort of thought and will which is necessary to place themselves among the more fortunate members of the community; but very few among these are seriously concerned to secure for all the advantages which they seek for themselves. It is only a few rare and exceptional men who have that kind of love toward mankind at large that makes them unable to endure patiently the general mass of evil and suffering, regardless of any relation it may have to their own lives. These few, driven by sympathetic pain, will seek, first in thought and then in action, for some way of escape, some new system of society by which life may become richer, more full of joy and less full of preventable evils than it is at present. ...

There's more in the same sense, which might have been written by a Jew in 'Tikkun Olam' mode combining self-praise with discussion of how best to use the worthless 'goyim'.
      And here he is published in 1973, in interview with Ralph Miliband, a 'Belgian' Jew.
RUSSELL: Oh yes, I’ve never seen any reason to change it. I find it very odd, very odd, that when people talk about religion they never enquire whether it is true or not: they only make out that it’s useful. But I don’t think a thing which is false can be useful, because it leads you astray.
'It' is his opinion of religion. He doesn't notice that it can be useful in leading other people astray. Something applied by Jews for thousands of years.

Just another philosopher: 1976 film of Isaiah Berlin interviewed, entitled Why Philosophy Matters. Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997), a 'Jew' of course, was touted as a historian of ideas. The interview shows him puzzling over the meanings of words—it looks very much as though he was uneasy with the English language, reasonably enough for someone who considered himself a Jew from Latvia. We also have an anecdote about the Second World War, in which of course he takes the Jewish view as automatically as possible, though no doubt there's some hesitation. He wrote a long review of Russell's History of Western Philosophy.

Copyright issues: Only two remarks I'm aware of refer to Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, and The Managerial Revolution by James Burnham. Russell thought his ideas in Religion and Science were a copied by Huxley, and that Burnham had taken up the thesis of Power and popularised it. I'm personally uneasy about these claims; for one thing, Religion and Science was itself standard matter, generally quoting received anti-Church views. And Burnham seemed to present standard American views, probably of course Jewish.
      More ordinary issues include copyright in his own works—see Anton Felton, below. And a brief humorous comment to a woman who thanked God for his Autobiography, suggesting that He might have infringed Russell's copyright.

German Social Democracy 1896 (lectures. Date corrected!)
Why Men Fight [in US] = Principles of Social Reconstruction 1916, written 1915
Political Ideals 1917 [US only]; 1963 [UK]
Roads to Freedom 1918. Long.
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy 1919
Practice and Theory of Bolshevism 1920
The Analysis of Mind 1921
The ABC of Atoms 1923
Prospects of Industrial Civilization 1923
The ABC of Relativity 1925
On Education 1926. My plea for Jew-aware education
Sceptical Essays 1928
Marriage and Morals 1929
The Conquest of Happiness 1930
Education and the Social Order 1932
Freedom and Organization 1814-1914 1934. + Commentary on Patricia Spence
In Praise of Idleness (1935)
Religion and Science 1935   (Published by Home University Library)
Which Way to Peace? 1936   First ever Internet upload! Complete text. 30 June 2017. NEW!!
Power: A New Social Analysis 1938
Let the People Think 1941 (Review Aug 2017)
History of Western Philosophy 1945
    Extract from History of Western Philosophy: Russell on Jews 1945
Authority and the Individual 1948
1950: Nobel Prize for Literature, probably to reward Russell for his conventional, Jew-unaware, and anti-German post-World War 2 History of Western Philosophy, but nominally awarded for his Marriage and Morals. His acceptance speech, Politically Important Desires, was reprinted in his book Human Society in Ethics and Politics, and it, of course, included nothing on Jews and their politically important desires.
New Hopes for a Changing World 1951
The Impact of Science on Society essay collection 1952
Human Society in Ethics and Politics essay collection.   Note: Chapter 7, 'Can Religious Faith Cure Our Troubles?' is interesting to show up Jew-naivety in Russell (and in numerous Americans such as Kevin MacDonald). 1954
'Why I am not a Christian' and Other Essays essay collection
Portraits from Memory and other essays 1956
Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare 1959
My Philosophical Development 1959
Fact and Fiction 1961
[Herbert Gottschalk, eine Biographie 1962]
War Crimes in Vietnam My review of this essay collection 1967
      Download entire book here in pdf format. c 50MB
Autobiography (3 vols, 1967, 1968, 1969)
Against the Crime of Silence: Russell International War Crimes Tribunal 1968. My short review
Dear Bertrand Russell: A Selection of His Correspondence with the General Public,1950-68 1969
Rupert Crawshay-Williams: Russell Remembered 1970
Allen Lane book Prevent the Crime of Silence in full 1971 with notes on Penguin Books propaganda and Jew-aware interpretation of Vietnam War. Some, but not much, by Russell who was in his mid-90s at the time
The Collected Stories of Bertrand Russell (1972)
Barry Feinberg: Bertrand Russell's America, 1945-1970 v1 1973; v2 1983?
Ronald W Clark: The Life of Bertrand Russell 1975
Katherine Tait: My Father, Bertrand Russell 1975
Caroline Moorehead: Bertrand Russell: A Life 1992 | Rerevised long update about 10 years later. Jews telling lies and covering up. Includes Schoenman.
BBC on Russell: BBC co-production in 2nd Reputations series; Part 1   2 hours 1998
Yours faithfully, Bertrand Russell 2002 | Edited by Ray Perkins Jr


German Social Democracy


1896 lectures, delivered at the LSE, which then was very new while pretending in Jewish style to be old and established. (About twenty years later, Principles of Social Reconstruction was delivered as lectures. Russell seems to have needed claqueurs to help him out.)

Russell's first book; he visited Germany with Alys for 'research', but, unsurprisingly, found only Jewish publications, which outnumbered non-Jewish by a vast margin.


Marxism and Politics by Ralph Miliband, published in 1997.
Note 6 (in the top right) refers to H. Gruber, International Communism in the Era of Lenin, published in New York, 1972.
It's unlikely Russell would even have noticed anything published against Jews.

image   Review of Bertrand Russell   Autobiography. Three volumes first published by Allen & Unwin 1967, 1968, 1969

Reasonably Honest Autobiography, Largely Greeted with Enthusiasm, by a British Aristocrat Torn Between Philosophy, Science, and Nascent Social Sciences.
11 March 2016.
Volume I   1872-1914
Russell was born in 1872; old enough not to have been called up in the 'Great War'. Volume 1 of his Autobiography (with the green jacket design spine, and a black-and-white cover photo by Lotte Meitner-Graf, a copy of which appears in Chomsky's study, and in a 1970s film including Malcolm McDowell) was published by Allen & Unwin, his lifelong publisher. Volume I is 1872-1914; Volume II 1914-1944; Volume III 1944-1967 (from memory) with a 'tailpiece' of 1969. These divisions clearly correspond to milestones in Russell's mental life: the outbreak of the 'Great War', and the supposed invention of nuclear weapons.
      There were astounding changes in Russell's lifetime: automobiles and aeroplanes and skyscrapers hardly existed until he was about 40 years old. Underground and tube railways first came to London somewhat earlier. Telephones were rare and valuable. Oil-based plastic polymers were hardly known before 1945. Machine guns and dynamite pre-dated 1900. Their later developments were in time to be misreported by radio, and then television. Russell recognised the power of TV: he thought most people would believe any lie promoted by television.
      When this autobiography appeared, flattering blurbs suggested it was remarkably honest. I don't think this is quite true. Russell had many 'relatives'—I don't know the phrase Russell would have used. Not 'extended family'. Probably 'my people'. But there's nothing like a family tree. I think this expands the impression of loneliness in a misleading way.
      Russell's longevity reflects on his cultural background. He was not of a temperament to be attracted to Greek and Roman classics; these had their day, but were outdated by Victorian progress. He was hopelessly impractical, not having any empirical scientific skill, though he recognised the importance of science. Such books as Lewis Carroll's and Edward Lear's, Tristram Shandy and The Trumpet Major and War and Peace (later, in English) and the Cambridge Modern History were part of his upbringing and early maturity. Alys Pearsall Smith (his first wife, an American New England Quaker) and Russell ploughed through standard histories together, as Darwin and his wife did. I don't think Russell ever applied scepticism to history: for example, about Nero, or Cromwell, or the Protestant view of the Reformation, or the French Revolution. Before this, his early years in his grandfather's gift-of-Victoria house in Richmond Park were partly spent looking through Prime Minister Russell's library, though L'Art de Verifier des Dates (the only 'art' involved was looking them up) is the only book (I think) he specifically locates there.
      All Russell's early years were spent, more or less in isolation, in Richmond Park, with his elder brother Frank, his servants, and elderly relatives, notably an ancient puritanical Scottish grandmother—it's not clear to me which of his parents was her child. As in many European countries, aristocrats carried with them a considerable penumbra of hangers-on. Possibly there was a painful waste of talent: they might have observed the world more than they did. But equally possibly there was not; it's agonising to reflect on the missed opportunities.
      Pembroke Lodge still exists, in a state of conversion into tea room with car park, and a huge outdoor poem carved into wood: City of Dreadful Night. Poor Russell is almost elided away by now. He loved the landscape and nature, which he thought of as wild, and described in old age with great vigour.
      When Russell was young, Joseph Conrad did not of course exist as part of a more-or-less official literary canon. Shelley was there—Russell read Epipsychidion aloud to Alys in between kissing sessions. Byron furnished materials for Russell on 'Byronic unhappiness'. The really immense historical upheaval at that time was the French Revolution and Napoleon, and the preceding philosophical groundwork, Voltaire, Blake, Swedenborg and so on, but especially Rousseau, who retained an aura of irresponsibly-'romantic' evil in Russell's mind. The simple outline of this historical set of events (including slogans, the terror, and military conquests) adapted itself well to the so-called 'Russian Revolution' of volume 2 of Russell's Autobiography. Russell never had any doubt about this scheme, and for example always called the Jewish-run 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Russia, as though it was simply another nation-state made up of one well-defined nationality.
      Russell regarded himself as a triple philosopher-mathematician-social scientist. His philosophical life started largely with his attack on Christianity, in his exercise book labelled 'Greek Exercises'. It's similar to other rationalistic attacks of the time, concentrating fire on falsehood and absurdity. Russell was too young or naive to understand that much of established religion is an income-generating scheme, though he must have been aware of the history of the Reformation as presented in 19th-century England. Anyway, at the end of this process Russell recalls feeling relieved that it was all over. When he finally went 'up' to Cambridge, he says he met only one person who had heard of Draper's History of the Conflict between Religion and Science. Russell claims to have been led into mathematics by his brother's explaining some of mysteries of geometry to him, from Euclid, including the problem of parallel straight lines not meeting. Aged about 18, he was ready for Cambridge, full of promise—the famous Jowett came to visit what there was of his family. (Both his parents died when he was young—too young to remember them). Russell's social science interests started in Volume II; before that, he worked at his Principia Mathematica. He claims to have discovered much of the work of Cantor independently. My own belief is that Cantor and (later) Einstein are flawed. I suspect Russell was well aware of fame and publicity and renown; most of his beliefs were in accordance with ideas currently promoted at the time. One of his 1930s essays, on Tom Paine and Washington and the early views of democracy, Russell states that 'Some worldly wisdom is required even to secure praise for the lack of it.' In Volume I this hardly mattered; Russell's views were not very controversial. But, at least in my view, Russell always had some intellectual timidity: he never dared criticise Freud, for example, in any forthright way.
      Russell at Cambridge found Cambridge University life exactly suited to his tastes and abilities. He was sought out by intellectual clubs, was able to talk for the first time in his life, found the buildings beautiful, met Whitehead, and generally expanded. He bought and smoked Fribourg & Treyer's 'Golden Mixture'. He took very long walks. He rode his bike. He became less shy. He liked the ambience of completely free discussion, and never noticed it was much less free than he'd imagined. He made fun of people who tried to popularise. A note that strikes me as discordant is his dislike of the 'Dons'. He wrote prose with purple patches. As with almost all biographies, Russell writes very little on what he actually learned at Cambridge. He gives no summary or account of the influence of mathematical structures on his thinking. Very likely 'propositional functions' are one such thing, but he doesn't explicitly say so. He liked philosophy 'and the curious ways of conceiving the world that the great philosophers offer to the imagination.' His first philosophical ventures led him, following others, to criticisms of Hegel and German Idealism, though not of the assumptions and mind-sets that led to its being favoured.
      Russell married (partly because he wanted children) and moved to a newly-built house. He was—I did some comparative calculations—the equivalent of a millionaire now, through inheritance. He was in a position to turn down work he found distasteful: for a short time in 1898 he tried diplomatic work in Paris, but disliked working on a dispute as to whether lobsters legally counted as fish. (Plus ça change ..: the EU had a dispute as to whether carrots count as fruit). It's not quite true to say that Russell was fully absorbed in philosophy and mathematics: his wife Alys spoke on votes for women and similar issues. I found a short essay by her in Nineteenth Century Opinion, taken from The Nineteenth Century of 1877-1901, in a 1951 paperback edited by Michael Goodwin (if you must know) in which she expressed the desire of single wealthy women for work—with the usual implicit restrictions. At the end of his chapter Principia Mathematica Russell wrote 'Few things are more surprising than the rapid and complete victory of this cause women's suffrage] throughout the civilised world.' Russell was impressed (unfavourably) by Philadelphia politics—as a long letter to Graham Wallas in 1896 on 'bossism' and voting fraud shows. (This letter is instructive: Russell provides examples of bosses' voting frauds, purchases of votes, paid fake demonstrators, as he somewhere in his writings comments on the skilled management of bankrupt US railways. He could never, at any time in his life, bring himself to analyse the costs of party politics and the economics of corruption. As he puts it: Americans are unspeakably lazy about everything but their business [and] invent a pessimism, and say things can't be improved). Russell and Alys went to Germany to study 'social democracy' there; the outcome was his very first book German Social Democracy (1896). This set a style for all Russell's social science books: he simply had no idea about Jews, which of course was a standard head-in-the-sand attitude in polite Britain. Probably he simply assumed the vast number of Jewish publications in Germany, and the tiny number of those discussing Jewish influence, must have been a plain reflection of merit. (If you're looking for a full-on criticism of Russell, see Bertrand Russell, dupe of racist Jews.)
      Russell's following three books were An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (1897), A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900), and The Principles of Mathematics (1903). However, Russell doesn't write much about his books, which he often implied came from unconscious thought, as for example in his account of sitting in the parlour of the Beetle and Wedge at Moulsford, wondering what to say about 'our knowledge of the external world'.
      One of the attractive characteristics of Russell's Autobiography is its peppering with famous names: G E Moore, J M Keynes, D H Lawrence, G B Shaw, Eddington, Einstein, H G Wells, Malinowski, Sidney and Beatrice 'Webb', as a tiny sample—though arguably some names are chosen for notoriety rather than firm reputation. Russell worked in Cambridge, London—at the time one of the world's largest cities— and his Hindhead house. And he had a large set of women companions, but this fact only emerged later, and is only very slightly present in his Autobiography. In this way, he might have proceeded from the 1890s to the twentieth century and onward, for the rest of his life as a respected academic, reading The Times and hefty Victorian books, with no inkling that other outlooks and forces were designing and plotting.
      Woven into his narrative are relatives—often enough, surprising, because of the inevitable limitations of the first-and-surname principle. General Pitt-Rivers was his uncle. Lord Portal, responsible for bomber command (in Volume III) and perhaps therefore the Second World War, was Russell's cousin. The Duke of Bedford was 'head of my family'. And of course Russell had personal friends. Russell's chapters each end with a collection of letters. In Volume I, the final five chapters have far more letters than text, beginning with his life in Paris and dalliance with a diplomatic carrier. And Volume II has far more of his letters than text, many being his own, suggesting his early life had disproportionately the most emotional meaning for him, and that Russia, China, and America between them managed to exhaust him.
imageVolume II   1914-1944
Just a few comments on Russell's attitudes at the time. A run-in with a family doctor caused other family members to tell Russell he ought not to have children, because of the taint of insanity of a relative of Russell's. Russell said people at the time tended to believe overmuch in heredity. Since then, population movements have become so much easier that people if anything are at the opposite extreme, denying all role for genetics—this of course is the official Jewish view since 1945. The point really is that if people are to be ignored as sub- or non-human, as per Jewish orthodoxy, it doesn't matter if there are differences. Similarly with Russell: if you're a secure aristocrat, what do other people matter? Russell assumes all human populations are similar: his book on Power doesn't differentiate in any way between populations, though there are token references in his books on education. This must have had a lot of muting effect on his knowledge of the 'masses', and of Jews vs Russians. Inaccessible populations of southern Africa had been described for 50 or 60 years, but Russell failed to note systematic differences.
      Russell was aware of, and discussed in his books, genetics and Darwin. He seems to have veered away from such awareness: a letter in Volume III says all Germans would have been 'sired by Hitler', for example. In a way it's odd, because he himself felt some need for intellectual accomplishment; and yet he was forbidden from reading books in his grandfather's library, and discouraged from rationalist critiques of Christianity.
      Russell disliked 'capitalism', but seems to have taken the word and its connotations straight from Marx. Although he was aware of finances, and the power of panics and crashes and so on, his use of 'capitalism' was just like that of all the other 'economists' of the time trying, or pretending, to be critical. Quite apart from money, as far as I recall there is nothing in Russell on economic goods: Can there be too much? Should inventions made in A be allowed into B? Is there some law making some level of 'productivity' ideal? Is there an optimum population? Despite Russell's attempts, I don't think he discovered anything, though some people credit him with 'effective demand' and 'spending out of depression'.

Russell was influenced by 'trigger words' or 'loaded words' of the type used by Jews.

I don't mean newspaper-headline stuff with silly exaggerations, but phrases which look technical and accurate but in practice are not defined at all, or described vaguely. In a time of aggressive propaganda, this is a serious failure, giving no help when it is most needed.   'Capitalism' is a perfect example, a word always used by Russell in a contemptuous manner. And yet, presumably, any large project needs money if there's any sort of money system.


      Russell regarded himself as an innovator: he regarded Prospects of Industrial Civilization (1923) as a pioneering work in sociology. No doubt it's partly due to Jews that writers such as Durkheim and Weber are given priority. And perhaps to British writers that Herbert Spencer is ignored. Russell regarded Power as founding a new science, as Adam Smith is regarded as founding economics. Russell considered that Power had been plagiarised by Burnham (in The Managerial Revolution). Russell complained the final chapters of The Scientific Outlook were plagiarised by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World.
      Russell was horrified by the 'Great War'. As with most people, he was at the level of calling it an 'outbreak'. His chapter The First War is worth reading, especially by people who have never heard any arguments against that war. He had no analysis of people who wanted war, and why they wanted war, though he implied he'd kept an eye on Sir Edward Grey and others. But his eyes were on average people:
'... Although I did not foresee anything like the full disaster of the War, I foresaw a great deal more than most people did. The prospect filled me with horror, but what filled me with even more horror was the fact that the anticipation of carnage was delightful to something like ninety per cent of the population. I had to revise my views on human nature. At that time I was wholly ignorant of psycho-analysis, but I arrived for myself at a view of human passions not unlike that of the psycho-analysts. I arrived at this view in order to understand popular feeling about the war. I had supposed until that time that it was quite common for parents to love their children, but the war persuaded me that it is a rare exception. I had supposed that most people liked money better than almost anything else, but I discovered that they liked destruction even better. I had supposed that intellectuals frequently loved truth, but I found here again that not ten per cent of them prefer truth to popularity. ...
Thus Russell. But how could he be so sure of all this? On Monday, August 3rd, Russell went to London; he 'spent the evening walking round the streets, especially in the neighbourhood of Trafalgar Square, noticing cheering crowds, and making myself sensitive to the emotions of passers-by. During this and the following days I discovered to my amazement that average men and were delighted at the prospect of war. ...' Russell did not 'make himself sensitive' to the ideas and information available to passers-by. Jews no doubt joined the crowds to cheer and shout; "Oy veh! The Goyim are going to kill each other again! Then we can take over in Russia/Germany/Poland!" they must have thought. Many of the fighters and cannon fodder would be told they'd get free uniforms, expensive equipment, training, and good food and pay.
      Most of Russell's information came from newspapers, and if newspapers are owned by people who want war, it's simple to fill the pages with war stories. The Bryce Report state propaganda against Germany, and the prolonged leaks of anti-Russian and anti-German and anti-British material into other countries, clearly showed this. Russell did not talk to ordinary people; I've certainly met people who say they didn't want war at the time. Russell believed that pre-war outbreaks of violence (including those attributed to suffragettes) proved that British society unconsciously wanted war; in fact, it's likely that some of the supposed violence by suffragettes was in fact a Jewish false flag. However, the war gave him a new topic, the part played by impulse in human (and animal) life, which Russell mixed in with Freud, in my view unfortunately.

George Bernard Shaw is represented by five letters to Russell, most relating to the 'Great War'. Shaw loathed it as an evil, a social problem, a monstrous triviality, a vulgar frivolity. He clearly, judging from these letters, had no idea of the forces behind it. Russell had an inkling, but was inclined to blame ordinary people, subjected to intensive propaganda, and, later, call-ups and conscription and two years' hard labour for trying to escape. The general lines of the War as it appeared in Britain show through Russell's pages, but he seems, as far as his autobiography reveals anything, to have been out of touch with belligerents. It's a sad story, but set him up as an out-of-touch useful idiot.


      His new topic emerged as Principles of Social Reconstruction (1915):
'... I did not discover what it was all about until I had finished it. It has a framework and a formula, but I only discovered both when I had written all except the first and last words. ...'
The first sentence is: 'To all who are capable of new impressions and fresh thought, some modification of former beliefs and hopes has been brought by the war.' Last is: 'Out of their ghosts must come life, and it is we whom they must vivify.'
I quote, below, from Dear Bertrand Russell, on seeing a drowning child, to illustrate how Russell lacked completely a feel for instinct and impulse. He seemed to think everyday life had no connection with evolution; he had no idea that different people react differently for genetic reasons.

Russell states that his book on social reconstruction made him a great deal of money (with no figures either of money or copies sold). He was obviously right in regarding the 'Great War', and the 'Russian Revolution', as important; but he ignored serious attempts at analysis of the results—for example, who gained from it, and to what extent the gains were planned. Russell seemed to have been aware of the Bryce Report as a propaganda fake—he wrote a bit about it in his wartime articles. He must have been aware of the 'Balfour Declaration', and was aware that secret agreements preceded the war. I can find no reference to John Reed in Russell's publications; and he dismissed Hilaire Belloc as being 'anti-Semitic'. Despite Russell's theoretical devotion to free enquiry, he failed completely in this critically important test case.
      Russell's chapter on 'The First War' reveals him to have been ineffectual—writing articles, addressing audiences. Despite knowing Keynes, and despite his family connections, and familiarity with Prime Ministers, and visits to the USA, his chapter shows his helplessness. The dark side of British, or Anglo-Jewish, power, showed itself in jailings, for himself in the 'first division', and with hard labour and I think consequent death for E D Morel. And in compulsory call-up, when 'popular feeling about the war' proved insufficient. And of course in censorship. And in control over money 'for the duration'. And of course loans. The 1913 Federal Reserve and its other organisations set the stage. Anyone who takes Russell seriously must feel the tragedy of all this: he might have accomplished substantial work in deciphering events, as Europe's aristocrats fell and civilisation retrogressed; but he didn't.
      Russell wrote articles throughout the Great War. One was Justice in Wartime, put into a book of essays; but most were I think not republished. He seems to have not taken them very seriously: a TV interview showed him talking about 'sheets' which nobody read. Russell was reluctant to have his writings republished if they showed him in a bad light: an entire 1930s book, Which Way to Peace, was never republished after 1945. I've now (June 2017) uploaded it; click here.

Here are three examples of Russell's ignorances on the 'Great War'. In each case Russell's error was to take the view of war which had been fed to most Britons (but not Jews), and which they hadn't had the brains or energy to analyse:–

  1. Like many others, for example Hilaire Belloc, he did not trace the roots to the Jewish hatred of Europeans. Jews wanted war.
  2. Russell thought the war proved that modern techniques were very productive; great productivity was proved by the fact the war went on for years, but people still were fed and clothed. He had no idea about loans in exchange for land, factories, assets: he'd only heard accounts of wars run on a cash-only basis, and had no idea that assets had changed hands (partly of course because the matter of ownership is very hidden and secret). The impoverishment was hidden.
  3. Russell had no idea of durations of wars: he assumed generals and civil 'servants' and politicians wanted short, efficient, wars. Deliberate prolongation was not on his 'radar'.
Death in the Great War embraced many promising people: Rupert Brooke, Mosley of atomic theory, Alfred Whitehead's son. Many were influenced intellectually, such as W H R Rivers (mentioned in Power on primitive beliefs), and W Trotter on herd instincts. Russell of course records some of this, for example Whitehead's anguish over the death of his son.
      Russell often wrote for Jewish publications. It's curious to read (in an essay) that he was aware of the Coudenhove-Kalergi scheme for a mixed race Europe—he was inclined to think it may be a good idea, since of course he blamed Europeans for the slaughter of the 'Great War'.
      Chapters II and III deal with Russell's visits to Russia after the Jewish coup, and then China. In the first case, he was an observer. He praised his hosts, but in such a vast territory, and with no Russian, it's difficult to see how he could expect to report reliably in such a land. He might have said he simply didn't know. But intellectuals dislike steps of that sort. Almost incredibly, he met Lenin and Trotsky and other 'revolutionaries'. In just one of his letters he talks of tyrannical Jews.
      Russell was very gullible about Jews in the USSR. He writes for example of fish abounding in the Moskva river, but says only fish from trawlers were allowed, since they were industrial. Obviously people fishing would be called 'profiteers' and killed. Only the Jewish 'state' was allowed property—as in the famine in Ukraine. He records shots audible in (I think) Peter and Paul fortress, and thinks 'idealists' were being shot, rather than anyone educated, or rich and non-Jewish, or pro-Russian. He seems to have known nothing of anti-Russian Orthodox killings, and the expansion of Yiddish 'education'. He records how, after WW1 had officially finished, he was in Lulworth Cove, enjoying the scenery, and trying to decide between two lovers, indifferent to any serious concerns.
      Russell then visited, and loved, China. ('Once a week the mail would arrive from England, and the letters and newspapers that came from there seemed to breathe upon us a hot blast of insanity like the fiery heat that comes from a furnace door suddenly opened.') He wrote somewhere that China's adopting Communism was inconceivable; in Russia he'd compared Communism with the ideals of Plato's Republic—showing he had no idea how Communism had been forced onto peoples. For that matter, he was surprised by the change in fortunes away from Germany near the end of the Great War—possibly the result of a secret agreement added to Balfour's Declaration giving Russia to Jews. He lectured in China, and his new companion, Dora, lectured on things like women's issues. (Russell realised he 'no longer loved Alys', on a bike ride). Russell's letters are moving and heartfelt, though understandably his grasp of the history of these vast regions was sketchy, mostly nourished by British Victorian history, in which Constantinople, the East India Co, ruination of the Peking Summer Palace, opium, Hong Kong, the Indian Mutiny, and so on were treated in the way distorted modern history is fed to gullible undergraduates now.

Addendum Oct 2017: Russell's visit to China appears to have been about a year—October 1920 to October 1921—and of that time about a quarter was spent in severe illness and recovery). The Chinese Lecture Association invited him, for a year; the previous year had been John Dewey. An online article by Tony Simpson says next year was to be Bergson—perhaps they thought official western philosophers were Confucius-like. And that Russell in his farewell address in July 1921 spoke of China passing through a stage analogous to that of the dictatorship of the communist party in Russia for the purposes of education and non-capitalistic industrialisation. ('Industrialism' ends to be a Jewish word; factories making weapons, slag heaps and ruin, huge prisons, make money for Jews, but not others). It's not clear which parts are verbatim Russell; it is clear that the financing, which must have been Jewish, was of course secret. Russell never succeeded in separating 'capitalism' from 'finance': in practice, non-Jews relying on the fluctuating Federal Reserve Jewish lending policies were evil capitalists, while Jews printing money ad lib to suit themselves and finance wars were respectable financiers. No wonder Russell received a note after his departure from China very politely chiding him for giving no useful advice.
      Russell seems to have had not the slightest insight into realities of money; it's possible it was far more secret even than now. Just a few examples: In Korea at that time a Christian was practically synonymous with a bomb-thrower. Really? Sounds like Jews to me. And I also had a seminar of the more advanced students. All of them were Bolsheviks except one, who was the nephew of the emperor. They used to slip off to Moscow [in 1920!] one by one. I'd take a large bet they were puppets of Jews, perhaps even the 'Kaifeng Jews', a taboo group of course. Russell says The National University of Peking was very remarkable, the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor both passionately devoted to the modernising of China. This despite the 'funds which should have gone to pay salaries were always being appropriated by Tuchuns ['provincial military governors'] so that teaching was mainly a labour of love. Well, there are lots of teachers like that, aren't there?
      A reprinted letter from Johnson Yuan (Yuan is not on the list of 7 Sinified Jewish names I've seen) could not I think be the original invitation; he wants knowledge of Anarchism, Syndicalism, Socialism etc to be acquired, his letter written after Russell arrived in Shanghai. Anyway, a point which puzzled me is explained: Russell's works so far had been mainly in geometry, mathematics, and philosophy, and of course plenty of those might have been invited to China. He wrote against the 'Great War', but said nothing very helpful. His works on Social Reconstruction must have been the target. Russell mentions the Rockefeller Foundation as intellectual enemies. Probably in fact Russell was invited and paid as a useful idiot, conveying nothing. He writes all but nothing of his lectures and speeches, while much of his part-chapter talks of beautiful scenery, witty Chinese, impressive banquets, hotels elegant and otherwise, vicious British officialdom, Dora Black's pregnancy.
      Aged almost 50, Russell never acquired more knowledge of China; he did nothing for the millions of deaths claimed to have been under 'Communism'.

      The second parts of Volume II deal with Russell's second marriage, and a school Russell tried to set up in Telegraph House, an obsolete building which he bought from his bankrupt brother. This was a great period for experimental schools, because the memories of 19th century paying schools (H G Wells wrote on this) were still alive. There was scope for a combination of business with idealistic education. Russell never seems to have thought of founding or jointly founding a new university. Taxation, and legal restrictions, are now so high that perhaps home-schooling will become the 21st-century equivalent. Musing over Russell at the time, writing newspaper columns and collections of essays, and a potboiler or two, in a school he couldn't manage, trying to write great books and short of money, suggests he was at the nadir of his fortunes. His history of the 19th century Freedom and Organization: 1814-1914, written in two parts Legitimacy vs Industrialism 1814 to 1848 ('Industrialism' is used by Jews to suggest progress) and Freedom vs Organization 1776 to 1914 (1934), shows his struggle to make sense of the world whilst omitting the Jewish issue. Russell's literary non-starts are not stressed in his autobiography, but it's clear from McMaster University Archives that he tried, and failed, to write on 'fascism'. He said in a TV interview (not in his autobiography) that he had a new idea for a book almost every day.
      Russell was invited to the USA to take up an academic position. If there were retirement and pension implications, Russell doesn't state them, though he does of course discuss his adventures when opposition was stirred up in the 'chair of indecency' Catholic incidents. At the time, New York had been spared the huge immigration of Jewish 'refugees', whose fraudulent claims provided them with a model for subsequent nonwhite invasions. Russell spent his time until the end of the Second World War in the USA. It's clear from his letters that he had no clue about Hitler or the Second World War.
      During Russell's time in the USA, arms were shipped to the USSR in huge quantities, largely secretly as not everybody liked Stalin. Bear this in mind when reading Volume II. Russell isn't very clear on the 'phoney war' before 1941, or on the way Jews fixed up war against France, Germany, and Italy—and in effect eastern Europe, by supplying Stalin—and took part in the 'civil war' in Spain. Maybe this Anglo-American action will eventually produce a European backlash and revenge.

      The final part of this volume has Russell working on History of Western Philosophy, as Jewish influence over the world sank deeper. Russell had theories on the rise and fall of civilisations and worldview: 'Three cycles: Greek, Catholic, Protestant. In each case.. decay of .. dogma leads to anarchy and thence to dictatorship. I like the growth of Catholicism out of Greek decadence, and of Luther out of Machiavelli's outlook'. This may have been related to the feeling of insecurity of a world amid a huge war—though very few people could explain why a tiny country like Germany should be taken so seriously. Thus Gilbert Murray, in typical confusion, to Russell: '.. not quite clear what the two sides were: Communism or Socialism against Fascism.. Christianity against ungodliness. But now.. Britain and America .. against the various autocracies, which means Liberalism v Tyranny..' Russell was not very secure in these categories. He was comfortable with philosophers and their schools, largely because some sort of consensus had been decided upon. But, despite his efforts, he never found convincing historical impulses and motives, as his book Power shows. Nor of course did for example Toynbee, at more or less the same time.
      History of Western Philosophy can now be seen to be marred by errors, all to do with misunderstandings of Jews. No doubt others will become clear, for example related to science. Anyway, by Volume II Russell was convinced that Rousseau and Romanticism had led to 'Fascism'—Russell never seemed to use the expression 'NSDAP'. The NSDAP's name being a socialist workers party, and Russell advocating 'socialism', must have been a problem for him. However, the Labour Party leadership in Britain had decreed that Hitler was not left wing, after all, but right wing. Russell was primed to announce Rousseau 'led to Auschwitz' though this phrase is not present in History of Western Philosophy.
      The reprinted letters following Chapters 12 and 13 (1930-7, 1938-44) light, one must assume, Russell's states of mind and activities when he was in his 60s, and well-known in the world. One from Einstein (1931), after flattery, recommends 'an international journalistic enterprise (Cooperation) to which the best people all belong as contributors ... to educate the public in all countries in international understanding. ... Dr J. Révész, will visit England in the near future..' [Original in German.] Russell's reply as printed merely invited Einstein to visit; probably this was just a small subsection of Jewish propaganda for Jewish control, which of course worked: Jews won the Second World War. Russell commented in the Tom Mooney case—no doubt a media-promoted thing.
jews in hungary
He wrote a 'brilliant' letter for the defence of Mátyás Rákosi, described in a footnote as 'a Hungarian Communist'.

[And described by David Irving in a video The Manipulation of History as one of many cruel, murderous Jews.]
      Here's another account:
Matyas Rákosi (born Rosenfeld), de-facto jewish ruler of Communist Hungary, was part of jewish Bela Kun’s doomed government in 1919 but fled to Russia after Soviet Hungary’s collapse. He then became the Cominterm leader and returned to Hungary as dictator propped up by Joseph Stalin when Hungary fell under communism after WWII.

No doubt, for those Hungarians who lived through the Communist Era, it was common knowledge that Jews like Rakosi dominated The Party, but to state so publicly was suicidal considering it was a capital offense.]

It's clear Russell had no idea about the machinations intended to lead to world war. A large chunk—in my view, far too large—of the later letters deals with the City College of New York issue, in which an offer of a professorship was withdrawn—this is reminiscent of manufactured outbreaks of scandals in US education, which of course still happen. A letter from the 'Student Council' is enclosed; I'm sure Russell never got to the bottom of what happened, though he thought (as he said on early TV) it was a 'Catholic thing'.

At the end of his Chapter 9, 'Russia', (BR never seems to have used the expression 'Soviet Union'), here are 7 letters from Harold Laski in Harvard in the USA, 5 of them more or less consecutive from Aug 1919 to Jan 2020. They seem an example of the manipulations of fellow-Jews to get their people into controlling positions.


imageVolume III   1944-1967
After the success of the first volumes of Russell's autobiography, there were problems with this. (Note: volume 3 is still not downloadable, in 2018). It seems the American publisher declined to publish. (I don't know any contractual or other details, though clearly the appearance of homogeneous external appearance of the volumes is misleading). Anyway, it was published eventually, though there seem to be traces of carelessness—Fennimore Cooper, Ralph Milliband, and Pablo Cassals suggest sluggish proofreading. (A tape-recorded transcription elsewhere of Russell has 'Bishop Bluebroom' for Brougham—perhaps proofreaders preferred simpler stuff). The problems were with war crimes and atrocities, which of course the Jewish media censor. The final quarter-century of Russell's life included his activism against the 'West'—Russell knew nothing of ZOG, except, just possibly, at the very end of his life. Certainly this volume is very much unlike the author's preceding volumes. Russell records his reactions to public events: the Second World War, the Cold War, the BBC, nuclear weapons, the Korean War, Kennedy's murder, the Cuba Crisis, the Vietnam War. Chapter III - Trafalgar Square looks at protests against nuclear weapons. Chapter IV - The Foundation is on the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.
      That at least is the formal version. Russell probably had no idea about Eisenhower (Jew from Sweden) starving Germans after the war. Or the fraud of what was later called 'the Holocaust', curious Greek expression as it is. Or the BBC frauds, of which the plump and oily Dimbleby, a Jew from London, started anti-German post-war propaganda in earnest. Or the fact, suppressed for decades, that mail bombs were sent to Labour Party leaders by Jews, over Israel. Russell had been to Germany: he accepted the figure of 135,000 Germans destroyed in the razing of Dresden, 'but also their houses and countless treasures'. 'By giving part of Germany to Russia and part to the West, the victorious Governments ensured the continuation of strife between East and West, particularly as Berlin was partitioned and there was no guarantee of access by the West to its part of Berlin except by air.' Note Russell's assumption that the Governments, all of course known now to be Jewish controlled, wanted to stop strife. He must have been laughed at, for his gullibility.

Important note on which issues were taken up by protestors: Jewish misdirection encouraged timewasting on a vast scale, on issues now known to be non-existent, including 'Communism' and 'Nazism' and 'Italian Fascism' as spontaneous movements, nuclear weapons, the JFK 'assassination', the fake Holocaust of Jews, the moon landings. 'Climate change' mostly post-dated Russell. Rather pointless disputes over religion concealed the rent-collecting and fact-suppressing aspects of established religions.

      Russell made a public announcement that Stalin's USSR should be invaded. He later denied his words, but the important point is that Jews in Russia felt they had to pretend to 'explode their first bomb in August, 1949'. Perhaps readers who have not met the nuclear revisionist view before might reread the above few sentences. A typical example of Russell's activism was his campaign on the Cuba Crisis—clearly at this distance a fake rigged up by Jews, along with the marrano Castro. About a year later, Kennedy was murdered (or allegedly murdered); again there's a Jewish link. (The Who Killed Kennedy? team included Mark Lane, a Jew, and Victor Gollancz, a lifelong propagandist for Jews. It's unlikely they would ever investigate seriously, of course).
      In the late 1940s and 1950s, Russell was lonely and rather isolated. He says himself that after the war, Cambridge ladies thought he and his wife were 'not respectable'—you'd imagine they might have had other things to think about. Rupert Crawshay-Williams is my source for the 'loneliness' of Russell. His friends from youth had largely died. Alan Wood (who wrote on the then-notorious money-wasting groundnuts scheme) and his wife became friends; but Wood died, after writing a biography of Russell.
      Russell's lifelong ignorance of Jews is clearer in (for example) Ronald Clark's Life. In 1945, the Jew propagandist, publisher and liar Victor Gollancz, 'leader of the "Save Europe Now" campaign', wrote to Russell: '.. the meeting may be given the character of an "anti-Bolshevik crusade" in the bad sense. I am told that already, as a result of the things they have seen, a lot of soldiers in Berlin are saying "Goebbels was right"; we don't want that sort of development.'
      Russell's public views appeared on BBC radio as the first Reith Lectures, in 1948, a series of six, Authority and the Individual. Probably suggested by Sir Arthur Keith, and by nuclear myths, part of his talk stated that war had been a leading cause of innovation—very probably the reverse of the truth. Russell took little effective interest in the 'United Nations', unfortunately. For example, one of its foundational bases was the idea that races were of no importance—naturally, Jewish input was important here. Russell therefore was weak on actual possible world government, which he considered essential, since he swallowed the myth of nuclear annihilation. Volume III has Russell meditating on the future: the population problem. And 'economic justice'. Russell, misreading the world, thought political democracy applies in industrialised countries, no doubt accepting the Jewish view; but economic justice is 'still a painfully-sought goal.' Fascinating to read this elderly man's lucubrations on likely events of the next few centuries, especially, now, from a revisionist viewpoint.
      Russell was given a Nobel Prize (for Literature) in 1950—most of which went in alimony payments, he writes here. Nobel Prizes are of course something of a joke; probably it had been decided that Russell's support for WW2 was worth a bit of cash. Among other things, Russell in 1952 visited Greece, troubled by the US Army; 1953, Scotland; 1954, Paris; in 1955 made a speech in Glasgow for a Labour candidate (which Alistair Cooke, a BBC hack from Salford in northern England, wrote about). This period was enlivened by philosophical disputations; Russell disliked linguistic philosophy, with 'common usage' one of its slogans, and Russell has accounts of his disputes. He seems not to have realised that Oxford philosophers might feel out of their depths in a world of nuclear weapons and mass murder of Jews, in which in retrospect they must have been laughed at, by politicians in the know.
      And in 1955, Russell tried to get 'eminent scientists' to make a statement calling for joint action; Neils Bohr, Russian Academicians, Otto Hahn, Lord Adrian and others refused, and there was no reply from China. Josef Rotblat agreed to act as Chairman; I believe he was a Jew from Hungary. Looking back, he must have been part of the scheme to pretend Jews had nuclear weapons. In 1957, Cyrus Eaton, a Jew in Canada, put up money for a meeting in Pugwash. It can be seen that Jews were circling, just in case. (Note that Herman Kahn invented or popularised the word 'megadeath': I wonder if this was a leftover from the Jewish victory in the second World War). Ralph Schoenman is reported to have met Russell in 1960, the story being he hitch-hiked there; but who knows?
      Russell's Autobiography mentions his affection for Victor William Williams Saunders Purcell (1896–1965), 'a Government administrator in South East Asia' [probably Malaya] and Don at Cambridge. 'I did not even begin to know him till he was drawn into discussions with us about the Foundation's doings in relation to South East Asia. ... it was not until May, 1964, that we really came to know each other...' They only really knew each other for about 9 months before Purcell's death. It struck me that perhaps he was part of the control being applied to Russell.
      The Foundation: Russell's first speech to members of the Vietnam War crimes Tribunal was November 13th, 1966. This met some ridicule from the Jewish media; I doubt if anyone yet has researched into archives of (for example) the New York Times. Russell was uncomprehending about the Jewish media: newspapers exist to facilitate truth, and improve the world; surely that's an obvious ethical ground rule? Russell uncomprehendingly faced the Jewish liars of the world, to whom bombs meant money and young Vietnamese girls raped were good for a Jewish laugh. I think his letters to the New York Times were the first occasion in which he was faced with people genuinely and unblushingly favouring evil: destruction of Vietnamese landscape, bombing villages, large-scale rape, chemical warfare etc. The sort of thing that caused Robert Faurisson to say the USAF killed more children than any other organisation. Russell had no idea that so-called 'Jews' were evil, wanted to be evil, and liked being evil. His verdict on the destruction of Vietnam was pitifully innocent, and utterly non-aware of Jews: The Press, the military authorities, and many of the American and British legal luminaries, consider that their honour and humanity will be better served by allowing their officers to burn women and children to death than by adopting the standards applied in the Nuremberg Trials. This comes of accepting Hitler's legacy. It's now known by many that, of course, it was Jewish legacy, and here's my extra note–


8 Feb 2018: Detailed notes on Russell's Vol III, section 4 The Foundation, (Chapter 17 of the complete The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell). This is a revisionist review of Russell's important chapter The Foundation in which Russell describes his activities. In my view, the only part which stands up now is his anti-war work, which of course was targeted by Jews. (Remember Russell was born in 1872, so his Foundation was established in his 90s).

[1] Nuclear Weapons.
[2] Persecuted minorities.
[3] Persecuted individuals and liberation of prisoners.
[4] 1963 Foundation formed, probably by 'Hungarian Jew' Ralph Schoenman. With Christopher Farley and Pamela Wood. Offices, secretaries, fact-finders, representatives, correspondents etc.
[5] 1963 JFK
[6] 1965 Russell's speeches against Harold Wilson and Britain's "Labour Party".
[7] 1966 Vietnam War: International War Crimes Tribunal

[1] Nuclear Weapons. Russell believed the entire propaganda message on nuclear weapons, and considered himself qualified to discuss them. He must have unwittingly become part of the propaganda process. Rotblat, Cyrus Eaton, Herman Kahn, Edward Teller, and many other Jews were part of the circus. How many members of the public were sceptical remains a secret, though probably Jewish public opinion samplings could provide some insight. Russell's chapter begins with his assertions about "self-preservation", and this (according to Russell) "trumped by the desire to get the better of the other fellow". Russell of course was naive about the entire Jewish technical faked superstructure. He believed in US search for raw materials and markets, for example cobalt which (Russell thought) could be used in a 'cobalt bomb'. Russell had no idea that Jewish profits from weapons, takeover of central banks, plus imposition of rents, could be far more lucrative: He was a perfect model of the type who sucks up to the rich, without determining where the riches come from, as described by Hilaire Belloc. Russell gives a puzzled account, in his section on financial begging: ... we [met] only once with virulent discourtesy. This was at a party of rich Jews given in order that I might speak of our work for the Jews in Soviet countries in whom they professed themselves mightily interested. Unfortunately, Russell doesn't say what the rich Jews said. And he doesn't say why Jews predominated in the Foundation; were there really so few honest whites in the world?
    Cold War—Russell believed in the Cold War (and Cuba as a 'Communist' country) just as advertised in the Jewish media. Today, it's far more obvious that Jews controlled both the USA and USSR.
[2] Persecuted minorities. Russell mentions the Naga—still a live issue; they are being flooded by Bengalis. He also mentions 'Gypsies'. But on the whole there are few of these; certainly not whites, for example. Of course the Jew media approach only considers Jews, and Russell, with an almost comic ignorance, was concerned with Jews in the Soviet Union! ...
[3] Persecuted individuals and liberation of prisoners. ... Russell often championed individuals, generally with the most extraordinary indifference to what they had done. One gets the feeling that if Stalin had been found in prison, Russell would have responded to a letter pleading for the release of this long-term activist, with, admittedly, an uneven history. He lists a Jew from Germany, wanting to get an English girl pregnant; a Pole, or perhaps Jew, writing obscene verse; Greeks described as 'Communists, I'd guess Jew collaborators; Palestinians, described by Russell as 'refugees'; Jews in the USSR—'I began to make appeals on behalf of whole groups'; Sobell, the fake nuclear spy—but, if his story were true—might have imperilled the entire human race; Heintz [sic] Brandt. Even the notorious killer Jew, Rákosi.
[4] 1963 Foundation formed, probably by 'Hungarian Jew' Ralph Schoenman. Secretaries, fact-finders, representatives, correspondents etc. Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (company limited by guarantee), and Atlantic Peace Commission (the latter a charity).
[5] 1963 JFK Russell lists (in about 9 pages) '16 QUESTIONS ON THE ASSASSINATION'. He was of course ignorant of the pattern of Jewish assassinations and violence through the ages. He was of course also ignorant of media-driven false flags and campaigns of lies.
[6] 1965 Russell's speeches against Harold Wilson and Britain's "Labour Party"
[7] 1966 Vietnam War: International War Crimes Tribunal. Russell talks in the final five pages or so, before the letters section, of his book War Crimes in Vietnam, which is not reprinted (2018) by his supposed trusts. Russell says it sold out, and was widely translated, but gives no sales figures. Here are the relevant pages from his autobiography:  russell autobiography war crimes in vietnam
russell autobiography war crimes in vietnam
Note how Russell, under the influence of post-1945 Jewish propaganda, always blames Germans and Japanese: '... [pretexts] reminded me of nothing less than those offered ... for Hitler's adventures in Europe ...' and '... American conduct in Vietnam as barbarism 'reminiscent of warfare as practised by the Germans in eastern Europe and the Japanese in South-East Asia'.
      Russell's letters and appendices say more about the Vietnam War. The biography of 1975 by Ronald W Clark gives more information, including Russell's 'Private Memorandum concerning Ralph Schoenman'; the final portion states that Schoenman stated that all Russell's major initiatives since 1960 were Schoenman's work, 'in thought and deed', which Russell describes as 'preposterous' and perhaps 'well established in megalomania'. However, it may be truer than Russell thought: the 'Committee of 100' started in 1960, and it now appears that nuclear weapons were a hoax, and e.g. Cuba was controlled all the time. It's easy to imagine Schoenman selecting misinformation to feed to Russell, in (for example) Has Man a Future? published in 1961, and Unarmed Victory, published in 1963, on the 'Cuba Crisis' and Sino-Indian dispute. According to Clark, Schoenman's behavior (which included a lot of unexplained absences) became erratic and insulting as the War Crimes Tribunal took shape.

But note that Russell never, ever, separated the idea of a state or nation from the internal Jewish influence. No doubt the Vietnam War was a takeover by Jews; to this day as far as can be determined Jews control the money, and also control war crimes information—the opposite policy to their Holohoax fraud. He really thought some countries were 'Communist', for example.
      Jews gathered round and controlled poor Russell's Foundation. Vladimir Dedijer was probably a Jew activist claiming to be a Serb; Isaac Deutscher wrote a junk biography of Stalin; Noam Chomsky issued statements mainly about Jews, and his later record on e.g. 9/11 and Kennedy proves his rôle was to obstruct and evade. Victor Gollancz corresponded with Russell (says Ronald Clark—himself of course a gullible paid-by-advances writer, who even wrote on Einstein); Barry Feinberg was an editor; Anton Felton was an accountant for Russell; Cyrus Eaton in Canada kept an eye on nuclear discussions; the New York Times censored him; so did the BBC. A large proportion of the writers in the Foundation's London Bulletin were Jews.
      Looking back, it's clear a large part of Jewish activity was propagandist, and aimed to conceal Jewish wars and mass killings.


      Jewish wars are not between nations or states, as is advertised, but to make money for Jews by control of weapons and equipment by finance, and making money from loans, usually to governments or 'governments', and controlling issue of money, with the bonus of maiming killing goyim and destroying creative achievements such as splendid cities. None of this is present in Russell. (It's just possible, though very unlikely, that John Russell ('Lord John Russell'), could have lived long enough to tell young Bertrand a thing or two). His speech to his tribunal was three or four years after his epistolary exchange with the Jew York Times. His book War Crimes in Vietnam remains discreetly unpublished by Routledge, his posthumous publishers, presumably picked by his Foundation. All this activity by Russell causes me to doubt Russell ever considered himself a Jew, something which has been suggested. I see why they say it; and why judging from published books it's credible. But I don't think it's true; he was just a Briton being polite and Christian to a few racially outlandish oddities. But he did follow the convention of secrecy about Jews: if there were any in his family tree, as is likely enough, he said nothing of them in his autobiography.
      The main office or centre of the B.R.P.F. was established in Nottingham. Certainly atrocity accounts from Vietnam were known in Nottingham University. There were student actions in 1968, which have subsequently been presented by the Jewish media as hippiesque 1960s self-indulgence, and many people considering themselves politically aware have no comprehension of the underlying issues. Most of the activists were Jews, and most non-Jews at the time had no idea of this; and Jewish motives were mainly to hide the truth of creatures like Kissinger, and to hold on to money Jews made from war. The BRPF was a Jewish front from the start; just the list of their writers makes this plain enough. Probably revisionist re-examinations of the 1960s will correct the media mirage which has been assembled. But the picture largely remains intact: Richard Dawkins' autobiography, for example, shows complete ignorance of that time.
      Looking again at Russell's conclusions drawn from his long life, we find: Consider the vast areas of the world where the young have little or no education and where adults have not the capacity to realise elementary conditions of comfort. These inequalities rouse envy and are potential causes of great disorder. Whether the world will be able by peaceful means to raise the conditions of the poorer nations is, to my mind, very doubtful, and is likely to prove the most difficult governmental problem of coming centuries. Russell used the expression 'third world' in his Autobiography, perhaps borrowed from Schoenman, I'd guess. But he left the problems to others: he believed 'the techniques are all known' for general prosperity; but he expressed no views on the genetic ability of populations, or the availability of raw materials and energy to move them around.
      His final paragraph is about the 'The essential unity of American military, economic and cold war policies was increasingly revealed by the sordidness and cruelty of the Vietnam war. ... Most difficult for many in the West to admit.' Russell faced opposition, but never fathomed the truth about Jews and their collaborators.
      After his Autobiography, Russell continued his activities as best he could. Dear Bertrand Russell was extracted from his archived letters, but edited by two Jews. His last published statement was on Israel's expansionism. His The Entire American People Are On Trial was published posthumously in March 1970. Russell's Autobiography is a landmark on the road to reversing several centuries of evil. It is well worth reading in entirety. He was not completely honest; and he missed some important truths, to such an extent that he might legitimately be regarded as worthless. But he has one thing which Jews and their allies can never have: they will never be able to present their lives, as truthfully as they can, to genuinely interested audiences, in the way Russell does.
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RUSSELL, BERTRAND, ed. Feinberg, Barry: THE COLLECTED STORIES OF BERTRAND RUSSELL [1972]


Not just stories, but some other writings. Collected by the Jew Feinberg, who seems to have made some sort of living out of Russell, and presumably had met him.

The book is by now probably online, for example in archive.org, but I recently noticed I made notes on it many years ago. These notes include transcriptions of FAMILY, FRIENDS AND OTHERS (made from tape; about 1959) and READING HISTORY AS IT NEVER IS WRITTEN also from tape.
      The transcriptions from tape contain a few errors; square brackets enclose my corrections, where I found them.



Russell is at his absolutely characteristic; he assumes non-aristocratic great men, and popular movements, come from nowhere, and has no idea about the activities of groups of people. It is saddening to perceive his lack of insight. But anyway here he is.

FAMILY, FRIENDS AND OTHERS


      My paternal grandmother, who was a daughter of Lord Minto, had many interesting and some amusing reminiscences which it was rather difficult to elicit . she had to be coaxed to tell them. Her mother's father was a certain Mr Brydon who wrote a book called Travels in Sicily and Malta in which he advanced the terribly rash opinion that the lava on the slopes of Etna was so deep that it must have begun to flow before 4004 B.C. On account of this heresy, I regret to say, he was cut by the county. Nevertheless, one of his daughters married my grandmother's father, and her sisters came to live at Minto. On one occasion, after a good deal of coaxing, my grandmother told me that one of her aunts was rather vulgar. I said, 'In what did the vulgarity consist?' 'Well, she always had two eggs for breakfast, and she would look round the breakfast table and say "Who's eaten my second egg?" ' They were always boiled eggs and her vulgarity consisted in having two. Such was the effect of this story upon me that never throughout a long life have I been able to eat two boiled eggs for breakfast, though I can quite easily eat two poached eggs or two scrambled eggs or two eggs in any other way. But this story made it impossible for me to eat two boiled eggs for fear my descendants should say that I was somewhat vulgar.
      I asked her whether she knew Sir Walter Scott. Abbottsford was in the immediate neighbourhood of Minto where my grandmother passed her girlhood. She told me that she only met him once, and that the reason she met him so seldom was that there was a feud between the Elliots, my grandmother's family, and the Scotts, who were the great family of Roxsboroughshire. This feud was taken on by Sir Walter Scott, and it was thought he had no right to take it on because he was not really at all closely related to the Scotts of Roxsborough; but he did take it on, with the result that she only met him once.
      She told me once about an incident when her grandfather had been appointed Governor-General of India, and his wife was looking out for a chef who would be suitable for such an exalted situation. She interviewed one chef, who demanded two hundred a year. 'Why,' she said, 'that's as much as many curates get.' 'Ah, yes,' said the prospective chef, 'but you forget the mental work in my profession.'
      She used to tell macabre stories sometimes, almost always somewhat derogatory of conjugal affection. Her worst of these stories was the story of an old couple who had lived in the closest harmony for many years, to the admiration of all their neighbours; and at last the wife died and was
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put into the coffin. And as she was being carried downstairs, the coffin bumped against the corner and she revived. And they lived again happily for many years. At last she died again, was put into the coffin again, and as it was being carried down, the bereaved widower remarked: 'Take care not to bump against the corner.' This was the sort of story that she liked. I do not know quite why.
      There was another story that she used to tell about a Scots girl called Maisie, who had very beautiful golden hair and in addition had a golden leg; and when she was buried, some very very wicked man rifled the grave and took away the golden leg. The next night as he was sleeping Maisie appeared before him and he said, 'Maisie, Maisie, whar is yer beautiful blue e'en?' and she replied, 'Mouldering in the grave.' And he said, 'Maisie, Maisie, whar is yer beautiful goulden hair?' and she said, 'Mouldering in the grave.' And at last he said, 'And Maisie, Maisie, whar's yer beautiful goulden leg?' 'Here, you thief!' At this point he gave up and restored the leg to its proper grave.
      There was a story about my grandfather which illustrated, perhaps, a certain lack of such a tact as one might have expected. He was at a dinner-party, and after dinner when the gentlemen returned from the dining-table, he sat beside the Duchess of A. But after sitting beside her for some time he got up rather suddenly and walked across the room to the Duchess of B and sat beside her. When he and his wife got home, his wife said to him, 'Why did you so suddenly leave the Duchess of A?' and he said, 'Oh, because the fire was too hot and I could not bear it.' She said, 'I hope you explained to the Duchess of A.' 'Well, no,' he said, 'but I explained to the Duchess of B.'
      At a time when my grandfather was Prime Minister, a terrible misadventure once befell him at the Lord Mayor's banquet. The Lord Mayor had received a very magnificent silver snuff-box, which was a gift from Napoleon III, and as he was showing it to my grandfather he said, 'You see it has a hen on it.' My grandfather, who wasn't looking at it very closely, said, 'Oh, I should have thought it would have been an eagle.' And on looking again, he saw that it was not a hen but an N. The rest of the dinner had to go on after this misadventure.
      When I was six years old my grandmother took me to stay at St Fillans in Perthshire, and one day we went on a very long drive to Glenartney. I got rather bored with sitting still for such a long time and I was being amused by little rhymes; one of which was 'When you get to Glenartney, you'll hear a horse in a cart neigh', and when we got to Glenartney, sure enough, we did hear a horse in a cart neigh. I have often wondered since whether the Lord Macartney was a son of the Glen. But as to this I have never been able to ascertain the correct genealogy.
      My paternal grandmother was a very patriotic Scots woman; and she told me that when she was a girl it was the practice at Christmas-time for

Family, Friends and Others

the village people to come up to Minto, where she lived, and perform little plays and songs, rather in the style of Bottom in Midsummer Night's Dream. These all had a patriotic tone about them. There was one in which a boy came forward and professed to be Alexander the Great, and said 'I am Alexander, King of Macedon / Who conquered all the world but Scotland alone. / But when I came to Scotland my blood it waxed cold / To find so small a nation so powerful and so bold.'
      My grandfather established a village school in Petersham, which was his parish, at a time when such schools were still uncommon. My grandmother went to ask the children questions that were intended to test their intelligence, and one of the questions she asked them was 'Did you ever see a Scotchman?' And one of them cried, 'Yes, Milady, once at a Fair.' Then she went on to say 'Was he white or black?' 'Oh, black, Milady.'
      When I was two years old my grandparents rented Tennyson's house, Aldworth, for the summer months, and I stayed with them. They used to take me out onto Blackdown and they taught me to recite, 'O the dreary dreary moorland; / O the barren barren shore, / O my Amy's shallow hearted, / O my Amy's mine no more.' / I am told, and I can well believe it, that the effect was irrestibly comic.
      We often hear the phrase, 'old world courtesy', and I think that probably a good many people doubt whether there ever was such a thing. I think I can give two illustrations, both of which happened to my grandfather. My grandfather's nephew, Lord Odo Russell, afterwards Lord Ampthill, had had an interview with Napoleon III, shortly after Napoleon's rise to power. My grandfather asked him what he had thought of Napoleon III and he said: 'I thought that he was thinking, as I was, that he was the nephew of his uncle.' It seems to me that this was one of the most flatteringly polite remarks that I have ever come across. There was another example of the same thing, which was when the Shah of Persia was caught in a rainstorm in Richmond Park and took refuge in my grandfather's house. My grandfather apologised for the smallness of his house: 'Yes,' said the Shah, 'it is a small house but it contains a great man.' I think these examples show that old world courtesy really did exist.
      When my parents visited America in 1867, my mother noted a few occurrences in her diary. There are three of these that seem somewhat interesting. One was when they went to see a well which Berkeley had visited, while he was on his abortive journey to the West Indies; and my mother played with the bucket of this well in a manner that was thought irreverent by Berkeley's admirers who had taken her to this place. The second occasion was, I found, still remembered when I went to America nearly thirty years later. There was a very fine dinner-party arranged for my parents and they provided terrapin which was considered a very great delicacy. My father, who was somewhat conservative in his eating habits, 267

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refused, whereupon my mother shouted along the length of the table, 'Taste it, Amberley, it's not so very nasty!'
      This was still remembered with horror when I was there in 1896. The third incident which is recorded in her diary is another dinner-party in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She says, 'I sat between Mr So and So and Mr Longfellow, the poet. I liked Mr So and So.' Of Mr Longfellow she says nothing whatever.
      Some occasions, when I was a child, filled me with somewhat bitter disappointment. On one occasion after we had been talking about cannibalism I heard my people say to each other: 'When is that Eton boy coming?' and I thought they meant a boy who had been eaten. When he turned up, and was a perfectly ordinary boy, it caused me the most profound disenchantment. But that was not the worst. The worst instance was when I heard them say to each other, 'When is that young Lyon coming?' And I said, 'Is there a lion coming?' 'Oh yes,' they said, 'and you'll see him in the drawing-room and it'll be quite safe.' And then they came and said, 'The young Lyon has come,' and they ushered me into the drawing-room and it was a completely conventional young man whose name was Lyon. I burst into tears and wept the whole of the rest of the day, and the poor young man couldn't imagine why.
      My first contact with Robert Browning was when I was two years old. He came to lunch with my people and brought with him the actor Salvini. Everybody was used to Browning, but Salvini was more of a rarity, and they would have liked to hear him speak. But Browning talked the whole time without stopping. At last, unwittingly, expressing the feelings of the company, I said, 'I wish that man would stop talking.' I had, of course, to be hushed very quickly, but he did stop.
      I was kept to very spartan fare in the matter of eating when I was a boy. It was thought that fruit was absolutely disastrous for a child and he must never be allowed any. One time after we had all had pudding, the plates were changed and everybody except me was given an orange. I was given a plate but I was not given an orange. I remarked plaintively, 'A plate and nothing on it.' Everybody laughed-but I didn't get an orange.
      My cousin, G. W. E. Russell, who was something of a gourmand, was dining once with my people and expressed a very strong preference for one dish rather than another. I also had the same preference but I was compelled to have the dish that I didn't like and was told: 'You must not have your little likes and dislikes.' And I said, 'Cousin George has his little likes and dislikes.' Again I was quickly hushed, but I never was able to see the justice of it.
      I had an uncle, Rollo Russell, who was very good at explaining things to children. I asked him one day why they have stained glass in churches, and he said 'Well, I'll tell you . long ago they didn't, but one day, just as the parson had got up into the pulpit and was about to begin his sermon,

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he saw a man outside the church walking with a pail of whitewash on his head. And at that precise moment the bottom of the pail fell out and the man was inundated with whitewash. The poor parson could not control his laughter and was unable to go on with his sermon. So ever since they've had stained glass in windows.'
      My cousin, St George Lane Fox, afterwards Fox Pitt, was a very singular character. While a very young man he invented electric light before Swann and Edison had thought of doing so. He then got religion, not in the form which is usual in the West, but in the form of esoteric Buddhism. This caused him to think that he should occupy himself no longer with mundane affairs, and he went to Tibet to visit Lamas and to learn all the niceties of Buddhist theology. However, after a certain length of time in Tibet he decided to come home again, and he then discovered to his disgust that Swann and Edison had been making electric light. He brought actions against them, a number of actions, all of which he lost, and in the end he was reduced to bankruptcy. But he consoled himself with the tenets of esoteric Buddhism and thought that after all a man should be able to do without a plethora of worldly goods. He then had an experience which shows the dangers of book-learning. He married a sister of Lord Alfred Douglas. On his wedding night he was overheard saying: 'I must go and look it up in the book,' and shortly afterwards he was heard saying, 'It sounds quite simple.' However, very shortly afterwards there was a nullity.
      My great-aunt, Lady Charlotte Portal, had various claims to distinction. Her latest was that she was the grandmother of the only man who holds both the Garter and the Order of Merit. Her earliest claim to fame occurred when she was a very small child. She tumbled out of bed, failed to wake up, but was heard muttering: 'My head is laid low, my pride has had a fall.' She was sometimes a little inapt in ways of expressing herself. On one occasion when she was starting for the Continent, her. footman, whose Christian name was George, came to take her luggage to the train, and just as the train was starting it occurred to her that she might wish to write to him about some matter of business, and that she didn't remember his surname; so she put her head out of the window and said: 'George, George, what's your name?' George touched his hat and replied: 'George, Milady.' By that time the train was out of earshot and the thing was irremediable.
      My sister-in-law, Elizabeth, was once staying in a Swiss hotel where the partitions were somewhat inadequate. The room next to hers was occupied by a middle-aged American couple. She heard them coming up to bed and conversing animatedly for a time, then, there was a long silence, interrupted at last in a severe feminine voice, 'Henry, is it because you won't, or because you can't?'
      Another sister-in-law, when she became engaged to my brother, was brought to lunch with my grandmother, who practised the strictest Victorian propriety. The girl was shy and behaved with a pretty restraint until near 269

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the end of lunch when, unfortunately, there came a thunderstorm. The thunder got louder and louder and at last there was an absolutely deafening clap. She leapt from her seat, exclaiming 'Golly!' My grandmother had never heard the word, but very justly concluded that if it had been a suitable word for young ladies, she would have heard it.
      My [maternal] grandmother, Lady Stanley of Alderley, was a person of quite exceptional vigour, and a good many of her descendants inherited this exceptional degree of vitality. She used to give Sunday luncheons to her children and grandchildren, and at these there used to be argumentation such as I have never heard before or since, for vehemence and profound conviction of entirely opposite sorts. One of her sons was a Mohammedan, one was a Roman Catholic priest, one was a free thinker, one was an Anglican, and one of her daughters was a free thinker and another was a Positivist. All these different creeds used to meet, and each would uphold his own point of view with the utmost vigour. The Mohammedan was nearly stone-deaf and when the disputes reached a certain degree of noisiness he would become aware that something was going on. He would then ask what it was, and his immediate neighbours would pour completely garbled versions of the argument into his ear, whereupon all the rest would shout, 'No, no, Henry, it's not that.' And at that point the din became such that it was almost incredible that everybody was not deaf. He, Henry, the oldest of my grandmother's sons, was a very odd character. Not only had he become a Mohammedan, which was odd enough, but he had married a certain completely unknown and obscure Spanish lady, not once, but three or four times without being in fact legally married to her at the end, although he, poor fellow, did not know this. He was a very curious person altogether; he caused Lord Salisbury to say that many things had been said against their Lordship's house, but until now it had not been possible to say that they were not gentlemen, and I regret to say that he had made this possible.
      He had, of course, as might be expected, ultraconservative opinions. I knew a lady named Miss Coolidge, who was a great granddaughter of Jefferson and very proud of the fact. She met him at the house of one of my aunts, where there was at the same time a doctor who had just happened to have called in. My uncle turned to Miss Coolidge and said, 'Do you believe in old-age pensions?' And she said, 'Yes I do.' And he said, 'Shows you know nothing about it.' He then turned to the doctor and said, 'Do you believe in old-age pensions?' And the doctor said, 'Yes.' 'Shows you want one yourself.' At this point my aunt thought she would smooth matters over and said, 'You see, Miss Coolidge is an American and perhaps she does not quite understand our conditions.' At which he said, 'American, are you? I suppose you know Washington was a murderer?' And she said that no, she did not know that. And he said, 'Yes, he was, and I shall never forgive those people until they return to their allegiance.' 'Well, you see,'

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she said, 'you can't expect me to think that, because my great grandfather wrote the Declaration of Independence.' To which he said, 'How many people's great grandfathers wrote the Declaration of Independence, I should like to know !' She then got up to go. He bowed handsomely and said, 'Don't you think I get on very well with your countrywomen?' However, she remembered the story and many years after told it to me precisely as I have now related it.
      My uncle Henry had a younger brother called Lyulph. My brother, meeting with uncle Henry in the Lords on one occasion, very rashly went up to him and said, 'Have you heard that Lyulph's cook has gone mad ?' My deaf uncle who always insisted upon hearing said, 'What, what, what?' So my brother said more loudly, 'Have you heard that Lyulph's cook has gone mad?' To which my uncle still said, 'What, what, what?' My brother then shouted as loud as he could, HAVE YOU HEARD THAT LYULPH'S COOK HAS GONE MAD?' But this time all their Lordships were looking round to see what the noise was. My uncle said, 'Lyulph's gone mad? Well, I'm not surprised.' At that point my brother gave up.
      My grandmother, Lady Stanley of Alderley, had the great advantage of being completely incapable of doubting her own merits. She used to say, 'You know I've left my brain to the Royal College of Surgeons, because it'll be so interesting for them to have a clever woman's brain to cut up.' She also said that she knew only one thing in which her ancestors had been foolish and that was that they were Jacobites. They had, in fact, had to fly from Ireland after the Battle of the Boyne, and they only returned when the French Revolution made France dangerous for them.
      She used to sit in a very large drawing-room and entertain at tea all the leading literary men of the age, and when any of them went out she would turn to the others with a sigh and say: 'Fools are so fatiguin'.' This caused all the rest to determine that they would not be the first to leave the gathering, for fear the same should be said about them. She had rather high standards. She put me through a viva one time, in the presence of a large number of visitors: 'Had I read this and had I read the other,' and I hadn't read any of the books. At last she turned to the others and said, 'I have no intelligent grandchildren.' According to all modern educators this should have damped me down. It did not, however: it made me determined that I would prove that she was mistaken.
      My grandmother had two sorts of descendants: those who inherited the Stanley toughness, and those who did not. I, to my misfortune, was one of the latter. The others, who inherited the Stanley toughness, didn't mind at all the way she talked to them. I remember my cousin, Christopher Howard, being taken to task by her for always answering her in a way she didn't like. She said, 'Don't say, "Yus, Granmama".' And he wasn't in the least abashed, whereas I would have sunk through the earth at having such a thing said to me. She used, sometimes, when she was in a good

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humour, to tell stories to her credit. She told, for example, how when she was a very young girl in a convent school, the other girls induced her to throw snails over the wall into the neighbour's garden. And this, of course, was a very wicked act. But she said, 'But, you see, I can't tell it to show how badly we turned out, because I've turned out so well.'
      There was, however, one occasion, the only one I know of, in which things turned out as she might not have wished. She was staying at Naworth Castle where her daughter [Lady Carlisle] reigned. Lord Carlisle was a Pre-Raphaelite painter and a friend of all the other Pre-Raphaelite painters. Burne-Jones happened to be staying with them and had a tobacco-pouch which was made to look like a tortoise. One evening, when they were at dinner, this tobacco-pouch was brought in, for fun, and put close to the drawing-room fire. Now there was a real tortoise in Naworth at this time, and when they came in from dinner Lord Carlisle discovered this supposed tortoise close by the fire, picked it up and said, 'What an extraordinary thing, its back has grown soft.' He then went to the library and fetched the relevant volume of the Encyclopaedia, looked up 'tortoise' and read out in a very portentous voice: 'On certain very rare occasions under the influence of very great heat the back of the tortoise has been known to become soft.' My grandmother was intensely interested in this very curious zoological fact, until then quite unknown to her. And she went about telling everybody about it. Years later when she was quarrelling with her daughter about Home Rule her daughter said to her, 'Well, Ma, you know you were taken in about that tortoise. It was really Burne-Jones's tobacco-pouch.' And she said, 'My dear, I may be many things, but I am not a fool, and I refuse to believe you.'
      My uncle, George Howard, Lord Carlisle, was a friend of Cross, the husband of George Eliot. Cross was known in literary circles as the author of a book called, A Commentary on Dante, with an Appendix on Bimetallism. On one occasion, my uncle ventured an opinion on bimetallism, and Cross said, 'What do you know about bimetallism?' To which my uncle replied, 'Well I've read Dante.' His next contact with Mr Cross was of a more painful sort. Cross and George Eliot were on their honeymoon in Venice. My uncle was staying in the same hotel. Suddenly he saw Cross plunge from the balcony into the Grand Canal. Naturally my uncle went to rescue him, which was not difficult. It appeared that Cross had read in George Eliot's journal that she only married him out of pique because Lewis was not faithful to her, and this had driven the poor man to suicide. However, suicide in the Grand Canal in front of a large hotel was not so dangerous as it might have been, and he lived for many years after.
      My uncle, Lord Carlisle, was willing to tell stories against himself, and he told me that he had once related to a newly-rich American the story of the cast of the Venus de Milo which had been ordered by another newly-rich American. When it arrived, so the story averred, he sued the railway

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company for having broken the arms, and won his case. 'Yes,' said my uncle's American friend, 'but there's just one difficulty about that story, it's older than the Venus de Milo.'
      Gilbert Murray was not only an eminent classicist, but also a very amusing raconteur. He had a great fund of stories, some of which I much enjoyed. I remember particularly one about Mr Gladstone. At a very large meeting, the Conservatives had planted a drunken man in the front row with a view to interrupting Mr Gladstone. Mr Gladstone endured the interruptions for some time with patience, and then at last he turned upon the drunken man, and in his most majestic voice he said, 'May I request that gentleman who has not once, but repeatedly, interrupted the flow of my observations, to extend to me that large measure of courtesy, which, were I in his place and he in mine, I should most unhesitatingly extend to him.' The drunken man was overwhelmed and uttered not another word.
      My cousin, Lady Mary Murray, the wife of Gilbert Murray, was a woman for whom I had a very great respect, but she had one shortcoming: she was destitute of a sense of humour, and occasionally this had curious results. I went to see her and Gilbert Murray one day and he said to me, 'I have just found a school for my boy.' So I said, 'Oh, where is it?' 'Well,' said he, 'it is kept by the Reverend V. Ermine, of the Creepers, Crawley Down.' Mary interrupted and said, 'Oh, Gilbert, he is not Reverend.' The only truth in the whole story was that the school was at Crawley.
      I remember another occasion when I rang the front door bell and asked the maid if they were at home, and she said, 'Well, Sir, I think they're probably in unless they're out.' So I found that they were in, and I said, 'Your maid is of the opinion that one should employ great caution in applying the laws of thought to empirical material.' And Mary said, 'Oh, what an unkind thing to say.'
      Mrs Bernard Shaw was a very remarkable lady. Some of her merits are set forth in Man and Superman, but there were some I was privileged to observe. One time when I was lunching with Mr and Mrs Shaw, there was a young Austrian lady present, and she apparently, was a poetess. As the rest of us were saying good-bye, Shaw remarked, with something of a simper, that this young lady was not going yet as she was going to read him her poems. Nevertheless, when we got outside the door, there was the young lady; I have never known how Mrs Shaw got her out. But a very few days afterwards this same young lady went to visit Wells and said, 'If you do not make love to me I shall cut my throat.' He refused, and she cut her throat, but apparently she had had a good deal of practice and was not much the worse. This gave me a considerable respect for Mrs Shaw.
      Sir Sidney Waterlow, whom I had known since he was an undergraduate, achieved a position of some distinction in the Foreign Office. He was, in fact, in charge of Foreign Office relations with the Far East. I had some dealing with him in this connection, because during MacDonald's first

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Government it was decided that Britain should devote the money obtained by her under the Boxer Indemnity to some project that would be of advantage to China, and a committee was appointed to see how this should be done. Among those put on the committee were Lowes Dickinson and myself. There were also to be two representatives of China, who were to be appointed by the Chinese Government. However, before the committee was fully functioning, MacDonald's Government fell, and the succeeding Conservative Government decided that Lowes Dickinson and I should not be on the committee, nominally on the ground that we did not know much about China, but really because we were friends of the Chinese. I had recommended to the Chinese, Hu Shih and V. K. Ting, as people whom the Chinese Government might think suitable. The Chinese Government agreed, and suggested them. The Conservative Government sent word to the Chinese that they would accept any two Chinese except these two. The Chinese Government replied that they must have these two or no one. This confirmed Waterlow in his opinion that I knew nothing about China.
      However, it was not only with regard to China that I had dealings with him. He had married an extraordinarily beautiful young woman, a daughter of Sir Frederick Pollock. I met them by accident on their honeymoon, and I observed that something was amiss, though it was six years before I knew what. At the end of six years Waterlow told me the whole story. Under the influence of G. E. Moore he had become convinced that there was something base about sexual intercourse. He had, therefore, never consummated his marriage. At the end of three years of marriage, however, he changed his mind, and thought that perhaps Moore was mistaken, and he therefore tried to consummate the marriage. But three years of total abstinence had rendered him, in regard to his wife, impotent, and he was unable to consummate the marriage. They went on for another three years with gradually increasing quarrels, and at last decided that the marriage must be annulled. He, at this point, was sitting alone in a restaurant in London feeling rather melancholy. A prostitute sat down at the same table and said, 'You seem melancholy, duckie, what's the matter?' So he told her all about it. And she said, 'Oh I'll soon cure that, you come home with me.' He did and she did. It so happened that, though a prostitute, she was married. Her husband divorced her for improper relations with Waterlow, at the very same moment at which his marriage with his wife was annulled on the ground of his impotence. He, though he didn't much like having his marriage dissolved, was so pleased to discover himself not impotent, that he went round to all his friends boasting about it. He subsequently married another lady and had by her an adequate family. It does not seem to me that he managed his matrimonial affairs very much better than he managed our relations with China.
      When I was a younger man I was very much addicted to walking. On one occasion I was walking round the coast of Cornwall, and as the evening

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came on, I reached the Lizard. I went to the hotel and asked if they could put me up for the night. They said, 'Is your name Trevelyan?' I said, 'No, why do you ask?' They said, 'Oh, because we are expecting Mr Trevelyan tonight, and Mrs Trevelyan is already here.' I was much surprised, as I knew that it was George Trevelyan's wedding day, and I was very much astonished to think that Mrs Trevelyan should be there and he should not be. I thought something dreadful must have happened, and I went to see her to inquire. 'Oh, no,' she said, 'nothing dreadful happened, but when we reached Truro, George said "I must have a little walk," and he got out of the train to walk to the Lizard' [a distance of some forty miles]. Sure enough he arrived at eleven at night, completely worn out, and had to be revived by brandy. It was a very happy marriage.
      There were some things in my childhood education which I suppose came about by accident, but which had a very considerable influence upon me. I had a book called Stories About, and when you looked inside it was mostly about clever dogs and horses and things of that sort, and, in fact, all the stories except two at the end were such as would still be considered entirely suitable for children. But it was not these stories that interested me. The one that interested me most was the very last, which was about a Negro woman in Jamaica who caught her child stealing sugar-cane and therefore fastened the child on an ant heap where it was eaten to death. This was the story that really interested me. And then I had a book of nursery rhymes set to music. It began quite conventionally with 'Sing a Song of Sixpence' and 'Hickory Dickory Dock'. But there again there was just one that particularly interested me. It began: 'There was a lady all skin and bone', and it went on to relate her doings.... 'Sure such a lady was never known; / She went to church one summer's day, / She went to church all for to pray, / and when she got the church within, / the parson prayed against pride and sin, / on looking up, on looking down, / she saw a dead man on the ground; / And from his nose unto his chin, / the worms crawled out, the worms crawled in; / Then she unto the parson said, / "Shall I be so when I am dead?" / "Oh, yes Sah, yes," the parson said, / "You will be so when you are dead." ' This somewhat diminished my confidence in the consolations of religion.
      There are some well known stories that give me a lot of pleasure. One of them comes in Dickens, apropos a gentleman who was knighted by George III under a misapprehension, when it was another man he should have knighted. And Dickens remarks, 'On this occasion, His Majesty was graciously pleased to observe "Ooooh, ooooh what, whaaat, why, why, why?" '
      Then there is the story about the somewhat irascible schoolmaster who turned to one of his boys, and said in a very cross tone, 'Who made the world ?' And the boy said, 'Please sir, it wasn't me.' Then there is Lady Betty. Lady Betty was a very young girl, perhaps six

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or seven years old, and she had committed what her parents considered a sin and was told to ask God to forgive her. She was asked afterwards by her parents, 'Did you ask God to forgive you?' And she said, 'Oh yes, and He said, "Pray, don't mention it, Lady Betty!"'
      And there was another child, I think of about the same age, who put an embarrassing question. She said, 'What time does God dine?' And they said, 'Ach, God doesn't dine.' And she said, 'Oh, I see, he has an egg with his tea.'
      Ever since I was a boy, I have derived a great deal of pleasure from that piece of nonsense which says, 'So she went into the garden to cut a cabbage leaf to make an apple pie and just then a great she-bear coming up the street pops its head into the shop. "What! No soap?" So he died, and she very imprudently married the barber and there were present: the Piccaninies, the Joblillies and the Galeolies and the Grand Panjandum himself with a little round button atop and they all fell to playing the game of Catch As Catch Can till the gunpowder ran out of the heels of their boots.' I took so much pleasure in this that I learnt to say the whole of it in one breath.
      There was once upon a time a family with a very rich maiden aunt, whose affections were entirely centred upon a cat whom the rest of the family detested. One of her nieces became engaged to a young man who, after hearing the general abuse of the poor quadruped, killed it, and presented it to the family, saying: 'I have brought in this cat as trophy.' The maiden aunt disinherited them all and with one voice they exclaimed: 'What a catastrophe !' The Oxford Dictionary appears not to know the etymology of this word.
      When I was a boy of about twelve, I was taken to Midhurst, and derived very great delight from the ruins of Cowdray. I was standing on a little bridge over the River Rother. I did not known that it was the River Rother. An old countryman came along and I said, 'What is the name of this river?' And he said, 'She ain't got no name and she don't want none.' It was many years before I discovered the name of the river.
      When I was a very shy youth of seventeen, I once went out to dine at a neighbouring house, where the two daughters were friends of mine, and their mother was only an acquaintance. Before dinner, their mother, whose name was Lady Burdett, said to me: 'I hope you won't mind not being given your proper precedence. You ought, of course, to take me into dinner, but I'm a dull old woman and I thought you would rather sit between my daughters.' I was completely stumped; I did not like to seem to insist on my proper precedence, nor could I admit that she was a dull old woman. I hummed and hawed and was reduced to silence. When I got home I asked my grandmother what I should have said. She provided the answer at once. 'You should have said, "Oh! Lady Burdett!" '
      The first time that I ever heard of Winston Churchill was in 1890 when

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I was a freshman at Cambridge and he was still a schoolboy at Harrow. I was having my hair cut at Trufitt's and the man who was cutting my hair said, 'Lord Randolf's son's 'aving 'is 'air cut in the next room, Sir. 'e is a young pup 'e is.' And so I got interested in him and followed his subsequent career.
      When I was first at Cambridge, one of the figures of Cambridge Society was F. W. H. Myers, a poet who was also much addicted to spiritualism, and was considered, though this may have been scandal, to be a man of not strictly virtuous life. He related how George Eliot, when he took her into the Fellows Garden at Trinity, remarked that 'There is no God and yet we must be good.' The man who related this story to me made the comment: 'and Myers concluded that "There is a God and yet we need not be good."'
      A young fellow of Trinity having become engaged to be married, asked the Whiteheads for permission to bring his fiancee to lunch. She came, but was too shy to utter a word, until towards the end, Mrs Whitehead said, 'Will you have tart or pudding?' To which she replied, 'Poy'. She survived, however. Fifty years later, I was travelling from London to Cambridge and she happened to be in the same compartment. She lost her ticket, but when she presented herself at the barrier saying she had no ticket, the ticket collector replied, 'That's all right, Milady.'
      When I was a young man there was a teacher of philosophy in Cambridge named Dawes Hicks. It happened that he lived next door to the Whiteheads. Whitehead dropped in to see him one evening and found him rather unhappy because he said his housekeeper had borrowed his car without asking permission, and so he was unable to go out as he had intended to do. So Whitehead said, 'Well, why don't you give her notice?' And Dawes Hicks said, 'Well, perhaps I will.' Whitehead went to see hun again a week later and said, 'Well, did you give your housekeeper notice?' 'Well, . . . no,' said Dawes Hicks. 'Well, what have you done?' 'Oh, well, I've married her.'
      The two most perfect snobs that I have ever known were both Dons at King's College, Cambridge. One of them was Sir Charles Wallston, and the other was Oscar Browning, commonly known as O.B. I remember an occasion when the Empress Frederick came to Cambridge for the day. I met both of these men in the evening. Sir Charles Wallston said, 'It was really most annoying that in spite of all I could do to dissuade her, the Empress Frederick insisted on lunching with me a second time.' Oscar Browning, on the other hand, was most sad and discouraged and said, 'I have been Empress hunting all day.' I only once heard Oscar Browning admit to not personally knowing a celebrity, and that was when the King of Saxony came up in conversation and he said, 'I knew him very well . . . by sight.' He had, unfortunately, a very painful experience when Tennyson came to Cambridge, and King's College gave a party for him, at which all

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the Fellows appeared one by one and mentioned their names to him; and when O.B. came he said, 'I'm Browning.' Tennyson looked at him and said, 'You're not.' I do not quite know how he survived this incident.
      When I was a young man, I once took Professor Stout, the editor of Mind, for a walk in the country. We came upon a lot of cows, some of which, at any rate, some of us thought might be bulls. His little son aged five, who has since become a professor of philosophy himself, remarked to his father, 'Now father is the time for your afraidness to come on.' And in view of that remark, the eminent philosopher did not dare to show any fear.
      At one time when I was on a walking tour in County Kerry, I visited Henry Butcher, who was well known as one of the translators of the Odyssey. He told me a rather curious story about the Maglicurry [sic; McGillicuddy] who was the great chieftain of that region, and held the distinction of having a whole mountain range called after him. It appeared that the Maglicurry on one occasion was travelling on the Continent. He was at a bookstall thinking what he should buy, when a young American lady came up and mistook him for the bookstall attendant, and asked for a book. He was very haughty and refused to answer at all to what she said. However, on looking round he saw that she was very charming, so he observed which carriage she got into in the train and he got in too. He tried to get into conversation, but this time she was haughty. She was travelling with her parents, and he discovered that her Christian name was Mary. Her surname was still unknown to him. Presently the parents wanted the window closed, but it was very stiff and wouldn't close. So he got hold of the strap and pulled very hard, and the strap came off, and he was deposited full length on the floor of the carriage. After this it was impossible to keep up any kind of haughtiness and they began to converse. Presently the time came when the young lady and her parents were getting out of the carriage, having reached the end of their journey. As they got out, he turned to her and he said, 'Miss Mary, someday you shall be my wife.' She was rather surprised. He didn't know where she lived or what her name was. And he didn't say, 'Someday I hope . . .'; but 'Someday you shall be my wife.' However, he found out what hotel they were staying at, and ingratiated himself with them and explained that he was an Irish Chieftain of very ancient lineage and very grand altogether. And so at last the lady accepted him. He took her back to his home, which was not nearly as grand as she had expected and after some time he became a Mohammedan. They had one son, and the religious education of the son consisted solely of one precept. He said, 'My boy, remember this: God is a perfect gentleman.' That I believe was all the boy ever learnt of religion.
      Logan Pearsall Smith in his mature years was a somewhat precious and very careful highbrow author. But in his younger days he had his off moments, some of which I remember; and as I think they were never printed, it is perhaps worth recording them. I remember some of his verses

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in a play that he produced for family consumption. One of the verses said: 'Naughty little cuss words, / Such as 'blast' and 'blow', / Quite as much as wuss words, / Deep in the realms below; / Naughty little social fibs, / Such as "not at home" / Lead us to the outer realms, / Where the wicked roam.'
      And then he made a little verse about love: / 'Ah love, love, love, / It cometh from above / And sitteth like a dove, / On some. / But some it never hits, / But only gives them fits / And takes away their wits. / Ah hum.'
      In 1894 when I was for a few months honorary attache at the British Embassy in Paris, I was invited to a dinner-party by a very rich American lady. Among the guests, the most noted was the daughter of Jay Gould, then at the height of his fame. All the young men present, except me, made up to her, although she was not a lady, apart from her fortune, who would have seemed particularly attractive. At the end of the evening the hostess said to me, 'Are you engaged to be married ?' 'Yes,' I said, 'I am. Why, what made you ask?' 'Oh, I thought you must be because you were the only young man who did not run after Gould's daughter.'
      When I was in Rome in 1894 I met a very pleasant middle-aged American lady whose hair was still all black except for one streak of pure white. She told me a story which gave me the very greatest delight. It was the story of an old countryman who observed that another traveller on the same train had a hamper to which he paid very great attention, and the old countryman longed to know what was in the hamper. And at last he asked, 'What have you got in the hamper?' And the man who had the hamper said, 'A mongoose.' And he said, 'Why have you got a mongoose?' 'Why,' the other said, 'don't you know that a mongoose will eat snakes. And I have a friend who, alas, has been somewhat unduly addicted to alcohol and who sees snakes, and I'm taking the mongoose to him to eat the snakes.' And the old countryman said, 'But don't you know those snakes are not real?' And he replied, 'No more is my mongoose.' This story from its metaphysical turn delighted me and I laughed so loud that the lady could not imagine why.
      When I was a slightly younger man than I am now, I was much addicted to bathing, and somewhat curious things sometimes happened to me when I emerged from a river in a remote country place after bathing. On one of these occasions when I went to put on my clothes, I found the Prime Minister on the bank. This was in 1916 when he was just debating whether or not he should put me in prison, and I felt that it was a little difficult to preserve the dignity that I should have wished to show on such an occasion, when I had not a stitch of clothing on me. However, we had a very pleasant conversation, and I escaped on that occasion without being carted off to jail.
      When I lived in China I found the Chinese sense of humour extraordinarily congenial to me, and, in fact, it gave me great delight. I will give one instance. One rather hot day, two Chinese businessmen, both of them

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rather corpulent, invited me to spend the day in the country motoring with them. We went to visit a very famous, very ancient pagoda, which was in a somewhat dilapidated condition. There was a staircase up to the top, and I went up, expecting them to follow me. But when I reached the top, I saw them below in earnest conversation. When I got down I asked them why they had not come up. 'Well, we debated, with many very serious arguments pro and con whether we should come up or whether we should not, but we decided that as the pagoda might at any moment crumble it would be as well that there should be some to bear witness how the philosopher died.' And, of course, the whole truth was simply that the weather was hot and they were fat.
      I had heard many times the story of a young man named Bidder, the son, or perhaps the grandson, of a famous calculating boy. This young man was very averse to getting up early in the mornings, and during one Easter vacation, while he was still an undergraduate, he was staying in Naples, and they came to him and said, 'You must get up.' And he said, 'Why?' And they said, 'Because the hotel is about to be sold.' 'Oh,' said he, 'I'll buy it.' And went to sleep again. The result of this was that he became a hotelkeeper in Naples, and remained so for the rest of his days. I'd always heard this story without believing it. At last one day I met the man, and to my astonishment found that the story was true.
      I have sometimes caused astonishment to my friends without intending to. When I was President of the Aristotelian Society, a great many years ago, I decided to shave off my moustache, which had been rather large and luxuriant, and at the next meeting of the Society I observed a curious kind of coldness and aloofness among the other philosophers. At last I sat down in the President's chair, and they all gave a gasp, and I realised that until that moment they hadn't recognised me and hadn't imagined who this person was who had come in. That was the first time that I created astonishment. Another time was when I was engaged in writing Nightmares of Eminent Persons, and I had notes on my table which were observed by a visitor, and the notes were headed 'Notes for Nightmares', and he said 'Do you really, before going to bed, make notes of the nightmare you expect to have?'
      When I was a young man I became very much interested in Bishop Creighton, who seemed to me rather similar to Bishop Bluebroom [sic; Blougram!] in Browning. The first time I met him, he and his wife were arriving to dinner with Professor Marshall, the economist. She was saying in rather a loud voice, 'I don't care what I eat, I leave that to the men.' To which he replied, 'What do you leave to the men, my dear?' This remark pleased me and I remembered him. I learnt later from his wife's life of him that he sometimes gave offence to very earnest clergymen. There was one who was extremely High Church, and, I regret to say, used incense not merely for fumigatory purposes, which is permissible, but for purposes which are forbidden by law. The Bishop had to go and expostulate with him, and expos

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tulated in perhaps a somewhat frivolous manner. At last the clergyman said, 'You seem to forget, Milord, that I have a cure of souls.' To which the Bishop replied, 'Oh, I see, you think souls are like herrings, before they can be cured they must be smoked.'
      I have always been of the opinion that it is possible to live a virtuous life without the support of revealed religion, but I have found that some of the men who agreed with me in this opinion were not altogether to my liking. There was Dr Stanton Coit, who was the head of what is called the Ethical Movement, which exists to prove that virtue can be independent of dogma. Some of the evidence, however, was a little curious. He once invited me to a dinner-party, arrived after all his guests had assembled, threw himself into an armchair, produced a bottle of smelling salts and, between sniffs, remarked in a moribund voice: 'Oh! I've had such a day, such a day!' When slightly revived, he informed one of his lady guests that she needn't think he was a marrying man. He later married a rich widow. On one occasion, at a meeting of the Aristotelian Society, a paper was read about Kant. In the discussion, Dr Stanton Coit said: 'Kant was good to his mother and this fact will be remembered when his system is forgotten.' When it came to my turn to speak I said: 'I cannot share the cynical opinion of Dr Stanton Coit that kindness to one's mother is rarer than Kant's philosophical ability.' I fear, however, that his cynicism was as great after, as before. He was, as it were, the bishop, if one may use such a term, of the Ethical Movement, which retained from orthodox religion the habit of meeting at eleven o'clock on a Sunday in a quasi-religious building. I went once to see what happened on these occasions. They had a large number of choir boys in surplices who came in and intoned a creed designed to show how very different their tenets were from those of the orthodox. The boys all said: 'We do not believe in God, but we believe in the great spirit of humanity.' And when I'd been almost bowled over by this sentiment, they went on to say: 'We do not believe in survival after death but in immortality through good deeds.' On the whole I felt less inclined to believe in their tenets after this occasion than I had before, and I found it extremely difficult to preserve my faith against the buffets of experience.
      On the last occasion on which I visited that extraordinarily beautiful building, Tewkesbury Abbey, I was considerably surprised to find a memorial tablet to a lady named Victoria Woodhull Martin. I was surprised because I had known of this lady and her equally or almost equally famous sister, for a very long time, and not in ways that would lead one to expect commemoration in a religious edifice. Victoria Woodhull Martin was a very extreme feminist at a time when feminism was not yet common; and she was extreme, not only politically, but also ethically, in her feminist claims. She stood for President of the United States at a time when such a thing was unheard of, as, indeed, it still would be. A local newspaper in a city where she was speaking announced her coming with the words: 'Victoria

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Woodhull Martin is a lady of quick conception and easy delivery and her husband is a man of great parts and deep penetration.' Her sister, Tennessee Katherine, married a neighbour of ours in Richmond where I lived as a boy. He was Sir Francis Cook when he was in England, but in Portugal he was a Marquis. He had a considerable picture gallery and was an authority on art. When he first married her, she sent round a work that she had written on reformed and feminist morality to all the important people at Richmond, and with one accord they decided that they would not call on her. When her husband died, his grandson, who loved her desperately, wished to marry her, and was only dissuaded when they showed him the table of affinities in the prayer-book. I do not know exactly what happened to her after this tragic severance.
      At the beginning of the Second World War, Julian Huxley, then Secretary of the London Zoo, was summoned by Mr Winston Churchill, as he then was, to explain the provisions regarding wild beasts that had been made in case of air raids. He told how whenever an air raid was in progress, keepers with loaded revolvers would stand ready to shoot any animal whose escape would be dangerous. 'Seems a pity,' said Mr Churchill, 'bombs exploding, houses tottering, flames spreading, lions and tigers roaring. Seems a pity.'
      My friend Crompton Llewelyn Davis, who was a partner in the eminent law firm of Coward, Chance and Co., was addicted to extreme shabbiness in his clothes, to such a degree that some of his friends expostulated. This had an unexpected result. When West Australia attempted by litigation to secede from the Commonwealth of Australia, his firm was employed, and it was decided that the case should be heard in the King's Robing Room. Crompton was overheard ringing up the King's Chamberlain and saying: 'The unsatisfactory state of my trousers has lately been brought to my notice. I understand that the case is to be heard in the King's Robing Room, perhaps the King has left an old pair of trousers there that might be useful to me.'
      Everyone knows the first recorded words of Thomas Babbington, afterwards Lord Macaulay, and everyone remembers that these words were: 'Thank you, Madam, the agony is abated.' But it is a mistake to suppose that these are the first words that that man ever uttered. A great.aunt of mine in her very early youth knew his nurse in her extreme old age, and she used to say, 'Lor, Milady, they was not his first words, you wouldn't believe the things he used to say.' She would then repeat some of them, not in her natural idiom, but with all the elegance of diction and pronunciation to be expected in the words of so eminent a man. 'Why, Milady, I remember as if it were yesterday the little lad come running up to me, fresh from the garden, three years old he was, and he says to me, "Nurse," he says, "in the ideal constitution there should be a just balance of forces, while on the one hand the will of the people should be adequately represented in a popular house, on the other hand the wisdom of those who through their

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stake in the country have acquired a certain stability of political judgement, should not remain unheard." "Lor, Master Thomas," said I, "'ow you do go on." ' Many hundreds of such pearls of wisdom she would repeat to my great-aunt, but alas, between my great.aunt and me, all the rest are buried in oblivion.
      There has been a similar drying up of the well of truth in regard to Thomas Carlyle. He, as everyone knows, is supposed to have observed the gospel of silence until the age of three, when he remarked in a meditative tone of voice, 'What ails wee Jock?' This also, however, is a myth. His mother told his wife and his wife told my mother of many earlier sayings showing the first budding of philosophical rhetoric. Several months before the above known occurrence, he made another remark about wee Jock: 'Mither,' he said, 'the lamp of history sheds its glimmering light down the long corridor of the past, and to those who have eyes to discern its flickering flame, reveals that it was not I but wee Jock that broke the vase on the mantelpiece.' 'Ach, Tommy, don't fret so,' said his mother.
      When Thales and Jeremiah were both living in the town of Tempe in Egypt, they happened one evening to meet in the pub. Owing to the Babylonian war, the beer was not what it had been. But, faute de mieux, each ordered a tankard. After a first sip, Thales said: 'All is water.' Jeremiah replied: 'Woe, woe!' Nevertheless, they left the pub arm in arm.
      Once when I was staying at Clovelly, I walked, on a fine day, to Hartland Point. There I met a coastguardsman with whom I got into conversation. I asked him how far it was from Hartland Point to Clovelly, and he said, 'eight miles'. And I asked him how far to Lundy Island, and he said 'ten miles'. 'And how far from Lundy Island to Clovelly?' I then asked. 'Twenty-two miles,' he replied. 'But that is impossible, for according to what you say, even if one came round by Hartland Point it would only be eighteen miles.' 'Well, Sir,' he replied, 'all's I can say is, Sir, that Captain Jones was here a few days ago, and I says to Captain Jones, says I, "How far do you make it from Lundy Island to Clovelly?" And he says to me, says he, "I've known this coast, man and boy, thirty years and I make it twenty-two miles."' Against Captain Jones, man and boy, Euclid's arguments flung themselves in vain.
      Disraeli, in spite of his political eminence, was somewhat painfully conscious of the fact that his hands lacked beauty. Nevertheless, in an absent.minded mood he allowed them on one occasion to rest upon the dinner-table. There came one of those unusual moments of complete silence. Lady Margaret Cecil, who was sitting next to him, remarked, 'Awful pause'. With extreme haste he withdrew his hands and concealed them beneath the table.
      I know of another example of the danger of homonyms. Mr Attlee is only known to have made one joke in the course of a long and honourable career. At a Pilgrim dinner he spoke of a certain village in rural England

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where there was a very fine old church falling into disrepair, where no money was forthcoming to keep it from ruin. At length, by good fortune, an immensely rich American discovered that his family came from that village, and he therefore supplied the funds needed for the restoration of sacred edifice. When the restoration was complete, a thanksgiving service held in the renovated church at which, as was natural, the eminent American was present. The vicar in an eloquent prayer expressed his gratitude to Providence, saying: 'O Lord, we thank Thee that in our hour of need Thou hast sent us this succour.' The American thought the sentiment might have been better expressed.
      Once, in an American train, I got into conversation with a young naval officer, and happened to mention Brussels. 'Brussels,' he said, 'I like Brussels. There's more sex appeal per square foot there than anywhere else except Suez and Constantinople.' Nevertheless, I have never visited either.
      The people one meets in trains tend to be somewhat odd. One time when I was travelling, there was in the train an old farmer, a very simple old farmer. And I found on talking to him that he was an anarchist. He did not know the word anarchist, he did not know he was anarchist, but he had been impressed with the fact that Public Bodies waste water. It happened that the train was running alongside a main road and there was a steam-roller and a great quantity of water being spread upon the ground. 'There, you see,' he said, and on the ground that Public Bodies waste water he wanted all public bodies abolished.
      I have sometimes found that people with whom on the whole I am in agreement, express their opinions in ways that I cannot entirely subscribe to. I remember once meeting a fiercely feminist lady who, after talking at great length about the superiority of her sex, wound up by saying: 'The half of every man is a lunatic.' 'Yes,' I said, 'the better half.'
      And I remember another lady, also a very very convinced feminist, who was impressed by the fact that women, who at times were not able to sit in Parliament in England or in Congress in America, were able to sit in the State legislature of a State which she called 'Collarada'. And she said the effect of their presence in the State legislature had been an immense improvement in morals and manners. She assured me that since women have sat in legislative halls in 'Collarada' there has been no more of that throwing of spittoons and ink-pots. They soon showed the men that they were not to be flirted with, no, nor flirted at. At this point she turned to her neighbour, who was a Roman Catholic, and said: 'Nothing is more certain than that women will be ministers of religion, ay, and priests too.' He said, 'Oh, I hope some things are more certain.' 'No,' she said, 'nothing is more certain.'
      Advantages sometimes happen through the misguided practice of getting on to a train after it is in motion. I was once travelling from Paddington to Evesham. There was one other passenger in the carriage, a youngish lady.

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We sat at opposite corners in prim silence. But at Oxford, after the train was well under way, a man dashed into the carriage. A porter seized him by the legs to keep him out, and I seized him by the arms to get him in. I shouted at the porter: 'Let go or the man'll be killed!' He did, and we got the man in. This broke the ice and there ensued a rather curious conversation with the lady. She turned out to be a school-teacher who was being obliged to leave England and go to Canada, because her headmistress disapproved of teaching arithmetic by modern methods. So I naturally said to her, 'What are modern methods?' 'Ah, well,' she said, 'the old method was, you told the children two and two are four; and they learnt this. But the modern method is to say: "Now dear children, how many eyes have you?" and they say: "Two"; "And now dear children how many ears have you?" and they say: "Two"; "And now dear children, how many legs have you?" and they say: "Two"; "And now dear children, how many noses have you?" and they say: "Two". But my headmistress does not approve of this method of teaching arithmetic and I shall have to go to Canada. There's only one drawback, which is that I'll have to become a Roman Catholic.' And I said, 'Don't you mind that?' 'Oh, no,' she said, 'I've nothing against them except that they play cards on Sundays after Mass.' With this contribution to theology the conversation ended.
      One of the most beautiful women that I have ever seen, was one with whom I had only five minutes conversation and whom I never saw again. However, the conversation was as fruitful as five minutes could make it. She told me that she had recently returned from Mexico, and that while in Mexico City she, having taken a taxi, was pursued by twelve Mexican Generals, each in a taxi, and each determined to rape her. 'But,' said she, 'I was on very good terms with the President, and I managed to reach him before they had accomplished their fell work.' I regret to say that by this time the five minutes were up.
      I once met a lady teacher from Texas who, if one may believe her own account, had had a somewhat curious and adventurous life. She said that the youth of Texas were extremely violent people, some of them: she had boys of fifteen or sixteen in her class and had some difficulty in keeping order. 'How did you manage it?' I said. 'Oh,' she said, 'of course I always had a loaded revolver on my desk.' Which didn't seem to her at all an odd thing for a teacher to have. She'd had all sorts of adventures. She wrote an autobiography which opened with her being raped by her brother when she was four years old. Unfortunately she got this autobiography printed in Paris, and had the proofs sent to her in England. The British Government considered the autobiography improper and Scotland Yard waited upon her, and the autobiography never saw the light of day.
      I once met in the train a gentleman who was even more anti-clerical than I am. It was a train which was about to arrive at Exeter, and he said, 'I hate Exeter, there are so many parsons there.' At that moment the train

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reached the platform and he said, 'Look, there's one now!' in just the tone of voice that he might have employed if it had been a black beetle on his kitchen floor.
      There have been two occasions in my life when I have thought that I was on the track of a good story but found to my great regret that I was not. The first of these was when I was walking one day with Sir Spencer Walpole, the historian. I had been reading Kinglake's History of the Crimea, and I said to him, 'Why does Kinglake hate Napoleon III so bitterly?' And Sir Spencer Walpole replied, 'They quarrelled about a woman.' I naturally said, 'Will you tell me the story?' And he said, 'No, Sir, I shall not tell you the story.' And shortly afterwards he died. The other occasion was when a friend of mine, at a public dinner, found himself sitting next to Sydney Colvin, and Sydney Colvin began complaining about Rossetti and said he used to write the most scurrilous verses; 'He wrote a scurrilous verse about me, it began: "There is an art critic named Colvin, whose writings the mind might revolve in . . ." 'My friend said to him, 'Will you tell me how it went on?' 'No, Sir, I shall not tell you how it went on.' And history does not relate what the remaining lines were.
      Dante Gabriel Rossetti, like a good many other famous men, had to have his off-times when he was not exhibiting those virtues for which the public loved him. When he had got tired of 'The Blessed Damosel' he would write verses of a somewhat different sort. I can remember two examples of these. One commemorates a notable event in the town of Aberystwyth. It goes as follows: 'There was a young girl of Aberystwyth, / Who took sacks to the mill to fetch grist with, / But the miller's son Jack / Laid her flat on her back / And united the things that they pissed with.' There was another poem which I believe has never been printed, of which I can remember only one verse. It commemorated the joys of paradise, before the fall, and this verse which I remember said: 'Who in Eden's garden had 'em / without so much as Sir or Madam, / Who rogered Eve, who buggered Adam ? / My Maker.' I think that if these verses had ever been published they might, perhaps, have diminished his popularity with the admirers of the Blessed Damosel.
      The grounds of people's political opinions are many and diverse: some seem fairly ordinary, some are more strange and bizarre. I think the most remarkable reason for voting that I ever came across was that of the Professor of Arabic in Cambridge when I was young. He very much disliked Mr Gladstone's excursions into scripture knowledge, and on one occasion when he had voted Liberal my friend Whitehead asked him why he had voted Liberal. 'Oh,' he said, 'because when Mr Gladstone is in office he hasn't time to write about holy scripture.' I think this is the strangest reason for voting that I have ever come across.
      The Reverend Dr Abbot was a clergyman who wrote a book called Flatland, which greatly delighted me when I was a boy. He was a man

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in whom philosophy somewhat overpowered the clerical qualities which one would have expected of him. He found himself once on a bus, where there was a drunken man who was pouring forth foul-mouthed obscenities such as no clergyman could be expected to endure. He felt it his professional duty to reprove the man, and the man said, 'There must be some of all sorts and I'm of that sort.' Dr Abbot, remembering his Plato, was completely silenced.
      Everybody remembers how Napoleon on his way to Egypt sat on the deck of the ship surrounded by members of the Institute: various scientific luminaries who, during the Revolution, had been vehement atheists. Napoleon, however, was determined to regard himself as the earthly reproduction of the Heavenly Emperor, and, therefore, thought that there must be a Heavenly Emperor. He set to work to convert the scientists. He pointed to the stars and said, 'Who made the Stars?' The members of the Institute, realising on which side their bread was buttered, were then and there converted.
      Now I was once sitting beside the driver of an old horse-bus on a starry night and the bus driver said to me, 'A week ago, Sir, there was a hathiest a.sitting where you is now.' So I said, 'Oh'. He said, 'Yes there was, Sir. And I said to him, " 'o made them stars?" and 'e didn't know what to say.' So I thought, well, I don't know whether he has the other qualities of Napoleon, but he certainly has one of them.
      There was an extremely genteel lady once who was travelling in a train, and it so happened that sitting opposite to her there was a man who had a crucifix on his watch-chain, but in spite of this talked in a very blasphemous and horrible fashion. The lady said to him, 'I am surprised, my man, in view of the emblem that you bear, to hear you speaking in this manner.' And he said, 'Lor, Maam, that ain't Christ, that's the other bloke that died by him.'
      Maupassant, on a visit to England, decided to visit literary men living. in London. The first on his list was George Meredith. Maupassant, as everybody remembers, suffered from ailments which are generally considered the result of a not too virtuous life. So did Meredith. Maupassant remarked, 'Well, after all, we have to pay for our pleasures.' 'Not at all,' said Meredith. 'Not at all. It has nothing to do with that.' He had another adventure on the same visit. This time it was Henry James. In those days fashionable ladies used to drive round the park in open carriages if the weather was fine, and Henry James, who understood that Maupassant took a certain interest in the ladies, determined to try to impress him. And all the most famous beauties of the age drove by in open carriages, and Henry James would say to Maupassant, 'That's a beautiful woman'; and Maupassant said 'Non'. And he tried it again and again. Maupassant said 'Non'. At last, so Henry James related, he said, 'I persisted in my little opinion.' And Maupassant said, 'Non. J'ai couche avec une foute d'Anglaises et

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Americaines. Habillées elles sout bien. Deshabillées, Non.' Henry James pursued the subject no further.
      I have often heard people spoken of as 'the typical Englishman' but I have found a logical difficulty in this conception. One may say that an Englishman is typical in this or that respect, if he possesses most of the properties that most Englishmen possess. Now, as a matter of fact, most Englishmen do not possess most properties that most Englishmen possess. Therefore, the typical Englishman is untypical. I have never been able to get round this puzzle, and I have therefore concluded that no Englishman is typical.
      Sir Donald MacKenzie Wallace, the author of a monumental work on Russia, told me a story which illustrates the tribulations of an author. He said that shortly after the publication of this work, he happened to meet Robert Louis Stephenson, then a very young man, at a party. They got into an argument about Russia, in which Stephenson maintained certain views which Wallace, somewhat modestly, controverted. At last Stephenson, who had not heard the name of the man to whom he was speaking, explained, 'I know I'm right because I've just been reading Wallace's Russia.' 'And I have just been writing it,' replied Wallace.
      Mrs Sheldon Amos, whom I knew some number of years ago, was a highminded lady whose main activity was rescue work. As she expressed it to her friends: 'Since my dear husband's death, I have devoted my life to prostitution.' Her son-in-law, a gallant officer in Her Majesty's Regular Army, had fought in many parts of the world, had been repeatedly shipwrecked, and had been the only White man in the midst of native mutinies. After listening to his story, I ventured to say, 'You've had a rather adventurous life.' 'Oh, no,' he said, 'I don't think so. Of course I've never missed my morning tea.'
      Professor J. A. Smith, the eminent Oxford moralist and metaphysician, visited me at my college rooms in Cambridge in 1912. It happened that the Professor of Arabic was present at the same time, but Professor Smith failed to apprehend this fact. By sheer accident the Reader in Ornithology in the University of Cambridge and the Reader in Oriental Art were also present. Professor Smith who, though a metaphysician, prided himself on his outdoor life, ventured a remark about a bird that he had seen, and was corrected by the Reader in Ornithology. He then spoke of a famous objet d'art which he said had been removed from Peking by the Germans after the Boxer Rebellion. The Reader in Oriental Art remarked that he had seen it in Peking a few months ago. Nothing daunted, Professor Smith began to speak of his travels in Egypt. His saddle-man, he said, had made a certain Arabic speech, which he repeated to us and which he then translated for our benefit. The Professor of Arabic, who until this moment had sat silent and apparently asleep, looked up and asked, 'What did you say he said?' Professor Smith repeated the supposedly Arabic words. 'And what did you

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say it meant?' said the Professor of Arabic. Professor Smith repeated the English equivalent. 'Well that is very odd,' said the Professor of Arabic, whose identity had remained a secret until that moment. 'The correct Arabic for what you say is etc.' Professor Smith took the next train to Oxford and never returned to Cambridge.
      In spite of my duties as host, I viewed his discomfiture with equanimity, because once while I was reading a paper to the Jowett Society at Oxford, he had sought to triumph over me by methods which I could not wholly approve. Professor Smith, in common with our Hegelians, held that truths are only truths because the Absolute thinks so. I remarked that according to this doctrine a man would instantly become bald if the Absolute forgot to notice his hair. Professor Smith, in replying to my paper, alluded to the text about the hairs on our head being numbered and said in a tone of portentous gravity that to his infinite regret I had seen fit to make fun of beliefs in which all of us had been brought up, and which for some of us were very precious. Apparently the beliefs in question included the belief that he knew Arabic.
      It has sometimes happened to me to be accused of things which the general public does not seem to think me guilty of. in fact, it tends to think exactly the opposite. I was once in a large town in the State of Kansas, and thirty men invited me to dinner. It was during Prohibition and I was not offered a drink, but one of the thirty had arrived very drunk. He was seated a good distance away from me, but he crawled along the whole length of the table to say, 'What do you know about life? You ought to have more to do with women. You don't know anything about women. You're an ignorant fellow you are.' The others all tried to hush him, but it was quite impossible, and I was rather pleased to have this very unusual accusation hurled at me.
      Again, quite recently, a journalist asked me what newspapers I read, and I said I read The Times and the Manchester Guardian. So he said, 'Oh, then you don't know anything about human nature, you can only find out about human nature by reading the popular Sunday Press.' And I was impressed by the fact that human nature to him consisted entirely of scandals, divorces and murders and he didn't seem to think that human beings ever did do anything else.

HISTORY AS IT NEVER IS WRITTEN


      I am about to relate the history of the period that I am writing about. In this period, the ancient yeomanry gradually lost control of their landed property through a succession of bad harvests, which were taken advantage of by urban adventurers destitute of the ancient piety that had distinguished the yeomanry. Through this corruption, the State became far inferior to what it had been in the old days, and the tentacles of financial power extended from the capital over many rural areas. It is to be lamented that the decay of morals which was thus caused, was not for many centuries remedied, and, as was not to be wondered at, the State thus degraded morally, tended to fall a victim to other States more morally regenerate and less intellectually decadent. This, I say, is the history of the period I am writing about; if you ask me what period that is I will say it is Attica before Solon's legislation, it is Rome after the Punic Wars, it is England as depicted in Moore's [sic] Utopia, Goldsmith's Deserted Village and the Hammonds' Village Labourer, it is Southern California as depicted in Lawrence's [sic; Norris] Octopus. Last it is the state of Kenya as described in the future official history of East Africa, in the chapter called 'The Mau Mau Martyrs'.
      I find that the things that interest me in history are not exactly those that the historians emphasise, and indeed I have found very frequently that the things that seem to me best worth emphasising are passed by in a footnote or a parenthesis. Now take for example the Dialogues between Buddhists and Greek philosophers which resulted from Alexander's conquests. In these Dialogues, since they were composed in India, the Buddhist is, of course, victorious, but I do not find that Western philosophers give as much weight as they should to the Buddhist's arguments. They always assume, as a matter of course, that the Greek philosopher must be the better, but I'm not at all sure that he really was. Or take another thing, take Justinian, and the School of Philosophy in Athens. The School of Philosophy in Athens persisted in glorifying Pagan philosophy long after the State had become Christian, and this pained Justinian and he decided to close the School of Philosophy. The worthy philosophers thereupon migrated to Persia, which, as they had been correctly informed, was not Christian, and therefore they thought must be open to Greek philosophy; but when they got to Persia they found two things that they considered quite intolerable. One was the practice of incest, encouraged in the Royal Family, and the other was the practice of polygamy. Both these things so

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shocked the philosophers that they came back to Athens and conformed, at least outwardly, to the Christian ethic.
      I was very much pleased when I read about the first negotiations between the British and the Chinese, to find that the Chinese Government officially complained of the British that none of their suggested treaties contained any mention of filial piety. On this ground, the Chinese considered the English morally degraded, and until they managed to complete some moral reformation, the Chinese thought it would be unwise to have any treaty with them whatsoever.
      Hegel was at one time the ruling philosopher in academic circles; he was so when I was young. I did not learn at that time what I discovered since: that Hegel thought the Absolute idea spread gradually from one country to another, but at the time of Charlemagne settled upon Germany, which it had never since abandoned. There were, however, three periods in German history according to Hegel; the first period was that of the Father, the second that of the Son, and the third that of the Holy Ghost. The period of the Holy Ghost, according to Hegel, began at the time of the Peasants' War, a most atrocious business in which the State, encouraged by Luther, brutally extirpated those who demanded agrarian reform. I was rather interested to find that this seemed to Hegel a suitable activity for the Holy Ghost.
      Another thing that I found very interesting is the extraordinary difference between the thirteenth century as it was, and the thirteenth century as it appears in most books of Christian apologetics. The thirteenth century was a very vigorous and a very remarkable century, in many ways one of the most remarkable there has ever been, but it was not, if one may trust what its own people said at the time, altogether remarkable for a high standard of virtue. The friars and the monks hated each other with a passionate hatred, and the friars said things about the monks which are far worse than any the Protestants have ever said about them. For example, they describe the lady who went to confess to a friar, and when she had finished her confession, he found that she had a dagger in her bosom. And he said 'Why that?' 'Oh,' she said, 'because the last three times I went to confession it was to a monk, and each time the monk raped me, and I decided that if this happened again I would plunge the dagger into my heart.' The friar considers this typical monkish behaviour.
      At one time I kept a school that was more or less on modern lines, and it was accused by the neighbours of every kind of shocking practice. I, of course, did what I could to deny these accusations, but at last I discovered that exactly similar accusations were made by the friars against the schools conducted by the monks. It appeared that in these schools, all the things that I was said to do, were said by the friars to be done by the monks. This rather consoled me.
      Another thing that I discovered rather to my surprise about that same

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period of history, was that cathedrals were not built to the glory of God, as one is commonly told, but to the glory of the local bishop. It was always the local bishop who wanted the cathedral to be great and grand; and all the really pious people of the time were puritans, who objected to pomp and splendour and thought that a little tin tabernacle would do just as well, and opposed bitterly the creation of the cathedrals, which was the work of thoroughly worldly dignitaries of the church. This was a surprise to me and somewhat interesting.
      Another thing that one is told is that the Church preserved learning throughout the Dark Ages. Now, Pope Gregory the Great, who was Pope in the year 600, was a very remarkable man, a very great statesman, but he, who lived just at the beginning of the Dark Ages, did not have this attitude towards elegant latinity which we are told the Church preserved: on the contrary, he wrote to a certain bishop, saying: 'A rumour has reached us which we cannot mention without a blush, that thou expoundest grammar to certain friends. The praises of the Lord and of Jupiter cannot exist in the same mouth, and should this rumour be not without foundation, we enjoin you to desist at once from this pernicious practice.' What the bishop did, I do not know, but I do remember this, that when I learnt Latin grammar there was a list of impersonal verbs . rains, snows, hails and so forth . and my grammar said that Jupiter is understood as the subject of these sentences. This rather enables me to understand the point of view of Gregory the Great: I believe modern grammars omit this remark.
      I once knew a man who made a marriage of reason, but the result was not wholly satisfactory. He was a philosopher of some eminence, A. W. Benn. He wrote a very good history of Greek philosophy, lived in Florence, and was very much addicted to long walks throughout the neighbourhood. But he was extremely short.sighted, and could only see a little way with the help of very powerful spectacles. When he reached the age of fifty, he decided to marry. He decided that the lady of his choice must have three qualifications; first, she must not be under thirty, second, she must know Greek, and third, she must be able to walk at least twenty miles. The first of these qualifications was satisfied by many of the ladies in pensions in Florence, the second . that she should know Greek . was not nearly so common, but he discovered one, at last, who had this qualification. It remained to be seen whether she had the third. He invited her to take a walk in the neighbourhood of Florence, and he knew that when on their return they reached a certain house in Florence, the twentieth mile would have been completed. They reached the house, he proposed, and was accepted. But, ah, alas for him, the lady, after marriage, bought a bicycle and gave up walking on foot. He, being so short-sighted, was unable to ride a bicycle, and the marriage of reason failed to bring that bliss which he had fully expected it would produce.
      One of the men whose life has always interested me was Apollinarius

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Sidonius. Apollinarius Sidonius was a Frenchman at the time of the Barbarian Invasion. A very cultivated gentleman, somewhat in the Bloomsbury style, he devoted himself to writing poems which you can read backwards and forwards equally well - a line would begin with 'amor' and end with 'Roma' - and it was a skill that was much admired among the Bloomsburyites of that period, to write poems that you could read backwards or forwards equally. Well, he devoted himself to this pursuit very successfully and very happily, but then the barbarians came and this rather interfered. It did not interfere exactly in the way that one would think from reading about the Barbarian Invasion. It interfered in a different way. He writes to a friend and says: 'It's such a bore, I have to dine with Germans tonight and they have such bad table-manners.' And this is what the Barbarian Invasion was in real life. However, in the end their table-manners so shocked him that he became a very earnest Christian, a bishop, and died fighting the Germans in the great cause of culture in order that the pursuit of poems to be read backwards and forwards might continue throughout future ages.
      I had always been told throughout my youth of the fanaticism of the Mohammedans, and especially that story of the destruction of the library at Alexandria. Well, I believed all these stories, but when I came to look into the history of the times concerned, I had a great many shocks. In the first place, I discovered that the library of Alexandria was destroyed a great many times, and the first time was by Julius Caesar, simply because he couldn't get a hot bath any other way. But the last time was supposed to have been by the Mohammedans, and for this I found no justification whatsoever. Nor did I find that the Mohammedans were fanatical. On the contrary, the Christians of that time were extraordinarily fanatical. The contests between Catholics, Nestorians, and Monophysites were bitter and persecuting to the last degree. But the Mohammedans, when they conquered Christian countries, allowed the Christians to be perfectly free, provided they paid a tribute. The only penalty for being a Christian was that you had to pay a tribute that Mohammedans did not have to pay. This proved completely successful, and the immense majority of the population became Mohammedan, but not through any fanaticism on the part of the Mohammedans. On the contrary they, in the earlier centuries of their power, represented free thought and tolerance to a degree that the Christians did not emulate until quite recent times. This is one of the stock lies of history, of which there are a great many.
      I found a very interesting story in the history of Japan. Japan, as everyone knows, had a period when Christian missionaries, especially Jesuits, had very great success in converting large numbers of Japanese to the Christian faith. And then there was a reaction, and Japan was closed to all foreigners except one Dutch ship every year, and that lasted for a long long time. Well, I didn't know how this had come about until I had

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occasion to study the history of Japan. I then discovered that the first incident that led to this result was the wreck of a British ship on the coast of Japan; and its Captain, Bill Adams, who was a breezy Elizabethan, and, like all Elizabethan sea-faring persons, passionately Protestant, was asked by the Shogun what he thought of the Jesuits, and if he knew anything about them. And he replied: 'Jesuits, Lor luvyer, Sir, I can tell you all about the Jesuits.' And he poured forth Protestant tales about the wickedness of Jesuits, and the Shogun listened entranced. He gave Bill Adams a position at Court, but never would allow him to leave Japan. What we know about him we know from his letters to his wife, very affectionate letters, more ill-spelt letters than any I have ever seen, and from them we know all that he told the Shogun and all that the Shogun thought about what he told.
      Just after the Shogun had learnt these stories about the Jesuits, a Spanish ship proceeding from Macao to Panama was wrecked on the coast of Japan. The local populace started immediately to ransack the ship and steal all it contained in the way of rich merchandise. The Spanish Captain appealed to the local Daimio and said, 'Look, these people are thieves, they're stealing the cargo, will you stop it?' 'Oh, yes,' said the Daimio, 'they have no right to the cargo, it belongs to me.' So then the Spanish Captain, nothing daunted, went up to see the Shogun and said, 'Look here, the local Daimio is stealing my cargo. Do you think you could stop it?' 'Oh, yes,' said the Shogun, 'of course it doesn't belong to him. It belongs to me.' Thereupon the Captain, who was not perhaps quite as wise as a Captain should be, threatened him and said: 'On the contrary, the cargo belongs to the King of Spain, the King of Spain is very powerful and if you steal the cargo you will incur his displeasure.' 'The King of Spain,' said the Shogun, 'Who is he?' (having never heard of him). The Spanish Captain thereupon produced a map of the world in which the Spanish dominions were all coloured green. they embraced at that time very large parts of Europe and the whole of North and South America. The Shogun was somewhat impressed, and said: 'How did the King of Spain acquire these large dominions ?' 'Oh,' said the Captain, 'he sends missionaries to these places who convert the people to Christianity. The Christians become a fifth column, and set to work to see to it that their Government is overthrown and their country is subordinated to Spain.' 'Ho, Ho,' said the Shogun, 'we'll have no more missionaries in this country.' Thereupon he made ten years preparation, and on a given day he had every Christian in Japan massacred. And this was the beginning of the two and a half centuries during which only one Dutch ship a year was allowed into Japan. The period of anti-Christianity was brought to an end by Commodore Perry, who, supported by gunboats and a powerful navy, compelled the Japanese to become tolerant to the doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount. One of the myths of history is Brutus, especially in England where we

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take our view of him from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. I discovered with infinite sorrow that Brutus was not the splendid fellow he is said to be by Shakespeare. You find in one of Cicero's letters, when Cicero was Governor of a province, that he found a private army besieging a certain city in his province. He went to the Commander of the army and said, 'What are you doing here?' And the Commander said, 'Oh, we were hired by Brutus to besiege this city.' 'Why?' said Cicero. 'Why?' 'Because Brutus had lent them money at sixty per cent and they thought twelve per cent would be enough interest to pay, and he thought no, they must pay the sixty per cent and so he hired an army to besiege them.' Now Cicero and Brutus belonged to the same political party, and Cicero found this rather painful, so he wrote to Brutus and besought him to be more merciful, and Brutus very reluctantly consented to reduce the interest to twelve per cent. What is perhaps even more shocking, is that after the assassination of Caesar for claiming to be Emperor, Brutus, in the provinces where he was in control, had coins struck describing himself as Emperor. I have seen such a coin myself and there is no doubt about it, so that I'm afraid we must say that Brutus only objected to Caesar being Emperor, and didn't object when it was he who was the Emperor.
      Another matter about which the history books for the most part tell unmitigated lies, or at any rate misrepresentations, is the Crusades. One is told that the Crusades were very great and glorious acts of faith, in which noble men heroically devoted themselves to freeing the Holy Sepulchre from the infidel. This is not quite what really happened. What really happened was that trade in the West in those days was almost entirely in the hands of Jews, and it was found that if you stirred up religious enthusiasm sufficiently, you could get people to go for the Jews; and in fact every Crusade began with pogroms . very extensive pogroms . in every Christian country that took part, and the Crusades were in fact completely successful. At the beginning of them the trade was in the hands of Jews, at the end it was wholly in the hands of Christians. True, the Holy Sepulchre remained in the hands of the Turks, but that had been only a pretext, the real purpose of the Crusades had been achieved.
      The philosopher Seneca I found a very interesting person. Everybody knows how it was supposed by Christians in subsequent centuries that he, though not nominally a Christian, had in fact very closely approximated to Christian doctrine and been very sympathetic to it. In fact there were produced letters between Seneca and St Paul which later scholarship pronounced spurious, but which throughout the Middle Ages were universally accepted as genuine, in which it appeared that Seneca and St Paul were practically in agreement. Well, when I came to find out what Seneca really did and said, it was not quite what I had been led to expect. In the first place, he was the Minister to Nero at the time when Nero plotted the murder of his mother, and Seneca certainly was an accomplice

Anecdotes

in that performance. In the second place, I found what very much interested me, that in his capacity of great financier, he lent a lot of money to Boadicea at a very high rate of interest. She after a time found difficulty in paying the interest, and therefore rebelled against Rome, with the result that we all know. At last Nero got tired of him, and sent messengers to say that in view of his great services to the State in the past, he should be allowed to commit suicide instead of being executed. So he set to work to make a will, being in fact enormously rich. But the messenger said that there was not going to be time for a will, and all his property was going to be confiscated to the State, that is to say to Nero. So he could not go on with making a will, and he had to set to work to commit suicide. He got into a bath, opened a small vein, had three secretaries round his bath to take down his last words, and made a most edifying end.
      One of the minor characters of the Elizabethan age whom I have found interesting, was Sir John Harrington. Sir John Harrington was a sort of enfant terrible who always amused Queen Elizabeth, so that she could not bring herself to punish him as he apparently sometimes deserved. One of the things that he did, was to be the first inventor of the W.C. The only W.C. in the country was Queen Elizabeth's, and she, I believe, was duly grateful for this. However, on another occasion he translated the only improper canto of Ariosto, and presented the translation to Queen Elizabeth, who professed to be very much shocked and said that this sort of thing must be punished, and she condemned him as a penalty to translate the whole of the rest of Ariosto . a very very long piece of work. He had, however, another side to him. He went to Ireland with Essex and was considered to be Essex's close friend. I discovered what I must say rather shocked me, that he was employed by the Government as a spy upon Essex, and throughout the period when Essex completely trusted him, he was really in the Secret Service with a view to convicting Essex of treachery or traitorous conduct, if possible. He was so much beloved by Essex, that Essex knighted him. This vexed Elizabeth. Originally every knight could confer a knighthood, but nowadays, as everybody knows, only the Sovereign can, and I think that Sir John Harrington was the last, or very nearly the last, to get a knighthood from a subject. He got it from Essex and did his utmost to get Essex condemned.
      One of the fundamental divisions in politics is between parties of creditors and parties of debtors. But there is a difficulty if you belong to a party of debtors, and the difficulty is this: that if you win, you instantly become a party of creditors and you therefore have to alter the whole of your programme. One of the most remarkable illustrations of this rule is Julius Caesar. Julius Caesar, in the civil turmoils in Rome, took the side of debtors. When a very young man, he was captured by pirates and held on

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an island. They offered to release him in return for ransom. He asked how much they had demanded, and they told him. He was bitterly outraged and said, 'Oh, you should have asked ten times as much-you evidently did not know what an important man I am. If you ask ten times as much you will certainly get it, but I shall come back and hang every man of you.' They asked ten times as much, they got it, and he did come back and hang every man of them. He belonged to a different sort of political party from that to which Alexander belonged. Alexander, before starting out to destroy the Persian Empire, made treaties with all the Greek States that on no account were there to be vendettas while he was absent. He stood for creditors, Julius Caesar stood for debtors, until such time as he was in a position to take the attitude of the creditor. The same division existed between Protestants and Catholics in early days: Catholics stood for debtors, Protestants for creditors. For this reason, Catholics thought that interest was immoral, Protestants thought that it was not. But gradually, as finance capital came more and more into the hands of Catholics, the Catholics modified their view on this point, as debtors always have as soon as they acquired power.
      When I was a very young man I was shown over an Oxford college library by the librarian who had occasion to mention Wycliffe, and to my great delight alluded to him as Professor Wycliffe, making him seem as though he were quite contemporary. I wondered at that time, and indeed for quite a long while afterwards, how it was that Wycliffe during his lifetime had escaped persecution. The reason really was quite simple: it was that the Popes were satellites of the French Government at that time, and the French Government was at war with the British Government, and therefore the Government in England, which in those days was in the hands of John of Gaunt, befriended anybody who was attacking the Pope; and this was how it was that Wycliffe, throughout the whole of his life, escaped persecution. In fact, the University of Oxford at that time defended academic freedom against all ecclesiastical attacks, severe as they were. Later on, when Henry V had conquered France, the matter changed, and Henry V became just as persecuting as the Church could possibly have wished.
      If I had more leisure, or a longer life, I should write a book called Shelley the Tough. I got very tired of the ineffectual angel of Matthew Arnold's criticism: Shelley, in fact, was not at all that sort of person. You will remember that when he was a schoolboy, he was always asked by the other schoolboys at Eton to raise the devil, which he did, by means of magical incantations and so forth, and altogether he was considered by the others at Eton to be a very tough customer. You will, no doubt, remember also that he was an extremely good shot with the pistol, much better than Byron or any of Byron's friends, who went in for being toughs. There was

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one occasion when Shelley and Byron were both living in Pisa, and Shelley went out with Byron's bravos into the country, and they were pursued by the town-guard of Pisa, which considered these men ruffians. All of the bravos fled, with the exception of Shelley, who single-handed routed all the municipal worthies of Pisa and was left holding the field. I think altogether that he should be represented in that line. I live in a place where he supported his friend Maddox [sic; Madoc?] in disfiguring one of the great beauties of North Wales, in the interests of modern industrialism. This is what Shelley was really like, it was only occasionally that he wrote poems. In fact, he was a tough customer given to revolver shooting and to modern industrialism.
      At the time when Parnell was convicted of adultery, and the question arose whether Mr Gladstone should throw him over or not, he told John Morley that he had known ten Prime Ministers, and nine of them he knew to be adulterers. Now among the ten was my grandfather; I have always hoped that he was the tenth.
      It has sometimes been considered remarkable that Napoleon allowed the emigrés to come back to France. I think the reason why he allowed this is quite plain. He had been a scholarship boy at the military academy at Brienne, and had been looked down upon by the scions of ancient nobility who were his schoolfellows. When he became Emperor, he had a chance to see these people who had treated him with contumely when he was a boy, bowing down before him and seeking to ingratiate themselves with him. [This explanation and the Arabian Night feel of it is also in 'Conquest of Happiness', I think - RW] I think it was the pleasure of this that caused him to allow them to come home. He was, of course, not at all above that sort of pleasure: he would throw his hat into a corner and make a foreign ambassador pick it up. When my grandfather visited him in Elba, which was after his great days were over, he tweaked my grandfather's ear just to show familiarity. And I think it is extremely probable that his sole motive in allowing the emigres to come home was to see these schoolfellows of his bowing down before him.
      I find that psychoanalysts and people of that sort do not adopt what would seem to me the right method for discovering the natural human instincts. What they ought to do, if they want for instance to discover the nature of women, is to examine the lives of those very few women who have been exempt from the tyranny of public opinion, that is to say, Empresses Regnant. There are not very many Empresses Regnant in history, and it is a remarkable fact that they generally put their sons to death. I think this fact should be remembered when people talk about maternal affection. On the whole, Empresses Regnant do not encourage the view that a woman is a gentle and kindly creature, even when not compelled to be so by the tyranny of public opinion.
      Bishop Colenso, who was a centre of controversy in the days of my parents, had a somewhat unfortunate experience. He went out to South

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Africa to convert the Zulus to Christianity, and he translated the Bible into Zulu. The Zulus read the translation, and parts of it seemed to them excellent. They particularly liked the Book of Joshua, because it glorified the sort of activities that they were in the habit of indulging in. And he had a piece of undeserved good luck: he didn't know the Zulu language quite as well as he thought he did, and instead of saying 'God is Love' he said 'God is Butter'. Now the Zulus were very fond of butter, and this converted them in shoals, so that he had a very good time. But presently, in reading through the sacred book, they came upon the statement that the hare chews the cud. They went to him and said: 'Look, this book you have given us says that the hare chews the cud, but it doesn't.' 'Oh yes,' said Colenso, 'if the Bible says so, it must do so.' But they gave him a hare and said, 'Now you watch and see.' He watched, and being an honest man he had to confess that the hare did not chew the cud. And he wrote home to the missionary society and said to them: 'I am in a great difficulty, the Bible says that the hare chews the cud, and after watching the hare diligently for quite a long time, I find that it does not chew the cud. What am I to do about it?' And the missionary society wrote back and said: 'Since the Bible says that the hare chews the cud you must believe this or be deprived of your salary.' He chose the latter, and from that time onwards he had to live on the charity of the Zulus. I am afraid that this somewhat interfered with the diffusion of Christianity among those people.
      When I had occasion to study the works of the Fathers [for 'History of Western Philosophy'? RW] , I was impressed by the difficulties that arose from the inadequacy of the postal system in those days. St Jerome and St Augustine had a long and somewhat difficult correspondence about a great many points of theology. St Jerome lived in Bethlehem, St Augustine lived in Hippo near Carthage, and it took a very long time for letters to get from either of these places to the other. The most acrimonious of their controversies concerned the conduct of St Peter, who, when he was staying with St James, refused all food that was condemned by Jewish law, but when he was staying with St Paul, was quite willing to eat such food. One of these two eminent divines considered that this was time-serving, and the other did not. The letters that were exchanged on the subject took about six months to get from one to the other, and therefore the controversy, which if they had met could have been solved in a few minutes, lasted some twenty years. It had very grave consequences in the history of the early Church.
      The social credit scheme which has had very considerable success in winning over public opinion in parts of Canada, was invented by Major Douglas, who wrote a book expounding it. The Labour party did not at first know whether it should adopt this view or whether it should not. It decided to follow the advice of the Sidney Webbs on the point. The Sidney Webbs came to me and said, 'We haven't time to read Major Douglas's

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book. Will you please read it and tell us what we think of it.' So I said I would, and I read the book and I told them that I thought it contained fallacies and that I didn't think the scheme was one which the Labour party ought to adopt. They invited me to lunch to meet Major Douglas, and then and there I conveyed to Major Douglas the Webbs' opinion on his book, and that is the reason why his scheme has never been adopted by the Labour party.
      I think that a great many people who admire the poetry of Blake are not aware of his connection with radical movements in the days of the French Revolution. There is a story, a well-authenticated story, about how on a certain occasion he saved the life of Tom Paine. They both belonged to a very very small group of more or less revolutionary people, who used to meet together; and on one occasion Tom Paine, who had just been elected to the Convention in France as the member for Calais, related that he had just been making a speech of a somewhat subversive sort, and Blake said to him, 'Now, you know this is a very dangerous speech and I'm afraid you may get into trouble with the British Government.' 'Oh,' said Tom Paine, 'It's all right, I'm just going off to France, and I'm only going home just to collect my luggage, then I shall go.' And Blake said to him, 'Don't you go home and collect your luggage. Go quite straight to Dover.' And Tom Paine took his advice, went to Dover, got there twenty minutes ahead of Pitt's police, and managed to get on to his boat, and arrived in Calais where he was acclaimed by an enthusiastic multitude. If it had not been for the advice of Blake he would have been put to death at that period.
      The Empress Josephine had a very interesting and very remarkable life, full of ups and downs. As everybody knows, she came from the West Indies and was in Paris at the time of the Reign of Terror. Not only that, but she was imprisoned during the Reign of Terror, and was in imminent danger of being guillotined. But, however, she succeeded in not being guillotined, and in getting into intimate relations with Barras, who became the first of the Directors, and when asked what he had done during the Terror, remarked, 'I survived.' And so she survived through the period of the Directoire. However, Barras was getting a little tired of her because she was already elderly, and he decided to marry her off to Napoleon, who was very very young, and who wanted a reward for such an act of self-abnegation, and was given the command of the French army in Italy as a reward. That was how she became Napoleon's wife. Once she had achieved this position she made much use of it. She was a somewhat extravagant lady, and after a time Napoleon began to object to paying her bills. On one occasion, when he had been particularly adamant about her bills, she went to the War Minister and said, 'Now look here, you know perfectly well that if I say one word against you to Napoleon, you will be dismissed from office. Now what I want you to do is to take some part of

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the funds devoted to the war to pay my debts.' The War Minister under this pressure reluctantly consented. Throughout the whole of the forthcoming year, French arms suffered one reverse after another. Genoa, which the French had conquered, fell back and was lost to them, and all this in order to pay Josephine's dressmaker's bill. However, Napoleon was not always compliant. When he returned unexpectedly from Egypt and nobody knew that he was going to come, she was dining tête-a-tête with Barras. Napoleon managed somehow to convey that he was just going to arrive, and she fled quickly from Barras to Napoleon's and her flat. The door was locked and she remained outside; Napoleon was inside, having arrived before her. For twenty-four hours he kept her sitting on the doorstep.
      She had another more serious misfortune after Napoleon's fall. When the Emperor Alexander came to Paris, she thought, 'Well, Emperors are my meat, I ought to be able to catch him.' She tried very hard. She invited him to dinner, and following the custom of fashionable ladies of that time, she wore her dress wet in order that it might cling to the figure. The result was that she caught a chill and died, and the Emperor Alexander remained unaffected by her charms.
      Her relations with Napoleon had a somewhat unfortunate beginning. On their wedding night, just as Napoleon was getting into bed, Josephine's dog bit him in the calf, which completely spoilt this important occasion. Many years afterwards, when he was divorcing her, he brought this up as a grievance, and it appeared to be one of the reasons why he wished to divorce her.
      People are accustomed to treating Greek history in a spirit of reverence which makes events unreal; they do not see those events as being very similar to those of our own time. Take for instance the age of Pericles, always regarded as a sort of great and glorious and shimmering wonder, and never treated in terms of realism. But in fact Pericles was a party boss, who succeeded in establishing himself very largely by corrupt means, and who, when he set to work to build temples on the Acropolis, did so exactly in the same spirit as that which inspired the P.W.A. [Webster gives 'Public Works Administration'] . that is to say, he wanted to prevent unemployment and to cause contentment by the distribution of public money. When he fell, he fell in very much the manner in which bosses fall. He was accused of being corrupt: Phideas, whom he employed in the making of statues, was accused of stealing the gold that should have gone into the making of them, and Aspasia, who appears always, in spite of certain moral dubiousness, as rather splendid, was regarded at the time of the fall of Pericles as just a madam. Altogether, the time was very like modern times, and has only failed to be seen so because it has been treated by scholars who disliked realism.
      In the history of the Papacy, there are some episodes that are rather curious and do not invite a clear moral judgement. For example Pope

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Gregory VI, at a time when simony was rife throughout the whole of the Catholic Church, bought the Papacy with a view to abolishing simony. He in fact did abolish simony, and his friend and disciple, Gregory VII, reaped the benefit from it, and established an enormous increase in the power of the Papacy owing to the reforms which Gregory VI introduced by these rather dubious means.
      The order of the Templars has had a somewhat smirched reputation owing to the accusations which were brought against it at the time when it was dissolved. It was only through the work of Henry C. Lee [sic] that the truth came to be known about this whole episode. The truth as it appeared from Henry C. Lee's investigations was as follows: The Templars had become enormously rich and had immense landed estates throughout Western Christendom. The Pope at that time lived at Avignon, and was entirely subservient to the King of France; the King of France was extravagant and had debts which he saw no means of paying. He went to the Pope and said, 'Look here, the Templars are really much richer than anybody ought to be, and it seems to me that you and I together could confiscate all their estates. You declare them heretics, and I will use the secular arm to dispossess them, and we will divide their property fifty-fifty, and in that way we shall each get a good thing out of it.' The Pope said, 'Done!' and it was done. On a given day, all the leading Templars were arrested, they were all tortured on the rack, they all confessed that they had kissed the devil's arse, and their property was taken away from them. And the Pope and the King of France were enabled to pay their debts.
      In the examinations for the Civil Service which existed in China until early in the present century, there was a question that was set which said: 'Once upon a time a Chinese sage preached non-resistance, and Chinese soldiers threw down their arms, with the consequence that the doctrines of the sage had to be suppressed. Now the same doctrine was taught by Christ, whose authority was unquestioned throughout the West. But the effect upon Western soldiers was not that which it had been upon Chinese soldiers. How do you account for this?' History does not relate how Chinese examinees replied to this question.
      Rome, since it became great, has been three times sacked. The first and third of these sacks were events of world-shaking importance, the second was not. The first of the sacks was that of A.D. 410 when the Goths invaded Rome. This occasion led to St Augustine's City of God in which he promulgated a doctrine which enabled the Roman Church to survive the long centuries during which the eternal city was eclipsed. The second sack of Rome, which was a comparatively obscure event, occurred in A.D. 846, and the people who made the sack were the Saracens, but they shortly retired, and left no permanent mark upon history. The third sack of Rome, which occurred in A.D. 1527, was a very curious and confused

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occurrence. A German Emperor, who was fighting in defence of the Catholic religion, was fighting against the Pope, who was a Renaissance Medici, and the German Emperor was fighting with a French General and an army of Protestants. The French General and the army of Protestants succeeded in defeating the Pope, thereby re-establishing the authority of the Catholic faith. The results were two. On the one hand there was a great increase of Catholic piety, and on the other hand there was an end to the Renaissance. The previous Medici Pope, Leo X, when he was ill had had a large number of leading citizens of Rome sacrifice a bull of Jupiter on the Capitol, with a view to promoting his recovery. This sort of thing no longer occurred after the Protestant army had established the holiness of the Papacy.
      Posthumous fame is a very curious thing. The philosopher Epicurus, who gave rise to the word 'epicure' to denote a man very fond of good eating, was in fact a man of quite extraordinary abstemiousness. He lived upon dry bread, except on feast days when he allowed himself a little cheese. It seems odd that this man should have given rise to the word 'epicure'. The fact that he did so was due to the malignancy of the Stoic School, which was never tired of throwing stones and casting aspersions upon Epicurus and his whole sect. The Stoics stood for a lofty morality, Epicurus stood for a much more humdrum morality. But it was Epicurus and not the Stoics who behaved in a moral manner in the controversy.
      Traditional Chinese history is somewhat curious. After some millennia of Emperors who succeed each other one after another and are plainly legendary, we suddenly come upon a man who is universally known as the First Emperor. He was, in fact, the first who is fully historical. He was a fascist, and he established fascism during the period of his lifetime throughout his domains in China. He burnt the books expressing previous philosophies except for books on agriculture and necromancy. These he thought valuable and preserved, the rest he destroyed. He made a mistake in tactics; and it was that he cut the salaries of the litterati [sic] who were the people who [not only] controlled history in China, but in fact, the only organs of publicity of the time, and, consequently the litterati gave him a very bad press. When he died they decided that this sort of regime wouldn't do. His son was a rather feeble fellow, and they invented a plan by which they would get rid of him. On one occasion there was a very impressive public procession, on a State occasion, and everybody appeared on his very finest charger. The Ministers who surrounded the Second Emperor were determined to make him feel a little queer, and one of their number, instead of being mounted on a horse, was mounted on a camel. The Emperor turned to them and said, 'Why is that man on a camel?' They tapped their foreheads, looked at each other, and said, 'Camel, Your Majesty? I don't see any camel.' And the poor fellow thought he was mad.

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They pursued this policy with one incident after another, and in the end the poor fellow abdicated on the ground that he was insane, and that was the end of that sort of regime. [Cf my notes on Thailand, where I heard the same story but with an elephant]
      In Tzarist Russia there was a sect for which I had great respect because it gave more attention to logic than is customary in ordinary life. It was called the Runners. It held two precepts, each of which seemed to me unquestionable. The first of these precepts was that you should not receive the impress of Anti.Christ, which seemed to me entirely sound. The second was perhaps even more evident; it was that Peter the Great was AntiChrist. Now, it followed from this that you should not accept a Russian passport because it contains the impress of the Tzar, who is descended from Peter the Great, who is Anti-Christ. But in Tzarist Russia you were not allowed to stay for more than twenty.four hours in one place unless you had a passport, and so the Runners had to spend their whole life running from place to place. However, there was a lax sect among the Runners which held that one ought to run, but it was so inconvenient that one could be pardoned for not actually doing it, and these people obtained absolution by keeping open.house for those who actually did run, and in this way the sect continued to exist for a long long time.
      The history of Athens, during the Peloponnesian War, is generally taught in a manner which is utterly unhistorical. There were two parties in Athens: the Democrats and the Aristocrats. The Democrats were vulgar and are held up to opprobrium, the Aristocrats are admired; but in actual fact, since Sparta was aristocratic, the aristocrats in Athens tended to be quislings, and to be traitorous and on the side of Sparta. This however is never taught. Creon, the Democrat, is held up to opprobrium as a vulgarian, although when he was appointed General he won victories. Nicias, the Aristocrat, is admired although he led his country to disaster. He is admired because he was enormously rich and had immense numbers of slaves in the sulphur mines in Sicily, which of course had something to do with his support of the Sicilian expedition. The treachery of the Aristocrats in the navy, which was a particularly aristocratic service, was the ultimate proximate cause of the defeat of Athens in the War. Nevertheless, we are still taught that the Democrats were horrid and vulgar, and the Aristocrats were noble and splendid. And I can even remember during the period when Lloyd George was still a Democrat, children being taught in school that Creon the Democrat was a man like Lloyd George. I wish that the history of Athens could be taught with a little more attention to truth.
      I was for a year a Professor in the University of California, and I learnt some rather interesting things about the economic life of California. During the Depression, most people who had land had been unable to pay the interest on their mortgages, and the mortgages, which were generally held by the Bank of America, had been foreclosed, so that the Bank of America

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owned the greater part of the farming land of California. Now the Bank of America was entirely governed by a certain Italian fascist, a man of very extreme reactionary views, who, in spite of being a fascist, was universally accepted as great and grand because he was so rich. I was credibly informed that if one were to say anything against him one would be assassinated. I don't know whether this was true or not, but it certainly was true that he completely governed the University of California, which had to do whatever he told it. He depended largely upon migrant labour, which was very cheap and very much oppressed, and one man at the University made an investigation of migrant labour, and suggested that the only cure for its troubles would be the formation of trade unions among the migrant labourers. As soon as he had published this document, the University decided that he did not do enough research and was a very bad teacher, and he was therefore dismissed from his post. A certain number of people protested against this action, but the supreme authorities in the University ruled any motion in his defence out of order, and he was sacked and destroyed as a teacher.
      [Wed 19 July, 95: Note on names: I found the name of the sacked man, in a facsimile of Russell's notes in the present book on p 13, 'Beecham the Lecturer'.
      And the following is surely the banker: In 'Encarta' is a brief biography of Amadeo Peter Giannini, 1870-1949, born in San Jose, California. 1904 started 'The Bank of Italy'. 1906 San Francisco earthquake; he salvaged assets and smuggled them under cart of fruits and veg and began trading before anyone else. Bought up small banks and made them into the 'Bank of Italy' too. 1928 Transamerica Corp. 1930: Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association; which made loans to California fruit farmers and lent 'large amounts' to motion picture producers when (says Encarta) no-one else would. 1949: Bank of America largest unincorporated bank in the world, with 3 million depositors and $6 billion assets. >

There has been throughout history, until quite recent times, a conflict between agriculturists and those who went in for pastoral land. This goes a very long way back: one of the most interesting texts in the Bible occurs in Exodus, where it remarks that every shepherd was an abomination unto Egypt. In Egypt they went in for cultivated land and not for pasture, but the Hebrews went in for pasture, and on this ground they had great difficulty in getting themselves admitted into Egypt. This enmity between shepherds and grain growers persisted through the ages, and I found it still in full force when I was in China in 1920. There were no shepherds in China, as in ancient Egypt, but there were shepherds in Mongolia, as in ancient Judaea, and so the Mongolian shepherds became Marxists, since Marx, as every one knows, had lived a pastoral life.
      I have sometimes thought, when considering past epochs in history, that I should like to have been a French liberal aristocrat who died in 1788. Some liberal aristocrats of that period, even though they escaped the guillotine, were less fortunate. There was one who went to the theatre in 1788, and when Marie Antoinette came into the Royal Box, he hissed her, because at that time there was the scandal of the diamond necklace. As he was an aristocrat, he was not treated with the severity which anybody else would have been, but he was put into a lunatic asylum on the grounds that only a lunatic would hiss Marie Antoinette. He thought, 'Well, since I'm here for life I may as well settle down.' So he sent for the manager of the lunatic asylum, and he said, 'Look, I'm going to write a history of Rome, will you kindly bring me paper, ink and pens and such books as I may need.' The manager of the asylum said that he would. And our liberal aristocrat settled down to write the history of Rome. He finished it in 1820. He sent again for the manager of the asylum, and said, 'I have

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finished my history and I wish to dedicate it to Louis XVI.' 'The late Louis XVI, you mean.' 'Tiens, il est mort?' said the aristocrat. 'Oh yes, yes, he's dead,' he replied. 'Well, then, Louis XVII.' 'Oh, he's dead too. A lot of things have happened since you have been here. And then there was a certain Napoleon . but it would take too long to tell you about that.' And so the aristocrat retired, bewildered.
      In the interval between the Jameson Raid and the outbreak of the Boer War, Lord Loch, who had been Governor of South Africa, paid a call on my grandmother; and when he was gone she said, 'It's extraordinary how living in the Colonies makes people forget how to behave.' So we said, 'What was the matter with Lord Loch?' 'Why,' she said, 'he told me that Mrs Kruger complained that Kruger never took off his trousers till after he'd got into bed.' And that shows that life in the Colonies makes people forget how to behave.
      Modern international politics begins with the Boer War, or perhaps even earlier, with the Jameson Raid. When the Jameson Raid proved a fiasco, people were impressed by the vigour with which Chamberlain disowned it. Few people knew, and nobody publicly stated, that because it was being planned, British troops returning from India were brought by way of the Cape so as to be on hand if needed. Still fewer knew that this measure had been sanctioned not only by Chamberlain, but also by the previous Liberal Government. The initial ill success of the British in the Boer War encouraged the Continent to express its hostility, and there was talk of intervention in favour of the Boers by a coalition of France and Germany and Russia. This fell through because their combined navies were not so strong as the British navy, but it frightened the British Government, and made it feel that we needed Continental allies. Joseph Chamberlain offered an alliance to the Germans, but his advances were rebuffed because the Kaiser was determined to have a big navy. Consequently the Foreign Office set to work to make friends with France and Russia. I first heard of this policy before it had been officially adopted, from Sir Edward Grey, then in Opposition.
      I first met H. G. Wells in 1902, at a small discussion society created by Sidney Webb and by him christened 'The Co-efficients', in the hope that we should be jointly efficient. There were about a dozen of us. Some have escaped my memory; among those whom I remember, the most distinguished was Sir Edward Grey, then there was H. J. McKinder, afterwards Sir, who was Reader in Geography at the University of Oxford and a great authority on the then new German subject of Geo-politics. What I found most interesting about him, was that he had climbed Kilimanjaro with a native guide who walked barefoot, except in villages, where he wore dancing pumps. Then there was Amory. [Amery - RW. Jewish names often seem misspelt] And there was Commander Bellairs, a breezy naval officer, who was engaged in a perpetual dingdong battle for the parliamentary representation of King's Lynn with an opponent univers

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ally known as Tommy Bowles, a gallant champion of the army. Commander Bellairs was a Liberal, and Tommy Bowles was a Conservative, but after a while Commander Bellairs became a Conservative and Tommy Bowles became a Liberal. They were thus enabled to continue their duel at King's Lynn. In 1902 Commander Bellairs was half.way on the journey from the old party to the new one. And then there was W. A. S. Hewins, the Director of the London School of Economics. Hewins once told me that he had been brought up a Roman Catholic, but had since replaced faith in the Church by faith in the British Empire. He was passionately opposed to free trade, and was successfully engaged in converting Joseph Chamberlain to tariff reform. I know how large a part he had in this conversion, as he showed me the correspondence between himself and Chamberlain before Chamberlain had come out publicly for tariff reform. I very soon found out that I was too much out of sympathy with most of the Co-efficients to be able to profit by the discussions, or contribute usefully to them. All the members except Wells and myself were Imperialists and looked forward without too much apprehension to a war with Germany. I was drawn to Wells by our common antipathy to this point of view. He was a Socialist and at that time, though not later, considered great wars a folly. Matters came to a head when Sir Edward Grey, then in Opposition, advocated what became the policy of the Ententes with France and Russia, which was adopted by the Conservative Government some two years later, and solidified by Sir Edward Grey when he became Foreign Secretary. I spoke vehemently against this policy, which I felt led straight to world war, but no one except Wells agreed with me. At one of the meetings of the Coefficients, Amory, then still quite young, discussed various possible wars, and his eyes beamed with joy as he said, 'If we fight America we shall have to arm the whole adult male population.' I was in those days still somewhat naïve, and when the Russian navy fired upon British fishermen at the Dogger Bank, I was pleased with Arthur Balfour, of whom in general I thought ill, because he treated the incident in a conciliatory spirit. I did not then realise that he was only preparing bigger and better wars. Still less did I realise that during the General Election of 1906, when the Liberals were supported largely because they were thought less bellicose than the Tories, Sir Edward Grey, without the knowledge of the country, or Parliament, or even the majority of the Cabinet, inaugurated the military and naval conversations with France which committed us in honour to the support of France in war, although Sir Edward Grey repeatedly affirmed in Parliament that we were not committed. Our agreement with France committed us to support the French conquest of Morocco, which was a wholly unjustified imperialist venture and led to violent quarrels with Germany. Our support of Russia had even worse consequences. The Russian Government suppressed the revolt of 1905 with great barbarity, especially in Poland. The Russians also invaded Northern Persia, and induced Sir Edward

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Grey to join them in defeating Morgan Shuster's efforts to introduce an orderly constitutional régime to that country. Every Tzarist atrocity was minimised by Sir Edward Grey, who did everything that public opinion would tolerate to discourage support for Russian and Polish rebels. I became so interested in Persian affairs that I wrote about them with indignation against the British Government. In consequence, a young man at the Persian Legation came to see me to express gratitude, and when he had finished with politics he sang Persian poems to me and explained his theological opinions. I said, 'You do not seem very orthodox.' But he replied, 'Oh, yes I am. My views are those of one of the recognised orthodox sects, namely the Sufis.' He was young, beautiful, idealistic and poetic. Thirty years later in a hotel in Cambridge, I met a fat middle.aged Persian bureaucrat who informed me that he was the Minister of Education. It was the same man.
      In the days when the outbreak of war was visibly approaching, I hoped against hope that England might remain neutral. I knew the Kaiser's Germany, though it had many faults, was more liberal than any Continental regime of the present day, except those of Holland and Scandinavia. Tzarist Russia had filled all liberal.minded people with horror for a long time and I found the thought of going to war in support of it intolerable. I induced a large number of Cambridge Dons to sign a letter to the Press urging neutrality. The day after the war began nine-tenths of them expressed regret at having signed it. The Nation, the liberal weekly edited by Massingham, had an editorial lunch every Tuesday; I went to this lunch on 4 August and found Massingham and his assistant editors all passionately in favour of neutrality. Then hours later England entered the war, and Massingham wrote to me next morning beginning, 'Today is not yesterday . . .' and retracting everything that he had said before. Almost all those who throughout the previous years had opposed Sir Edward Grey, became overnight his passionate supporters. Their excuse was the German invasion of Belgium. I had known for years from friends in the Staff college that it was quite certain that the Germans would invade Belgium in the event of a war. I was amazed to find that leading politicians and journalists had been ignorant of this easily ascertainable fact, and that all their public utterances had been due to this ignorance.
      There were various facts about the origins of the war which were kept dark. Long after it was over, I learnt that before the assassination of [sic] Sarajevo, its imminence was announced by the Serbian Prime Minister to his Cabinet. One of the crucial facts precipitating general war was the mobilisation of the Russian army which was ordered by the War Minister, Sokolnikov, without the knowledge of the Tzar. It was this that led the Germans to break off negotiations with Russia and declare war. But Sokolnikov's patriotism was of a peculiar sort. When the French and English sent supplies to Russia, Sokolnikov sold them to the Germans. Unfortun

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ately for him, the Russian Revolution cut short his enjoyment of the proceeds.
      It was my first experience of mass hysteria on a large scale and I had considerable inward difficulty in withstanding it. I used to think in buses or trains, 'if these people knew what I think, they would tear me to pieces.'
      The Press was filled with untrue atrocity stories. But anyone who questioned them was regarded as a traitor. I was told later on good authority [possibly Arthur Ponsonby's book Falsehood in Wartime (London, 1928) - RW 1997] that moving pictures of atrocities were manufactured by a cinema company in the Bois du Boulogne, and sold to belligerents on both sides impartially, with only a change of captions. The story that the Germans used human corpses to make gelatine was quite deliberately invented by a young man in a Government office in London, but nevertheless it proved very effective and was one of the main causes of the Chinese entry into the war on our side. The supposed idealistic aims of the war gave people an excuse for letting loose a great deal of ferocity, which the decencies of civilised life had until then compelled them to conceal. I remember at a time when the war was going badly and there was some talk of peace, Sidney Webb remarked: 'We must keep the soldiers' noses to the grindstone.' This was a not uncommon attitude among those not liable to military service on account of age or sex or holy orders. Patriotism of course had its limits. When at the outbreak of the war a coalition Government was established, it contained Sir Edward Carson, who had recently bought arms from the Kaiser for use against the British Government, and Bonar Law, whose brother sold arms to the Germans after the outbreak of war. I wrote to a friend in America pointing out how much these men strengthened the war effort, but I think the censorship prevented my letter from arriving. I learnt many years later that in the middle of the war, the Directors of the Nobel Company, of whom some were German, some English, some French, had met in Holland and discussed the affairs of the company which was, naturally, flourishing. In 1917 peace negotiations were well advanced and would probably have been successfully concluded but for the fact that America's entry into the war was obviously imminent. If these negotiations had been allowed to proceed to a successful termination, Kerensky's Government might have survived and Russia would almost certainly have had something better than the Communist regime. Germany would not have been ruined, and there would have been no chance of a Nazi regime. It may therefore be said that we owe both the Nazis and the Communists to Wilson's determination to make the world safe for democracy. The Hang-the-Kaiser election immediately after the armistice was disgraceful both to the country and to the Government. The Government agreed, in reply to popular clamour, that an indemnity of 26 billions should be asked of the Germans. When, after the election, somebody suggested to Lloyd George that this sum was impossibly high, he replied: 'My dear fellow, if the elec

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tion had lasted three weeks longer, the Germans would have had to pay 50 billions.' Lloyd George then and throughout the negotiations in Versailles was perfectly aware that a vindictive public opinion was demanding impossibilities, but he nevertheless proclaimed this awareness and was cynically willing to ruin the world for the sake of his majority.

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image   Review of Bertrand Russell: America 1945-1970   Barry Feinberg: Bertrand Russell's America, 1945-1970

Survey of Russell on 20th century USA but edited by Jews, December 8, 2011

First of two volumes with similar format, dealing with Russell's life in, and writings on, the USA. Volume 1 was published in 1973, shortly after Russell's death; in the period up to 1945, Russell lived, travelled, lectured, and wrote in the USA for a number of years in total.

Volume 2, published about ten years later, looks at Russell's work from 1945, mostly on free speech and related issues, supposed nuclear weapons, Kennedy's murder, the Vietnam War and Russell's Tribunal. He spent little time in the USA, however.

The first half of each book is biographical notes, based on Russell's Autobiography, supplemented typically with letters from the McMaster archives. Then there are plates—photographs and reproductions of cartoons and newspaper articles. The second half is Russell's writings—in the first volume, about 30 pieces, mostly news/ magazine article length. These seem to be reprinted from the relevant sources; if the published form was different from what Russell wrote, it's not stated anywhere.

As might be expected, the editing is Jewish and one can have no faith in its reliability; the feeling is as though edited by Jesuits. The lead up to the Second World War shows no awareness of the brutal viciousness of the USSR, and Hitler is presented as a serious risk to the entire world. The facts of Polish aggression and Britain declaring war aren't mentioned. India presents a problem to Russell which he couldn't solve. There's an extract from a letter from an American, presented with some horror, saying that Britain already dragged the US into a war which was none of its business—something Russell himself must have agreed with at one point, since he wasn't happy about the US entry into WW1. Russell must have been aware of people writing against Jews, as there were so many, including Mencken; and there were issues such as Speyer 'trading with the enemy'. But, if so, none of this appears in these volumes. There is of course information on the New York scandals surrounding Russell, and the sexual views/ freedom of speech/ academic freedom accusations, the details of which are not satisfactorily teased out. Russell's generous treatment by Barnes is only partially explained; it puzzles me why Barnes didn't simply help with Russell's History of Western Philosophy, rather than insist on lectures to not very interested parties, and what seems other rather pointless work. The falling-out is written entirely against Barnes; in view of the points of dispute, such as Russell's wife knitting in lectures, and Barnes seemingly knowing nothing of early philosophy, it's hard to form any sensible opinion. In volume 2 there's discussion of Sobell-Rosenberg, showing Russell at his most oratorical, and gullible; he based himself entirely on a book on the case, assumed there were no nuclear secrets, although it's hard to see how he could possibly have known. In my opinion, the 'spies' were simply a charade to support the pretence that the USSR Jews had atomic weapons. Volume 2 has fewer articles than volume 1, including shortish pieces—'What American [sic] Could Do With the Atomic Bomb' and several pieces on black militancy—plus longer pieces on the Vietnam War, and war crimes, ending with 'The Entire American People Are On Trial'—all of course censored out of the Jewish mass media, then and now. Poor Russell was misrepresented by the New York Times and the BBC etc but seems to have been unable to learn from this. Russell didn't seem to realise that the war was expensive -

Anyway ... a valuable collection of Russelliana, and Americana. Shows Russell's passion, but also indirectly reveals how information is controlled. It's hard to believe it's completely reliable.
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Political Ideals [US only] 1917 [UK 1963]
political ideal
The illustration is 'Dutch 17th century engraving' of a candle flame lighting another candle. '17th century Dutch' refers no doubt to William of Orange and Jews/Protestants
I must admit to only recently having noticed the strange publishing history of this smallish book, published in 1963, number 37 of 44 in the Unwin Books series. I'd guess it is about half the length of Principles of Social Reconstruction. It seems to have been published in the USA after Principles of Social Reconstruction. It is unmentioned in Russell's Autobiography. It is also not mentioned in Ronald Clark's biography, though some of the surrounding detail, for example the first chapter being read out at a talk in Glasgow by Smillie, a coal miner leader, does appear. The list 'Books by Bertrand Russell' on page 2 of Political Ideals does not include itself!

I'd guess the book is a collection of separate talks or writings, though the sources are nowhere that I can find. Justice in Wartime is a similar collection of essays.

The five chapters are:
I. Political Ideals
II. Capitalism and the Wage System
III. Pitfalls in Socialism
IV. Individual Liberty and Public Control
V. National Independence and Nationalism

Russell was in fine oratorical form, making statements one after the other in a verbally-skilled manner. However, the content is lacking; I can imagine many American readers exploding with annoyance, but being unable to answer, in a similar way that Chomsky must have enraged some whites, but never received much in the way of serious comment. Remember, this book is better than most people could manage to write!
      The technique resembles a Jewish method: appeal to a group of persons, praise them, and make them out to be victims, and back up that support anonymously by Jews pretending to have an interest in them. By the time they learn they've been deceived, it's too late.

I won't attempt to review the chapters. I'll just make a few points. Note that some of the book resembles modern American Jewish oratory; handy phrases may have been borrowed from Russell. One of these is 'creativity': Russell praises this, as one of his ideals, without defining it in detail. If he'd thought about it, he would have noticed that 'creativity' can be harmful. At the time he wrote, bombing planes and high explosives were absorbing vast creative efforts; so were creative lies and propaganda, and creative plans for population replacements. Just a few simple examples. And creativity may not be important: people may love allotments and growing giant marrows, but what help is that?
      Another important hate word is 'Capitalism', which Russell never defines, annoyingly. In this way, questions about money and the Rothschilds are unasked; people treat money as something given, which they are not to investigate.
      Russell does notice that there is no sharp division between people who may think of themselves on the side of Capitalism, or Labour: 'the proletariat and the capitalist'. Unlike between Turks and Armenians. An important word, only detectable by skilled readers, is Jews, which are never mentioned seriously: is there a sharp dividing-line between Jews and non-Jews? the Federal Reserve ought to have been common knowledge, but is not in Russell. We have mention of 'minorities': Russell mentions gipsies, and the Irish. But not lawyers, or bankers, or experts, or for that matter families of aristocrats, who presumably are 'minorities' too. And we have 'prejudice', in its now-usual standardised subtly misleading senses—Russell didn't bother with the completely rational bases for quick judgements.
      On nations, it is rather remarkable that Russell, trying to define a 'nation', says in effect that if people feel they are a nation, then they are—race, language, and history being of manipulable importance. Even this seems to be Jew-friendly, designed to ignore internal stresses.

Russell liked oratory (a letter quoted in Clark explains why he prefers his own style to plain statements, comparing the process to Beethoven's supposed exploration of themes). He states 'There is nothing for the politician to consider outside or above the various men, women, and children who compose the world.' There must have been many would-be readers who regarded Russell, correctly in fact, as a type of preacher, failing to be helpful.

I could, and do, wish that Russell had found a way to treat these matters as sets, or groups, in a neutral mathematical sense.

Russell knew little about forces for war: he says somewhere that capitalism can be praised in four categories, one being that it maximises output. His example is absurd: war in South Africa gave Capitalism diamonds and gold! Maximisation of output presumably might included housing and food, something which the ANC ('African National Congress' - in fact of course a Jewish organisation) hasn't come anywhere near a century later. Russell had no evident conscious awareness that war can make money; he says it's bad business, and that most countries for most of the time are at peace, when in fact both the USA and UK were continually at war, and the 'national debt' in both countries was a significant money-maker for lenders. Russell has no feel for the funding of militarism; many young people got more money, and had access to training of a sort and expensive weaponry, so that—if they faced far weaker groups—it could be argued they were rational in joining up.

Worth quoting is Russell on the [British or supposedly British] civil service: A large part of the best brains of the country are in the civil service, where the condition of their employment is silence about the evils which cannot be concealed from them. He meant, I presume, that they all had to sign the relatively recent Official Secrets Act. The 'best brains' is a bit of a joke; did anyone really believe that 21-year olds, schooled in Plato and Caesar and the classics, knew everything there was to know? Russell also said: This system ['... far better that men should be rewarded for working well than that they should be punished for working badly] is already in operation in the civil service, where a man is only dismissed for some exceptional degree of vice or virtue, such as murder or illegal abstention from it.

It's difficult to know, looking back over a century or so, how much information Russell in fact knew. Was he aware that Bernard Baruch was in control of the whole of US industry, for example? Or what the nominal President, Woodrow Wilson, was blackmailed by Untermyer (or other spellings) to co-operate with Jews? Or that plans had been made to fake a revolution in Russia and its empire of surrounding countries, and install a Jewish oligarchy? Or that war decisions were being made largely according to international Jews decisions on money-making from armaments?
      Even at less important levels, Russell's analyses are worryingly evasive. Should, for example, everyone in an organisation have a voice in how it is run? Clearly—something obvious to Jews—this would allow subversion, and weakening, to the possible advantage of rivals. Russell says, of schoolteachers, that their union bargaining power is very weak; he might have pointed out the curious duality in education, that it is supposed to create an educated populace, but it also has to supply money to teachers. He might have made other points, which are clearer now than then, to show that teacher unions are stronger than might have been imagined; but I doubt if Russell could have guessed that teachers could be forced into teaching assorted perversions, for example, backed completely by their 'unions'.
      Significantly, Russell treats 'ownership' without analysis, without really noticing, much as Tolkien assumes hobbits have land-ownership and wills and inheritance. Many people today talk of 'billionaires' without understanding how 'value' depends on future streams of income, and needs quite a huge structure of land registration, company law, stable property enforcement.

On the USA, many people seem to have thought, following Jews, that Russell was a silly pinko; others. following Jews, thought he was rather sublime and ingenious, also following Jews. All I have is a few reviews; I quote Caroline Moorehead, late enough to be able to read a few newspaper reviews online: the Chicago Dial and (this is Principles of Social Reconstruction) the International Journal of Ethics. You have to wonder, especially in view of Russell's appeal to Wilson to enter the war, essentially on the jew side, whether Russell wasn't just representing aristocrats.

At this distance in time, it seems Russell may have been a useful idiot, saying nothing useful to opponents of wars, and raising hopes in people who liked reading and speculation, leaving only a few fine phrases, but nothing substantial. I'd guess anyone with serious arguments against the 'Great War' would have been well and truly censored. Russell had his fun, was discussed as though he was a serious opponent, and in fact did nothing.

The value of this book really is a practice ground for clear thinking; each chapter is short enough to work through, several times, and see the tricks, and try to do better.

© RW 6 May 2020

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Review of Bertrand Russell   The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism

Shows Russell as a Dishonest Aristocrat in Thrall to Jews
  © Rae West 2000; First uploaded 2000-07-31

Russell's deliberate omission of Jews from his study of Bolshevism: Why?
Exchange of E-mails looking at Russell's Practice and Theory of Bolshevism. Late 1998. These are from russell-l, a group closed in May 2000. All emails (except for the first) unedited and unaltered, except for formatting and cutting of header info. Too long for inclusion here; they open in a new window, and are in my piece Bertrand Russell, Dupe of Racist Jews.
Bertrand Russell to Morrell soon after leaving the USSR. Autobiography vol II (1968).
Bertrand Russell visited the new 'Soviet Union' in 1920, arriving on May 11th and leaving on June 16th. The official delegation he accompanied (not as an official delegate) was fêted with regimental bands, banquets, speeches, and military reviews. About a week later he wrote to Ottoline Morrell from Sweden—see illustration, right. Two or three months later (September) he wrote the preface to his new book, which was first published in 1920, according to its copyright page. My paperback copy records no reprints until 1949, when he dropped a chapter written by Dora, his woman companion of 1920, and altered the word "Communism" to "Socialism" 'in many places', 'in order to conform to modern usage'. He wrote that, at the time, there was no sharp distinction between the two words.
      The point of this brief note is to point out that Russell, who was perfectly aware of the Jewish nature of the Revolution, or coup, consistently failed to mention it in this book.
      And he continued to fail to mention Jewishness in modern politics, so far as I know both privately as well as in public (though I haven't attempted to check this in detail). For example Russell's character-sketches of Beatrice Webb go into considerable detail as to her family background (something like war profiteers from the Crimean War), her habits (strange use of the word 'we', fasting, dining), and influence with politicians. But Sidney Webb is left a much shadowier figure—he was industrious, in fact very industrious, not very scrupulous, and had been a civil servant. But his Jewishness is omitted, as is any psychological point or philosophical outlook which might be attributed to Jewishness. Even his real name isn't given.
      Why this should be, I have no rational (or irrational) explanation. Russell happily said unpleasant things about Americans, authors, bishops, bookmakers, businessmen, Christians, Muslims, politicians, Russians and so forth. Why this taboo? The following remarks don't address the issue directly I leave it to the reader to note the ways the omission distorted Russell's analyses.

    First mention of Jews in The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism
  • Just two pages from The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (right) contain references to Jews; and one of them is encoded. Compare this with Russell's letter, above.
  • Russell chose the word 'Bolshevism' in the title carefully. The word 'communist' had a sort of vague meaning; suggesting Italian Comune, the Paris commune, millennarians and perhaps medieval monks (although their vows to poverty were something of a fake, as the institution itself was rich). Russell adopted the Russian meaning when he wrote (p. xi): 'A full-fledged Communist is not merely a man who believes that land and capital should be held in common, and their produce distributed as nearly equally as possible. He is a man who entertains a number of elaborate and dogmatic beliefs..' and he wrote 'Communism may become as unimportant [to Bolshevism] as abstaining from alcohol is in Islam.' Ironically, there was real communism of a sort: 'To a remarkable extent, each village is an independent unit. So long as the Government obtains the food and the soldiers that it requires, it does not interfere, and leaves untouched the old village communism...' (p. 66)
  • Russell corrects the view he says was held in England by advanced Socialists, who '.. think of the dictatorship of the proletariat as merely a new form of representative government, in which only working men and women have votes, and the constituencies are partly occupational.. They think that "proletariat" means "proletariat", but "dictatorship" does not quite mean "dictatorship." This is the opposite of the truth. When a Russian Communist speaks of dictatorship, he means the word literally, but when he speaks of the proletariat, he uses the word in a Pickwickian sense. He means the "class-conscious" part of the proletariat, i.e. the Communist Party.'
          When Russell arrived, the system of 'Soviets' was 'moribund'. (p. 40)
          How was this done? 'No conceivable system of free election would give majorities to the Communists, either in town or in country. Various methods are therefore adopted.. voting is by show of hands, so that all who vote against the Government are marked men. .. no candidate who is not a Communist can have any printing done, the printing works being all in the hands of the State. .. he cannot address any meetings.. The whole of the press, is of course, official; .. it is easy for the Government to exercise pressure over the election of the Executive Committee, and again over the election of the Presidium. ... in the villages.. I was met always with the reply that they were not represented at all.. if they elected a non-Communist representative he could not obtain a pass on the railway.. All real power is in the hands of the Communist Party, who number about 600,000 in a population of about 120 millions. ..' (pp. 41-43)
          What had this to do with the belief 'that land and capital should be held in common, and their produce distributed as nearly equally as possible'?
  • It's very important to understand the deliberate confusion of socialism, communism, bolshevism, and the rest. There was enormous opposition to socialism by a mixed bag of people, and it was useful to be able to point to a disaster and say "Look, that's socialism." In my view, 'communist' organisations and theory have been tacitly encouraged, because of their uselessness, and socialist organisations and theory discouraged. Britain's LSE illustrates the sort of thing.
          Another myth is the idea that revolutionaries were persecuted: '.. all the older members of the party have proved their sincerity by years of persecution. ..' In fact the conditions were lenient. The real victims were the soldiers (more than a million killed?) and the peasants fighting the Germans. The revolutionaries mostly had a relatively easy time, typically in the US, in Switzerland, or safe in camps.
  • As Russell points out, Marxist theory predicted revolution in the USA. He doesn't emphasise the essential absurdity of the Russian situation: 85% of the population were peasants, and most of the remaining 15% must have been soldiers, government workers, teachers, domestics and so on. Perhaps 4% were workers in the Marxist proletarian sense. This of course is why 'workers' had to be altered to 'workers and peasants'.
          Also, note the general assumption that peasants are ignorant, drunken, stupid, etc. The fact that they survived in inhospitable surroundings and fed themselves etc shows some skill. In fact they embody 'primitive communism' in the phrase of Engels.
  • Russell invented or took up the claim that 'bureaucracy' might become the main problem (this was, I think, Weber's new and perhaps exciting word). It is of course absurd—bureaucrats don't oppress, round-up, and kill people.
  • It's important to understand various attitudes to Russia and 'Communism':—
    1. Russia had an empire both west (bits of Poland) and east (places like Siberia, Khamchatka). It was important for English ideology to claim that Britain was much more civilised. So, it was habitual to call the entire Russian empire 'Russia', so they could talk about the horrors of Russia under the Tsar. Whereas India was not called 'England'!
    2. This permitted considerable hypocrisy. Thus Russell, after the Second World War, contemplating nuclear weapons, said that Russia had always been imperialist.
    3. It's important to realise there was great hostility to the Russian empire. This appears for example in Kipling, and his 'great game'. The Germans and the Jews were not the only people anxious for Russia's downfall.
    4. 'Marx has taught that Communism is fatally predestined to come about; this fits in with the Oriental traits in the Russian character, and produces a state of mind not unlike that of the early successors of Mahomet. Opposition is crushed without mercy...' Russell believed in Asiatic characteristics for most of his life. He doesn't explain why, if something is inevitable, people should be energetic; why not just sit back and wait?
    5. Russell also insisted on the stupidity of the peasants whose 'reasons for disliking the Bolsheviks are very inadequate. .. the peasants are better off than they ever were before. I saw no one—man woman, or child—who looked underfed in the villages. The big landowners are dispossessed, and the peasants have profited. ..' (pp. 43-44). In fact, the peasants achieved this partly as a result of Tsarist reforms, and partly as a result of taking things into their own hands as the First World War dissolved into chaos. The Bolsheviks did nothing for them.
    6. Also, Russians are lazy. This contrasts oddly with: '.. The fact is that the rations [BR doesn't state what they were] are not sufficient, .. food in the market costs about fifty times the fixed Government price. .. Some do additional work..' (63) 'By proclaiming itself the friend of the proletarian, the Government has been enabled to establish an iron discipline, beyond the wildest dreams of the most autocratic American magnate. ..' (59) '.. very many people do extra work, because the official rates do not afford a living wage. .. When the day's work is over, a great deal of time has to be spent in fetching food and water...' (57)
    7. Russell accepted the legend of Lenin as a sort of superman. 'Napoleon said you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them; Lenin disproved the exception' Russell wrote, years later (from memory—this quotation mayn't be exactly correct). The facts of secret financial support by the Germans and various others weren't guessed by Russell.
    Russell in the New Leader: Note his utter naïveté about so-called Jews:
    The death of Lenin [1924] makes the world poorer by the loss of the one really great man produced by the war. It seems probable that our age will go down to history as that of Lenin and Einstein—the two men who have succeeded in a great work of synthesis in an analytic age, one in thought, the other in action. Lenin appeared to the outraged bourgeoisie of the world as a destroyer, but it was not the work of destruction that made him pre-eminent. Others could have destroyed, but I doubt whether any other living man could have built so well on the new foundations. His mind was orderly and creative; ...
  • Second, and last, coded mention of Jews in The Practice and Theory of BolshevismRussell talked to Lenin for an hour, saw Trotsky at the opera, listened to Kamenev, and was 'acquainted' with Sverdlov, the 'Acting Minister of Transport'. He also met, and liked, Gorky: '.. very ill... heartbroken.. begged me.. always to emphasize what Russia had suffered. He supports the Government.. because the possible alternatives are worse. One felt.. a love of the Russian people.. All the intellectuals whom I met—a class who have suffered terribly—expressed their gratitude to him..' (pp 38-39)
  • Russell has an interesting chapter (at the start of his 'theory' section) on 'the materialist conception of history', i.e. economic determinism, in which he comments that other determinisms (climate, sex) are just as possible, and other remarks which however aren't very relevant here. Another interesting chapter looks at 'Deciding Forces in Politics', a theme he liked and which appeared in other books, as e.g. 'politically important desires'. His theory chapter however is weak on Marxism (for example, the 'labour theory of value') an omission he remedied much later in his jointly-written book on 19th century history.
  • Pages 28-9 have Russell's comparison with Plato's Republic, which, he thought, annoyed many people. He also says: 'The Communists in many ways resemble the British public-school type: they have all the good and bad traits of an aristocracy which is young and vital. They are courageous, energetic, capable of command, always ready to serve the State; on the other hand, they are dictatorial.. They are practically the sole possessors of power, and they enjoy innumerable advantages in consequence..' A.J.P. Taylor made the same point, that Communism instilled self-confidence. Here again, the facts seem a bit more complicated. Possibly there is such a thing as endogenous self-confidence; but, usually, self-confidence is instilled by outside circumstances—being part of a large group, for example, or owning money. Their self-confidence is equally attributable to their position.
  • In retrospect, one of the distinctive features of 'communism' was its lack of prosperity. Was this caused by money being secretly siphoned away? Or weapons production? Or incompetence? Or was it that simple arithmetic shows that a country with little industry must take longer to build things up than one with more? It's difficult to be certain, and Russell brings up the possibility that the Soviet Union might sustain an enormous industrial revolution. Most people have no experience in building up industries or infrastructure, and so find it impossible to judge. So this made quite an effective scare story, as did the idea that 'the doctrines of Communism are almost certain, in the long run, to make progress among American wage-earners..' (p 75). It's curious just how uncreative the experiment was. Consider industries which have been distinctive of the 20th century: motor vehicles and air flight. In neither case did the new arrangement achieve much. Even such things as battery chickens, for which 'Communism' might have seem well adapted, weren't developed there.
  • A final point, to emphasise the lack of understanding by people who are (or in many cases pretend to be) on the left: Ken Coates' 1995 foreword states that 'All attempts by the left to replicate its previous experience have been blocked..' his two examples being the Chinese revolution, which in my view unsurprisingly was unique, and Cuba not being repeated in Bolivia. But in fact, Hungary and Poland, and no doubt other less well-documented places (for example, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), had 'revolutions' very like the USSR ones, also Jewish, in the aftermath of war.


Further note: Russell had an odd relationship with the Pole Joseph Conrad (not his real name)—Russell said Conrad was every inch the Polish aristocrat, and Russell's Autobiography has the two men in mutual exultation together reaching the 'central fire'. Conrad has of course become established as an official great writer in English. But an interesting aspect is the rôle of Jews in Poland; Conrad's The Secret Agent perhaps is Jewish rather than Polish, though I doubt if this possible aspect of Conrad is even mentioned in today's grey close atmosphere of suppression.
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THE ANALYSIS OF MIND 1921
This is a very interesting book, because
1. Russell was a master stylist; it's usually possible to see what he means.
2. When he wrote, computers did not exist. There were no man-made objects which could appear to mimic the 'mind'. Mind and body seemed very different, and Russell's attempts to feel for some machinery to explain thinking should be considered.
3. After the 'Great War', Russell believed most people wanted war, at least if the conditions were right. This led him to take the view that people were controlled by impulse and pushed to activity, rather than attracted and pulled by objectives and aims.
4. At the time he wrote, Jewish theories were not highly represented in official publishing and universities and medicine.
5. His book had been delivered as lectures. So there's a time-limitation constraint on each chapter. This gives each chapter a unity, very helpful in practice, and one of many reasons I recommend it.
6. He knew such people as William James and Dewey and John Watson, and was familiar with 'pragmatism', though not with its Jewish roots.
7. He was aware (mostly through books) of animal experimentation and instincts, and of course the ideas within evolution.

The chapter titles are:
I. RECENT CRITICISMS OF “CONSCIOUSNESS”
II. INSTINCT AND HABIT
III. DESIRE AND FEELING
IV. INFLUENCE OF PAST HISTORY ON PRESENT OCCURRENCES IN LIVING ORGANISMS
V. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL CAUSAL LAWS
VI. INTROSPECTION
VII. THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION
VIII. SENSATIONS AND IMAGES
IX. MEMORY
X. WORDS AND MEANING
XI. GENERAL IDEAS AND THOUGHT
XII. BELIEF
XIII. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
XIV. EMOTIONS AND WILL
XV. CHARACTERISTICS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA

A pdf format (i.e. photocopy style) of the book can be downloaded from here https://archive.org/details/analysisofmind032971mbp

Review of Bertrand Russell   The ABC of Atoms

Diligent Summary by Russell of Atomic Theory, Taken Entirely from Publications
  These comments uploaded 14 Feb 2016
By 'Bertrand Russell FRS' published by E P Dutton in New York, and Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co in London. Unindexed. About 175 pages; not much per page; about 30,000 words. Russell was about 51 when this was published. As far as I can tell, Russell relied on books for his material: I don't think he spent time in laboratories, or with men using physics apparatus. As a result, he was not well equipped to note mistakes resulting from practical misinterpretations, or to note practicalities needed in making equipment and possibly consequent sequence of discoveries. And he liked everyday explanations—see for example his descriptions of transverse waves and longitudinal waves, below. His chapter sequence therefore is not very securely thought out. This may help explain his misleading title. He did not speculate; for example the sequence 2, 8, 18 in electron shells suggests geometrical explanations, for example surface areas of spheres of radii 1, 2, and 3, but Russell avoids such possibilities. Most of the notes consist of my extracts from his book, made in the 1980s or 1990s. I haven't used Greek letters.

CONTENTS:
I   INTRODUCTORY
II   THE PERIODIC LAW
III   ELECTRONS AND NUCLEI
IV   THE HYDROGEN SPECTRUM
V   POSSIBLE STATES OF THE HYDROGEN ATOM
VI   THE THEORY OF QUANTA
VII   REFINEMENTS OF THE HYDROGEN SPECTRUM
VIII   RINGS OF ELECTRONS
IX   X-RAYS
X   RADIO-ACTIVITY
XI   THE STRUCTURE OF NUCLEI
XII   THE NEW PHYSICS AND THE WAVE THEORY OF LIGHT
XIII   THE NEW PHYSICS AND RELATIVITY
APPENDIX   [Four pages: BOHR'S THEORY OF THE HYDROGEN SPECTRUM]

MY NOTES ON CONTENTS:

I INTRODUCTORY
- [Attempt to describe scale, not unlike Wells on the universe:] .. Let us start with a gramme of hydrogen, which is not a very large quantity. [Footnote says a gramme is about one 453rd of a pound] How many atoms will it contain? If the atoms were made up into bundles of a million million, then we took a million million of these bundles, then we should have about a gramme and a half of hydrogen. That is to say, the weight of one atom of hydrogen is about a million millionth of a million millionths of a gramme and a half. Other atoms weigh more than the atom of hydrogen, but not enormously more. .. An atom of oxygen weighs sixteen times as much .. Per contra , an electron weighs very much less than a hydrogen atom. It takes about 1850 electrons to weigh as much as one hydrogen atom.

The space occupied by an atom is equally minute. As we shall see, an atom of a given size is not always of the same size. When it is not crowded, the electrons which constitute its planets sometimes are much farther from its sun than they are under normal terrestrial conditions. But under normal conditions the diameter of a hydrogen atom is about a hundred millionth of a centimetre. [A centimetre is about a third of an inch]. That is to say, this is about twice the usual distance .. one electron from the nucleus. It might be thought that not much could be known about such minute phenomena, since they are very far below what can be seen by the most powerful microscope, but in fact a great deal is known. What has been discovered about atoms and molecules is doubly amazing. In the first place it is contrary what every man of science expected, and in part very difficult to reconcile with other knowledge and with deep-seated prejudices. In the second place it seems to the laymen hardly credible that such very small things should be not only observable but measurable with a high degree of accuracy. Sherlock Holmes at his best did not show anything like the skill of the physicists at making inferences, subsequently verified, from minute facts which ordinary people would have thought unimportant. ... There are three methods by which most of our knowledge is obtained: the spectroscope, X-rays, and radio-activity. ... All the atoms except that of hydrogen present some problems which are too difficult for mathematicians, in spite of the fact that they are largely of a kind that has been studied ever since the time of Newton. Although exact quantitative solutions of the questions that arise are often impossible, it is not impossible, even for the more complex atoms, to discover the sort of thing that is happening when they emit light, or X-rays, or radio-activity. When an atom has many electrons, it seems that they are arranged in successive rings round the nucleus, all revolving around it approximately in circles or ellipses... The chemical properties of the atom depend almost entirely upon the outer ring; so does the light that it emits, which is studied by the spectroscope. The inner rings of electrons give rise to X-rays when they are disturbed, and it is chiefly by means of X-rays that their constitution is studied. The nucleus itself is the source of radio-activity. In radium and the other radio-active elements, the nucleus is unstable, and is apt to shoot out little particles with incredible velocity. ..

Nowadays, transmutation, the dream of the alchemists, take place in laboratories, but unfortunately it does not transform the baser metals into gold; it transforms radium, which is infinitely more valuable than gold [sic], into lead - of a sort. ... One of the most astonishing things about the processes that take place in atoms is that they seem to be liable to sudden discontinuities, sudden jumps from one state of continued motion to another. The motion of an electron round its nucleus seems to be like that of a flea, which crawls for a while, and then hops. The crawls proceed accurately according to the old laws of dynamics, but the hops were a new phenomenon, concerning which certain totally new laws have been discovered empirically, without any possibility, so far as can be seen, of connecting them with the old laws....

II THE PERIODIC LAW
.. January 22nd of 1923.. last discovery of a new element.. hafnium announced in Copenhagen..

.. [Radio-activity:] .. The word atom originally meant indivisible. It comes to us from the Greeks... We now know what are called atoms can be cut up, except in the case of positively electrified hydrogen.. but in chemistry apart from radioactivity there is nothing to prove the atoms can be divided... some instinct rebels against the idea of its [viz. the universe] being built of eighty-eight different sorts of things. Physicists have now all but succeeded in reducing matter to two different kinds of units [i.e. basically proton and electron]

.. Mendeleev .. periodic law which was discovered about the year 1870. .. The fact that very many atomic weights are almost exactly whole numbers cannot be due to chance, and has long been regarded as a reason for supposing that atoms are built up out of small units.

.. Lothar Meyer, a German chemist observed that the elements which occurred at periodic intervals resembled other elements, for example, "the alkalis", 3rd, 11th, 19th etc in the series.. alkaline earths.. inert gases..

Once the periodic law had been discovered it was found that a great many properties of elements were periodic. This gave a principle of arrangement of the elements.. Argon, an inert gas, has the atomic weight 39.88, whereas potassium.. has 39.10, but nevertheless argon has to be placed before potassium.

.. There are seven periods of unequal length [sic]. The first contains only two elements, hydrogen and helium. The second and third each contain eight... The elements are placed in a series beginning with hydrogen and ending with uranium. .. What is called the "atomic number" of an element is simply its place in this series. .. irregularities, for example the sixteen rare earths that do not correspond to any of the other elements.. iron and two neighbouring elements have magnetic properties.. [Russell also talks of the atomic weights of the earlier elements being double, or one more than double, the atomic number, apart from hydrogen, but after the twentieth element the atomic weight becomes increasingly more than double]

III ELECTRONS AND NUCLEI
- [Mentions the cloud chamber, though not by this name, or attributing it to Wilson] .. water vapour.. each electron collecting a little cloud which can be made visible with a powerful microscope.. [Russell seems not to realise that visible condensation would be vastly greater than an electron]

Some readers may expect me at this stage to tell them what electricity "really is". The fact is that I have already said what it is. It is not a "thing" like St Paul's Cathedral. It is a way in which things behave. When we have told how things behave when they are electrified, and under what circumstances they are electrified, we have told all there is to tell. [I wonder if this is a tribute to 'behavorism'? - RW] .. velocity is about one 134th of the velocity of light. Thus the electron manages to cover about 2,200 kilometres, or about 1400 miles, in every second. .. The modern man is supposed to have a passion for rapid motion, but nature far surpasses him in this respect. ... Helium has two electrons, lithium three and so on, until we come to uranium, like the Grand Turk, with 92 consorts revolving round him. .. When, by any means, an atom is robbed of one of its electrons it becomes positively electrified; if it is robbed of two electrons it becomes doubly electrified and remains electrified until it has an opportunity of annexing from elsewhere as many electrons as it has lost. A body can be negatively electrified by containing free electrons; an atom may for a short time have more than its proper number of electrons, and thus become negatively electrified, but this is an unstable condition, except in chemical combinations.

[Orbits:] We know that the electrons must all orbit around the nucleus in orbits which are roughly circles or ellipses, but they will be perturbed from the circular or elliptic path by the repulsions of the other electrons. .. in the solar system, the attractions which the planets exercise .. are very minute, but the electrical forces between two electrons are not very much less strong than the forces between electrons and nucleus at the same distance - in the case of helium, they are half as strong; with lithium, a third as strong; and so on. This makes the perturbations much greater than they are in the solar system, and the mathematics correspondingly more difficult. .. The first hypothesis was that the electrons were like people in a merry-go-round, all going round in circles.. but for various reasons the arrangement cannot be as simple as that. .. It is impossible to get a ring to hold more than a certain number of electrons, and it has been suggested by Neils Bohr, in an extremely ingenious speculation, that a ring can hold more electrons when it has other rings outside it than when it is the outer ring. This theory accounts extraordinarily well for peculiarities of the periodic table.. though it cannot yet be regarded as certainly true. .. Thus krypton [this is Bohr's speculation] the inert gas which completes the fourth period will still have only eight electrons in its outer ring, but will have eighteen in the third ring. .. Some elements in the fourth period differ from their immediate predecessors not as regards the outer ring, but by having one more electron in the third ring. These are the elements that do not correspond accurately to any elements in the third period. Similarly, the fifth period, which again consists of eighteen elements, will add its new electrons partly in the new fifth ring, and partly in the fourth, ending with xenon which will have eight in the fifth ring, eighteen in the fourth, and the other rings as in krypton.. If we accept Bohr's theory, the outer ring, when it is completed, always has eight electrons except in hydrogen and helium. There is a tendency for atoms to combine so as to make up the full number of electrons in the outer ring.' [He gives an example of an 'alkali' and, I was expecting him to mention 'halogen' but he says 'an element next but one before an inert gas]

IV THE HYDROGEN SPECTRUM
.. The spectroscope has supplied the experimental facts, but the interpretation of the facts required an extraordinarily brilliant piece of theorising by a young Dane, Neils Bohr, who when he first propounded his theory in 1913 was still working under Rutherford. The original theory has since been modified and developed, notably by Sommerfeld, ... We are concerned with the explanation of the lines emitted by different elements. Why does an element have a spectrum consisting of certain sharp lines? What connection is there between the different lines and a single spectrum? Why are the lines sharp instead of being diffuse bands of colours? Until recent years, no answer whatever was known to these questions; now the answer is known with a considerable approach to completeness. In the two cases of hydrogen and positively electrified helium, the answer is exhaustive; everything as been explained down to the tiniest peculiarities. .. The mathematics involved in the case of atoms that have many electrons is too difficult to enable us to deduce their spectra completely from theory, as we can in the simplest cases. In the cases that can be worked out, the calculations are not difficult. [Footnote refers to Norman Campbell, 'Series Spectra' 1921, and a book by Sommerfeld]

.. [Description of transverse waves and longitudinal waves: Russell compares a longitudinal wave to a procession marching up Piccadilly, which is stopped by a policeman time after time, .. compression wave.. travel down the procession.. when people begin to move out at the front they will begin to thin out again. Whereas a transverse wave he illustrates by a policeman on a horse, riding along the edge of the procession, so that people on his right move to the left and the movement to the left will travel along the procession as the policeman rides on]

.. [Speed of light and speed of sound]

.. People have invented a medium, the aether, for the express purpose of transmitting light waves, but all we really know is that the waves are transmitted; the aether is purely hypothetical and does not really add anything to our knowledge. We know the mathematical properties of light waves .. but we do not know what it is that undulates; we only suppose that something must undulate, because we find it difficult to imagine waves otherwise.

Different colours of the rainbow have different wavelengths, that is to say different distances between the crest of one wave and the crest of the next.. [Red, violet.. longest waves those of the sort used in wireless telegraphy.. X-rays are much shorter.. gamma rays the shortest we know].. Any waves that are too long or too short to be seen can nevertheless be photographed, so in speaking of the spectrum we .. do not confine ?ourself to visible colours but include all experimentally discoverable waves.. for example, X-ray spectra.. a recent discovery beginning in 1912..

.. wave-number.. the number of waves in a centimetre. Thus, if the wavelength is 1/10000 of a centimetre, the wave number is 10,000. .. The wave number is also sometimes called the "frequency", but this term is more properly employed to express the number of waves that pass given point in a second. This is obtained by multiplying the wave-number by the number of centimetres that light travels in a second, i.e. thirty thousand million. These three terms: wavelength, wave-number and frequency must be borne in mind in reading spectroscopic work,

.. For many years no progress was made. .. It was supposed there must be one fundamental line [of hydrogen] and that the others must be like harmonics in music. ..

At last in 1908 a curious discovery was made by W Ritz, which equalled the Principle of Combination. He found that all the lines were connected with a certain number of inferred wave numbers, which are called "terms", in such a way that every line has a wave-number which is the difference of two terms, and the difference between any two terms (apart from certain easily explicable exceptions) gives a line. [Russell gives an analogy:] .. eccentric shopkeeper.. the only sums ever spent by his customers were 19/11, 19/-, 15/-, 10/-, 9/11, 9/-, 5/-, 4/11, 4/-, 11d. At first these sums might seem to have no connection with each other, but if it were worth your while you might presently notice.. they are the sums that would be spent by customers who gave 20s, 10s, 5s, or 1s, and got 10s, 5s, 1s, or 1d in change. .. The oddity would be explained if you found the shopkeeper's eccentricity took the form of him insisting of giving one coin or note in change, no more, no less. The sums spent in the shop correspond to the lines in the spectrum, while the sums of 20s, 10s, 5s, 1s and 1 penny correspond to the terms. You will observe there are more lines than terms; ten lines and five terms in our illustration. As the number of both increases, the disproportion grows greater. Six terms would give fifteen lines; seven, twenty-one; eight, twenty-eight, and so on. This shows that, the more lines and terms there are, the more surprising it becomes that the Principle of Combination should be true...

.. The terms of the hydrogen spectrum can all be expressed very simply. There is a certain fundamental wave number, called Rydberg's Constant after its discoverer. Rydberg discovered that this constant was always occurring in formulae for series of spectral lines, and it has been found that it is very nearly the same for all elements. Its value is about one hundred and nine thousand seven hundred waves per centimetre. This may be taken as the fundamental term of the hydrogen spectrum. The others are obtained from it by dividing by four, nine, sixteen, and so on. This gives all the terms. The lines are obtained by subtracting one term from another. Theoretically, this rule gives an infinite number of terms.. but in practice the lines grow fainter as higher terms are involved, and also so close together that they can no longer be distinguished. For this reason .. it is not necessary in practice to take account of more than about thirty terms; and even this number is only necessary in the case of certain nebulae [sic; surely 'elements'?] ...

It will be seen that, by our rule, we have obtained various series of terms. The first series is obtained by subtracting from Rydberg's constant successively 1/4, 1/9, 1/16, .. of itself, so that the wave numbers of its line are respectively 3/4, 8/9, 15/16, .. of Rydberg's Constant. These wave numbers correspond to lines in the ultra-violet.. this series of lines is called after its discoverer the Lyman series. Then there is a series of lines obtained by subtracting from a quarter of Rydberg's Constant successively 1/9, 1/16, 1/25.. of Rydberg's Constant, so that the wave numbers of this series are 5/36, 3/16, 21/100, .. of Rydberg's Constant. This series of lines is in the visible part of the spectrum. The formula for this series was discovered as long ago as 1885, by Balmer. Then there is the series obtained by taking a ninth of Rydberg's Constant, and subtracting successively 1/16, 1/25, 1/36.. of Rydberg's Constant. This series is not visible because its wave numbers are so small that it is in the infra-red, but it was discovered by Paschen, after whom it is called. .. Thus so far as the conditions of observation admit, we may lay down this simple rule: the lines of the hydrogen spectrum are obtained from Rydberg's Constant by dividing it by any two square numbers, and subtracting the smaller resulting number from the larger. This gives the wave number of some line in the hydrogen spectrum if observation of a line of that wave number is possible, and if there are not too many other lines in the immediate neighbourhood. .. All this so far is purely empirical. Rydberg's Constant and the formulae .. were discovered merely by observation and by hunting for some arithmetical formula which would make it possible to collect the different lines under some rule. For a long time the search failed because people employed wave lengths instead of wave numbers; the formulae are more complicated in wavelengths, and therefore more difficult to discover empirically. Balmer who discovered the formula for the visible lines in the hydrogen spectrum expressed it in wavelengths, but when expressed in this form it did not suggest Ritz's Principle of Combination, which led to the complete rule. Even after the rule was discovered, no-one knew why there was such a rule, or what was the reason for the appearance of Rydberg's Constant. The explanation.. was effected by Neils Bohr...

V POSSIBLE STATES OF THE HYDROGEN ATOM
- It was obvious from the first that, when light is sent out by a body, this is due to something that goes on in the atom, but it used to be thought that, when the light is steady, whatever causes the emission of light is going on all the time in all the atoms of the substance from which the light comes. The discovery that the lines of the spectrum are the differences between terms suggested to Bohr a quite different hypothesis which proved immensely fruitful. He adopted the view that each of the terms corresponds to a stable condition of the atom, and that light is emitted when the atom passes from one stable state to another, and only then. The various lines of the spectrum are due, in this theory, to the various possible transitions between different stable states. Each of the lines is a statistical phenomenon: a certain percentage of the atoms are making a transition that gives rise to this line. Some of the lines in the spectrum are very much brighter than others; these represent very common transitions, while the faint lines represent very rare ones. On a given occasion some of the rarer possible transitions may not be occurring at all; in that case, lines corresponding to these transitions will be wholly absent on this occasion. According to Bohr, what happens when a hydrogen atom gives out light is that its electron, which has hitherto been comparatively distant from the nucleus, suddenly jumps into an orbit which is much nearer to the nucleus. When this happens, the atom loses energy, but the energy is not lost to the world: it spreads to the surrounding medium in the shape of light waves. When an atom absorbs light instead of emitting it, the converse process happens: energy is transferred from the surrounding medium to the atom and takes the form of making the electron jump to a larger orbit. This accounts for fluorescence - that is to say, the subsequent emission in certain cases of light of exactly he same frequency as that which has been absorbed.

.. Let us first consider the results which Bohr [indecipherable] .. we will assume to begin with that the electron in a hydrogen atom in its steady states goes round the nucleus in a circle, and that the different steady states only differ as regards the size of the circle. As a matter of fact, the electron moves sometimes in a circle and sometimes in an ellipse; but Sommerfeld showed how to calculate the elliptical orbits that may occur .. also showed that, so far as the spectrum is concerned, the result is very nearly the same as if the orbits were always circular..

According to Newtonian dynamics, the electron ought to be capable of revolving in any circle which had a nucleus in the centre, or in any ellipse which had the nucleus in a focus; the question what orbit it would choose would depend only on upon the velocity and direction of its motion at a given moment. Moreover if outside influences increased or diminished its energy, it ought to pass by continuous graduations to a larger or smaller orbit in which it would go on moving after the outside influences were withdrawn. According to the theory of electrodynamics, on the other hand, an atom left to itself ought gradually to radiate its energy into the surrounding aether, with the result that the electron would approach continually nearer and nearer to the nucleus. Bohr's theory differs from the traditional views on all these points. He holds that, among all the circles that ought to be possible on Newtonian principles, only a certain infinitesimal selection are really possible. There is the smallest possible circle, which has a radius of about half a hundred millionth of a centimetre. This is the commonest circle for the electron to choose. If it does not move in this circle, it cannot move in a circle slightly larger but must hop at once to a circle with a radius four times as large. If it wants to leave this circle for a larger one, it must hop to one with a radius nine times as large as the original radius. In fact, the only circles that are possible in addition to the smallest circle are those that have radii 4, 9, 16, 25, 36 times as large. When we come to consider elliptical orbits, we shall find that there is a similar selection of possible ellipse from among all those thought to be principle on Newtonian principles.

The atom has least energy when the orbit is smallest; therefore the electron cannot jump from a smaller to a larger orbit except under the influence of outside forces. It may be attracted out of its course by some passing positively electrified atom, or repelled out of its course by a passing electron, or waved out of its course by light waves. Such occurrences as these, according to the theory, may make it jump from one of the smaller possible circles to one of the larger ones. When it is moving in a larger circle, it is not in such a stable state as when it is in a smaller one; it can jump back to a smaller circle without outside influences. When it does this it will emit light, which will be one or other of the lines of the hydrogen spectrum, according to the particular jump that is made. When it jumps from the circle of radius four to the smallest circle it emits a line whose wave number is 3/4 of Rydberg's Constant. A jump from radius 9 to the smallest gives us a line which is 8/9 of Rydberg's Constant. ...

.. This is supposed to happen instantaneously, not merely in a very short time. It is supposed that for a time it is moving in one orbit, and then instantaneously it is moving in the other, without having passed over the intermediate space. An electron is like a man who, when he is insulted, listens at first apparently unmoved, and then suddenly hits out. The process by which an electron passes from one orbit to another is at present quite unintelligible, to all appearance contrary to everything that has hitherto been believed about the nature of physical occurrences... Evolution in biology and relativity in physics seemed to have established the continuity of natural processes more formally than ever before. Newton's action at a distance, which had always been considered something of a scandal, was explained away by Einstein's theory of gravitation. But just when the triumph of continuity seemed complete, and when Bergson's philosophy had enshrined it in popular thought, this inconvenient discovery about energy came and upset everything. How far it way carry us no-one can yet tell. Perhaps we were not speaking correctly a moment ago when we said that an electron passes from one orbit to another "without passing over the intermediate space;" perhaps there is no intermediate space; perhaps it is merely habit and prejudice that makes us suppose space to be continuous. ... It is odd that the orbits of electrons down to the smallest particulars are such as to be possible on Newtonian principles. Even the minute corrections introduced by Einstein have been utilised by Sommerfeld to explain some of the more delicate characteristics of the hydrogen spectrum. It must be understood that, as regards the present question, .. Einstein and the theory of relativity are the crown of the old dynamics, not the beginning of the new. Einstein's work has immense philosophical and theoretical importance, but the changes which it introduces in actual physics are very small indeed until we come to deal with velocities not much less than that of light. The new dynamics of the atom, on the contrary, not merely alters our theories but alters our view as to what actually occurs, by leading to the conclusion that change is often discontinuous and that most of the motions which should be possible are in fact impossible. This leaves us quite unable to account for the fact that all the motions that are in fact possible are exactly in accordance with the old principles, showing that the old principles, though incomplete, must be true up to a point. Having discovered that the old principles are not quite true, we are completely in the dark as to why they have as much truth as they evidently have.

.. Other elements.. when there are many electrons revolving round a single nucleus, the mathematics becomes too difficult for our present powers.. There is one case which can be tested to the full, and that is the case of positively electrified helium, .. it only differs from hydrogen as regards the movement of the electron by the fact that the charge on the nucleus is twice as great as that on the electron, instead of being equal to it, as with hydrogen, and that the mass of the nucleus is four times that of the hydrogen nucleus. [Incidentally; I think the 'neutron' is not mentioned anywhere in this book] The changes which this produces in the spectrum as compared with hydrogen are exactly such as theory would predict.

.. We have seen what was the conclusion to which Bohr was led as to the possible states of the hydrogen atom, but we have not yet seen what was the reasoning by which he was led to this conclusion.

VI THE THEORY OF QUANTA
Planck, in 1900.. showed that it was necessary, that is to say, that the energy of a body cannot vary continuously, in order to account for the laws of temperature radiation; roughly speaking, if bodies could part with their warmth continuously, not by jumps, they ought to grow colder than they do when they are not exposed to a source of heat. .. His reasoning was somewhat abstruse; there is an account in Jeans's Report on Radiation and Quantum-Theory, published in 1914.

.. Planck's Principle in its original form was as follows: there are bodies undergoing any kind of vibration or periodic motion of a frequency nu, (i.e. the body goes through its whole period nu times in a second) then there is a certain fundamental constant h such that the energy of the body, owing to this periodic is h nu, or some exact multiple of h nu. That is to say, h nu is the smallest amount of energy that can exist in any periodic process whose frequency is nu and if the energy is greater than h nu, it must be exactly twice as great, or three or four times as great, ... The energy was at first supposed to exist in atoms, in little indivisible parcels, each amount h nu. .. The quantity h, which is called "Planck's quantum", is of course very small. ... We may say that a million million million million times h would be a quantity just appreciable without instruments of precision. Taking the electron in its smallest orbit, h is exactly obtained by multiplying the circumference of the orbit by the velocity of the electron and multiplying the result by the mass of the electron. In the second orbit, the result of this multiplication is 2h; in the third, 3h and so on. [Footnote says: expressed in the usual CGS units h = 6.55 x 10^-27] ... The right way to generalise Planck's Principle has been discovered by Sommerfeld, but is very difficult to express in non-mathematical language. It turns out that the principle.. cannot be stated in its general form as involving little parcels of energy; it only seemed possible because Planck was dealing with a special case. The general form requires a method of stating the principles of dynamics which is due to Hamilton...

.. [periodic movement, like a pendulum or planet].. a system is called conditionally periodic when its motion is compounded of a number of motions each of which separately is periodic, but which don't have the same period. For example the earth has a motion compounded of its rotation round its axis, which takes a day, and revolution around the sun, which takes a year. So.. when we take account of both rotation and revolution, the motion of the earth is "conditionally periodic." .. The motions of electrons in their orbits, when we take account of niceties, are, strictly speaking, conditionally periodic and not simply periodic. .. We can now state the generalised quantum principle: take some one co-ordinate of the system, and imagine the motion of the system throughout one period of this co-ordinate. Divide it into a great number of little bits. In each little bit, take the generalized momentum corresponding to the co-ordinate in question, and multiply it by the amount of change in the co-ordinate during that little bit. Add up all these for all the little bits that make up one complete period then, in the limit, when the bits are made very small and very numerous, the result of the addition for one complete period will be exactly h or 2h or 3h or some other exact multiple of h. [Refers to Sommerfeld, 'Atombau und ?Spektrallinien'] No-one knows in the least why this should be the case; all we can say is that it is so, in all the cases that have been tested.

.. We can now understand how Bohr's theory explains the lines of the hydrogen spectrum. When the electron jumps from a large to a smaller orbit, it loses energy. A little very elementary mathematics shows that the kinetic energy in the second orbit is a quarter of that in the first; the third is a ninth, and the fourth a sixteenth, and so on. [The appendix has four pages on the working] It is also very easy to show that (apart from a constant portion which may be ignored) the total energy in any orbit (potential and kinetic energy) is numerically equal to the kinetic energy, but with the opposite sign. Therefore, the loss of total energy in passing from a large to a smaller orbit is equal to the gain in kinetic energy. It follows that, if we call e [epsilon] the kinetic energy in the smallest orbit, the loss of energy in passing from the second orbit to the smallest is 3/4 e; the loss in passing from the third orbit is 8/9 epsilon, and so on. The loss in passing from the third to the second is 1/4 minus 1/9 epsilon, that is 5/36. ... the same as those concerned in connection with Rydberg's Constant.. The energy that is lost by the atom in one of these jumps is turned into a light wave. What sort of a light wave it is to become, is determined by the theory of quanta. A light wave is a periodic process, and if its frequency is nu, its period is a nuth of a second. The generalized quantum principle shows that, if he period of a wave is t, the energy of the wave multiplied by t must be an exact multiple of h. In fact, so far as observation goes, it appears to be always h. Since t is a nuth of a second, where nu is the frequency, it follows that the energy of the wave is h nu. Also by the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, the energy of the wave is equal to the energy the atom has lost.

This shows that, if e is the kinetic energy of the electron in the smallest orbit, the wave caused by the transition from the second orbit to the first will have a frequency nu given by the equation 3/4 e = h nu. The transition from the third orbit to the first, 8/9 e = h nu, and so on. .. They agree if Rydberg's Constant is equal to e divided by h and the velocity of light (We have to divide by the velocity of light because in this chapter we have been speaking of frequencies whereas in chapter four we were speaking of wave numbers). Now e is easily calculated, since we know the charge on a hydrogen nucleus and on an electron, the mass of an electron, and the radius of the minimum orbit. Also h and the velocity of light are known. It is found that the calculated value and Rydberg's Constant.. agrees closely; this was from the first a powerful argument in favour of Bohr's theory.

.. The quantity h, Planck's Quantum, has been found to be involved in all the very phenomena that can be adequately studied. It is one of the fundamental constants to which science has led; for the present, it represents a limit of explanation, since no-one knows why there is such a constant, or why it is just the size it is.. for Planck's Quantum for the present is a brute fact.

VII REFINEMENTS OF THE HYDROGEN SPECTRUM
[This chapter is concerned to see if the admission of elliptical orbits makes a difference:] .. There are three effects which it [admission of ellipses] explains: 1 What's called the Zeeman Effect, which is an alteration produced by a strong magnetic field. 2 The Stark effect, which is produced by a strong electric field. 3 "Fine Structure" - the fact that each line of the spectrum when closely examined is found to consist of a number of almost identical lines.

[Ellipses drawn with a couple of pins and loop of string] There are now two periodic characteristics of the orbit, instead of only one as in the case of the circle. First is the angle that SE, [the sun so to speak - the focus], to the electron makes with the major axis; the other is the distance of the electron from the nucleus; the distance grows continually smaller while the electron is travelling from the further point to the near point, and then continually larger. As there are two periodic characteristics of the orbit, the general quantum theory will give two conditions that the orbit must fulfil instead of only one. It is impossible to explain the process by which the results are obtained, but the results themselves are fairly simple. ... The amount of energy radiated out in waves when this occurs .. the same electron is torn away from.. when the electron occupies a vacant place near the nucleus, the amount of energy radiated out when this occurs is very great, and therefore the frequency of the waves is very great. X-ray waves differ from ordinary light waves by their great frequency, so the emission of X-rays is just what might be expected under the circumstances..

VIII RINGS OF ELECTRONS
.. Bohr has given a table setting out his theory of the way the electrons are arranged in various inert gases, each of which has an outer ring as full as it will hold. .. The helium atom in its commoner form he supposes to contain two electrons moving in circles, each with the same total quantum number, namely 1, as the minimum circle in hydrogen. There is however as we saw another form of helium in which one of the electrons moves in an eccentric orbit. In the next inert gas, neon, there are ten electrons, two in the inner ring and eight in the outer. The two in the inner ring, according to his table, remain as in helium, but of the outer eight, four are moving in circles and four in ellipses. This and the other figures in the table apply of course to the atoms' most compressed state, the state to which it tends when it is let alone, the state corresponding to the minimum circle in hydrogen. Argon, which comes next with eighteen electrons, has its two inner rings as in neon, but it has eight electrons in a third ring. Partly from spectroscopic considerations, partly from stability, Bohr maintains that of these eight outer electrons, none move in circles, but are divided into two groups of four, the first group moving in orbits of very great eccentricity, the second in less eccentric orbits. The first group of four will at moments penetrate inside the first ring. It is assumed that the two inner rings are definitely completed as soon as we reach neon, but that the later rings are not completed so quickly.. and so on. [He goes right through Bohr's table. I presume this is the same stuff as represented by s, p and what have you orbitals. Several pages on this. For example:] .. In accordance with this principle, the outer, fifth, ring of xenon in to have eight electrons, divided into two groups of four, the first group having the most eccentric orbit at this stage, length five times breadth, the second group having the next most eccentric, five times half the breadth, ... For convenience we are speaking as if the orbits were still ellipses and circles, but of course this is only very roughly true..

IX X-RAYS
- Everybody knows that they can take a photograph of the skeleton of a living person so the exact position of a bullet lodged in the brain but not everybody knows why this is so. [my notes sic] The reason is that the capacity for ordinary matter for stopping them varies approximately as the fourth power of the atomic number of the elements concerned. Thus, carbon, whose atomic number is 6, is 1296 times as effective as hydrogen at stopping X-rays; nitrogen is 2401 times.. calcium, 160,000 and so on. The human body consists mainly of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and hydrogen, but bones consist mainly of calcium. Consequently X-rays which go through the rest of the body easily are stopped by the bones.. lead.. is about forty-five million times as affective as hydrogen, and about 280 times as effective as calcium; so it is no wonder that bullets come out clearly in X-ray photographs. ..

[More, inc. 'kathode' spelt with a k, Greek style] .. X-ray spectra do not occur as a regular thing in the form of absorption spectra, and in this they differ from optical spectra. It is worthwhile to understand why this is. An ordinary light of a frequency which an element is capable of emitting passes through a gas composed of this element: the element absorbs all or some of it, though light of other frequencies passes through freely. The reason is that the light corresponding to the spectral line of the element supplies just the quantum required to move an electron from an inner to an outer ring; the energy of the light-wave is used up in doing this. The electrons involved in optical spectra are only those in the outer ring.. but in X-ray spectra the electrons concerned are those in the inner rings. When one of these is fetched out by a passing electron, it cannot settle in an outer ring, because the outer rings are already occupied by electrons. Each of the electrons that it passes on the way out repels it and gives it so to speak an extra shove, with the result that it cannot rest in an outer ring unless by some exceptional stroke of luck but has to go wandering off into space. The energy involved in such a journey is not tied down to certain amounts, like the energy involved in passing from one orbit to another. Its place on the inside is taken by one of the other electrons, while the outer ring remains one electron short until it has a chance to help itself from some other atom by means of some free electron. .. The atomic number represents the fundamental property of the atom, namely the positive charge on the nucleus.. X-ray spectra have given the decisive victory to the classification by atomic numbers.. The law of X-ray spectra is just the same as the law of optical spectra, namely that if nu is the frequency of a line in the spectrum, i.e. the number of waves per second, and h is Planck's quantum, h multiplied by nu is the energy lost by the atom in the transition that gives rise to the line in question. There are three principle lines in X-ray spectra, called respectively the K, L and M lines; for any given atom, the K line has the greatest frequency, and the M line the least... X-ray spectra are also important concerning the "fine structure" because the distance between these fine lines ought to increase roughly as the fourth power of the atomic number. On this point, the empirical evidence obtained from X-ray spectra agrees closely with the theory developed by Sommerfeld.

X RADIO-ACTIVITY
Becquerel's discovery that a very sensitive photographic plate put away in a dark cupboard with a piece of uranium was found to photograph the uranium in spite of the complete darkness.. Becquerel found that the rays came from the uranium itself and did not depend on previous exposure to light, as is the case with fluorescent substances. Uranium was found able to produce rays apparently indefinitely.. This seemed to go against the conservation of energy.. but the energy as we shall see comes out of the nucleus of the uranium atom. But something equally astonishing was found to happen: in radioactivity one element turns into another. .. In radioactivity atoms of one element throw out particles from the nucleus, and become atoms of another element.

Radioactivity is associated in popular thought with radium, but in fact the discovery of radium was caused by that of radioactivity, and not vice versa. M and Mme Curie, who were working under Becquerel, observed that pitchblende, from which uranium is obtained, is more radioactive than pure uranium. They inferred that it must contain some very radioactive constituent.. The search finally led Mme Curie to the new element, radium. Since then, a number of new radioactive elements have been discovered. Sommerfeld enumerates forty of them.. The atoms of a radioactive substance are like a population which has a certain death rate. In a given time, a certain percentage of them die and are born again as atoms of a different substance, but they are not endowed like human beings with a certain span of life. Some live a very short time, some a very long time; the old ones are no more liable to death than the young ones. .. Uranium, which is only very slightly radioactive, takes 4,500 million years in its most stable form for half its atoms to decay. The first product of their disintegration is a substance which half decays in just twenty-four days; .. a minute and a quarter the next; two million years.. at this stage, two different products may be formed, one of which in turn becomes radium, of which the period is 1,580 years, while the other becomes protoactinium, [NB: Webster's says this is 'early form of protactinium'] of which the period is 12,000 years, the next product being actinium. Radium gives rise to the inert gas, niton, also called radium emanation [or radon!] of which the period is a little less than four days. The end of both series is a form of lead which so far as we know is not radioactive at all.. [He talks about thorium after that. Then explains about half-life and about statistical averages.] ..

In this respect, as in some others, ... the universe seems like a clock running down with no mechanism for winding it up again.. it seems strange there should be any uranium. But if, like some insects, we lived only for a single spring day, we should think it strange that there should be any ice in the world, since we should find it always melting and never being formed. Perhaps the universe has long cycles of alternate winding-up and running-down; if so, we are in the part of the cycle in which the universe, or at least our portion of it, runs down. .. It is only this process that liberates energy for purposes that we regard as useful. [Then discusses alpha, beta and gamma rays:] Alpha rays being the nucleus of a helium atom, beta.. electrons, and gamma rays being of the nature of light waves, of frequency higher even than X-rays.. [Paths of decay, for example uranium 1 and uranium 2, both very stable, though uranium 1 is the great-grandfather of uranium 2] ..

129: F W Aston who.. by gas separation.. discovered.. isotopes.. for example in chlorine, in krypton..

[Finally, on the energy inside the atom:] Sommerfeld says the sources of energy which are thus disclosed to the external world are of quite a different order of magnitude from the energies of other physical and chemical processes. They bear witness to what powerful forces are active in the interior of atoms, the nuclei. The world of the interior of the atom is in general closed to the outer world; it is not influenced by conditions of temperature and pressure which hold outside; it is ruled by the law of probability, spontaneous chance which cannot be influenced.

XI THE STRUCTURE OF NUCLEI
- [A lot about hydrogen nuclei, helium nuclei, and electrons. Still haven't found the word 'neutron'. He also mentions that of elements with odd atomic numbers, there is only one instance, nitrogen, in which the atomic weight is just double the atomic number..]

.. Overcrowding in the nucleus of the heavy atom must be something fearful; radium C.. has a nucleus whose radius is about three million millionths of a centimetre; its atomic number is 83 and its atomic weight is 214. This means that in this tiny space it must contain 53 helium nuclei and two hydrogen nuclei, .. also.. 131 electrons. It is no wonder that helium nuclei and electrons move fast when radioactivity liberates them from this slum.

[NB: Unsure how he gets this; helium nucleus with atomic weight 4 times 53 plus two gives 214, but I don't see why other combinations shouldn't be possible. The 131 'electrons' are 214 - 83 but of course the charge would be positive]

XII THE NEW PHYSICS AND THE WAVE THEORY OF LIGHT
[Starts with a discussion of "action":] The word "action" in physics has a precise technical meaning, and may be regarded as the result of energy operating for a certain time. Thus, if a given amount of energy operates for two seconds, there is twice as much action as if it operated for one second. .. Waves.. interference.. problem with quantum theory.. James Jeans:
    'There appears no hope of reconciling the undulatory theory of light with the quantum theory..'

In Sommerfeld's work we no longer have little parcels of energy. What we have is a property of periodic processes.. For the purposes of stating the quantum principle, one period of a periodic process has to be treated as an indivisible whole. This was not evident at the time when Jeans's report was written [1914] but has been made evident by subsequent developments. While it makes the quantum principle more puzzling, it also prevents it from being inconsistent with known facts about light. ... [Typical Russell warning:] .. The charge on the electron, the equal and opposite charge on the hydrogen atom, the mass of the electron, the mass of the hydrogen nucleus, Planck's quantum, all appear in modern physics as absolute constants.. the aether.. has sunk into the background.. It may be found, however, as a result of further research, that the aether is after all what is really fundamental, and that electrons and hydrogen nuclei are merely states of strain in the aether, or something of the sort. If so the two "elements" with which modern physics operates may be reduced to one, and the atomic character of matter may turn out to be not the ultimate truth. This suggestion is purely speculative; there is nothing in the existing state of physics to justify it, but the past history of science shows that it should be borne in mind as a possibility to be tested hereafter.

XIII THE NEW PHYSICS AND RELATIVITY
Distances too small for the microscope are concerned in the theory of quanta; distances too large for the telescope are concerned in the theory of relativity. .. The two theories have been pursued by different investigators, because they required different apparatus and different methods.. [Then we have Einstein 1905 first part, 1915 second part of relativity.. Two books for those with 'sufficient mathematical equipment': Hermann Weyl's 'Space, Time, Matter' and Eddington's 'Mathematical Theory of Relativity'] We are only concerned here with the points where this theory touches the problem of atomic structure.. It is relevant at several points. Its doctrine that mass as measured by our instruments varies with velocity and is in fact merely part of the energy of a body .. It is part of the theory of relativity to show that the results of measurement, in a great many cases, do not yield physical facts about the quantities intended to be measured, but are dependant upon the relative motion of the observer and what is observed.. so.. [stuff about increase in mass which is only apparent to observers..]/ .. elementary dynamics.. energy consists of two parts, kinetic and potential energy; Russell considers the kinetic energy, which depends on the mass and the velocity:] the velocity depends on the observer, and is not an intrinsic property, so energy has to be redefined in the theory of relativity. It turns out we can identify the energy with its mass as measured by the observer or, in ordinary units, with its mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light. In the theory of relativity, there are two kinds of variation of mass to be distinguished, of which so far we have only considered one. We considered the change of measured mass, as we have called it, which is brought about by a change in the relative motion of the observer and the body whose mass is being measured, that is not a change in the body itself but merely a relation to the observer, .. [continues with proper mass being a genuine property of a body which is increased when it absorbs radiant energy and so on, and] .. there is another point, not easy to explain clearly, and as yet amounting to no more than a suggestion, capable of proving very important in the future. We saw that Planck's quantum, h, is not a certain amount of energy, but a certain amount of what is called "action". The theory of relativity would lead us to expect that action would be more important than energy. The reason for this is derived from the fact that relativity diminishes the gulf between space and time which exists in popular thought, and traditional physics. How this affects our question we will now try to understand. [Well, he discusses two events which happened a day apart, in London and Edinburgh, and said that the 24 hours interval and the four hundred miles interval idea is really a mistake; there is really only one type.] The importance of this principle is impossible to exaggerate. It means in the first place the ultimate facts in physics must be events rather than bodies in motion, and it follows from various considerations.. when you consider what is happening in a very small region, you must take a very small region of space-time, not just of space. This leads us to consider not merely the energy at an instant but the effect of energy operating for a very short time, and this is the nature of "action" in a technical sense. .. from Eddington on action; quite a lot is quoted from 'Space, Time and Gravitation'; Eddington claims that the theory of relativity has shown that most of the traditional dynamics, which is supposed to contain scientific laws, really consist of conventions as to measurement, and are strictly analogous to the "great law" that there are always three feet to a yard. In particular, this applies to the Conservation of Energy. This makes it plausible to suppose that every apparent law of nature which strikes us as reasonable is not really a law of nature, but a concealed convention plastered onto nature by our love of what we, in our arrogance, choose to consider rational. Eddington hints that a real law of nature is likely to stand out by the fact that it appears to us irrational, since in that case it is less likely that we have invented it to suit our intellectual taste. And from this point of view, he inclines to the belief that the quantum principle is the first real law of nature that has been discovered in physics.

[Final paragraph:] This raises a somewhat important question: is the world rational, i.e. such as to conform to our intellectual habits? Or is it "irrational" i.e. not such as we should have made it if we had been in the position of the Creator? I do not propose to suggest an answer to this question.

APPENDIX: [Four pages: BOHR'S THEORY OF THE HYDROGEN SPECTRUM, which I'll briefly discuss, which no doubt occurs in other physics books:]

m the mass of an electron; a the radius of it orbit; omega its angular velocity; e its negative charge.

Elementary dynamics says centrifugal force is m a omega^2, while the force attracting it to the nucleus is e^2/a^2 by Coulomb's Law. Put these equal to get the quantum theory.

Kinetic energy is 1/2 m a omega^2. The potential energy is -e^2/a. In view of the above equation, e^2/a is double 1/2 m a^2 omega^2, so that the total energy is equal to the kinetic energy with its sign changed.

The impulse corresponding to omega is m alpha^2 omega. This has to be taken round one complete circuit of the orbit,

This yields 2 pi m a^2 omega, which must be put equal to a multiple of h, say nh.

So 2 pi m a^2 omega = n h

Because m, e, and h are known, equations 1 and 2 determine a and omega, as soon as m is fixed.

a = (n^2 h^2)/ (4 pi^2 m e^2) and omega = 8 pi^3 m e^4/ n^3 h^3.

The smallest possible radius.. putting n=1.. radius 1 is h^2 / 4 pi^2 n^2 e; next possible one is 4 times this = 4 a1 etc

Kinetic energy in nth orbit is m a^2 omega^2 / 2 = m/2 2 pi e^2/ (nh)^2

Since the total energy = the kinetic energy with the sign changed, and loss of energy from kth to nth orbit is (1/2) m (2 pi e^2/h)^2 (1/m^2 - 1/k^2). If this transition is to give rise to a wave of frequency nu, we must have (1/2) m (2 pi e^2/h)^2 (1/m^2 - 1/k^2) = h nu, that is to say nu is given by the equation nu = m 2 pi^2 e^4 / h^3 x (1/m^2 - 1/ K^2). If c = the velocity of light this gives a wave number nu/c.

Now, the empirical formula is r (1/n^2 - 1/k^2) where r is Rydberg's Constant. This shows that if our theory is right we should have:

r = 2 pi^2 m e^4 / h^3 c.

By substituting the observed values for m, e, h, and c, it was found this equation is satisfied. This was perhaps the most sensational evidence in favour of Bohr's theory when it was first published.

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image   Review of Bertrand Russell   Prospects of Industrial Civilization

Inconclusive Brew—'Great War', USSR under Jews, Chinese Civilization, Factories..., November 27, 2011

Bertrand Russell and Dora Russell 1923—The Prospects of Industrial Civilization

Not a popular book by Russell. A second edition was published in 1959, with a preface attributed to Dora Russell (they married in 1921, for a while). It's not clear what differences were made from the first edition—the preface is worthless trivia and amusingly comments on the 'communist block' and 'spirit of free enterprise' despite the fact that book shows that even in 1918 there were huge American trusts. I'm pretty sure I once read the first edition—I remember a phrase something like 'men desire sexual intercourse with all women', which is missing from this version. Unfortunately, Russell was not averse to a bit of editing of his own past—his book 'Which Way To Peace?' published just before 1939 was never reprinted. Dora Black, 'daughter of a senior civil servant', studied Greek, Latin and German, before going to Cambridge where she got a first in Modern Languages. The details seem hard to find—but anyway after her degree she researched in France, so one assumes French was one of her languages. It's not clear to me whether she knew Russian. One has to assume she had something like zero awareness of science, technology, and industry, and I'll assume in what follows that Russell wrote most of the book, despite the claims that it was a joint effort. It seems she loved the Bolsheviks, but, with almost insane hypocrisy, disliked the 'machine age'.

A 1996 reissue by Routledge has an introduction by Louis Greenspan, who unfortunately appeared to be involved with the large team editing Russell's papers. I take it he thinks he's a Jew; certainly the introduction is painfully careful to avoid mention of Jews in the 'Russian Revolution' and in finance generally, notably the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913. Poor Russell was hedged by Jews in death, as in life. Greenspan comments that Russell's book was published in same year the 'Frankfurt School' was established by Horkheimer; he regards Stalin as attractive, and sees no relation between depression in the USA and credit restrictions by the Jews of the 'Federal Reserve'. The introduction is a disgraceful piece of hackery ignoring the mass murders by 'Jews' in the Soviet Union regime of so-called 'socialism'. Routledge reprinted Russell's works—with the significant omission of War Crimes in Vietnam. The bias is so extreme it casts doubt on the accuracy of the entire McMasters University project on Russell.

First, the title and presentation. It's necessary to spend a little time on these. The title in fact is misleading. The book is in two parts, roughly speaking (1) a retrospective view of industrialism so far, and (2) a theoretical look at ethics and what a good society should be. There's a certain amount on prospects, but not much. Russell unfortunately made little attempt to knit his essays together or signpost them. Thus a number of chapters are subdivided—I, II, and III style—but it's left to the reader to try to deduce the reasons for these subdivisions. So this book leans towards being an atomised collection of essays rather than a unified argument—his Human Society in Ethics and Politics, a quarter of a century later, has the same bitty style, analogous to university courses in 'modules'.

Although I have a high opinion of Russell, this book is so bad that I wonder whether it has any value at all. There are some acute-ish comments, for example comparing cells of a body with individual single-celled creatures (p34—pagination taken from the Routledge edition) though obviously this sounds Hobbesian. There's a good comparison of Calvinism with industry—for example with inheritance as something like predestination. Predestination may of course be a cover for supposed supposition of Jews being 'chosen by God'. It sounds unfair to brush Russell off, and I don't entirely mean what I say. The effect is something like reading a newspaper or magazine, with many piquant references, but, at the end, nothing of an overview or effective grasp of the world. Much of the book is very weak.
      On 'Industrialism' it's worth commenting on the hidden meanings; I suppose of dirt, hard labour, castes devoted to their machines. There seems no obvious reason why 'industrialism' shouldn't connote such feelings as modernity, elegance, organised clean drudgery-sparing efficiency, and helpfulness, but it doesn't. I'd guess this is yet another Jewish influence; they like the idea of slave labour.
      I'll go through bullet-point fashion---

[1] One of Russell's tricks, perhaps taken from set theory, or from Marx on classes, is to start on some topic—generally a buzzword of the time—and then, rather than define it in sufficient detail to be useful, to split it into two parts, and describe those instead, generally in some mutually hostile way. Thus (p18) two growing forces 'stand out .. Industrialism and Nationalism'. He doesn't say why these 'stand out'. He was writing soon after the 'Great War'; one might have thought that Militarism would 'stand out'. Or, in view of the Empire, race issues. Or, in view of the effects of science, population growth to unprecedented levels. Anyway, he describes 'Industrialism' as something like (p19) an extension of normal tools—Russell means the use of huge, expensive, temporarily unproductive factories and installations. He then says 'Industrialism' must be, or is, of two types—'capitalist' or 'socialist'. And 'Nationalism' has two forms (p25)—one for the bosses, Imperialism; one for the underdogs—Self-determination. This technique is often Russell's way of smuggling in various assumptions.

[2] Russell had little feeling for technology and science; and Dora presumably even less so. Russell never quite got the feeling for the difference between description and analysis. All his material on 'Industry' was based on Britain, the USA, and Europe, including steam-powered engines, the cotton cloth industry, coal, and iron. Why did he pick these? He had no predictive technique—if he'd been born in 1700 he could have predicted none of these. His material relies on other people's having decided to try these things, and get them to operate. This means all his pontification is somewhat pointless, because he seems to have no way to suggest how it ought to have been different. His mental model of 'Industrialism' is of spoil heaps, muck, sweat, labourers, huge factories, and top-hatted capitalists. (Stalin had a different scheme—on behalf of his foreign controllers, to import factories and arm the USSR for all-out war against Europe. This is 'industrialism' of a sort, too.) Apart from the aims oligarchs might have, there's the issue of techniques: for all Russell knew, simple methods for extracting food and water and heating and clothing, and making tools, might have been on the point of being invented. This thread runs through the entire book, as does his view that there are significant numbers of 'idle rich'. He dislikes these as much as militarists who want to kill people cheaply.

[3] Russell tended to regard ideas, and groups of ideas, as purely psychological, and independent of the physical world. To use his own style of commentary, we might divide ideas, or ideologies, into two parts. One part is the set of ideas imposed by ruling groups. The other part is ideas which reflect the actual world. For example, on sexual attitudes, Russell says little about the realities of pregnancy and disease and economics, but treats beliefs purely as though they are tokens which can be altered. A very important mistake in Russell is the assumption that religious beliefs are pure superstitions. He has no feel for the way Christianity may have acted as a 'politically correct' glue binding together assorted groups, as were found in the Roman Empire. This may apply to the Russian Orthodox Church after about 1600—I don't know; but nor does Russell. And he has no feel for the way tribal cults, notably Judaism and Islam, and also Hinduism, don't permit instant change or conversion.
      One of Russell's fixed fantasies was the belief that Britain's education and ambience embraced free discussion, when in fact Jewish activities were almost unknown. As with H G Wells and Hilaire Belloc, when the awarenesses of Belloc were not passed onto Wells, Russell too did not accept Belloc; this was a tragedy, as the whole of Russell's work was weakened by the omission.

[4] Russell included quite a few Darwinian themes as evidence for some aspects of human behaviour. He thought people had genuine spontaneous friends because they were people who would help the befriended person have a maximum number of children. (p151)—'Our instincts, in the main, are such as would be likely to achieve [a large number of descendants] in a rather uncivilized community.' This contrasts oddly with his comments on nearly-static white populations. He thought there is an instinct of hostility to remote people—and yet how could an instinct evolve in any creature, for creatures so far away it couldn't even know they existed?

[5] Russell was rather naive about newspapers. Continuing the previous theme, how can anyone know about faraway places, other than by being told about them? If a genuine instinct for war exists, why is there any need for propaganda at all?

[6] Russell had no idea of the influence of Jews, or, if he did, it shows in none of his books. He doesn't mention the 'Federal Reserve'—admittedly, only ten years earlier. He notes President Wilson and the 'American' (meaning USA's) entry into the Great War (p180), but has no mention of the Balfour Declaration. He quotes from a 1918 investigation into US meat packing (pp 176-81)—on similar lines to Upton Sinclair's 'The Jungle'—but not on US credit and money.

[7] Quite an important part of Russell—which I hadn't understood until I read this book—is how Freud's idea of the unconscious was used by Russell to excuse Jews and others. This is how it works: Russell knew the USSR after the Jewish coup was run by Jews—he met a number of them, in fact. They told him they were bringing about socialism, or some other lie, correctly perceiving Russell as a stupid goy.
      (Russell in this book quotes quite a chunk of writings by Lenin (Ulyanov), pp 92ff, and Trotsky (Bernstein—p74 in a 1922 newspaper letter). In both cases Russell shows no awareness they might be lying).
      Russell writes that Bolsheviks, and other more or less autocratic types, are 'unconscious' of the fact that their idea of the State just happens to give them a key position in it! How could this possibly apply to a group that spent years of planning against the Tsar?

[8] Russell's idea of 'justice' is spelt out (p 233): '.. no one will inherit money, no one will own more land than he can cultivate himself, no one will be supported in voluntary idleness if he is physically fit for work. ....' Russell says nothing on ownership of assets, such as shares in shipping or in businesses or in tithes, or inheritance of positions and titles; after the Great War, which was partly paid by transfer of ownership to repay Jews, there's not much excuse for the omission. It's clear that, though Russell expects progress, he has no reliable way to ensure it will happen, or happen in the right direction. However he says (pp 234-5) '.. Socialism.. is only possible .. if the population is stationary... the less prolific races will have to defend themselves against the more prolific by methods which are disgusting even if they are necessary. In the meantime our aspirations .. have to be confined to the white races.. perhaps with the inclusion of the Japanese and Chinese..' The second part of the book is clearly largely rhetorical. Incidentally this book was published only about a year after his 'The Problem of China'—in my view a better book. Russell found the Chinese loveable, and civilized, and part of his idealism section in this book was clearly based on traditional China, then in its transitional state.

[9] Throughout the book there are flickers of such problems as 'the crisis of overproduction' and whether capital equipment should be exported to areas which currently have cheap labour. Russell quotes a book by Lord Leverhulme (who controlled manufacture of soap and other products; his 1918 book was 'The Six Hour Day') and Myers 'Mind and Work' (1900). The first says that, provided there's machinery, six hours a day is enough. The second drew attention to fatigue and stated in effect that productivity was pretty much the same with shorter hours, a lesson reinforced by wartime arms production, and mentioned later in H J Eysenck's psychology books. It seems to follow that strenuous people would end up running unproductive bureaucracies, fake charities, or frauds of the NASA type, but Russell only notices weapons production in this theoretical result of industrialism. Rather oddly he says nothing of the possibility that 'developed' industrial countries could help other countries build their own machines, something the Bolsheviks were secretly funded to do.

[10] Russell had his views on population movements and migrations, but not of long-term scheming. Thus he says (p 114) 'The main causes of [U.S.] prosperity ... [seem] ... [1] Vast natural resources without overcrowding [2] energy and ability of the capitalists [3] absence of conservative [i.e. old, inefficient] traditions [4] immigration of adults, saving expenses of infancy and education.
      Russell says nothing about European capital—often of course invisible—and the importation of techniques and physical capital. But he had no clue as to the habits of Jews and their parasitic habits. P114 has a footnote added from 1923 (on Kevin MacDonald's point on Jews and immigration): The [London] Times, February 22nd, 1923, ... states 'The leaders of industry who appeared yesterday before the Senate Committee on immigration predicted economic disaster for the United States unless the immigration laws are changed so as to enlarge the sources of common labour.' No prizes for guessing who the 'leaders of industry' were.

[11] Russell was weak on the construction of laws and legal frameworks, and had little conception of the way legal tweaks can cause large effects. (For example, a law that any believers in a god should receive no help, since god will provide, would have dramatic effects). In Prospects, the way companies are organised, their 'ownership' structure, the way their money operates, as examples, which must have some influence, are not outlined. The way companies offload the costs of getting raw materials (in another of his books, he states the public are unaware of these sinister goings-on) is unmentioned.
As just one illustration of Russell's ignorance of Jews, consider Russell in Chapter VII, Socialism in Advanced Countries, page 106's footnote says this (apparently, the most advanced countries have famine)
      ‘In 1921, at the height of the Russian famine, a scheme was organized by philanthropists (not by Bolsheviks) to bring children from the famine are to countries where food was plentiful. Municipalities [i.e. presumably some town councils] and others in England expressed willingness to take these children, whose mothers sent the following appeal: ‘We Russian others who are destined to die this winter from starvation or disease implore the people of the whole world to take our children from us...‘ The Home Office rejected this appeal... Daily Herald January 23, 1922.’
      It's sad that Russell ignored the work of such people as Hilaire Belloc (on Jews in Russia, and News agencies etc), Nesta Webster on conspiracies, and Arnold Leese On worldwide Jews. Perhaps the immense disasters of 20th century Jews might have been diminished. His final two chapters (XI Education, and XII Economic Organization and Mental Freedom) might have been concerned less with Nationalism than the forces behind it, and (X The Sources of Power) also the sources of religions (Russell meant Christianity). Much of the book is on similar lines to Power.
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BELOW: My 2011 review which was after Internet began, but before much of modern revisionism ...

... AND FURTHER BELOW: 2020: My thoroughly revised view of Moorehead on Russell: reputation massage by Jew censorship.

Review of Bertrand Russell biography   Caroline Moorehead: Bertrand Russell: A Life

Vacant—interesting mainly for scandal, and Russell's last years, July 8, 2011

some of Russell's books
About 25 years after Russell's Autobiography (1967, 1968, 1969), and nearly 20 after Clark's biography (first published 1975), by the time this book was written (at a suggestion—it wasn't a spontaneous decision) the McMaster Archives were well established. These may have included newspaper cuttings—this is not clear, but seems likely. Moorehead supplemented this with papers (G E Moore, J M Keynes etc) and interviews with survivors of those who knew Russell. The result is a sort of composite book: the main lines are as in Russell's Autobiography—upbringing, Cambridge, WW1, USSR, China, 1930s school, WW2, nuclear weapons, Vietnam War. And of course his books. Much of this material is simply taken from Russell. These main lines are interspersed with a multiplicity of affairs, of a sort vaguely reminiscent of some Internet activity now. Some women loved Russell all their lives, though it's not entirely easy to see why, as it's clear few of them were interested in his ideas. I suspect, though nobody ever says this, that it was his aristocratic side which attracted them—after all many adults found Princess Diana a swooningly attractive figure; why not something analogous? In a sense, Moorehead is in this same groupie category. Her comments on his mathematics, relativity, atoms and so on aren't even dutiful: she simply quotes the received views as briefly as possible, without the slightest interest or sign of comprehension. Similarly with related ideas—for example, Keynes and economics. And the same applies to politics and protest. She says nothing intelligent about the USSR. She says absolutely nothing about the ideas in Russell's Reith Lectures, essentially on world government. She is saddened by Russell getting worked up over war crimes—surely he could have been more moderate! Moorehead evidently has no clue about atrocities etc. She has no idea why Woolf was upset over Russell's letter in vol. II of his Autobiography, revealing after nearly fifty years that Russell knew Jews ran the 'Soviet Union'.

The interest of this book is in some side-issues, notably Russell's closing years, when of course he was extremely old. There's some information on his Committee of 100/CND activities, and on his War Crimes Tribunal, though not much, with many sideswipes at Ralph Schoenman. Occasional bits of information surface: for example, Americans students it seems talk of 'Occam's eraser'. Moorehead gives an account of Which Way to Peace? which Russell self-censored from his post-1945 writings. I hadn't known the unpleasant New York Times piece on Russell was written by Bernard Levin. I hadn't known Schoenman was a Hungarian Jew. There's an amusing piece of mischief—Russell listed (in 'Dear Bertrand Russell'—not mentioned at all by Moorehead) his favourite words, including wind, heath, begrime, and multisyllabic words—alembic, chrysoprase, Chorasmian. Moorehead has 'health' in place of 'heath', but more seriously someone inserted 'asholala' into Russell's list.

Rereview of   A 'Definitive' Biography of Bertrand Russell.   Caroline Moorehead: Bertrand Russell: A Life

REPUTATION MANAGEMENT: THE LONG ARM OF JEWS.   And: RECONSIDERING RUSSELL AND HIS PLACE IN THE WORLD.

Moorehead on Russell cover

Kendrick Mews, London SW7. South Kensington is a congested part of London, marked by museums, Crom­well Road, expensive shops, and traffic; including travellers by under­ground. With agents, reps, lawyers, renters, salesmen, collectors, mana­gers, dealers, planners, liars.
It's taken me about ten years to see from Moorehead's passive review (above) to a more fully revisionist view, mainly because there are many individual breakthroughs to be made before the full syndrome moves into focus. And this time in 2020, with its fake virus and hidden Jew activity, resembles some issues (such as the First World War) which exercised Russell, with such futility. This is therefore a longish piece, not just a review, but a meta-commentary on 20th-century media.

The copyright message (1992, by Caroline Moorehead) starts this journey: First published in Great Britain by Sinclair-Stevenson, 7/8 Kendrick Mews. This seems to have been founded by Christopher Sinclair-Stevenson, born in 1939 and author of a few romantic historical novels, it appears. 'Sinclair' is a Jewish red flag. His wife appears to be, or have been, Deborah, her surname unhyphenated. Random House seems to have bought them. Many an agent, editor, reader, literary agent, has followed this sort of path. At that time, computers and publishing had intermeshed in the script input and proof preparation sense, most obviously perhaps in the press and news.

Caroline Moorehead (b 1944) has a jacket photo credited, for some reason, to Newnham College; there seems to be no connection. She is stated (in 1992) to write a column for the Independent on 'human rights'. I'd forgotten this was invented as long ago as 1986. However it was clearly founded as part of the push for 9/11 and Jewish wars, with mostly US thugs, and US money purveyed by Jews, against Middle East targets. It's painfully obvious she has no genuine interest in 'human rights'.

The Jewish-controlled network of Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook and all the rest of it reports that Moorehead's biography is ‘definitive’ which of course it isn't. This is another of many clues that Bertrand Russell is a displacement, removing serious comments on and by Russell, much as Jews plan to displace whites. Moorehead has no competence to assess any aspect of Russell, apart from feminine gossip and rivalry. Russell's letters have been mined for their mixture of oratorical skill with sex, and incidentally can be irritating—Russell often praised wild places despite his complete lack of practical skills and one is sometimes tempted to wish a mischievous sprite had dumped him in, say, the Andes or Karakorum.
      I think Moorehead must have been suggested for this project because Russell had some serious anti-establishment opinions. Jews wanted a thumping big book in the hope Russell's own biography might be replaced by something 'definitive' in the blank minds of readers to be kept in ignorance.


From a 1934 partwork 'Concise Universal Biography'. Russell received plenty of uncritical media adulation. Unless he wandered into Jewish territory, which only happened late in his life.
Let's look back at Russell. I'll try to be accurate, but not over-detailed. In no special order:–

Aristocracies are much less studied than they were; not many people, except perhaps Miles Mathis, thrill to the pages of Debrett's, and the lines of descent from Russells and Stanleys are barely mentioned in most biographies, including Russell's own. But it should be mentioned that part of the long process of Jewish intrusion involved promotions of people for purely Jewish political reasons. This piece Bertrand Russell duped by Jews and physicists tries to cover this ground, which as regards Bertrand himself (3rd Earl Russell) depends on Lord John Russell, Queen Victoria, and the Test Act, permitting Jews various legal concessions. I think this explains some of the oddities of Russell's family, such as their isolation. For example, Pembroke Lodge (in Richmond Park) was 'in the gift of the monarch'; Bertrand had relatives, such as Lord Portal, later something to do with bombing Germany, though his autobiography only hints at them. Russell seemed to have no idea of handling his copyrights—involving himself with Anton Felton, a shady accountant. His brother Frank became entangled with litigious women, in the American style, and seemed to have mucked about with a Thames-side small business. The brothers showed little sign of what might be thought of as traditional aristocratic pursuits: Bertrand thought in terms of writing for others, in running tiny schools, in being something like an academic employee.
      (Russell had a distinctive unattached attitude to property. To illustrate the opposite, Hilaire Belloc thought the sanctity of property was part of the European soul. C N Parkinson in Left Luggage expressed profound fears over what he thought of as Marxist 'expropriation' of property; he never understood Jews. I see no sign that Russell understood, or deeply felt, such things as land ownership, land tenure, rents, church ownership, and so on, and this impeded his understanding of economics—Russell occasionally tried to study economics, but only in a derivative copycat sense, with no creative thought. It prevented him understanding the main thread of organised religion, namely the possibility of long-term income and stability in exchange for tasks which were often simple enough. All his life he underrated the finance of religion, and assumed that people were driven by religious ideas, despite the implausibility of that sort of underpinning
      A similar unattached attitude applied to the non-Jewish world of study: Jews studied subjects such as medicine and law as a means to power, including poisons and evading crimes. In contrast to the languor and unimportance of the 'Apostles', and others of the most intelligent men at Cambridge, all of whom Russell wrote he knew.)
      Russell on education is a perplexing writer. Britain and Europe have an immense tradition of educational forms: these include tutors, dame schools, charity schools, grammar schools, free schools, small paid schools with a few masters, church schools, language schools, schools with long histories, colleges of the Oxbridge type, paid boarding schools. There was a Jewish school in London. H G Wells I think had more feeling for the variations, and the rather tragic loss and leakage away of talent, during the 19th century. Russell's experience of crammers shocked him. But he seemed to have little feeling for the high quality locked away in these organisations: my bookshelves include (just a tiny sample) the 'Goddard Schools', University College School, Sanderson of Oundle, Elementary Algebra by Hall and Knight, both schoolmasters. Russell tended to lean to people like Pestalozzi.
      Russell (and Whitehead) had a rather sad uncritical addiction to foreign stuff. Obvious examples are Hegel, Marx, Cantor, Freud and Einstein. Russell's praise of the 'Communist Manifesto', a bit of Jewish plagiarism, was fulsome and absurd, but all these names still limp along to the present day. Whitehead recorded that he felt relativity swept away all of physics, which made a tremendous impression on him. Moorehead of course knows nothing of this.
      I'd be surprised if Moorehead read any of Russell's books.  Russell can be a fascinating writer. He was aware of Coudenhove-Kalergi (but without naming him). He nibbled at the supposed Keynesian Revolution, though without being convincing. Russell mentioned somewhere the lack of wisdom in giving money creation to private groups: if Keynes knew of the Federal Reserve, as he certainly should, it was criminal to hide that from Russell. But the essence of Moorehead's uselessness is her inability to steer through Russell's vast output and pick out the pointless and wrong and missing parts.

Much of Russell's early life was devoted to mathematics, but it's debatable whether he contributed much to mathematics, although he loved to be complimented on his creative genius. Lewis Fry Richardson was more like a creative mathematician (Russell reviewed him a few times). Richardson applied calculus to figures for money, armies, death rates and so on, but of course had no idea about invention of money. Richardson did not deal in groups, classes, sets and logical collections; perhaps Russell might have? Something of genetics was understood; perhaps Russell could have worked on genetics and eugenics? And on parasitism? Perhaps he could have worked on the dynamics of human groups, on the lines of Kirchoff's Laws and inputs and outputs? Perhaps he might have tried to model attraction and repulsion between individuals and groups? Or communications; or weaponry? Russell commented somewhere on times when defence was stronger than attack, as happier than times when attack was stronger than defence. Russell might have speculated on productivity; what proportion of a population might spy on the rest? Russell had opinions on power, on groups ordering other groups around; is there some theory which could explain how tiny a minority can be, to impose a dangerous idea on the others? He had opinions on finance, but nothing on the way the real world is echoed by human arrangements. Moorehead of course hasn't the ghost of an idea of any such possibilities.
      Statistical theory was a new topic, to which Russell contributed nothing. So were waves in the aether sense. And Russell was, unfortunately, naïve about physics, including Einstein's copied stuff, and the engineers' mythical atom bomb.

The most important omission in Russell's worldview is facts about so-called 'Jews'. Consider for example the fact that Rabbis think they can fuck 3-year old girls (plus one day), or that an annual ceremony to to disavow all oaths with 'goyim' is thought valid, or that withholding medical help is considered fine against non-Jews. Wittgenstein (b 1889) is quoted as asking at 8 or 9 'Why should one tell the truth', though by Talmudic standards that age is elderly. I'd be surprised if Russell knew such things—despite his claim that Cambridge encouraged completely free discussion.
      Russell had no idea of Jewish ideas on deception. As a remote example, he raised Wells's The War of the Worlds (1898) as ‘very good at imagining mass behaviour in unusual circumstances’ when propaganda and the spread of beliefs is of course not part of the war with Martians.
      This mental blindness was passed on: Conrad Russell's book on the English Civil War doesn't mention Jews and Cromwell; it is sublimely worthless.

On Religion  Russell's blindness to 'Jews' followed on into whole clusters of related ideas, for example Jewish connections with assorted junk, for example the connections with Roman Catholicism, with the King James Bible, Jesuits, Quakers, Mormons. Miles Williams Mathis, as far as I know, is by far the best writer pioneering in these expansive lands.

The Great War came as a huge shock to Russell. Moorehouse adds nothing here. For example, Britain declared war on Germany, not vice versa. (When I read Russell's Autobiography, I was shocked too—I hadn't known that opposition to WW1 was even possible). His Justice in War-Time (photo-reprint by BRPF) included (my best guess as to dates) An Appeal to the Intellectuals of Europe (1914?), The Ethics of War, which included 'four types of war' (1915?), Why Nations Love War (1915?), The Future of Anglo-German Rivalry (1915?), and Is Permanent Peace Possible? (1915?).
      Part of the repeated commentary on Russell is that his lectures were, in 1916, ‘considered the apotheosis of revolution’ but on consideration this seems unlikely. Russell said nothing on the 1913 Federal Reserve, on Russia and the USA, on funding of news sources, on various forms of alarmism and dishonesty of diplomats. He also asked Woodrow Wilson to arrange a peace conference, but as is now well-known Jews blackmailed Wilson. Russell had no idea that behind-the-scenes funding led to the appearance of support—the same principle as the Hungarian Jew Soros paying thugs to ship illegals. I think if Russell had been deeper, he would have been silenced, rather than just left to sew mailbags. After about a century, the coup by Jews remains little known, and many people still talk of 'Communists' when they mean Jews. Maybe in time Christianity and its variants will be renamed for Jews, too.
      Russell had little grasp of the importance of wars over time. Probably he accepted Creasy's unconscious attitude on wars—wars as single important events, but without much examination of long-term legal changes, deaths and population changes, wealth changes, civilisation changes, irreversibilities. Disappointingly, as Lytton Strachey said ‘Governments, religions, laws, property, even Good Form itself—down they go like ninepins—it is a charming sight!’—but what effects do hundreds of thousands of war deaths have? Should there be investigations? What about businesses and properties that were taken over or closed?
      At the time I enter this, the Coronavirus fraud is in full swing, with the ultimate effects being unclear, though it obviously has a lot to do with the Jewish Fed Reserve, which is as ignored by the Jewish media as serious events during the 'Great War'.

Russell's lifelong worldview remained pretty much the same for life. His mature view of the 19th century (with 'Peter' Spence) is expressed in two volumes, Legitimacy vs Industrialism and Freedom vs Organisation (both 1934). They did their best, with everything from Jeffersonian democracy, British Industrialism, and Bismarck, but of course it omitted serious finance. Here's my review. It's not too long!
      History of Western Philosophy (about ten years later) showed no serious awareness of Jews. (He regarded Spinoza as a 'Dutch philosopher'. He thought Latin was the only language available throughout Europe in the late Middle Ages). Or of the importance of secret groups throughout history.
      Russell failed to grasp the idea of nations as constructs:– in much of the 19th century Germany and Italy went through 'unification', and arguably this had as much to do with Jews wanting to fund single monarchs, in place of numerous dukes, princes and what-not, as with any processes of advanced thought. All his life Russell thought in terms of nations, ignoring internal stresses: England vs Germany, USA vs Russia, but not the slightest grasp that Jews ran the Netherlands, then the UK, then France, then the USA, then the USSR. Or Turkey, China. All his life Russell thought that 'British' sea power was British. All his life he thought scholars could and would discover truths. He regarded civilisation as started, more or less, by Greeks; probably this attitude was started in the Renaissance. His History of Western Philosophy was utterly shallow as regards Jews—it even had atrocity stories against Germans, including the Auschwitz myth—but probably remains the best book of its type, weaknesses and all.
      In fact the outline of a newer worldview is appearing with emphasis on the Mediterranean and perhaps earlier seas to the east, now relatively dry. This would allow evolution, both of men and other life, climate, transport in vast inland seas, writing, and power structures including destructive parasitisms, to be integrated together and perhaps allow for scientific predictions.
      I suggest here that H J Mackinder might be rediscovered as a geopolitical theorist; I think he's been suppressed.

The SECOND WORLD WAR is (I hope) entering an intense period of revisionism. The obvious starting hypothesis is that international Jews operated together with secret groups in all the supposedly belligerent countries. I wonder if the local intelligence groups were clued in to it all.
Here is my file How the 'Master Race' Won the Second World War.
And here's a collection of short questions on odd aspects of the wars by 'Hexzane527'.

And the supposed start of the nuclear age, with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Here's a very detailed but essentially simple enough forum on nuclear issues. The whole thing was a Jewish science fraud.
(This is a 3 ½ hour audio with Fakeologist and First Class Skeptic, recorded on 29 March 2013. Or look for the video Lords of the Nukes).




Grosvenor Lodge (I think) - 'Small and commonplace' in Cambridge. Bought after Russell's lawsuit of Barnes. Now near a Cambridge park-n-ride.
Russell after the Second World War: Up to about 1960. The period from about 1945 to 1950 was marked by post-war crimes, activities of the Jew-constructed United Nations, and the very vicious founding of Israel, all of course suppressed by the Jewish media, in which US radio and TV networks and cinema and press must be included. For fifty years, until Internet, most remained hidden.
      There was a rather ridiculous tendency, media-promoted, to view the 1950s as a golden age, which, from the most vicious Jew viewpoint, made some sense. Individuals such as Kevin MacDonald and David Irving overlooked the vast death rates of non-Jews, and were unaware of the Jewish control of paper money and immense secret funding of the USSR. They were not aware of Jewish takeovers—because these were kept secret—and had no idea nuclear weapons and power were new Jewish frauds. There was a supposed 'baby boom' which many naïve Americans still parrot. The huge fraud of the 'Holocaust' waited in the wings. The 1960s were manipulated; at present they are regarded as shocking, largely because of the Manson operation by 'intelligence'.
      Many Americans believed they were rugged individuals; I've sometimes got involved in arguments with Americans who seriously thought their land was a free gift, and their language, clothes, food, buildings etc and even religion were their own inventions. Many kept secret their activities during the war.

Russell became a grand old man of letters, appearing on BBC radio shows. He wrote stories: Satan in the Suburbs (1953), Nightmares of Eminent Persons (1954). None of his nightmares were assigned to Jews discovering their beliefs were nonsense, unfortunately. Alan Wood, after writing on the groundnuts scandal in Africa, wrote Bertrand Russell, the Passionate Sceptic in 1957. (This book seems to have been more or less pirated later by Herbert Gottschalk in Bertrand Russell Eine Biographie).

But then Russell stepped out of the official corral. He wrote The Vital Letters of Russell, Khrushchev, and Dulles (1958) and Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (1959). Russell took the nuclear issues seriously; he believed what he'd read.



U.K. MONOCHROME PROPAGANDA OF THE EARLY 1960s....

• Left: Four frames from a pre-digital BBC2 TV programme in 625 lines, That Was the Week That Was, credited to Ned Sherrin. Based loosely on the cabaret style, and complete with something like a brass band on stage—useful for finalising pieces where people attempting to speak could be stopped.
    Bottom left is Bernard Levin, just another Jewish propagandist and liar.
    The other frames show typical make-up and costume scripted pieces. Many people at the time were uneasy about 'satire'; many hadn't identified the Jewish anti-white threads.
    Russell thought the propaganda power of TV was so great that it would be undefeatable. (I've lost the exact phrasing).
• Right: Detail of a photo I found, showing the Daily Mail reporting on supposed H-bomb carrying ships moving to Cuba, October 1962. It's next to a piece on (I think) a boxing match victor, and a report on a horse race accumulator bet which seems to have not yet lost. I've not been able to find an online version.

Russell after the Second World War: After about 1960. This was the era of Ralph Schoenman, a 'Hungarian Jew', born 1935 according to Wikipedia, and who'd spent time at the London School of Economics. I wonder if he rubbed shoulders with Soros. In the words of David Irving, ‘Hungarian Jews have played a shameful and disgraceful role throughout the country’s Bolshevik-Communist history: Rákosi, Péter, Révai, Farkas ... The list goes on and on.’ As far as I know, Schoenman has never mentioned this legacy. There are accounts of his scraping a living in Alaska and hitch-hiking to Russell's house in Wales, but following the splendid example of Miles Mathis in rejecting rags to riches tales, we may disregard all that; I'll just assume Schoenman was some sort of agent.
      For some of what follows I'll rely on Mathis (see My link to Mathis and a site searcher).
      According to Ronald W. Clark on Russell and Schoenman, Schoenman claimed that since 1960 all Russell's initiatives—Cuba, nukes, Sino-India border, Vietnam, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation—were all Schoenman's. There are some videos of Ralph Schoenman on Youtube; I wondered if his image is partly based on Abraham Lincoln, another Jew, and another faked assassination victim, like JFK. One Schoenman Youtube video has an account of Jewish atrocities in Palestine; this may be due to the Jewish practice of telling non-Jews what they did, as Sassoon during the 'Great War announced that war was deliberately prolonged. (I just noticed that 'Bob Dylan' the Ukrainian Jew produced something on JFK, doubtless complete rubbish nearly 60 years later). I wonder if Schoenman was in on the various Jewish frauds: these included the 'moon landings' fraud, which Russell may have watched with distaste; the 'Holohoax' fraud, which he believed; the Cuba fraud, Castro being a minor film star and relation of Batista, and Cuba having a big US base—the media event reminds me of the coronavirus fraud, with TV, the Jew press, and Jew commentators, and crypto-Jews both in their regime in the USA and in the USSR all pumping out the official script, designed to suggest great peril, the need for more money, and 'Communism' as inexplicable thing, with the Jewish root never outlined—and in particular the nuclear frauds, which have only started to unwind since films of tests were sold, and the Vietnam War. I don't think Russell ever twigged to the Federal Reserve fraud and the various Jewish bank swindles; his criticisms were at the level of commenting on 'capitalism'.
      I have no idea where the truth lies with Schoenman; I hope he'll write it up some time—it must be a fascinating story, far more interesting and instructive than media rubbish. Including his travels and his interests in (for example) Iran. Russell was lied to with great success. BUT he did investigate the Vietnam War, so far as he could. Unlike typical Jews, he had (as far as I can tell) genuine disgust and horror for war crimes, an emotion Jews lack. And of course I assume here Moorehead was instructed, or acted spontaneously, to remove such details from her book.

The War Crimes Tribunals (which were banned from Britain by the 'Labour' Party, nominally led by Harold Wilson, of course a Jewish thing) were entwined by Jews, including Chomsky, Isaac Deutscher, and Sartre. It's possible they were atrocity management: I suspect the timing coincided with mass genocides in China. And/or possibly they were intended to make whites look genocidal killers, happy to bomb, rape, spread poisons, and waste resources on a huge scale. And simply look stupid. They were probably deservedly successful as campaigns by Jew publications in the 'Third World', and must have done something to bolster anti-white campaigns, though Americans seem unable to understand the simple point.

My reviews of many books by Bertrand Russell

© Rae West 2 April 2020

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New Hopes for a Changing World

Bertrand Russell. Published 1951.
Review by Rae West. There's some fascination in this book, which, so far from conveying new hopes, largely puts the burden onto people at the time to make more effort and not to think too well of themselves.

Russell's identity is marked by complete ignorance of Jews. He knows nothing of the Talmud, and the malevolent influence of Christianity and its symbiosis with Jews. He knows nothing of the truth about pogroms, or of Jews and the African slave trade. He knows nothing of Jews and the USSR, or Jews as directing money to fund things they like, including profitable wars—Korea was about to start— and control over land, banking, and other assets. He knows nothing of the funding of wars, or the distributed Jews making up a nation arranged on different principles from geographical nation-states. He knows nothing of the massive shepherding of populations by Jews. He thinks the African slave trade was stopped by whites, with the American Civil War playing a subsidiary part.

He thinks Malthus (preceded by Condorcet) laid down facts about populations. He had no idea that Jew-controlled wars had a huge effect in population control. In 1950ish Julian Huxley, with a similar mentality to Russell, directed UNESCO, and, looking back, was a halfway house to the miscellaneous Jew puppets at present. I'd wondered whether Russell stood on the population problem, and he clearly preceded Ehrlich's 1968 Population Bomb.

An early chapter, Three Kinds of Conflict, picks out (1) Man and Nature, (2) Man and Man, (3) Man and himself, a classification in earlier books of his, probably just a bit of Victoriana. The says absolutely nothing of the possibilities of parasitism within people. Here's a shortish piece on it.

Russell was always somewhat gullible—a career risk among people who 'cram' in youth and never examine their assumptions, like clergymen. In later life, he took on board the lies about nuclear power and bombs, mostly made up by Jews. But he worked on the USA in Vietnam. Americans inherited the short-sighted attitudes of the Victorians, but now (2021) some of them are awakening. Probably, as with the Victorians in 1914, it will be too late.

Rae West 27 Jan 2021

image   Review of Century-old socionomy futurology futuronomy   Bertrand Russell: The Impact of Science on Society

Future of Mankind as affected by Science. Very wide (but flawed) survey, October 25, 2010

Seven essays: six first given at Ruskin College, Oxford (not part of the University, but a sort of token place for aspirational working class types). I haven't found dates of the talks, but they probably postdate Orwell's 1984, published in 1948. The final essay 'Can a Scientific Society be Stable?' was given in 1949. The collection was first published in the UK in 1952.

Very important topic—possibly the most important there is, since science seems to be the only possible way to general happiness. It's therefore an ambitious work. (Note: there's extraordinary nonsense promoted about this book—my guess being because professional liars won't address Russell on US war crimes in Vietnam).

Russell's book isn't entirely easy to interpret though; because--

[1] His examples vary in length and emphasis—trivial points may get lot of exposition, complicated ones only a bit; rather like an impromptu speech. He sometimes doesn't keep to the point of the chapter titles; thus 'The Effects of Scientific Techniques' includes material on organisations (much of it taken from his book 'Power') which could apply to Chinese mandarins or the medieval church. His generalisations are often European-based.
[2] Possibly because he was consciously lecturing to the uneducated, some explanations are over-simply worded, and inconsistent with the rest of his book. For example, when discussing democracy, he talks of people as having three components—hero, common man, and cog. 'Hero' seems to refer to Carlyle's 'Hero Worship' and Mussolini; but turns out to mean someone allowed personal initiative. 'Common man' means someone with everyday security—Russell, being British, takes this for granted. 'Cog' means a useful member of society—but could mean devastatingly impersonal exploitation. There are quite a few confusing pages of this type.
[3] Russell does not clearly distinguish science from plain trial-and-error empiricism. For instance, he says cotton processing in the southern USA was scientific; but it was just a machine, perhaps no more scientific than a prehistoric weaving machine.
[4] Being a philosopher, he overstates the importance of philosophers. He includes the passage from Marx saying the point of philosophy is to change the world. Yet obviously people have wanted to change the world for millennia! Russell thought medieval philosophers were genuinely moved by other-worldly considerations, rather than just getting paid by the Church along with artists and others.
[5] He's very influenced by then-recent history: Germany, USSR, Japan, USA.

Anyway, after those cautions, here's what Russell says:

Chapter 1: Science and Tradition. Russell trots through prehistory and history—old favourites, including demons, eclipses, Galileo, witchcraft, through to Newton and Darwin. He discusses not so much what science is, as its effects on non-scientists' mentalities: the world as not having 'purpose' and being autonomous, rather than e.g. pushed around by Gods; the importance of evidence; man as being a tiny part of the universe.

Chapter 2: The General Effects of Scientific Technique—the longest chapter of the book. Russell lists inventions—gunpowder, compass, steam engine, electricity, telegraph, internal combustion engine and oil, flying. (Bear in mind that for about half Russell's life a car was a novelty). Then the social effects: 'War has been.. the chief source of social cohesion; and.. the strongest incentive to technical progress. Large groups have a better chance of victory than small ones..' Russell goes on to food and population, then industry and organisation and officials—he was concerned about this; one of his earliest books discusses the problem of jobs being given for cunning or nepotism rather than genuine merit. He also discusses 'mass psychology' in the usual rather condescending way, as though personally immune. This must have amused war propagandists and others; Russell turns out to have been very naïve, mostly in his failure to understand Jews.
      Russell doesn't notice that approval of discoveries depends largely, or anyway to some extent, on one's own attitude. He says gunpowder helped break the power of castles and their owners—but then he approves of Cromwell and the intrusion of Jews. But he doesn't mention the influence of firearms in taking over of parts of India by the East India Company: he'd rather not talk about it. Russell said of science, "the more the better". I don't think he considered the opposition case.
      I think this is quite a good chapter—it deals with vast issues.

Chapter 3: Scientific Techniques in an Oligarchy. This is largely about the USSR; Russell gives information on forced labour in the Arctic, mass deaths and the Soviet system, though without sources; much of his writing of the time (e.g. 'Human Society..') says this too. His introductory remarks on oligarchies (i.e. rule by smallish numbers) states that the 'Rule of the Saints' introduced in the English Civil War was the first example of power confined to one creed, which must be news to Muslims and Jews and others. This chapter includes much 'dystopian' material, and is intended to explore what might happen under scientific oligarchies. It's not a set of recommendations, as some rather stupid commentators on Russell claim. Russell ends optimistically: 'I do not believe that dictatorship is a lasting form of scientific society—unless (and this proviso is important) it can become world-wide.'

Chapter 4: Democracy and Scientific Technique complements the previous chapter. What's science like in democracies?—Russell surveys early enthusiasts for democracy (he dates it from about the 18th century) as compared with more sober prophets. There's a lot on weariness, despair, people liking wars (Russell was in the US at the time of WW2!), problems of huge constituencies etc. This is where his hero, common man, and cog aspects of people is discussed, in my view a bit confusingly.

Chapter 5: Science and War—the shortest chapter. Surprisingly optimistic, given Russell believed the A- and H-Bomb threats, which were very recent (only a few years after the myths of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). Russell mostly discusses effects on populations; he believed, like A J P Taylor, that modern war doesn't give rise to that many casualties—he seems to have taken this idea from armies in the Bible being wiped out by sudden epidemics. He doesn't seem aware of flu after WW1, and the sheer absolute numbers of deaths—very likely an effect of wartime censorship about Germany and the USSR, and post-war TV developments.
      [Note: Jan 2023: It occurred to me during the COVID fraud that deaths due to wars directly, or indirectly may be relabelled as deaths due to sickness, as a way to limit truthful judgements on wars or on other policies. Or they may be censored out; a Jewish technique.]

Chapter 6: Science and Values. Marx, Dewey and other pragmatists, Fichte and others are quoted for their philosophies. This chapter had a reference to Christian love which, his autobiography states, attracted a deluge of letters from Christians congratulating him on his conversion. Russell deplores fanaticism. He tries to list 'bad things it [science] can diminish, and good things it can increase.' The final part is anti-nation: he says 'Nationalist propaganda, in any violent form, will have to be illegal.' Russell of course assumed the 20th century wars were caused by nationalism. It's now known that the Federal Reserve, Balfour Declaration, US entry into WW1, the funding by Jews of Bolshevism, and of Churchill, has a huge effect; Russell was aware of much of this, but the 20th century fashion was to hush it up. However, if someone is trying to avoid or minimise wars, presumably it helps to know the causes of wars.

Chapter 7: Can a Scientific Society be Stable?—Fascinating attempt to survey the conditions needed, including physical and psychological stability. Russell comments, like Malthus, that wars or general misery will happen—and unlike Malthus, he mentions birth control too. Russell even includes the possibility of Asians exterminating Europeans. One of his conditions of course is a single government possessing a monopoly of force and therefore able to enforce peace. (Russell thinks in terms of peace between nations or countries; probably religious, cult, natural disaster-driven, and other events, might slip through).


Re-reading this years later, a quotation worth extracting is: 'Astronomers tell us that in all likelihood the earth will remain habitable for very many millions of years. Therefore if all goes well his future should be immeasurably longer than his past.' The figures may be wrong, but the simple point must be true.

Russell's final chapter seems to include conditions which seemed obvious to him in 1952, but all of which are questionable. He wasn't to know that 'nuclear bombs' were a Jewish horror/fraud. Nor did he understand that the world wars he'd lived through were cunningly fabricated by Jews. I don't think he could have been sure about raw materials depletion; for all he knew recycling might improve to the point where there are no shortages; energy might become more or less free—I calculated that a few seconds wind power across Britain exceeds all the energy ever used by man; human population biomass is probably less that the mass of earthworms in the world; and control of propaganda might diminish irrational fears to nothing.

On the psychology of boredom, subordination to large organizations, most people finding themselves in a groove, Russell writes, on war, that it 'offers an escape. I should like a Gallup Poll on the question: 'Are you more or less happy now that during the war? ... I think it would be found that a very considerable percentage are less happy now than then.' This of course is an upper-class view in a once-rich country, ignoring Jewish activity—Jew were happy to make money and take over assets, but of course weren't any part of the conventional war machines. Russell in History of Western Philosophy lightheartedly talked of war rapes, but attributed them to Germany, not Jewish-controlled forces. Again, he unthinkingly reflects the Jewish official view, in the grip of censorship.
     

The enormous factor in the world which he's overlooked was the issue of human internal power parasitism.

5 stars for adventurousness and considerable general knowledge, despite the weaknesses. It would not surprise me if this book (and his Reith Lectures of 1948—'Authority and the Individual') had a great deal of impact at the time, and some of his suggestions have been taken up or became part of 'conventional wisdom'; though of course potential elite people who were influenced tended to discount the democratic parts of Russell's argument, leading to today's skewed NWO protagonists. Russell doesn't I think ever mention difficulties with science, such as the possibility that some human groups simply can't do it, or that it may become so complex or difficult that it may collapse.

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why-i-am-not-a-christian  
UK 'Unwin Paperback' cover design. The book contains these other essays:
• Preface
• Has religion made useful contributions to civilization? [1940]
• What I believe [1925]
• Do we survive death? [1936]
• Seems, madam? Nay, it is [1899]
• On Catholic and Protestant skeptics [1928]
• Life in the Middle Ages [1925]
• The fate of Thomas Paine [1934]
• Nice people [1931]
• The new generation [1930]
• Our sexual ethics [1936]
• Freedom and the colleges [1940]
• Existence of God: Debate between Russell and Copleston [1948]
• Can religion cure our troubles? [1954]
• Religion and morals [1954]
• Appendix: How Bertrand Russell was prevented from teaching at the College of the City of New York.
 
Review of Bertrand Russell   'Why I am not a Christian' and Other Essays

Conventional Victorian rationalism, which omits crucial aspects of modern history
  Review by 'Rerevisionist' 26 May 2016
Russell's 1927 address to the UK's National Secular Society (he was in his mid-50s) has a Youtube audio version, not however spoken by Russell himself.

I'll list below some notes on these essays. Note that the contents may vary from those I've given; I've seen slightly different versions of these tables of contents.

First, I want to say why some readers find Russell's book hollow-centred and unconvincing.

Russell was brought up in the Victorian rationalist tradition. He assumed this tradition would be shared by his readers and listeners. Much of the tradition needs stating, but Russell tended to avoid this task. Gibbon is a perfect example of Eighteenth Century rationalism—a fastidious ridicule of absurd beliefs in elegant prose is a principal attitude. A later example—specifically mentioned in Russell's Autobiography, when he arrived at Cambridge, is John Draper's 1875 book A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe—Russell said he thought it a 'very good book', and found hardly anyone had heard of it. The author was a chemist and physiologist (biochemistry hadn't been invented), and uses a schematic overview of history—prehistory, Greek and Roman, Middle Ages, and modern times. The mental atmosphere of assured science, efficient technology, military security, and Christianity as a tolerated side-issue, was shared by most people not in the classics or historical literature or military or religious groups.

Russell, as with many people with assured wealth and incomes, was, for most of his life, naive about some religious roots. He simply had no idea that men of the time joined the Church of England for its easy life and light work, and other men, non-conformists, engaged in more-or-less Darwinian struggles for money and status. The traditional view was that Baptists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Quakers, Methodists, Primitive Methodists, Unitarians, Paedo-Baptists, believers in Greek Orthodoxy, Russian Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and so on genuinely differed in creeds. Russell's reading included Blunt's Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, Ecclesiastical Parties...—he compared Oxford philosophers after 1945 with the abecedarians', clearly regarding Christian sects as absurdities.
      Russell mentions somewhere a once-popular set of English books, published eventually in one volume as The History of the Fairchild Family by Mrs Sherwood. About a third of the way through is Story of the Absence of God in which the son Henry tries to learn Latin; his father becomes infuriated, and decrees that the family should ignore Henry. The point is that Latin was needed to become a clergyman, an ambition which Russell made fun of.
    And Russell had no idea about tribalist inclusive cults, such as Judaism and Islam, which attempted to include all aspects of life, and where penalties for leaving, or not being a member, could be murderous. This was partly for reasons of language barriers: the Talmud and related material wasn't translated into English until the 1930s. Hinduism is tribe-based too, as far as I can decipher it: Hindus are wedded to the caste system.

Because Russell failed to understand Judaism and Islam, and particularly Judaism, in view of its infiltration into all more-or-less liberal, generally white, societies, he misunderstood Christianity. As late as the 1960s, he regarded the USA under Johnson and Kissinger as 'Christian', with blood-red banners. He had no idea about the motives behind either the First or Second World War. So whenever he discussed Christianity, he had plenty of wars to choose from and dislike, without ever separating out the Jewish component. Considering he was fluent in German, and could have read texts on Jews in Germany, many of his comments on Christianity are inadequate. He was, of course, not alone in this.

Russell in my view was not aware of any of the subtleties of Jewish excursions against Christianity, including such things as the reasons for inclusion of the 'Old Testament' in the Bible, and the 'Scofield Bible'. He had little idea of the significance of Freemasonry.

Russell has little to say on everyday activities. Did Christianity help in everyday life, or not? For example, how valuable were the registrations of births, marriages, and deaths? What about holidays and festivals and public announcements? What are its strengths and weakness? Were churches deliberately designed to be uncomfortable? Russell is little help in making decisions.

Second, brief notes on the chapters:

Preface   Russell writes: I think all the great religions of the world - Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Communism - both untrue and harmful. I've tried to check this, but my own copy is lost. However, I'm pretty sure it's correct. The interesting point is that Russell does not mention Jews and their mythologies! It's possible the Russells were crypto-Jews; I wouldn't be surprised.
Why I am not a Christian [1927]. Long, and with interesting components, but limited by traditional Victorian ideas. Briefly, as estate agents say, we have a discussion on what Christians may be assumed to believe. God (Russell discusses the arguments, starting with the 'First Cause'). Then moral arguments on injustice, omnipotence etc. And then the character of Christ. (Russell doesn't discuss the truth or otherwise of the personage). Russell picks various maxims, and judges them. And of course there's a lot of dross there! Finally he looks at progress, and human fears, which he seems to think will vanish if everyone decides to be fearless and upright.
Has religion made useful contributions to civilization? [1940]. Philosophical rather than historical; except the start, where Russell considers the difference between the Church and its supposed Founder. Then Russell discusses sex, objections to religion, the soul and immortality, intolerance, free-will, and righteousness. He considers Christianity all but exclusively. Very unsatisfactory and inconclusive.
What I believe [1925]. This had been published as a short book. Russell looks at 1. Nature and man, 2. The good life.. inspired by love and guided by knowledge, 3. Moral rules, 4. Salvation: individual and social, and 5. Science and happiness.
Do we survive death? [1936] was part of The Mysteries of Life and Death. Russell favoured the research approach of seeking for evidence of survival.
Seems, madam? Nay, it is [1899] is one of Russell's first revolts against Hegel, or at least the odder philosophical points on the unreality of space and time.
On Catholic and Protestant sceptics [1928]. ''To the Protestant the exceptionally good man is one who opposes the authorities and the received doctrines, like Luther at the Diet of Worms. The Protestant conception of goodness is something individual and isolated. ... the Catholic has quite a different conception of virtue: to him there is in all virtue an element of submission, not only to the voice of God as revealed in conscience, but also to the authority of the Church as a repository of Revelation. This gives to the Catholic a conception of virtue far more social than that of the Protestant, and makes the wrench much greater when he severs his connexion with the Church. ... And he generally remains convinced, at least subconsciously, that the moral life is confined to members of the Church, so that for the free-thinkers the highest kinds of virtue have become impossible. ...'
    'Lenin took over his faith from a Protestant free-thinker (for Jews and Protestants are mentally indistinguishable), but his Byzantine antecedents compelled him to create a Church as the visible embodiment of the Faith.'
Life in the Middle Ages [1925]. This is mostly concerned with the very late Middle Ages. Eileen Power's Medieval People is 'a delightful book', dealing with Marco Polo and five other fairly obscure people. And material—all part of the rationalist view—on Gibbon, the French Revolution and Walter Scott and the 'reaction to reason', all ignoring the Jewish element, church building, charnel houses, and so on.
The fate of Thomas Paine [1934]. An interesting summary of Paine and his life and books. 'From the moment of his first participation in public affairs - his protest against slavery in 1775 -.. he was consistently opposed to every form of cruelty.. The Government of England was a ruthless oligarchy, using Parliament as a means of lowering the standard of life in the poorest classes; Paine advocated political reform and had to fly for his life. In France, for opposing unnecessary bloodshed, he was thrown into prison.. In America, for opposing slavery and upholding the principles of the Declaration of Independence, he was abandoned by the Government when he most needed its support.'
    Most is not very relevant to Christianity, but Russell also says: ''The greater part of The Age of Reason consists of criticism of the Old Testament from the moral point of view. .. it was considered impious to criticize the Israelites.. The orthodox of our day have forgotten what orthodoxy was like 140 years ago [i.e. 1795]..'
Nice people [1931] is a miscellany of épater le bourgeois comments. Including dislike of hangmen, dislike of policing, dislike of discussions on sex, the 'control of everything unpleasant by means of feelings of decency', dislike of politicians of all parties [who] tacitly combine to prevent anything damaging.. from getting known. Russell says The Fairchild Family is 'an invaluable work on how to produce nice people'.
The new generation [1930]. Russell on the effects of technologies: ''James Watt by making it possible for men to sleep in a place distant from .. work.. had the effect [of establishing a matriarchal family]'
Our sexual ethics [1936]. Russell thought sexual ethics were typically a couple of generations out of date.
Freedom and the colleges [1940]. Russell on academic freedom (but with virtually no concrete examples). For my taste, this chapter sadly misses the point. Rather typically, Russell gives a potted history of a few centuries, praising Holland and England, but has no idea of the extent of censorship, particularly by official experts. I was amused by this: '... the Chinese Empire had a Board of Censors, with the duty to criticise the Emperor and his government. Unfortunately, like everything else in traditional China, this institution became conventionalized. There were certain things that the censors were allowed to censure, notably the excessive power of eunuchs, but if they wandered into unconventional fields.. the Emperor was apt to forget their immunity.' There's a similar view that the 'the fool' in mediaeval courts, was allowed to voice criticisms; but I don't know what truth there is in this.
Existence of God: Debate between Russell and Copleston [1948] on BBC radio. Subdivided into the Argument from Contingency, Religious Experience, and The Moral Argument. (At the time of Stalin and mass killings etc). What happened was revealed in 1996: the two men spoke impromptu and were recorded; this was transcribed and edited; then they both read from the script for the broadcast!
Can religion cure our troubles? [1954]. Mostly a crit of Herbert Butterfield's Christianity and History. Russell's conclusion is a masterpiece of historical ignorance: 'our troubles have sprung... from the First World War, of which the Communists and the Nazis were products. The First World War was wholly Christian in origin. The three Emperors were devout, and so were the more warlike of the British cabinet. Opposition.. came, in Germany and Russia, from the Socialists, who were anti-Christian; in France, from Jaurès, whose assassin was applauded by earnest Christians; in England, from John Morley, a noted atheist.'
Religion and morals [1954]. A single page.
Appendix: How Bertrand Russell was prevented from teaching at the College of the City of New York.
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Fact and Fiction

Published in England in 1961 (see Russell's Autobiography Vol III for his 1950s/1960 activities, including the start of CND and the massing of Jews against him, including Ralph Schoenman). Russell was approaching 90 at that time.

I'll list the contents here, giving in effect an overview of Russell's politics. What strikes me now is the total absence of Jew awareness. His chapter Old and New Cultures is picked out for mention in his Autobiography, and glances at the Orphism and Greece and Rome; rise of Christianity, from which Russell, with imperturbable erroneousness, omits money. He views China as old, and Marxist Chinese as a new culture. He mentions Protestants and Catholics, and approves of the French, English, American Revolutions—and of the culture of Christianity! He had no idea that Eisenhower and Khrushchev had something very profound in common.

His essays are all 'Out of Date', although not in the sense in one of his Parables. He is out of date in the sense that he does not understand a new discovery or invention; ignorant of the existence of nitrogen, or of the discovery of the Americas, or the psychological finding that some people want war to kill of others.
      His essays are all short (which is helpful) and rather elegant; they encapsulate Victorian systemic ignorance. The text is available online. I've kept the page numbers, but of course these may not apply to other editions.


      I Books that Influenced Me in Youth 1
1 The Importance of Shelley 3
2 The Romance of Revolt 9
3 Revolt in the Abstract 15
4 Disgust and Its Antidote 21
5 An Education in History 27
6 The Pursuit of Truth 33

      II Politics and Education 39
1 What is Freedom? 41
2 What is Democracy? 66
3 A Scientist’s Plea for Democracy 96
4 The Story of Colonization 104
5 Pros and Cons of Nationalism 110
6 The Reasoning of Europeans 118
7 The World I Should Like to Live in 124
8 Old and Young Cultures 132
9 Education for a Difficult World 140
10 University Education 146

      III Divertissements 155
1 Cranks 157
2 The Right Will Prevail or The Road to Lhasa 161
3 Newly Discovered Maxims of La Rochefoucauld 182
4 Nightmares 185

1 The Fisherman’s Nightmare or ‘Magna est Veritas’ 185
2 The Theologian’s Nightmare 189

5 Dreams 193

1 Jowett 193
2 God 194
3 Henry the Navigator 194
4 Prince Napoleon Louis 195
5 The Catalogue 196

6 Parables 197
1 Planetary Effulgence 197
2 The Misfortune of Being Out of Date 199
3 Murderers’ Fatherland 204

      IV Peace and War 205
1 Psychology and East–West Tension 207
2 War and Peace in My Lifetime 220
3 The Social Responsibilities of Scientists 227
4 Three Essentials for a Stable World 232
5 Population Pressure and War 238
6 Vienna Address 248
7 Manchester Address 252
8 What Neutrals can do to Save the World 259
9 The Case for British Neutralism 265
10 Can War be Abolished? 276
11 Human Life is in Danger 282

I'll look here at What Is Freedom? and What is Democracy? but be warned these are very disappointing, and don't even include suggestions for ways to check their internal truth. Each is subdivided verbally (but not by diagram, which might simplify things).
      What is Freedom? (1) National Freedom - Freedom of the Group - Individual Freedom. Then (2) Political Freedom - Economic Freedom - Mental Freedom. Then (3) Personal Liberty - Government and Liberty - Liberty and Ideas - Limits of Tolerance - Education for Freedom. The a few paragraphs on The Future of Freedom.
      I don't think Russell answers his own question. In most times and places there was no obvious use for freedom: people had to work for things in ways which were rather obvious. But most of his analysis relies on the categories he selects. He has no idea of interactions, and in particular these have been Jewish-influenced for millennia. 'National freedom' for example was a Jewish pressure group issue. Russell mentions 'freedom of the group' but his few examples are all rather simple. His idea of personal liberty is that 'the individual ... should be able to do what he thinks important...' which presumably includes people who want to rob others, or attack women. His definition is absurdly weak, in fact, but anything more detailed would go far beyond 'freedom'. I'd suggest in fact his choice of 'freedom' is part of post-1945 Jewish triumphalism. But read it for yourself.
      What is Democracy? is similar, but a little longer. Russell uses the technique described here from my review (above) of his book on Industrial Civilisation:–

One of Russell's tricks, perhaps taken from set theory, or from Marx on classes, is to start on some topic—generally a buzzword of the time—and then, rather than define it in sufficient detail to be useful, to split it into two parts, and describe those instead, generally in some mutually hostile way. Thus (p18) two growing forces 'stand out .. Industrialism and Nationalism'. He doesn't say why these 'stand out'. He was writing soon after the 'Great War'; one might have thought that Militarism would 'stand out'. Or, in view of the Empire, race issues. Or, in view of the effects of science, population growth to unprecedented levels. Anyway, he describes 'Industrialism' as something like (p19) an extension of normal tools—Russell means the use of huge, expensive, temporarily unproductive factories and installations. He then says 'Industrialism' must be, or is, of two types—'capitalist' or 'socialist'. And 'Nationalism' has two forms (p25)—one for the bosses, Imperialism; one for the underdogs—Self-determination. This technique is often Russell's way of smuggling in various assumptions.

      Russell's history of 'democracy' treats it as a set of ideas or thoughts, more or less divorced from the real world. Greek Democracy in 'city states' excluding slaves and women must have been is small towns, not counting labour and women. No reference to external forces or to information. it's traditional to neglect these things, of course. At some point we have 'representative democracy', connected with such things as railways. (Russell does not consider democracy in sea empires). His main defence of 'democracy' is that he thinks it's less likely to lead to war. In his view, Hitler was the sole cause of the Second World War; 'no doubt is possible'. And 'almost anybody would agree that the greatest share of blame [for the First World War] is to be divided among the three Empires, Germany, Austria, and Russia.'
      His subdivision structure shares the weakness of his What is Freedom? in not being very abstract; he produces issues like rabbits from a hat, but not generalisations: (1) Democracy - What is means - How it began - Representative democracy - The Role of Police - The State and the Army. (2) Evils of Power - Democratic Freedom - Democracy and War. (3) The Geographical Problem - Tolerance in Democracy - Democracy and Nationalism - The Teaching of History. (4) Revolution - World Government - Excess of Government - Democracy and Liberty. (5) Dangerous Idolatry - Diminution of Liberty. (6) Redressing Grievances- Democracy and the West.
      All of these views were unreconstructed: absolutely nothing on the Fed, and Jewish money. 'American democracy' which of course was spun off from British Jewry; earlier, Cromwell as a part of democracy; nuclear weapons and nuclear spies, a huge set of hoaxes which Russell never doubted; Catholics and Protestants as driven by ideas, with no mention of money except for a few comments. He did say things about 'police' (without noting the change of meaning) for instance: 
Modern democracies are exposed to certain dangers which did not exist in former times. The most important of these dangers comes from the police. When the Communists were acquiring control of satellite countries, they were willing to enter into coalitions provided they had control of the police. [This was unevidenced.] Given control of the police, they could arrest anybody they disliked and concoct fantastic stories of plots. It was largely by this method that they passed from participation in coalition governments to exclusive control
and
For the Russian proletariat in Stalin's day there was no hope except the despairing hope of defeat by an external enemy. I do not think there has ever in human history been such a vast organized hypocrisy as the pretence that the Stalin government represented the interests of the proletariat. What it did represent was the arbitrary power of a clique supported in comparative affluence and comfort by a subsidized army and police force amid a vast ocean of squalor and misery and torture.
Anyway: 1961. Russell was approaching 90. But in a few years he discovered the USA's atrocities in Vietnam. Arranged by Jews.
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The business of Book Translation. Herbert Gottschalk, Bertrand Russell, eine Biographie published in Britain by Unwin Books as Bertrand Russell: A Life
Rerevisionist's Review: 14 August 2017
Unwin Paperback edition 1967, which struck me at the time as an oddity, possibly cashing in on the Russell Autobiography boom which (I take it) existed at the time.

The blurb says it 'forms a useful complement to the longer and slightly earlier study [in fact, 1957] by Alan Wood, also in this [Unwin paperback] series, The Passionate Sceptic. Gottschalk's Biographie was first published 'by the Colloquium Verlag, Otto H. Hess', in 1962. It was translated from German by Edward Fitzgerald, and published in 1965 by John Baker.

Reading between the bilingual lines, I think Gottschalk plagiarised and simplified Wood, and was then published in Germany. Then the reverse process occurred; probably Unwin came to some arrangement, as this book is shorter, with a handy table of 'Important Dates', but is a plagiarised work.
It's clear, after a few comparisons, that almost all of the material is simply lifted from Alan Wood—even the sequence is preserved. E.g. this is page 65 of Gottschalk: Whitehead galled by BR, p. 154 in Wood/ 1920s and 1930s, deaths of many friends and acquaintances 154/ Ottoline Morrell 154/ Eliot turning to the Church 155/ Shaw in favour of Stalin 155/ Charles Trevelyan parting 155/ by the time he married Patricia Spence, 'two of the few old friends he had left were Robert Trevelyan and his wife' 155/ biologist John Baker when the Russells moved to Kidlington 156/ Conquest of Happiness 157/ Religion and Science 157/ In Praise of Idleness & advocacy of spending, similar view to Keynes 158.

One of the tests for plagiarism is the repetition of errors; we find e.g. there's a passage about Shaw, metaphorically standing truth on its head, which Gottschalk interprets literally (71 in Wood).

Pages 70ff in Wood give good brief description of Russell's circle of friends in page 35 of Gottschalk, all comfortably off with sufficient money. Shaws, Webbs etc; Gilbert Murray.

Gottschalk keeps his book short and sharp by mostly omitting personal anecdotes (e.g. 'Robert Trevelyan had married a charming Dutch girl' - Wood). Gottschalk skates over contentious stuff, notably and predictably the First and Second world wars; e.g. 42 takes the argument from Portraits from Memory [Justice in War Time isn't mentioned] but doesn't seem to bother to consider what a 'German victory' actually would mean. He does say (p 32) Hegel's view that the interests of the state must always have priority over those of the individual had few if any supporters in British politics, but in Germany and Italy it was to provide the extremist right wings with a theoretical basis.. after the 1914-1918 [sic] War. Gottschalk is outdated at the latter part because it omits Russell on Vietnam.

Wood pp 126-130 is all copied in some of the following, in the same sequence as Wood:
-35: The story about C G Berry, a librarian at Oxford, who's in 'Principia Mathematica'. This is no doubt lifted from Wood, p 73 - but the name there is G G Berry.
- 40: '.. Eliot adopted B R's ideas as warmly as Bertrand had adopted him and his wife, and his review of Mysticism and Logic was the only one to meet with favour in B R's eyes.' [NB: Russell's footnote 'the suggestion.. that one of us influenced the other.. is without foundation' perhaps came from here.
- 54: '.. The New Leader.. enjoyed a world-wide reputation. ..'
- 54-55: Material on the USA, scattered in Russell's books and The New Leader. Gottschalk gives quite a few examples, and seems to have read widely the material which ended in Bertrand Russell's America (vol. 1), including Russell's advocacy of keeping Britain strong & maintaining large reserves of oil in order to be independent of US oil monopolies.
- 58: '.. The Analysis of Matter was.. a strictly philosophical analysis of the effect of Einstein's theory of relativity on the age-old problem of mind and matter. ..' says Gottschalk, rather wrongly. (The ABC of Atoms, according to Alan Wood, prophesies destructive weapons; Gottschalk says it prophesies atomic energy.
Gottschalk one guesses must be German; however at one point he refers to America as 'our country', so conceivably he was an American writing in German—or perhaps the translator, almost as a reflex, converted unthinkingly to a US standpoint.
      Gottschalk introduces some novelties not in Wood, no doubt taken from standard references: for example that Frank Russell was known as 'The Wicked Duke'. And Henry VIII gave Woburn Abbey to an ancestor of Russell: Henry VIII.. John Russell.. rewarded.. with Woburn Abbey.. The process of sequestration was carried out with great simplicity: the abbott was hanged from a convenient oak tree, and his monks were driven out. ..
    Gottschalk also has a tendency to give German thinkers notably greater priority than one finds in Britain, which of course makes an interesting change. He (of course) doesn't separate out Jews. Examples:
7: '.. The thesis [of Principia Mathematica] is disputed, for example, by Professor Freytag-Löringhoff, and by Professor Günther Jacoby.'
17: '.. allowed himself to be persuaded that Hegel and Kant were far ahead of Locke, Hume and Berkeley..'
20 '.. went with his wife to Berlin to study the German Socialist movement. .. series of lectures to the students of the newly-founded LSE.. German Social Democracy.. aggressive propaganda..'
20: '.. Marx and Engels..'/ 22: '.. Weierstrass.. analytical functions.. at Cambridge B R had never even heard the name mentioned.' / 23: 'In 1898 he read Hegel again.. everything the great man [sic] had to say about mathematics was 'confused nonsense'. ..'/ 24: '.. Symbolic logic.. men like G Peano, C S Peirce, E Schröder and G Frege..' / 26-27: '.. Meinong.. professor of philosophy at Graz University..'/ 58: '.. Einstein's theory of relativity. .. Einstein's calculations and equations..'/ 63: '.. his views now began to diverge from those of Freud in certain questions. ..'
There's an interesting point in Wood (which however I noticed first in Gottschalk, because of its trimmed down manner), that Russell took his factual stuff from 'experts'; when these were wrong, as they were, he went wrong, too. Wood thinks Russell never really allowed for hierarchy of developed-ness of sciences (this might explain why he talks more seriously than might be expected of e.g. psychiatrists).

On language, Gottschalk says
- 27: 'His book Theory of Descriptions, [sic; in fact a paper called 'On Denoting'] published in 1905, was an answer to Meinong...

Until now it had occurred to no one that the grammatical and logical structures of a sentence were not the same.. B R now analysed this sentence about the golden mountain, and adduced proof that the assumption was incorrect, since by words and semantic relationships one could arrive at thoroughly false conclusions. He reinforced his assertion with numerous other examples. ..
    .. B R ended the domination of ordinary grammar over logical analyses.. He insists that in future the laws of grammar shall not be allowed to dominate ontology. It is really no .. surprise to learn that.. he toyed with the idea of developing a perfect language...'

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Dear Bertrand Russell Searle cartoon   Review of Bertrand Russell   Bertrand Russell:

Dear Bertrand Russell: Selection of His Correspondence with the General Public, 1950-68

(edited by two Jews, Feinberg & Kasrils)

Another Ten Year Update. June 2024
As I write, there's general election propaganda in printed and TV forms all around. Looking at older material stuck me as perhaps worth doing. My old copy of this book to hand, I dipped in.
      A few things: the book was published when Russell as in his late 90s, and (following his Autobiography except for Vol III) at the peak of his fame. Yet the Searle caricature and thinness of the volume, and I think its small sales, conflict with its possible image. My best guess is that Russell was widely recognised as a propagandist, but one who left few handholds for critics, leaving them unable to find a focus for their attitudes. Just the way Jews like it. I doubt Russell ever met Feinberg or Kasrils. Worth noting on Jews as parasites, they tend to look like 'beta males', camouflaging their rapacity.
      The years 1950-1968 deserve remark. 1968 of course was the upper limit. 1950 and thereabouts was an important marker in Jewish chronological scent-marking and monument-placing. The 'United Nations' and Jewish international money establishments were built in Jewish-bought-land in New York, along with their ideas, including huge amounts of money for representatives of tiny countries which barely existed. Who had huge interests in the newly-imposed status quo. It must have seemed natural to include sweeping statement on race and on human rights and in international co-operation—though abolition of war was puzzlingly low on the agenda.
      Second World War 'lessons' were fixed, and, if Jews get their way, may become fixed for centuries. The whole Hitler-Germany-Auschwitz pseudo-facts on evil, and the whole Stalin-east Europe-'great patriotic war' pseudo-facts submerging Jewish mass murders were fixed into the Jewish media. Possibly the most important fraud was the pretence that Jews were victims, not aggressors. All of this was part of Russell's mental network.

Looking back, some things are clearer now than then. The attack on Vietnam—the shore seems to have been shelled, for example—slowly was revealed, with other facts such as chemical warfare; Frank Zappa being a or the son of some such 'expert'. The moronic ignorance of U.S. troops slowly emerged. The use of 'vets' seems peculiar to the USA; other countries have some obeisance, but in the USA, when it exists, it's a joke. The Liberty attack, still kept secret, illustrates such an incomplete reveal.
      The use of blacks by Jews is emerging, but slowly; the Jew Lyndon Johnson's use of money to separate blacks, and his use of force to weaken segregation, and the part of Jews in the Atlantic slave trade, and Jews in Africa are emerging.
      In education, Jews have a long history of faking outcomes; maybe this will begin to reduce.
      In science, Jews have a long record of deception; consider Fauci and others and 'AIDS' and 'COVID' frauds. The entire moon landing thing has been known for years to be fraudulent.
      In the media, it is a fact which some day may seem incredible that the New York Times still exists and is apparently taken seriously.

As regards Russell, his immense errors and gaps are painful to see. He had no idea of paper money and the Federal Reserve of 1913, understanding nothing of the connection with the 'Great War'. All the more a pity as he had contact with J M Keynes, who might have proved a fruitful contact. BR saw no connection between Jews and German Social Democrats, despite being, perhaps, a German speaker. BR had no practical ability; probably this helps explain his gullibility about the 'space age' and nuclear matters. BR in his letters says 'the Soviet Union has not so far attacked any neutral' which shows his self-deception; that 'union' held may components, and all of them had been subjected to Jewish violence. BR (sigh) had no idea of Jewish funding for universities and political parties, so that any number of nonentities and perverts appear as 'leaders'.

Dear Bertrand Russell has long sections on religion and on philosophy. It come as no surprise to find complete incomprehension of the rôle of Jews in inventing the sillier ideas and, by violence and money, swinging them onto 'goyim'. BR's early life in Victorian England had the Church and its lands everywhere; he could hardly guess that new technical media, entirely out of his mindset, would displace the Anglican hierarchy. And BR's philosophical questions in this book are largely of the 'can Man truly desire evil?' type. BR was totally ignorant of Jewish malevolence and absurdity.

© Raeto West   19 June 2024

 

Barry Feinberg - Bertrand Russell was a dupe
Barry Feinberg - Jew
Ronald Kasrils, Jew pretending to be South African
Ronald Kasrils, Jew pretending to be South African
Bertrand Russell's post-WW2 postbag, a tiny sample through Jewish filters. Review: October 24, 2010/ Jan 21, 2014/ A few more things Nov 2017
About 175 edited letters to Russell, and his edited replies, from 1957 to 1965 mostly—extracted from 'about 25,000' letters. Most, or perhaps all, of Russell's letters are now online, in the McMaster archives. Dear Bertrand Russell is indexed. It has a frontispiece photo of Russell at home in an armchair reading. Interesting, and I thought the book could be (and should have been) twice as long—and more—without any diminution in impact. I suspect this book was published to try to make money to help fund his Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal.
Kasrils (presumably) is the Kasrils of South Africa as discussed by Jan Lamprecht online. A 2020 video of Kasrils is about 50 years later than Russell's book.
Sorted roughly into main sections such as religion, philosophy, politics, war; plus 'anekdota'—the latter referring to A N Whitehead ('His philosophy in later years was essentially that of Bergson'), Tagore, D H Lawrence, Sinclair Lewis, George Gissing, H G Wells, Edward Carpenter, T S Eliot, Vaughan Williams, H J Mackinder. Others in the book include Shelley, Castlereagh, Tom Paine... and Sir Arthur Keith's New Theory of Human Evolution. There are several facsimile letters reproduced.
    Each section is introduced by the editors. Their value judgements are in the tradition of crypto-Jew propaganda. For example, Rákosi 'the famous Hungarian communist imprisoned by the Horthyists' and the Rosenbergs, allegedly executed in 1953 for allegedly spreading nuclear secrets to alleged Russians. The video on my site is an account of Rákosi as (of course) a Jew in Hungary.

- 10: 'Today favours are still sought in clubs and over lunch, but the growth of bureaucracies has produced a new form of letter which is archaic, deliberately uninformative and completely lacking in subtlety. The Civil Service rule books on letter writing must form part of the obituary notice of the 20th C.'
jews in hungary

Religion
- 43: [Q:] Buddha turned atheist but the inventors of other religions did not do so. We cannot say they were afraid to do so. They were the rebellious minds of their ages.. the teachings .. in the broadest sense .. "Believe in One Supreme Reality and do good deeds." Why did such a strange coincidence occur? [A] Russell's answer doesn't seem to cover the 'coincidence' point; he does however say 'Buddha did not want his ideas to be reduced to an arid orthodoxy with an autocratic priesthood.. many religious teachers in past millennia have sought what they considered to be a supreme reality.. most.. expressed this in terms of a personality which they conceived to have powers over men that no doubt they felt their fathers to have had..' and about man inventing 'powerful figures whom they name gods. 'I believe that they lacked the intellectual courage to face the world without the comfort of such a myth. For in the final analysis, it is human responsibility which is significant in our affairs. ...' [Note: One of my sociology books says working class people have little feeling of influence, and hence incline to believe in things like gambling]
- 44: '.. my troubles in New York in 1940.. or the outbursts of savagery against Mrs Knight's broadcasts (some of the less offensive of which were published in the Listener), you will be compelled to admit that in the West influential persons calling themselves Christians have almost a monopoly of intolerance..'
- 45: 'General Franco, whom Churchill called a 'gallant Christian Gentleman' .. It is in the name of kindliness and tolerance that I oppose organized creeds, Christian, Eastern and Communist, all alike. ..'
- 46: [Church] 'Christians [who] lived heroic lives with a view to mitigating suffering.. even these men, insofar as their activities rebounded [sic] to the credit of the Church as an institution, .. did more harm than good. .. The protagonists in every campaign for mercy have been inorthodox [sic].. burning of heretics and witches.. impeded the process of medicine by frowning upon dissection.. so shocked by geology that the Sorbonne condemned Buffon.. doctrines on eternal damnation.. opposition to birth control .. would mean that poverty and starvation must forever be the lot of mankind..
- 47: [1900-1950] 'The reasons which make me think its [church's] doctrines untrue are.. totally different, since we cannot know a priori that truth is useful or that error is harmful. .. intellectual arguments. I do not myself feel that any of the modern restatements of the old arguments for the existence of God are any improvement. I do not think there is a single one of them which would carry conviction except to one who ardently desired the truth of their conclusion. ..' [Note: on 'restatements' see e.g. 'The Scientific Outlook, part 1, fourth part of the section on Science and Religion, where he says all these modern arguments have counterparts in the past, though he doesn't state that they must be]
- 47: [Note: non-Golden Age:] '.. You ask about the 'splendid beliefs' of which the Queen spoke. Frankly I think this is pernicious rubbish. The beliefs of our ancestors included the belief that men should be burnt alive at the stake, that traitors should be hanged, drawn, and quartered, that torture should be used in criminal proceedings, and that sturdy vagabonds should be branded. I fail to see anything 'splendid' in these beliefs. There were of course better beliefs.. Algernon Sidney and Thomas Jefferson, of whom we killed the first and tried to kill the second. But by and large I think the prevailing beliefs of past times were both cruel and ignorant.'
- 48: '.. This moral code had its basis in the Bible but was then formalised by people who wanted to suppress all those things of which they were most afraid. ..'
- 48: '.. 1. Torture in the Congo, 2. Condemnation of Dreyfus, 3. Continued support for nuclear warfare. .. seems to put them [Christians] in a bad odour..' [He could continue this list 'for ever'. NB: A similar list in 'Why I Am Not a Christian'; see above]
- 49: 'You do not seem to know that in the service for the Ordering of Deacons the Bishop says: 'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?' And the Ordinand has to answer: 'I do believe them.' [I later found this in the 'Book of Common Prayer'] You will say, no doubt, that this does not matter, since no one expects a parson to speak the truth about important matters on solemn occasions..
      Furthermore, while.. most priests do not believe those parts of the Bible which they find inconvenient, many of them do believe some texts which they consider justification for inflicting great pain and hardship: .. divorce.. birth control. Most of them reject the pacifism recommended on the Sermon on the Mount, but accept with glee the text in which Christ says that he has come to bring, not peace, but a sword...'
- 51: '.. C S Lewis.. throwing away your life blindly [sic] as an imagined service to Christ is a form of glorifying masochism and of self-abasement before power.. same pattern as.. Russians who made confessions of guilt when prosecuted by Stalin. .. an essentially oriental attitude which Christianity took over when it attributed to God the moral defects of cruel despots.'
- 53: [Q] '.. various cases.. sincere belief of the old lady that she will meet again her dead husband.. child who fears the dark... ill person who apparently survives and grows well through persistent religious faith..'
      [A] '.. public point of view...
    1. If it is thought desirable that certain beliefs should be supported without regard to evidence as to their truth, one is landed with censorship and all its evils.
    2. The great majority of false beliefs have undesirable social consequences - e.g., Catholics oppose birth control and Anglicans oppose the marriage of divorced persons.
    3. The attitude of seeking comfort through false beliefs is somewhat ignoble.
    4. The question of children is more difficult than that of old people because one has to consider their future social activities. ...'
- 54: [1953] '.. I do not think that either the Nazi or the Communist religion embodies the religious needs of populations. I think both express merely the will to power of governments, and the incapacity of subjects to stand up against modern governmental techniques.'
- 56: [Why I am Not a Christian and translation banned in South Africa in 1959 and 1960]

Peace and Politics
- 67: 'Ever since my Christmas broadcast in 1954, most of my time has been occupied with the question of nuclear warfare...'
- 72: [1962: Mentions the connection between the expenditure on defence and the role of defence in the United States; military-industrial complex]
- 74: 1962: '.. The present method of solving disputes, by threatening to murder hundreds of millions of people, is so lunatic that it would seem that any alternative is an improvement..'
- 78: [Cuba; Dec 1962 letter:] '.. I criticised the United States because it threatened to sink Soviet ships on the high seas, knowing full well that such action would initiate general nuclear warfare.
    The United States has no right to determine the armoury in Cuba than the Soviet Union has in Turkey, Italy, Britain, or in any of the many other countries harbouring American bases ...'
- 79: 1963: '.. most Western newspapers are owned by wealthy men who have no desire to see the Cold War terminated..'
- 82: '.. the Afghan War of 1878, of which my family strongly disapproved..'
- 85: 1965: '.. it is inevitable that opposition to the cruel war of aggression waged by the United States will illicit (sic) crude hostility from those who promote it.
    .. I should not despair of the people of the United States, however, for the American people are not allowed to know the true character of the war waged by their government. It is the duty of those of us who understand the injustice and cruelty involved to educate and inform our fellow citizens.
    The war in Vietnam is not the first, and will not be the last such war waged by American imperialism. It may be hoped that as the peoples of the world struggle for their emancipation, the people of the United States will come to understand more clearly the nature of their government, and in time overcome it. ..'
- 86: '.. The Cold War is polarised in the Soviet Union and the United States, and one would, therefore, expect to find dissident opinion most carefully controlled or suppressed in these two countries. In the United States this suppression has become so complete that it has created the conditions for widespread fanaticism. Economic interests which ensure American support of dozens of feudal dictatorships around the globe make it necessary to propound a devil-theory about communism, and this results in an appalling self-righteousness which bears no relationship to the facts and cannot tolerate freedom of speech or independence of mind. The totalitarian pressures of the Cold War make the United States and the Soviet Union more similar in their intolerance, and the degree of freedom of speech in Britain will be very much dictated by the degree of British involvement in the Cold War. ..
- 7-88 [Russell on South Africa in 1964; note the basis is conventional Jew-free French Revolution historical notion] .. 'As with most industrial totalitarian countries, organised revolution is extremely difficult ... [but it is very difficult to stop violence once it begins ... The end result is a government dependent upon its army and it is because victorious revolutions invariably succeed through the discipline of a determined guerilla army that they soon enter a Bonapartist phase.'
- 88: [South Africa] ... 1.. I believe our efforts in Britain should be concentrated on making known the nature of the regime and on mobilising public opinion so that the British Government can be induced to apply pressure. I do not believe anti-apartheid organisations should dissociate themselves from nationalist movements advocating violence.
    2. In the event of outbreak of violence in South Africa, the campaign for external pressure of an economic order should be stepped up. United Nations intervention is rarely beneficial because the U.N. itself is so much the centre of Cold War power politics. Until this ceases to be true, intrusion of the U.N. will mean little more than the introduction of American power into the area concerned. This was evident in the Congo. If Nationalist movements seek assistance from Cold War powers, it will.. increase the danger of world war. There is no remedy other than seeking economic sanctions against the offending governments. The longer pressure.. is delayed, the more dangerous and violent the explosion will be. There is no escaping this. Western investments in South Africa are colossal. If the government is tolerated by those who hold these investments until the final explosion of violence, the situation will be even more grave.
    In short, the task of those seeking to oppose apartheid is to work for the maximum pressure against the regime from the outside. There is no way to remove the spectre of violence short of that. Violence is endemic where governments of this order hold sway.'
- 88: [Jan 1963 letter on Bill to strengthen the Minister of Education and ban Marxism in Japan. Whether the bill was passed isn't stated]
- 92: [Letter on 'Portraits from Memory':] Q, 1957: 'You deplore the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and hold that Britain should have stood aside from the conflict in 1914. Germany would then have defeated France, Italy and Russia. Militarism flushed with victory would then have been triumphant..' A: '.. militarism has steadily increased since 1918. .. democracy has steadily diminished. .. war to end war, and it was followed by an even worse war. Both the Nazis and the Communists resulted from the ferocity of the First War. ...' [Ironically, Russell's essay in Portraits from Memory make exactly the same points, and at greater length]
- 95-97: 3 letters all dated 1962 on civil disobedience, a topic also dealt with in Autobiography Vol III: 1. Schoolboy objecting to cost of policing; BR says 'Football matches, motor car rallies, Royal occasions and many other sporting events cause the police much inconvenience and expense, but nobody suggests that these should be curtailed. ..' 2. American wanting advice on picketing Kennedy; 3. Teacher faced with losing job or continuing as one of thousands who silently agree, but are of no practical use in furthering the vital call for nuclear sanity.

The philosophy section includes what must be the sharpest put-down of existentialism—'.. pure nonsense, based intellectually upon errors of syntax and emotionally upon exasperation.' There are letters referring readers to his own books—'Human Knowledge..' (theoretical philosophy), 'Power' (political theory), 'Human Society in Ethics and Politics' (political practice), 'Freedom and Organization' (includes his opinion of Marx). The final chapter (Lecture VIII) of 'Our Knowledge of the External World' 'says all that I have to say on determinism and free will', adding, correctly, 'If you find the discussion unsatisfactory, I can only say that I agree with you.' Disappointingly, Russell's conclusion on free will starts from the viewpoint (which he himself felt, considering the mathematics of muscles) that some men felt distressed at the thought they had no free will. Free will, therefore, is true in the only form which is important; and the desire for other forms is a mere effect of insufficient analysis.

Russell has things to say about the Church of England, in addition to Roman Catholicism. (The Greek and Orthodox Churches play little part in Russell's writings). He says the C of E is fundamentalist, quoting a passage on 'the ordering of deacons': Do you unfeignedly believe in all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?
    Russell wrote ... most Western philosophers have accepted Christian dogma. At most times and in most places throughout Christendom they could not otherwise have done their work unimpeded or earned a living wage. ... This is generous to them: in effect, he was saying they could only do their work by not doing their work! They posed as philosophers for money. But is not entirely true; less so than in the tribalist beliefs of Judaics and Muslims. Some philosophers, provided they had some sort of protector or kept anonymous, did 'their work'.
    Russell wrote: 'persons calling themselves Christian have almost a monopoly of intolerance..', his evidence being a collection of letters written to a broadcaster on the radio. This is an extraordinarily wrong remark, something like the belief that 'all religions are the same'.
    Russell wrote (not his exact wording) that, of course, many clergymen were honourable and honest, but the effect of them was to rebound [sic] to the credit of the Church, and thus indirectly to support a persecuting organisation. If he'd been a more adventurous reader, he might have applied the same lesson to 'Jews', or blacks, or other groups with exceptional minorities, when considering appropriate policies.   [His exact wording, to 'Father Holdsworth', in 1953, was I do not of course deny that a very great many Christians have been filled with humane feelings and have lived heroic lives with a view to mitigating suffering. What I think on the other side, and what of course makes an unbridgeable disagreement between you and me, is that even these men [sic], in so far as their activities rebounded [sic] to the credit of the Church as an institution, unintentionally and unwittingly did more harm than good. ...]
    Russell wrote that 'religions, like wines, mature with age', though he would 'desert logic if asked to back fetichism'. He expressed preference for Catholicism, in modern forms of considerable dissolution, over 'modern religions' of 'Communism' and 'Nazism' (National Socialism). But it's easy to see how his statement would be viewed by 'Jews'!
    Russell had little concern with practical comparisons between religions and their effects; his world especially when young was nominally Christian; anything else was remote and vague. As with many naive rationalists, he almost solely attacked Christianity, though occasionally he says things about other belief systems. A 1966 letter here gives three reasons why Christians are 'not without blemish' - 1. Torture in the Congo; 2. The condemnation of Dreyfus; 3. Continued support for nuclear war. The Belgian Congo (and probably French) was an 'alternative' cause in Russell's twenties, roughly the time of Dreyfus. It's a tribute to the power of Jewish censorship that, given everything that happened in the 20th century, Russell should pick only one mass killing, and what was probably a Jewish false-flag; along with the Jewish fake of nuclear weapons.

- 126: 'COMPLETE freedom is incompatible with organized society, but the amount of freedom that is possible depends upon how much tolerance there is in the general outlook.' [Examples: Byzantines, atheism, New Zealand whites and Maoris in ascending order of tolerance]
- 131: 'American army officer, part of whose work consisted of trying to persuade Japanese prisoners that it was not their duty to commit suicide.. I do not think that it was rational arguments.. [but] the effect of a social milieu with different attitudes combined with relief at finding an excuse for the instinctive love of life.. [Note: Not fear of death, but love of life] .. his account led me to wonder what I could have said to a Nazi prisoner .. to persuade him that massacring Jews is not the highest duty of man.. [unfortunately, he gives no examples of the arguments which the American had to try to meet, or of the results of his wonderings].
    You say.. ethics is.. concerned with man as a social being. .. But there are those who think differently. For example, Goethe, in Wilhelm Meister, sets forth the view that each individual's end should be self-realization.. best promoted by masonic mysticism and affairs with housemaids. .. how are we to PROVE that he is wrong?
    I cannot see that what you say about psycho-analysis is relevant to the fundamental issue. Psycho-analysis helps us understand the genesis of peoples' passions and may show the way of promoting the passions we like, but it does not show which passions we OUGHT to like. I can imagine an argument in favour of the Oedipus complex on the ground that it promotes great achievement. Alexander, for instance, might have remained quiet and obscure if he had not hated his father.
    .. your book has only confirmed me in my view that any system of ethics which claims objectivity can only do so by means of a concealed ethical premiss, which cannot be demonstrated.'
- 132: ''Cause' is.. a concept which belongs to a quite outmoded view. In so far as it is applicable at all, we can speak of one occurrence causing another, but this way of speaking is only applicable to bits of the world. To look for a cause of the whole is like trying to define the spatial position of the universe.'
- 132: Xenophanes.. 6th century BC.. 'Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among mortals.. if oxen and horses or lions has hands.. horses would paint the forms of gods like horses, and oxen like oxen.. the Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair..'
- 134: '.. social cohesion.. good account of its origins in Sir Arthur Keith's New Theory Of Human Evolution. In the past, and still for most people, social cohesion is a tribal affair promoted by fear of a rival tribe. This is what causes the psychological difficulty in advocating a world government..'
- 137: 'determinism and free will.. book in America called Scientific Method In Philosophy, in England Our Knowledge of The External World.. last chapter says all that I have to say on determinism and free will. If you find the discussion unsatisfactory, I can only say that I agree with you.
- 140: [Reply to questions from Yugoslav Journal:]
      1. Definition of 'philosophy' .. at beginning of my History of Western Philosophy.
      2. I do not think the world will be transformed by philosophy. All that philosophy can do is generate a comprehensive vision & mitigate acerbity
      3. Most adequate expression: theoretical, 'Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits'. Political theory.. 'Power'. Political Practice, 'Human Society in Ethics & Politics'
      4. I am not in agreement with much of contemporary British philosophy. I think that philosophy, like science, should aim at agreement with fact and cannot treat language as autonomous. I do not like Wittgenstein's later writings. The present-day English philosopher of whom I think best is A J Ayer
      5. I think the Existentialist philosophy [asked about Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, J-P Sartre] is pure nonsense, based intellectually upon errors of syntax and emotionally upon exasperation.
      6. .. my opinion on Marx in Freedom And Organization.
- 141-2: '.. maximum encouragement of independent thought .. for I believe that creative things beneficial to mankind emerge only from self-sufficient individuals who pursue knowledge without regard to the susceptibilities of authority or the weight of convention.
      I should hope that such a society would provide for the material welfare of all its citizens, that the degree of organisation would be only such as to make stable life feasible and that all members of that society would be encouraged to participate in the public policy of it.
      .. provision of occupation .. which proved to be coincident with their joy. Work ought not to be something from which people derive no creative satisfaction.. The social units should be small and a federal principle should obtain between different units. Cultural diversity should be valued and world organisation should have this as a major consideration. In this way the necessity for world order to cope with natural problems would not be incompatible with open societies and political and cultural freedom. ...'
- 143: 'if socialism is to permit freedom, powerful officials must somehow be curbed, for, if not, they will inherit all the powers of capitalists. I think that something along the lines of Guild Socialism would be the best answer. A democratic constitution is not necessarily a safeguard if democratic control is somewhat distant. For example, if the Prime Minister were democratically elected and had the power of appointing and dismissing officials, the democratic control would disappear except in the case of very important officials.'
- 144: '.. I cannot agree that any particular people [in this case, Israelis] are especially suited to solve all men's woes or to supervise his conduct. It is because of my intense conviction that such a belief is likely to wreak havoc that I passionately opposed the Nazis from the moment of their formation.'
- 145: '.. the alternative 'Red or Dead' is a quite unreal one. It would be perfectly easy, if the West so desired, to reach an accommodation leaving part of the world Communist and part Capitalist, and letting semanticism debate the amount of freedom in either..'
- [Somewhere here is a letter about a US professor, developing 'clean bombs'; this is presumably the 'Dr Libby' in 'Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare.']
- 147: '3. The best way to learn to write is to read and to write considerably.' (to Miss Dorheim, 15 in 1964)
- 147: '[Q:] ..life after death.. unreasonable in view of the fact that few of us are dismayed by the thought that we have not existed before birth.' '[A:] .. I cannot remember in what book the passage occurs.. part of the larger irrationality that we mind unpleasant things in the future more than in the past, which is why people like stories to have a happy ending.'
- 153: '[Q:].. in Conquest of Happiness.. peculiarity of modern communities that they are divided into sets..' [A:] 'I do not know exactly what to offer you in the way of 'material' to substantiate the diversity within a modern community. I should have thought it was obvious to any observer...' [Example on sexual ethics mentioned. Russell however doesn't seem to offer evidence for the supposed un-differences in unmodern communities.]
- 155: [Einstein]
- 156: [Two letters, both from Professors, seeming stupidly to challenge Russell's claims on priority:] 'I have written a paper to show that Peano often referred to Frege's work, before 1901...' 'I first became aware of the existence of Frege through a review of him by Peano (I think in the Revista Mathematica) ..'/ 'May I mention one of the finest pieces of work.. by your old friend Louis Couturat, entitled De l'infini Mathématique. .. one year before your essay..' '.. I reviewed his book.. in Mind for 1897. ..'
- 157: [On Pascal] '... he rebellion against reason which has disfigured much philosophizing ever since [Jean-Jacques] Rousseau. ...'
- 159: ['The Royal Institute of Philosophy.. Symposium in honour of the centenary of the birth of .. Whitehead etc.' What is this organisation? - July 97: It's near ULU, in an ecclesiastical-looking building; its offices are pokey but it has a nice lecture theatre. And it has public lectures every Friday of a dull sort]
- 162: '.. Modern western civilization seems intent upon elevating its violence to a scale which might be described as global butchery. ...'

The War and Peace section looks at Cuba, Khrushchev etc and nuclear matters—Russell spent a lot of time on 'current nuclear writings'.

Russell on the ‘Great War’ Feb 1957
... [in] Portraits from Memory [y]ou deplore the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and hold that Britain should have stood aside from the conflict in 1914. Germany would then have defeated France, Italy, and Russia. Militarism flushed with victory would then have been triumphant and I cannot believe that such liberal forces as there may have been would have had any hope against it ...

... I entirely agree with you that the consequences of a German victory in the First War would have been deplorable. My argument is that they would have been less deplorable than the consequences of our victory. We said it was a war against militarism, but militarism has steadily increased since 1918. We said it was a war for democracy, but democracy has steadily diminished. We said it was a war to end war, and it was followed by an even worse war. Both the Nazis and the Communists resulted from the ferocity of the First War. In all likelihood, neither would have achieved power if the First War had been brief. I repeat, I am not suggesting that the world would have been pleasant if the Germans had won quickly; but are you suggesting that the world is pleasant?

He states his view on the First World War—it was a disaster and he'd have preferred Germany to win a quick victory—then Communists, Nazis, and Fascists would not have existed. He replies to a pacifist re WW2 to the effect that the correspondent hadn't seen 'innocent Jews herded into gas chambers'—a rather odd justification, since it wasn't advertised during the war itself.
    All the politics is recognisable, or at least should be to Americans, as part of the Jewish world-view for the goyim. Many of Russell's comments in fact are disguised comments on the Jewish question from bygone eras: 'oriental despotism' for example.
    The nuclear material is derived from people like Herman Kahn—all the official nuclear 'experts'—and Russell never suspected there was anything fishy about it. Cyrus Eaton, 'Professor Eugene Rabinovitch, Editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Edward Teller (though his name is excised), Einstein and others appear, though Rotblat is omitted.
    Russell's action plan is: (1962) .... in Britain... when we offer a means of struggle both compatible with the peril ... and available to ordinary people... the popular apathy is replaced by determination to undergo any sacrifice ... that will help in the prevention of a nuclear war. There are no short cuts: we have to build an international movement of mass resistance to nuclear annihilation.
    The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES presumably by Feinberg & Kasrils state: 'By 1963 his total involvement had increased to such an extent that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation was formed, an organization designed to lift some of the burden of work off Russell's shoulders...' which I take to mean Jews moved in to ensure his words were corralled.

There are criticisms of Catholicism: Russell seemed to think the 'ultimate contest' would be between the Vatican and the Kremlin! But Russell had no idea that Nuremberg was rigged. I can recall no mention of Freemasonry anywhere in Russell. (He did mention Italy as being 'full of secret societies' after Napoleon. I wonder if Jews in Hollywood might have factored in Russell's comment when transferring Jewish criminal organisations to Italy, in for example the heavily-advertised The Godfather.

Russell noted 'American imperialism' but had little grasp of the realities, notably (i) Empires have other purposes than getting raw materials. He had no ideas on the control of currencies, the control of legal systems, the control of information, and control of people, whether for labour or for invasions. This of course fits in with his Jew naivete: he has no idea that Jews can extract money or buy assets at the expense both of target countries, and host countries.
    But (ii), unlike almost as many people, he had some grasp of militaries: In the United States this suppression [of dissident opinion] has become so complete that it has created the conditions for widespread fanaticism. Economic interests which ensure American support of dozens of feudal dictatorships around the globe make it necessary to propound a devil-theory about Communism, and this results in an appalling self-righteousness which bears no relation to the facts and cannot tolerate freedom of speech or independence of mind. ... (April 1963. P 86) shows his views on the US media, though he has no serious theory as to how this could have happened. Note that his 'devil theory about Communism' embodies a confusion: the Jews in the USSR produced a genuinely disgusting regime, but Russell in effect claims 'Communism' is a pure theory.
    Russell mentions US bases in Turkey, Japan, Italy, Britain and elsewhere 'on the Communist periphery' (1962, 1963). His book of essays War Crimes in Vietnam has more on bases, and also protests against US genocide—not identifying the Jewish component, for which of course such activity was routine whenever Jews were powerful. It is these protests which make me believe Russell was a 'useful idiot', not a collaborator, since these were also indifferent to war crimes. Russell swallowed the entire fabrication of mass murder by 'Nazis', and seems to have supported the Second World War purely on the strength of these lies and forgeries. Russell, all his life, was not very aware of mass thefts from, and mass killings in, Eastern Europe.

Russell talks about 'defence' contracts, and was quite bullish about potential money savings, but had no plans for 'Third World' improvements, which seems a bit lopsided—but is in line with almost everyone; I can't recall any group trying to tackle 'third world' issues without money involvement. Russell quotes 'What Peace would do to you' (1959) and 'After Disarmament, What?' (1960) both of whom said 'conversion of plant to peace-time uses will not be very difficult'. [Page 73: from Nation's Business, 'the organ of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce', and from Think]

Youth and Old Age There are several letters about blacks in Africa: Russell was part of the anti-Apartheid movement, including economic sanctions against South Africa, a secret Jewish thing. A letter on race from a US woman comments on one of Russell's books: the reply said his comment about inferiority applied to 'environmental conditioning'. Every detail shows no familiarity with the situation. It may be worth quoting another race-related comment to Chinese male in Canada; aged 14 (from the section 'Youth and Old Age'): ... I do not agree that it is harmful to belong to such a [racial] minority. ... for people who have independence of mind and strong character as you have, it provides a perspective on the follies of the many. You can see that the remarkable achievement of the Jews is due in no small part to their experience as a persecuted minority. ... in reality you are a member of the largest racial group on the planet for one of three human beings is Chinese. ... Russell doesn't state what 'the remarkable achievement of the Jews' [sic] is. Note the multiple assumptions, including in effect the idea that the Chinese are racially homogeneous.

- 106: 'I believe that the main object of education should be to encourage the young to question and to doubt those things which have been taken for granted. What is important is independence of mind. What is bad in education is the unwillingness to permit students to challenge those views which are accepted and those people who are in power. It is necessary for new ideas to emerge, that young people have every encouragement to fundamentally disagree with the stupidities of their day. Most people who are respectable, and most ideas which are considered to be fundamental are barriers to human achievement.
    .. All of human civilization is in imminent danger. If there is to be any hope.. all of us must work towards the elimination of these terrible weapons and must think independently about the policies of all our governments. These governments are preparing murder on a vast scale..'
- 108: 'I would urge you not to worry about the discovery of conflicting views. Do not resist being swayed by different points of view even if these seem to suggest contradiction. May I encourage you to come to a sympathetic understanding of the position that is being argued. I think you will find that after you have assimilated thoroughly the different philosophical positions, that your own thinking will clarify. It has often been my experience when coming in contact with new ideas that all of them seemed persuasive, and it had only been after I had familiarised myself with them that those things which seemed important became apparent, and that which was insignificant became less compelling. .. When you come to a point of view, maintain it with doubt. ..' [There's a similar comment near the start of 'History of Western Philosophy', on the puzzle of intelligent men saying things which seem obviously nonsensical].
- 109: Q: Royal Commission on Education.. province of Canada.. reactionary "Chant Report".. I am Chinese, and I regret it. Belonging to a racial minority is probably harmful.. I haven't been able to find anybody in any grade who shares my beliefs, or is even mildly intellectual...' A: '.. I spent the years 1920 to 1921 in China and they were among the most glorious of my life. They were of great importance to me.. I am appreciative of the meaning of being a member of a racial minority and I can well imagine the subtle ways in which you are mad to experience indignities every day. I do not agree that it is harmful to belong to such a minority. It is difficult, at times, but for people who have independence of mind and strong character as you have, it provides a perspective on the follies of the many. You can see that the remarkable achievement of the Jews is due in no small part to their experience as a persecuted minority. .. in reality you are a member of the largest racial group on the planet for one of three human beings is Chinese. ..'
- 114: 'The theory that it [masturbation] is wicked or harmful is a cruel invention of the old to keep the young in order. .. masturbation does nobody any harm.'
    [NB: Tue 11 Jan 94, amid Tory sex scandals, twice I heard on LBC this sort of remark: Deedes: "My view is you can't put the clock back. We used to have a systim of morality which everyone knew and believed in. Now people must make up their own mind and stick to it." & Frank Bough: ".. Or is it a matter of morality, which surely is a matter for their own consciences.."]
- 115: '.. I am afraid that education is conceived more in terms of indoctrination by most school officials than in terms of enlightenment. My own belief is that education must be subversive if it is to be meaningful. By this I mean that it must challenge all the things we take for granted, examine all accepted assumptions, tamper with every sacred cow, and instill a desire to question and doubt. Without this, the mere instruction to memorise data is empty. The attempt to enforce conventional mediocrity on the young is criminal. ..'
- 117: 'One of these hydrogen bombs contains more explosive power than twenty million V-2 rockets... Neither of these two governments has respect for the intellectual integrity you have shown. .. No political system is so important and no change of regime so intolerable as the mentality which contemplates two out of three human beings alive, living at starvation level; spends $100 million an hour on arms, proudly threatens genocide at every opportunity, and has the colossal arrogance to lay claim to morality and human responsibility. ...'
A number of letters are on capitalism, which Russell points out he'd opposed since his early years. But Russell does not distinguish worthless paper money (plastic and electronic were in their early stages) and its characteristics—when run by Jews—from ordinary capitalism, a vast chasm of misunderstanding. (Russell disliked gold as a currency support: he regarded South African and other gold grabs as transferring gold from one place underground to another, though that's not in this book).
    Russell is also a bit cavalier about (for example) South Africa, where he says western investments are colossal. But of course any developed society has to have enormous investments, as part of the mysterious processes by which techniques spread.

Russell did his best to be a rationalist, though I don't think he ever got the feel of tribal systems, such as modern Judaism and Islam. He has one letter on Islam, replying to someone who disliked the picture (supposedly—how could they know?) of Mohammed in 'Wisdom of the West', which was an illustrated version of 'History of Western Philosophy', with pictures presumably selected from photo libraries. Most of the religious letters are anti-Christian. This is no doubt where the Jewish editing comes in; most or all the letters promote the Jewish pressure-group attitudes—e.g. there's a pro-immigration into Britain reply to a south African.

Youtube comment 29 Aug 2015
Nitelaer reply to Alex McKelvey You stupid negroid sympathizer. mandela personally ordered the bombings and assassinations of white politicians and their children. FUCK OFF. You who allow the nigger to murder whites you are the problem.
 
In fact, one of the editors, Kasrils, ended in the ANC—strangely, the mineral wealth and businesses in south Africa appears to remain in Jewish hands. I couldn't find much about the other editor, Barry Feinberg.
    On the Vietnam War, Russell replies to a despairing opponent of American intervention [sic; Feinberg & Kasrils' wording] in Vietnam: 'I should not despair of the people of the United States, however, for the American people are not allowed to know the true character of the war waged by their government. It is the duty of those of us who understand the injustice and cruelty involved to educate and inform our fellow citizens' (page 85). Russell never suspected that money-making could be an object of 'war'. Or that the Jewish media would assist. Russell was aware of the power of lobbies in the USA, but only military lobbies—a letter says 'larger firms hire retired army men to lobby for them, and run very powerful lobbies in the U.S. senate'. (p 72). The Vietnam War was considered by Russell to be Christian, which must have pleased Johnson and Kissinger and other Jews. He quotes (p 168) two hymns, including the 'troops of Midian prowl and prowl around' and 'blood-red banners stream afar'—the followers, he supposes, being the Americans in Vietnam. This of course is a traditional Jew manoeuvre, attributing war crimes to non-Jews.

This is Russell addressing a 15 year old, reading philosophy books, but continually finding his 'reason is being swayed': ... I would urge you not to worry about the discovery of conflicting views. Do not resist being swayed by different points of view even if these seem to suggest contradiction. May I encourage you to come to a sympathetic understanding of the position that is being argued. I think you will find that after you have assimilated thoroughly all the different philosophical positions, then your own thinking will clarify. It has often been my experience when coming into contact with new ideas that all of them seemed persuasive, and it had only been after I had familiarised myself with them that those things which seemed important became apparent and that which was insignificant became less compelling. It is not error which is a danger to independence of mind. It is unwillingness to question everything. ... Much more easily said than done... as Russell himself exemplifies; none of his books published in his lifetime show any interest in Jewish questions. Russell, commenting on British politicians and clubs and favours, mentions coal owners writing to get public money, but does not mention helping East End Londoners against torrential immigration. Note the interesting fact that Russell provides no logical or mathematical help or techniques.

Russell seems never to have acquired much insight into human evolution. He wrote a letter something like this: I do not think that [passions] have any source. If you saw a child drowning, you would try to save it and would not wait for some -ism to persuade you that it was worth saving. ...' [Dear BR 1969 p 127] I see the human race drowning [i.e. threatened, in this case by 'nuclear war'] and feel a direct impulse to save it...' Russell had little idea that there must be some sort of mechanism linking perception with emotions. He assumed—'assumed' is too strongly worded; he seems never to have thought about it—direct impulses exist, and his other writings show impulse was something he thought underestimated in theories of life, and yet he made little attempt at an integrated view.
      Russell spent his whole life understating group activities, and irrationally exalting individuals. For example (p 148) deciding whether a hypothetical child is worth while, he writes in the abstract, you enumerate all the possible consequences ... if the hypothetical child exists and then all those that may occur if he does not exist. To each of these you attach the probability of its occurrence. You then add up all [etc ...] using the principle that a good and an evil are to be considered equal if you have both or neither. [etc] But it appears that group results don't figure here: the Jewish attitude would be to hypothetically select all possible activities in which he would work with Jews, or damage non-Jews; or consider his genetics maybe after many generations.

Even Russell's work practices are revealed: In 1963, aged about 90, this is a summary of his working day: 8-11.30, letters and newspapers. 11.30-1: seeing people. 2-4 reading, mostly nuclear writings. 4-7 writing or seeing people. 8-1 am reading and writing. At this time, he received 'on average 100 letters a day'.

Russell's ideals are summarised in a 1962 letter to an Italian: ... maximum encouragement of independent thought ... for ... creative things beneficial to mankind emerge only from self-sufficient individuals... [S]uch a society would provide for the material welfare of all its citizens... the degree of organisation would be only such as to make stable life feasible .. all members of that society would be encouraged to participate in the public policy of it.
    .. Work ought not to be something from which people derive no creative satisfaction and ... experience as drudgery. The social units should be small and a federal principle should obtain between different units. Cultural diversity among the communities should be valued [by] world organisation ... In this way the necessity for world order to cope with natural problems would not be incompatible with open societies and political and cultural freedom. ...


Anyone who thinks Russell was entirely honest might consider his remark (p 180) on British titles: .. Sir is a title confined to Baronets and Knights ... Nor am I 'Lord Bertrand'. For public purposes, I am 'Bertrand Russell'; and privately I am 'Lord Russell'. In addressing a letter or in a formal document, I am 'Earl Russell'—but the word 'Earl' is not used in conversation. ... for my part I do not care a pin how I am addressed.. He may not have minded how he was addressed, but he never as far as I know attempted to give up his title.

Anekdota
- [2006 note:] Somewhere there's a brief account of a debate with I think Bishop Gore, in 1926?; Russell could remember nothing except that the Bishop said all pain is a punishment by God for sin, at a time Russell's son was suffering intolerable pain from a mastoid. This belief seems to have been common and makes some sense - if God exists and is pleasant, pain must have some purpose - why not punishment? And I suspect this had something to do with the decline in belief after the First World War - see notes on 'Nonconformity' - since people probably would not feel their 18 year old sons deserved death.
- Somewhere here is Anaxagoras and red-hot stone & men building gods in their own image; if animals did, etc. And also self-styled 'Homo sapiens' and how he'd vote for 'Homo insipiens' which is indeed Latin for unwise, silly

- 168: [Hymns:] 'I remember in particular two hymns.. from 'Hymns Ancient and Modern.' I have always considered these hymns typical of Christian pacifism.
      Christian, dost thou see them on the holy ground
      How the troops of Midian prowl and prowl around?
      Christian, up and smite them, counting gain not loss;
      Smite them by the merit of the Holy Cross.

The Son of God goes forth to war,
      A Kingly crown to gain;
      His blood-red banners stream afar
      Who follows in His train?
(I suppose the answer should be, the Americans in Vietnam.)'
- 168: [Nursery and nonsense rhymes, an offprint by someone called 'Bredsdorff'; variants Russell had always known are given]
- 172: [Red Hackle whisky; I found on 15 May 92, in Bentall's in Kingston, from a manageress who phoned a Greek Street wholesaler, that Red Hackle had been the most popular brand in the 1930s and 1940s, but has since been discontinued. I bought a tin of Fribourg & Treyer's 'Golden Mixture' tobacco in about 1973; I wonder if their shop still exists? - By 1993 it has disappeared from the London phone directory.]
- 173: [Russell's day:]
      8.30-11 'deals with' average 100 letters & newspapers.
      11.30-1 seeing people
      2-4 read, primarily current nuclear writings
      4-7 writing or seeing people.
      8-1 a.m. reading and writing
- 175: [A] 'I do not know the origin of belief in the soul, but suspect it came from dreams. ..' [Rather curt reply; cp Winwood Reade for presentation of this idea which makes it quite convincing]
- 176: [Q] 'What kind of idiot you are.. Swiss-German Newspaper you evidently have said: "We are now living in a period with three revolutions ahead of us: the fight of youth against old age; the fight of poorness against richness and the fight of the fool against intelligency"..' [Dated 1958] [A] 'There is a kind of idiot that you have not considered. It is the kind which believes what it reads in the newspapers. I never made any such statement as you quote.' I think the 'ordinary Swiss-fellow' may have read a report of 'Authority and the Individual'; cp p 24 of Vol III of 'Autobiography' where R mentions young scientists vs established ones, and subversiveness of economic justice.
- 181: [Tom Paine memorial in the City of London?] [A] If I approached them I should ensure its rejection
- 182: H J McKinder and geography - interconnection of geographical facts is what's important; the facts themselves are of 'no intrinsic interest' says a geographer quoting Russell (p 143 of 'On Education' in fact)
- 184: [Ralph Vaughan Williams]
- 185: [T S Eliot: 'Heraclitus so like Villon'; in 1914, 'I only know I'm not a pacifist'] enquiry by a man who says 'his writings seem to me to display an astonishing narrowmindedness and intolerance..'
- 185: [Edward Carpenter in about 1900; women's suffrage meeting advocated a humane attitude to homosexuality, which inconvenienced everybody else.]
- 186: [George Gissing; story of his death [1903] and H G Wells' notes on it for use in Tono Bungay [1909], if Russell's right]
- 186-188: [Sinclair Lewis: one hour's monologue, then he could tell what one would have said with perfect mimicry; game answering questions in style of a poet, Swinburne in his case]
- 188: [D H Lawrence's wife cheering zeppelins]
- 188-9: [Meeting with Tagore in 1923 or 1925]
- 190: [Faulkner 1950 Nobel Prize ceremonies: shy; inaudible speech]
- 190: ['two levels, science & common sense and terrifying, subterranean and periodic.. might describe this as Satanic mysticism.. defensible on pure intellectual grounds, e.g. Eddington's contention that the laws of physics only seem to be true because of the things we notice..' Part of a letter on his experience with Conrad, his passion and pessimism and perhaps loneliness]
- 191: [Attack on Shelley at Tanyrallt; which is in full view of Russell's house/ this house in vol 3 of autobiography]

Anyway—an interesting if far too short collection. I bought a copy from Amazon, to replace one lost to me, but it seemed never to have gone to a second edition, or even impression. Published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd at 35s=£1.75

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image   Review of Bertrand Russell   Bertrand Russell: War Crimes in Vietnam

Vietnam—some of the (very repellent) truth by a very skilful writer, October 18, 2010

Download here pdf format. c 50MB.     More Vietnam War revisionist material here


Click for Russell's informative introductory essay, outlining the steps of world history leading to the American invasion. Bear in mind his comments need revision to include Jewish information.

Collection of essays, rather than one continuous book, published in 1967 when Russell, the philosopher, was in his 90s. The magisterial introductory essay looks at the French conquest, the First World War, Ho Chi Minh and others in Paris, the Second World War including Japan, and Dien Bien Phu where the French were decisively defeated. After this the Americans took over, though of course the period was dominated politically in the USA by Jews, notably Kissinger.

Four stars because several issues are, understandably really, played down: the influence of Catholicism—a tiny layer of converts in countries conquered by France became the new 'elite'. The influence of Jews of course is ignored—a 20th century convention. There is little on 'imperialism'—control of finance is omitted, and there isn't much detail on raw materials and markets. And the money-making aspect of war—war profiteers, the 'warbucks' aspect—isn't spotlit.

This book preceded Russell's War Crimes Tribunal, published under the media-crit but not search-friendly title 'Prevent the Crime of Silence'.

Very disgusting stuff; I think this is what led Robert Faurisson to say the USAF killed more children than any other organisation. Note incidentally the part played by the 'Holocaust' fraud—US commentators could say, well, in comparison with the Holocaust, this wasn't much—only a few million dead.

[1] The 'war' was probably a Jewish money-making opportunity—building bases, spending on ships and aircraft (including helicopters) and endless shells and bombs. Maybe there was experimentation, though personally I'd guess this is largely a myth; these things could be tested elsewhere.

With Jews controlling the USA, Europe, and USSR, China must have been a tempting next target. One of Russell's essays mentions McNamara trial ballooning Chinese weapons in Vietnam as a cause for war—almost unbelievable hypocrisy. Maybe a motive was to provoke war with China; who knows? The myth of H bombs may have allowed that option to be suppressed. Maybe it was a militarist vs banker struggle?
It's possible Jews may have carried out atrocities, perhaps in US uniform. This is a standard Jewish policy and has been used whenever Jews have carried out genocides. It would of course have reflected on US troops and airforce/artillery/chemical warfare operatives.
The US paperback has a strange paste-up cover, with what looks a bit like a Filipina and a young black rather crudely cut-and-pasted. Don't ask me!

About five years after this book, Chomsky's Backroom Boys appeared, the rather mild comment of which in retrospect seems like an apologia for Kissinger and other establishment war criminals. In fact it may not be too much to say that Chomsky's job was to minimise the secret acts of Jewish war criminals.

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  Review of Vietnam War   Edited by John Duffet: Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal (Stockholm, Copenhagen) (Foreword by Ralph Schoenman)

Ed Ken Coates, Limqueco, and Weiss: Prevent the Crime of Silence: Reports from the Sessions of the International War Crimes Tribunal Censored facts about the Vietnam War—a Nuremberg style inquiry, October 6, 2010

Rather little-known report. Organised by Bertrand Russell (and others) in 1967—when Russell was 95. There are two different hardback versions, published one year later, and some reprints. Based on, and edited down from, a large amount of witness testimony, some American, some (with translators) Vietnamese. Well worth reading to get the Vietnamese perspective on American war crimes and the racist anti-'gook' mentality. I suspect in retrospect the whole thing was Jewish-driven, with Kissinger as front of a policy to make money from war, and collect a percentage from currency from south-east Asia.

The idea was to mimic the Nuremberg Trials, though obviously without official support; in fact the Harold Wilson 'Labour' regime in the UK banned at least one Vietnamese witness. It's now known of course that the Nuremberg Trials were a fake, purely concerned to set up post-war mythologies.

Includes Chomsky and Ralph Schoenman among many others.

WARNING—much very unpleasant material. Note that the material is available online as internet documents, though this is not in book form. (In fact, I put the HTML there myself with permission in late 1997 to early 1998).
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Let the People Think (1941) - Brit Liby 8477.y.67
  Misleadingly-titled and Unoriginal Book; Presumably a PotBoiler
Clark's biography (paperback p. 561) mentions Gilbert Murray's proposal for a book on thinking, turned down January 1939 on the ground that Russell hadn't 'the vaguest idea either how I think or how one ought to think'. The 1930s had a small vogue for books on critical thinking, which of course often happens during stressful times—though the results are usually disappointing. Thus we have as examples: Graham Wallas, The Art of Thought (1926); Thouless, Straight and Crooked Thinking (1930); Jepson: Clear Thinking (1936) and Teach Yourself to Think (1938); A E Mander, Clearer Thinking (1936), L Susan Stebbing, Thinking to Some Purpose (1939).

Russell's book, despite the title, is NOT a 'how to think' book. It's a rather sad collection of obsolete essays, reprinted at least till 1961, published by the Rationalist Press Association (or RPA). This of course is just another Jewish front.

All the essays were printed in other places: 'In Praise of Idleness', 'Sceptical Essays', and other places, footnoted, some undated. These chapters are the entire contents:
ON THE VALUE OF SCEPTICISM
CAN MEN BE RATIONAL?
FREE THOUGHT AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA
IS SCIENCE SUPERSTITIOUS?
STOICISM AND MENTAL HEALTH 1928
THE ANCESTRY OF FASCISM 1935
"USELESS" KNOWLEDGE
ON YOUTHFUL CYNICISM 1929
MODERN HOMOGENEITY 1930
MEN VERSUS INSECTS 1933
WHAT IS THE SOUL? 1928
ON COMETS.

It's a saddening collection, disconnected from the world at that time. His 'official propaganda' piece dates from about the 'Great War', and is of little value. Russell might for example have discussed the BBC, then about twenty years old, and clearly a serious propagandist. Incidentally his 'Ancestry of Fascism' emphasizes Carlyle! And has nothing on either Mussolini or Hitler—or of course Jews in the USSR and elsewhere. Russell, having written an article, tended never to update it, or even reread it.

I insert this (in 13 August 2017) as I see the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has reprinted this; I thought it had dropped from memory. Incidentally, they haven't reprinted one of Russell's most impassioned books, War Crimes in Vietnam. What scum they are; how powerful and shitty are Jews..
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image   Review of Good wide view of, mostly, traditional philosophy. Not Jew-aware   Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day

Best single volume on philosophy, June 26, 2010

Best book on philosophy that I know of. But don't get the idea that it's simple: Russell's style is clear, and he is witty, and this can lead readers to think his material is simple; but Russell now and then puts in very sharp and complicated theory-of-types analysis. His book is divided mostly into names, which is handy for anyone dipping into the views of Parmenides, Plato, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Spinoza, John Stuart Mill, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson... there's a long list. Russell is happy to admit that academic philosophers have usually been cowardly types, and admits some names (e.g. Byron) not normally considered philosophers.

A Note on the Title: Much of the material is Jewish in origin. But has been repeated and inserted often enough to appear 'Western'.

Russell's style is so convincing he was often plagiarised—unconscious imitation being the sincerest form of flattery. Joad (who copied Russell on Marx), and Aldous Huxley (who based Brave New World on a Russell work) are just two non-philosopher examples.

There are innumerable asides, which I presume (he wrote and assembled this book aged about 70) were the fruit of discussions in his youth and middle age; on psychology, groups, sex, emotions, animals, ethics, totalitarianism, adventures, trade—a vast range of topics.

I recommend this to everyone willing to take some trouble. I've met many people who would have benefitted from its intellectual stiffening—for example a gifted physics man who couldn't seem to grasp that atoms are mostly holes, even though they don't look that way. And who had never understood that the square root of two is 'irrational'. Hoary problems—'universals', 'analytical' and 'synthetic', 'induction', 'teleology', 'determinism'—appear here and there, and it can do no harm to know about them. Russell also is good at picking out the strange practical effects of beliefs: just one example: Stoics and Christians both believed (supposedly) in personal virtue: if external circumstances cannot prevent a man from being virtuous, there is no need to seek a 'just' social system.

There are omissions, all I think to do with demarcation problems—the boundaries of philosophy, apart from politics, history, science, economics, and psychology. Darwin isn't here (much). Freud isn't here—but then Russell regarded the idea of unconscious motivation as the only significant part of Freud. Adam Smith isn't in. Marx is only treated as a philosopher: his economics is looked at by Russell in an earlier book, Freedom and Organization 1814-1914, in its first half titled Legitimacy versus Industrialism 1814-1848. Note that Russell seemed to regard Marx as 'socialistic'.
    All Russell's history in a sense is official: there must be innumerable people who were censored or killed or otherwise silenced; but Russell doesn't really bother with them. His book is a bit like commentary on a tidy, ordered library. A great deal of 'philosophy' must have been analogous to 'politically correct' chanting and chatter, not intended to help understanding, in fact, the reverse. His comments on (e.g.) Sparta, the various sackings of Rome, Platonists—any Christian discussing future life and God seems to be called a 'Platonist', even though Plato doesn't seem to be monotheistic—Islam, the Reformation, the World Wars—all are unquestioning. He doesn't ask about gangs and loot. Russell in fact has a comment to the effect that it seems impossible to find out to what extent anti-Semitism was based on genuine money concerns.

Russell's history is typical 20th century western: much of it jewish—prehistory, with Egypt, Babylon and the rest regarded as 'oriental despotisms'. Rather inconsistently, the Bible is admitted. There's a conspiracy of silence about true Jewish beliefs, though what these were was secret enough for 'conspiracy of silence' to be misleading. Then Greece, then Rome; then the dark ages, and 'middle ages'; Russell accepts that Islam was a transmitter, though I'm not sure he makes a good case. Finally, modern enlightenment and science. Not much was known about many chunks of history, so this schema appeared satisfactory. Some of his historical comments are typically Victorian: the dislike of Rousseau from hatred of the French revolution, and of Rousseau as the supposed origin of romanticism and silliness. Rousseau and Nietzsche and Carlyle were supposed to have led to extremism and Auschwitz; Plato and Sparta to Stalin.       Part 2 From Rousseau to the Present Day - Chapter XVIII THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT is a short, bridging chapter, which shows Russell had no idea how movements can be fed and planned. His lists of emotions and (mostly) authors appear to him to be spontaneous; he takes Frankenstein's monster as an allegory summarising romanticism, and deduces from it what led to 'Auschwitz'—showing (Russell wrote in 1945-ish) he had little idea of artificially made-up 'narratives'.

When eras change, Russell usually finds transitional people or ideas as exemplars: the Greeks treated in the then-usual awed way as a mix of peoples; Christianity as taking in Platonic and Judaic elements; Europe as church vs monarchs and feudal nobility and knights; Machiavelli, Erasmus and More at about the Renaissance. ...

Russell himself doubted his success in describing the relation of philosophy to social events 'when science became important'. Russell mostly knew maths, but was notoriously hopeless in practical activities; he literally couldn't make a cup of tea. (See Russell Remembered by Rupert Crawshay-Williams). Such things as the rise and fall of the idea of phlogiston, the growth of chemistry, changes in transport, and such things as anaesthesia, aren't really covered but taken for granted, in rather the way unreflective people seem to think motor cars and piped water and printing have always existed.

Two social events largely ignored by Russell are the Thirty Years War in early- to mid-17th century (a few scattered mentions of the vast devastation—but surely this was a Social Circumstance) and the late 17th century 'Glorious Revolution' of the Jewish foundation of the Bank of England in its new London home, away from the Netherlands. Locke, in Russell's opinion, was its philosopher, and of course says nothing on Jews and the Bank of England. I'm inclined to think that Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge was publishable precisely because of its uselessness—as with current 'politically correct' 'thought' in the USA, and orthodox un-heretical opinion many centuries ago. Hume, possibly genuinely Scottish, assembled a system in which only immediate impressions counted towards knowledge. 'Empiricism' is supposedly made up from the Greek word meaning 'experience'; so that anything secret cannot presumably count as 'knowledge'. This of course rules out speculations on Jews and money and serious history and secret agreements, and on the possible reasons for 18th-century Britain being impoverished. Hume disliked induction; he said there was no rational source of the belief that the sun would rise tomorrow. There is no space in his system for frank avowals that full information may not be known, but if it was, a reason might be found for sunrises and sunsets, even if it's not known now.
      For my taste, Russell show little feeling for the changes over time in population, discoveries, technology, travel and so on. He says of Aristotle that the 'natural way to get wealth is by skilful management of house and land'. Russell notices Aristotle's view of the City-State was outdated as he wrote. But he had no firmly integrated views on ease of transport, changes of meaning of slavery or war, effects of knowledge both of good (e.g. food) and bad (e.g. poisons), extents of laws, and effects of scale. In particular he had no theory of costs of weaponry, as was needed to understand invasions, infiltrations, expansions. And these topics were not generally recognised by Russell in 'philosophy'.
      Russell gives an example of an idea built up from other ideas: he says it's possible to imagine a winged horse. This is where his lack of science shows up: a horse is far too heavy to be lifted by bird-style wings; so his example is untrue. Rather oddly, Hume wrote a piece for post-mortem publication, supposedly (I haven't read it) showing that miracles are impossible—flatly contradicting the idea that induction is a superstition, and we have no reason to suppose expectations will fail. Probably the key to Hume is his statement that literary fame was his prime object in life. And probably the key to the empiricists was success, if they avoided the Jewish issue, plus perhaps the pun on India and Empire.   (Added 29 Nov 2018)



Some accuse Russell of bias; typically these are:-

[1] Catholics often can't face the rationalistic side of Russell. (They don't seem to know that Russell wrote a lot on mysticism).

[2] People who like Kant and Hegel, and Nietzsche. Russell was not keen on German philosophy—when he was young, all official philosophers were Hegelians. He followed G E Moore in 'climbing down'.
      It's clear that 'German philosopher' was often a synonym for Jew. Schopenhauer, Fichte and Anglo-Americanised Jews from Germany, mostly 20th century, are now-obvious examples: Dewey, Popper, Noam Chomsky, Herbert Marcuse, ...

[3] Supporters of Wittgenstein. Russell was a friend of his, and liked his work when it was new, but decided later it was rather trivial. (Though this is rarely stated, and not at all by Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein appears to have considered himself a Jew).

[4] Supporters of Sartre and other existentialists. Russell dismissed it in a sentence in Dear Bertrand Russell: based emotionally on exasperation, and intellectually on errors of syntax.

[5] 'Linguistic' philosophers of the Gilbert Ryle type—'just another clever man' according to Russell. He supplied an introduction to Ernest Gellner's Words and Things.

Note that, near the end of his life, Russell spent years on the problem of nuclear weapons, Kennedy's assassination, and, later, the Americans and the Vietnam War. For this reason he's partly censored, still. [These of course are all Jewish frauds].

It's a pity there is no equivalent book on eastern philosophies... that would be something. Incidentally Sophie's World is based on Russell. Probably Nigel Warburton's book is, too. This sort of thing is the penalty for a highly convincing writing style.
[Added later]
Book One, Ancient Philosophy, Chapter VIII Anaxagoras interests me in being the principal chapter in which the Sophists are mentioned. They appear in several chapters because they don't represent a special philosophy, but have an approach to philosophy, involving controversy, and money payments. They may have been in the same style as teachers of 'oratory' in the Christian era.
      I suspect they were Jews exercising 'pilpul', or perhaps Greeks copying the techniques. My piece on Plato's Sophist gives my reasons, which includes the issues of forgery and censorship, both dear to Jews and probably copied by the later Christians. The modern dictionary extract shows the double meaning of Sophist—not originally present—and the possibility that 'unsophisticated' might prove a useful counter to many of the present-day Jewish anti-white slogans and expressions of hate.
teleology (n.) "study of final causes," 1740, from Modern Latin [sic] teleologia, coined 1728 by German philosopher Baron Christian von Wolff (1679-1754) from Greek teleos "entire, perfect, complete," genitive of telos "end, goal, result" (see telos), + -logia (see -logy). Related: Teleologist; teleological.
The word has mutated in meaning; now it conveys the idea of a mistaken cause attributed to human desires, not a genuine cause attributed to nature. If the quoted etymology is correct, it's worth noting that it pre-dates The Origin of Species.
Here's a passage (from Russell's chapter IX from Book One on 'The Atomists') which shows Russell's unawareness of the possibility of parasitical subgroups of human beings emerging:

... the notion of purpose or final cause. The "final cause" of an occurrence is an event in the future for the sake of which the occurrence takes place. In human affairs, this conception is applicable. Why does the baker make bread? Because people will be hungry. Why are railways built? Because people will wish to travel. In such cases, things are explained by the purpose they serve. When we ask "why?" concerning an event, we may mean either of two things. We may mean: "What purpose did this event serve?" or we may mean: "What earlier circumstances caused this event?" The answer to the former question is a teleological explanation, or an explanation by final causes; the answer to the latter question is a mechanistic explanation. I do not see how it could have been known in advance which of these two questions science ought to ask, or whether it ought to ask both. But experience has shown that the mechanistic question leads to scientific knowledge, while the teleological question does not. The atomists asked the mechanistic question, and gave a mechanistic answer. Their successors, until the Renaissance, were more interested in the teleological question, and thus led science up a blind alley.

There are I think better passages in Russell on this topic, but I haven't found one. The point is that "Why?" can also be answered by the desire to trick or manipulate others.

I think it's worth pointing out that logic can also be used in attempts to trick and manipulate others. As examples: (1) a woman in her Amazon reviews wanted everyone to be taught Aristotelian logic; then, she thought, many errors in reasoning would fade away. (2) Many people seem to think there is a fixed scientific method, so that some arguments can be deemed unscientific, if they don't conform to their definitions. For example, if events are not 'repeatable'; or evidence is hidden and therefore may not exist; or some principle ('light travels in straight lines', 'water finds its level', 'a vacuum cannot exist') is violated.


Russell on the Reformation, and Counter-Reformation, [these names are Protestant] shows complete unawareness of the possibilities of adopting views because of their results in (e.g.) getting wealth, or invasion, or military conquest. Russell's two-and-a-half page commentary on 'The Reformation and Counter-Reformation' suggests to me that both events were managed by Jews, presumably holding on to (or increasing) their control over the surplus above survival generated in Christendom.

The Reformation and Counter-Reformation, alike, represent the rebellion of less civilized nations against the intellectual domination of Italy. ... Roughly speaking, the Reformation was German, the counter-Reformation Spanish...

      The three great men of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation are Luther, Calvin and Loyola. [Note by RW: All are now viewed as Jews below] All three, intellectually, are medieval in philosophy, as compared either to the Italians who immediately preceded them, or to such men as Erasmus and More. Luther and Calvin['s] ... theology was such as to diminish the power of the Church. They abolished purgatory, from which the souls of the dead could be delivered by masses. They rejected the doctrine of Indulgences, upon which a large part of the Papal revenue depended. By the doctrine of predestination, the fate of the soul after death was made wholly independent of the actions of priests. ...
      Protestant success, at first amazingly rapid, was checked mainly as a result of Loyola's creation of the Jesuit order. ... founded on military models; there must be unquestioning obedience to the General, and every Jesuit was to consider himself engaged in warfare against heresy. ... Their theology was the opposite of that of the Protestants; .. they opposed predestination. Salvation ... was by both Faith and works. They became popular as confessors because ... they were more lenient, except towards heresy... They concentrated on education... in the wake of conquering Spanish armies, re-established the terror of the Inquisition...

All three of Luther, Calvin, and Loyola have been argued convincingly were Jews. It appears both the Reformation and Counter-Reformation were Jewish movements; the point of interest is mostly the interactions with local people, including monarchs—Russell includes paragraphs on the attitudes of the various religions which 'made it necessary to abandon the medieval hope of doctrinal unity...' Russell had no idea of Jewish practices; he obviously doesn't understand that the Inquisition was, at least partially, concerned with unearthing secret Jews. He had no idea that beliefs, considered as memes to be argued for, lied about, and used, could be weapons, and often were—perhaps always. As just one example, Priories were buildings and occupants in similar style to monasteries; if purgatory was officially abolished, their work of praying for souls of dead rich people would come to a stop.

BOOK 3 - MODERN PHILOSOPHY. Part I - Chapter VI   The Rise of Science

Short (14 pages). Worth making three main points:
      [1] Russell was not good on the distinctions (if they exist) between science and technology. Russell thought technology was applicable to common sense constructions, such as windmills. But consider, for example, modern dams; skyscrapers; aeroplanes. The general idea is obvious, but not the detail.
      Anyway, Russell's chapter mostly looks at astronomy and the solar system. He writes the detail in the precise style of Victorian mathematics, with acceleration and inertia and momentum and so on (though he gives no explanation of how Kepler could have done his work on ellipses; after all, planetary orbits are almost circular and not quite flat). His conclusion is simple: '... the outlook of educated men was completely transformed. At the beginning of the [17th; the 1600s] century, Sir Thomas Browne took part in trials for witchcraft; at the end, such a thing would have been impossible. In Shakespeare's time, comets were still portents; after the publication of Newton's Principia in 1687, it was known that he and Halley had calculated the orbit of certain comets, and that thy were as obedient as the planets to the law of gravitation. The reign of law had established its hold on men's imaginations, making such things as magic and sorcery incredible. In 1700 the mental outlook of educated men was completely modern; in 1600, except among a very few, it was medieval.
      {2} In 1700 the mental outlook of educated men was completely modern; in 1600, except among a very few, it was medieval. I suggest this is wrong, and is a 'contrast effect' resulting from one new, sharp, belief system overpowering anything else. What is wrong is that the Jewish rubbish remained, and is still here hundreds of years later. The outlook of people like Biden and Lipstadt and the Clintons and Obama ad infinitum is not modern. I think Dawkins God Delusion is incomplete; he avoids the Jewish issue.
      [3] Russell notes the effect of telescopes on knowledge of astronomy. He is aware of their tremendous influence, without bothering about reflecting mirrors and glass lenses. Fine. But the problem is that, if (say) Egyptians or Persians had had telescopes, they might have invented science millennia earlier. Surely worth mentioning.


Philosophical Liberalism   (Book Three, MODERN PHILOSOPHY. Part I: From the Renaissance to Hume. Chapter XII).   This is a shortish, 7-page chapter, which covers, more or less, the Reformation in Britain up to the 'Glorious Revolution' and vaguely beyond.
      A more modern interpretation views the time as a process of Jewish infiltration, and I'd recommend Americans in particular, who are swamped with phrases about 'liberals', to examine Russell's chapter more or less in the light of Kevin MacDonald's account of Jewish movements in The Culture of Critique.
      Here are two paragraphs from Philosophical Liberalism (Russell's first two paragraphs distinguish liberal 'affairs')–

Early liberalism was a product of England and Holland, and had certain well-marked characteristics. It stood for religious toleration; it was Protestant, but of a latitudinarian rather than of a fanatical kind; it regarded the wars of religion as silly. It valued commerce and industry, and favoured the rising middle class rather than the monarchy and the aristocracy; it had immense respect for the rights of property, especially when accumulated by the labours of the individual possessor. The hereditary principle, though not rejected, was restricted in scope more than it had previously been; in particular, the divine right of kings was rejected in favour of the view that every community has a right, at any rate initially, to choose its own form of government. Implicitly, the tendency of early liberalism was towards democracy tempered by the rights of property. There was a belief — not at first wholly explicit — that all men are born equal, and that their subsequent inequality is a product of circumstances. This led to a great emphasis upon the importance of education as opposed to congenital characteristics. There was a certain bias against government, because governments almost everywhere were in the hands of kings or aristocracies, who seldom either understood or respected the needs of merchants, but this bias was held in check by the hope that the necessary understanding and respect would be won before long.

Early liberalism was optimistic, energetic, and philosophic, because it represented growing forces which appeared likely to become victorious without great difficulty, and to bring by their victory great benefits to mankind. It was opposed to everything medieval, both in philosophy and in politics, because medieval theories had been used to sanction the powers of Church and king, to justify persecution, and to obstruct the rise of science; but it was opposed equally to the then modern fanaticisms of Calvinists and Anabaptists. It wanted an end to political and theological strife, in order to liberate energies for the exciting enterprises of commerce and science, such as the East India Company and the Bank of England, the theory of gravitation and the discovery of the circulation of the blood. Throughout the Western world bigotry was giving place to enlightenment, the fear of Spanish power was ending, all classes were increasing in prosperity, and the highest hopes appeared to be warranted by the most sober judgement. For a hundred years, nothing occurred to dim these hopes; then, at last, they themselves generated the French Revolution, which led directly to Napoleon and thence to the Holy Alliance. After these events, liberalism had to acquire its second wind before the renewed optimism of the nineteenth century became possible.


All this was absorbed by Russell and his predecessors and successors. But a closer examination suggests a different interpretation: Jews pushed for things they thought suited them, and changed words and phrases to those ends.
  • 'it stood for religious toleration'. Well, it said nothing about the fanaticism of Judaism, which in any case invented Christianity.
  • 'It valued commerce and industry'. This is fascinating, because science was getting into its stride; consider a modern supermarket, which needs motor traffic, roads, electric refrigeration, and many other things—which may well have happened irrespective of 'liberalism'.
  • 'it had immense respect for the rights of property'. Well, it had no respect for the rights of people to their own lands. But it had respect for Jewish-style things: corporations, shares, the priority of money.
  • 'the hereditary principle was restricted in scope.' Jewish descent, or so-called descent, was secretly given priority.
  • 'the tendency was towards democracy tempered by the rights of property.' Russell hadn't noticed that Jewish-style democracy was purely intended to give votes to bribable and/or silly people.
  • 'there was a belief ... that all men are born equal' is obviously not a Jewish belief, but the related idea that all goyim are equally worthless is a Jewish belief.
  • '... medieval theories ... sanction[ed] the powers of Church and king ...' is thrown in, but not very à propos, if you understand that Church and king each supported Jews
  • note that Russell mentions the 'Bank of England' (he does again later in the chapter) but seems to have no idea that it was Jewish—and that poverty resulted in Britain.
      Another complication is the emphasis on kings. Even at the time, many states were too big to be controlled by a king; probably the very idea of Kingship was ridiculed; how could one man possibly know enough and have sufficient competence and control? On close reading I'd suggest the Jewish policy was to ridicule kings, then get rid of them in any serious capacity.
  • Russell says things about 'individualism'. He does not make the rather obvious point that, when Jews need collaborators and traitors and Freemason types, they are likely to look for isolated, selfish types—but, if Jews get their way, these individualists may be jettisoned.

Look at videos from the USA. The obvious push by Jews for policies they think suit them is pitifully obvious, though it is necessary to look for the Jews behind the scenes directing their puppets as anonymously as possible.


Spinoza: Russell, writing of insincerities when the First War ended (nominally) when he described himself as a Liberal, a Socialist, a Pacifist, while his sceptical intellect whispered doubts, and when he found 'no woman to whom the claims of intellect were as absolute as they are to me' (until 1967), wrote: 'What Spinoza calls 'the intellectual love of God' has seemed to me the best thing to live by, but I have not had the somewhat abstract God that Spinoza allowed himself...'.
      Another part of the intrusion by Jews of their obsessions.
Schopenhauer: (Arthur Schopenhauer 1788-1860). As (of if) censorship of Jews diminishes, it's likely that Jewish roots of 'German' philosophy will be discovered. Schopenhauer seems likely to be of this type. Russell notes Schopenhauer's dog was called (translated into English) the 'World Soul'. And that he dined in expensive restaurants, while recommending asceticism to his readers. He injured an old woman, and hated paying damages. All these things are typical of Jews.
      Hegel's fantastic determined historical views on historical eras and the use of violence in history, sound very Jewish. Kant's 'categorical imperative' sound Jewish. 'Idealism', the primacy of the mind over mere matter, sounds Jewish. Russell presumably had no idea of Talmudic and Kabbalistic beliefs.
The Utilitarians: Russell's 8 pages on the Utilitarians (or Philosophical Radicals) is a bit chaotic. He discusses Jeremy Bentham, James & John Stuart Mill, Ricardo, Francis Place and Francis Burdett, plus doctrines of Mandeville and Hume and Helvetius and Epicurus and Thomas Hodgskin and Marx and Malthus and Darwin. He lovingly describes the sort of small chains of reasoning which sound quite convincing: 'pleasure' as the only thing desirable, 'equality' in dividing coins amongst children, the 'principle of association' of ideas, and so on.
      [Russell regards Thomas Hodgskin's Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital (1825) as derived from Ricardo's theory of value. Whether this is accurate; I don't know; Hodgskin wrote a great deal. Russell dates 'the beginning of the long war between Capitalism and Socialism' (his capitals and choice of words) as an 1831 letter from James Mill to Robert Owen. At the present day a better description would be Jewish Capital and White Labour. But Russell treats 'Capital' as something with its own will and evades the issue of its controllers.]
      These things look scattered and rather silly, and in my view this is intentional, and a by-product of Jewish intervention, designed to waste time and effort while other undiscussed aims are smuggled in, such as forming 'democracy' into ways controllable by propaganda, and getting rid of redundant slaves by pretending to like them. Again, in my view, this happens at times of Jewish infiltration, such as Cromwell's assistance in taking over banking with Dutch force (misnamed 'the Puritan Revolution') accompanied by translation and massive subsidies for the new official Bible.
      What these things have in common is the suppression of all mention of Jews, so far as is possible. Including the destruction of evidence after the event, and the milder measure of simple non-mention until the meme withers and perhaps dies.
      Note that James Mill was offered employment (i.e. money), by the East India Co, after writing his History of India (assuming the official versions are roughly true). His work on the East India Co must have been censored; I can recall no comments or outcry on his book on the subject. His son John Stuart Mill was dependent on that source of money and no doubt John was careful to explain the realities to him, I'd guess in the coded evasive forms common then, as now. Wars, if they were truly fomented by Jews, would have been very taboo subjects, in the way primitive Africans avoid pronouncing certain words.
      I noted this in the course of reviewing an edited book about Victorians, Images of Race, reading chapter 5 on 'Race in Political Economy'.
Nietzsche: Nietzsche 1844-1900). At present (2018) some people are turning to Nietzsche, I think as a result of naive reassessments of Hitler, ignorant of the likely great and international Jew-influence on Hitler. Russell's view of Nietzsche partly includes Greek philosophers, which presumably allowed Nietzsche, the classicist, to write about these matters, in plausible style. But of course Nietzsche was more important as regards recent times. (He died in 1900). Nietzsche believed in the 'Great Man' idea, which is largely a Jewish promotion: Jews want whites to believe in one-man superheroes, as a distraction from the reality that large groups, operating secretly, and specialising in disparate aspects of power (propaganda, teaching, food, work, law, transport...), in practice can be far more important. There are no Jew superheroes—Rothschilds and the rest are very careful to remain hidden. On will, Russell is handicapped by not grasping evolution: he had no real idea about impulses and instincts and the brain converting the outside world into action; he contrasts Nietzsche with Buddha, but can't understand that some biological types can't understand emotional sympathy. I don't think Nietzsche has anything to offer. And he's pretty much unreadable.
      But Nietzsche can be regarded as a person influenced by the Talmud or by accounts based on it, though I suppose he might have read it untranslated. The superior race, indifferent to cruelty to the 'bungled and botched', and to their women, sounds very much like the secret theory of Judaism. Nietzsche's life (in which he debated, or argued, with Wagner) seems to have warned him off comments on Jews, and it's possible enough that Nietzsche's books and lecturing were conditional on Jewish approval, something Russell would not consider. I suspect even Nietzsche's insanity may have been a Jewish-approved diagnosis; in other words he may have ranted in ways 'unacceptable' to Jews. And perhaps the 'übermensch' idea of a vastly muscular physically impressive person was stressed to distract from the reality of deformed poison-dwarf style Jews.
      Russell has no idea how naive his assumptions on Christianity are. For example, he regards Christian saints as being embodiments of love for all people. But. historically, the award of 'Saint' was made to people who'd advanced the Church; it was a practical thing.
Henri Bergson: Suggested to me indirectly by C J Bjerknes's book Beware the World to Come. Bergson, a French Jew, interpreted by me here as pushing Jew-centred ideas.
John Dewey in Russell's chapter includes 'pragmatism' in a rather unemphatic and feeble way. The full meaning includes such aspects as insisting that mass murders of whites in the USSR by Jews never took place—with sufficient censorship, no such events are reported. This means that it is 'pragmatically' true that such events did not occur. For Jewish pragmatists, mass murders of Jews did take place, because many Jews tell what are considered 'lies'. Russell was too pro-Jew to be clear on these points.
Currents of Thought in the Nineteenth Century   (Book Three, Chapter XXI)   Added 3 May 2021
About ten pages which encapsulate Russell's opinions on the 19th century, which he probably considered his own preserve—born about the last quarter, aristocratic, fully-educated, wealthy enough until the 'Great War', then disoriented until the end of the Second World War, and looking back at the part he liked. The chapter is well worth reading, but mainly as an object lesson in misinterpreting the past. He was 18 in about 1890, feeling 19th century, when of course it was mostly over. Even at that time, Jews dominated publishing, and could push their own ideas. And, perhaps even more important, suppress ideas they didn't like, which roughly speaking was and is Jew realism.

Russell regarded the 18th century as rationalistic. He felt no need to investigate the effects of the Bank 'of England' and its selective impoverishment, combined with the rather gross country house establishments, and such events as militarism against the Americas, India, and China, backed up by the world-wide navy and sea-power. Although he discussed industrialists and financiers, he never really integrated them into his worldview—unsurprising as he was never able to identify Jewish people or thought. This of course was partly because Russell's life depended on his grandfather working for Jews, and in effect against the closely-related Church of England.
      Russell had no idea of Jewish intellectual influences, or perhaps it's more accurate to say of propaganda and control of ever-enlarging media. Many of the ideas he produces for examination were themselves products of Jews. For example, Kant and Hegel sound Jewish in addition to Marx and Engels. Nationalism looks like a Jewish prod to push areas into vulnerable monarchies. Elections and voting, and unified policing, and unified education, all sound Jewish as diverted through Freemasons and new religions. The emphases on education and equality sound like Jewish hypocrisies. Much of education was incredibly eastern-Mediterranean. Darwin is presented by Russell as ‘Darwin's theory’, and though Russell was aware of the tapeworm, he made nothing of intra-species competition.
      It's agonising to see Jewish manipulations entirely unrecognised by Russell. Consider the US Civil War, for example. Let's hope for improvement, understanding, and action!
      For just one different interpretation, it's worth reconsidering Alfred Russel Wallace's book The Wonderful Century: Its Successes and Its Failures (1898), Wallace now being recognised as at least as important as Darwin.

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Bertrand Russell on Jews. From History of Western Philosophy—Victorian View of Jews
I have made no notes on Russell's chapter—though very many ought to be made—but I include it as a sample of perfect Jew-naivety. Jewish history and beliefs at the time were an undiscovered country.
{307}

The Religious Development of the Jews

Below is a reply by Russell to a Jew, taken from Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell edited by Ray Perkins Jr, 2002.

Russell has no idea of the practical activities of Jews. The last sentences of his article said Jews no longer contributed to civilization 'as a race'. No wonder the complainant was annoyed! They contributed to what they thought was their religious duty.

THE Christian religion, as it was handed over by the late Roman Empire to the barbarians, consisted of three elements: first, certain philosophical beliefs, derived mainly from Plato and the Neoplatonists, but also in part from the Stoics; second, a conception of morals and history derived from the Jews; and thirdly, certain theories, more especially as to salvation, which were on the whole new in Christianity, though in part traceable to Orphism, and to kindred cults of the Near East. The most important Jewish elements in Christianity appear to me to be the following:
  1. A sacred history, beginning with the Creation, leading to a consummation in the future, and justifying the ways of God to man.
  2. The existence of a small section of mankind whom God specially loves. For Jews, this section was the Chosen People; for Christians, the elect.
  3. A new conception of "righteousness." The virtue of almsgiving, for example, was taken over by Christianity from later Judaism. The importance attached to baptism might be derived from Orphism or from oriental pagan mystery religions, but practical philanthropy, as an element in the Christian conception of virtue, seems to have come from the Jews. {308}
  4. The Law. Christians kept part of the Hebrew Law, for instance the Decalogue, while they rejected its ceremonial and ritual parts. But in practice they attached to the Creed much the same feelings that the Jews attached to the Law. This involved the doctrine that correct belief is at least as important as virtuous action, a doctrine which is essentially Hellenic. What is Jewish in origin is the exclusiveness of the elect.
  5. The Messiah. The Jews believed that the Messiah would bring them temporal prosperity, and victory over their enemies here on earth; moreover, he remained in the future. For Christians, the Messiah was the historical Jesus, who was also identified with the Logos of Greek philosophy; and it was not on earth, but in heaven, that the Messiah was to enable his followers to triumph over their enemies.
  6. The Kingdom of Heaven. Other-worldliness is a conception which Jews and Christians, in a sense, share with later Platonism, but it takes, with them, a much more concrete form than with Greek philosophers. The Greek doctrine--which is to be found in much Christian philosophy, but not in popular Christianity--was that the sensible world, in space and time, is an illusion, and that, by intellectual and moral discipline, a man can learn to live in the eternal world, which alone is real. The Jewish and Christian doctrine, on the other hand, conceived the Other World as not metaphysically different from this world, but as in the future, when the virtuous would enjoy everlasting bliss and the wicked would suffer everlasting torment. This belief embodied revenge psychology, and was intelligible to all and sundry, as the doctrines of Greek philosophers were not.
To understand the origin of these beliefs, we must take account of certain facts in Jewish history, to which we will now turn our attention.

The early history of the Israelites cannot be confirmed from any source outside the Old Testament, and it is impossible to know at what point it ceases to be purely legendary. David and Solomon may be accepted as kings who probably had a real existence, but at the earliest point at which we come to something certainly historical there are already the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah. The first person mentioned in the Old Testament of whom there is an independent record is Ahab, King of Israel, who is spoken of in an Assyrian {309} letter of 853 B.C. The Assyrians finally conquered the Northern kingdom in 722 B.C., and removed a great part of the population. After this time, the kingdom of Judah alone preserved the Israelite religion and tradition. The kingdom of Judah just survived the Assyrians, whose power came to an end with the capture of Nineveh by the Babylonians and Medes in 606 B.C. But in 586 B.C. Nebuchadrezzar captured Jerusalem, destroyed the Temple, and removed a large part of the population to Babylon. The Babylonian kingdom fell in 538 B.C., when Babylon was taken by Cyrus, king of the Medes and Persians. Cyrus, in 537 B.C., issued an edict allowing the Jews to return to Palestine. Many of them did so, under the leadership of Nehemiah and Ezra; the Temple was rebuilt, and Jewish orthodoxy began to be crystallized.

In the period of the captivity, and for some time before and after this period, Jewish religion went through a very important development. Originally, there appears to have been not very much difference, from a religious point of view, between the Israelites and surrounding tribes. Yahweh was, at first, only a tribal god who favoured the children of Israel, but it was not denied that there were other gods, and their worship was habitual. When the first Commandment says, "Thou shalt have none other gods but me," it is saying something which was an innovation in the time immediately preceding the captivity. This is made evident by various texts in the earlier prophets. It was the prophets at this time who first taught that the worship of heathen gods was sin. To win the victory in the constant wars of that time, they proclaimed, the favour of Yahweh was essential; and Yahweh would withdraw his favour if other gods were also honoured. Jeremiah and Ezekiel, especially, seem to have invented the idea that all religions except one are false, and that the Lord punishes idolatry.

Some quotations will illustrate their teachings, and the prevalence of the heathen practices against which they protested. "Seest Thou not what they do in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem? The children gather wood, and the fathers kindle the fire, and the women knead their dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven [Ishtar], and to pour out drink offerings unto other gods, that they may provoke me to anger." [Footnote: Jeremiah VII, 17-18.] The Lord is angry about it. "And they {310} have built the high places of Tophet, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire; which I commanded them not, neither came it into my heart." [Footnote: Ibid., VII, 31.]

There is a very interesting passage in Jeremiah in which he denounces the Jews in Egypt for their idolatry. He himself had lived among them for a time. The prophet tells the Jewish refugees in Egypt that Yahweh will destroy them all because their wives have burnt incense to other gods. But they refuse to listen to him, saying: "We will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we and our fathers, our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem; for then had we plenty of victuals, and were well, and saw no evil." But Jeremiah assures them that Yahweh noticed these idolatrous practices, and that misfortune has come because of them. "Behold, I have sworn by my great name, saith the Lord, that my name shall no more be named in the mouth of any man of Judah in all the land of Egypt. ... I will watch over them for evil, and not for good; and all the men of Judah that are in the land of Egypt shall be consumed by the sword and by the famine, until there be an end of them." [Footnote: Jeremiah XLIV, 11-end]

Ezekiel is equally shocked by the idolatrous practices of the Jews. The Lord in a vision shows him women at the north gate of the temple weeping for Tammuz (a Babylonian deity); then He shows him "greater abominations, " five and twenty men at the door of the Temple worshipping the sun. The Lord declares: "Therefore will I also deal in fury: mine eye shall not spare, neither will I have pity: and though they cry in mine ears with a loud voice, yet will I not hear them." [Footnote: Ezekiel VIII, 11-end]

The idea that all religions but one are wicked, and that the Lord punishes idolatry, was apparently invented by these prophets. The prophets, on the whole, were fiercely nationalistic, and looked forward to the day when the Lord would utterly destroy the gentiles.

The captivity was taken to justify the denunciations of the prophets. If Yahweh was all-powerful, and the Jews were his Chosen People, their sufferings could only be explained by their wickedness. The psychology is that of paternal correction: the Jews are to be purified by punishment. Under the influence of this belief, they developed, in {311} exile, an orthodoxy much more rigid and much more nationally exclusive than that which had prevailed while they were independent. The Jews who remained behind and were not transplanted to Babylon did not undergo this development to anything like the same extent. When Ezra and Nehemiah came back to Jerusalem after the captivity, they were shocked to find that mixed marriages had been common, and they dissolved all such marriages. [Footnote: Ezra IX-X, 5.] The Jews were distinguished from the other nations of antiquity by their stubborn national pride. All the others, when conquered, acquiesced inwardly as well as outwardly; the Jews alone retained the belief in their own pre-eminence, and the conviction that their misfortunes were due to God's anger, because they had failed to preserve the purity of their faith and ritual. The historical books of the Old Testament, which were mostly compiled after the captivity, give a misleading impression, since they suggest that the idolatrous practices against which the prophets protested were a falling-off from earlier strictness, whereas in fact the earlier strictness had never existed. The prophets were innovators to a much greater extent than appears in the Bible when read unhistorically.

Some things which were afterwards characteristic of Jewish religion were developed, though in part from previously existing sources, during the captivity. Owing to the destruction of the Temple, where alone sacrifices could be offered, the Jewish ritual perforce became non-sacrificial. Synagogues began at this time, with readings from such portions of the Scriptures as already existed. The importance of the Sabbath was first emphasized at this time, and so was circumcision as the mark of the Jew. As we have already seen, it was only during the exile that marriage with gentiles came to be forbidden. There was a growth of every form of exclusiveness. "I am the Lord your God, which have separated you from other people." [Footnote: Leviticus XX, 24] "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy." [Footnote: Ibid., XIX, 2.] The Law is a product of this period. It was one of the chief forces in preserving national unity. What we have as the Book of Isaiah is the work of two different prophets, one before the exile and one after. The second of these, who is called by Biblical students Deutero-Isaiah, is the most remarkable of the prophets. He is the first who reports the Lord as saying "There is no god but I." He believes in the resurrection of the body, perhaps {312} as a result of Persian influence. His prophecies of the Messiah were, later, the chief Old Testament texts used to show that the prophets foresaw the coming of Christ.

In Christian arguments with both pagans and Jews, these texts from Deutero-Isaiah played a very important part, and for this reason I shall quote the most important of them. All nations are to be converted in the end: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore" (Is. II, 4). "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." [Footnote: Isaiah VII, 14.] (As to this text, there was a controversy between Jews and Christians; the Jews said that the correct translation is "a young woman shall conceive," but the Christians thought the Jews were lying.) "The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined. ... For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace." [Footnote: Jerusalem under the High priests, p. 12]] The most apparently prophetic of these passages is the fifty-third chapter, which contains the familiar texts: "He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief. ... Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows. ... But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. ... He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth." The inclusion of the gentiles in the ultimate salvation is explicit: "And the gentiles shall come to thy light, and kings to the brightness of thy rising." [Footnote: Ibid., LX, 3.]

After Ezra and Nehemiah, the Jews for a while disappear from history. The Jewish state survived as a theocracy, but its territory was very small--only the region of ten to fifteen miles around Jerusalem, according to E. Bevan. [Footnote: Ibid., IX, 2, 6] After Alexander, it became a disputed territory between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids. This, however, seldom {313} involved fighting in actual Jewish territory, and left the Jews, for a long time, to the free exercise of their religion.

Their moral maxims, at this time, are set forth in Ecclesiasticus, probably written about 200 B.C. Until recently, this book was only known in a Greek version; this is the reason for its being banished to the Apocrypha. But a Hebrew manuscript has lately been discovered, in some respects different from the Greek text translated in our version of the Apocrypha. The morality taught is very mundane. Reputation among neighbours is highly prized. Honesty is the best policy, because it is useful to have Yahweh on your side. Almsgiving is recommended. The only sign of Greek influence is in the praise of medicine.

Slaves must not be treated too kindly. "Fodder, a wand, and burdens, are for the ass: and bread, correction, and work, for a servant. ... Set him to work, as is fit for him: if he be not obedient, put on more heavy fetters" (XXIII, 24, 28). At the same time, remember that you have paid a price for him, and that if he runs away you will lose your money; this sets a limit to profitable severity (ibid., 30, 31). Daughters are a great source of anxiety; apparently in his day they were much addicted to immorality (XLII, 9-11). He has a low opinion of women: "From garments cometh a moth, and from women wickedness" (ibid., 13). It is a mistake to be cheerful with your children; the right course is to "bow down their neck from their youth" (VII, 23, 24).

Altogether, like the elder Cato, he represents the morality of the virtuous business man in a very unattractive light.

This tranquil existence of comfortable self-righteousness was rudely interrupted by the Seleucid king Antiochus IV, who was determined to hellenize all his dominions. In 175 B.C. he established a gymnasium in Jerusalem, and taught young men to wear Greek hats and practise athletics. In this he was helped by a hellenizing Jew named Jason, whom he made high priest. The priestly aristocracy had become lax, and had felt the attraction of Greek civilization; but they were vehemently opposed by a party called the "Hasidim" (meaning "Holy"), who were strong among the rural population. [Footnote: From them, probably, developed the sect of the Essenes, whose doctrines seem to have influenced primitive Christianity. See Oesterley and Robinson , History of Israel, Vol. II, p. 323 ff. The Pharisees also descended from them.] When, in 170 B.C., {314} Antiochus became involved in war with Egypt, the Jews rebelled. Thereupon Antiochus took the holy vessels from the Temple, and placed in it the image of the God. He identified Yahweh with Zeus, following a practice which had been successful everywhere else. [Footnote: Some Alexandrian Jews did not object to this identification. See Letter of Aristeas, 15, 16.] He resolved to extirpate the Jewish religion, and to stop circumcision and the observance of the laws relating to food. To all this Jerusalem submitted, but outside Jerusalem the Jews resisted with the utmost stubbornness.

The history of this period is told in the First Book of Maccabees. The first chapter tells how Antiochus decreed that all the inhabitants of his kingdom should be one people, and abandon their separate laws. All the heathen obeyed, and many of the Israelites, although the king commanded that they should profane the sabbath, sacrifice swine's flesh, and leave their children uncircumcised. All who disobeyed were to suffer death. Many, nevertheless, resisted." They put to death certain women, that had caused their children to be circumcised. And they hanged the infants about their necks, and rifled their houses, and slew them that had circumcised them. Howbeit many in Israel were fully resolved and confirmed in themselves not to eat any unclean thing. Wherefore they chose rather to die, that they might not be defiled with meats, and that they might not profane the holy covenant: so then they died." [Footnote: I Maccabees I, 60-63] It was at this time that the doctrine of immortality came to be widely believed among the Jews. It had been thought that virtue would be rewarded here on earth; but persecution, which fell upon the most virtuous, made it evident that this was not the case. In order to safeguard divine justice, therefore, it was necessary to believe in rewards and punishments hereafter. This doctrine was not universally accepted among the Jews; in the time of Christ, the Sadducees still rejected it. But by that time they were a small party, and in later times all Jews believed in immortality.

The revolt against Antiochus was led by Judas Maccabaeus, an able military commander, who first recaptured Jerusalem (164 B.C.), and then embarked upon aggression. Sometimes he killed all the males, sometimes he circumcised them by force. His brother Jonathan was {315} made high priest, was allowed to occupy Jerusalem with a garrison, and conquered part of Samaria, acquiring Joppa and Akra. He negotiated with Rome, and was successful in securing complete autonomy. His family were high priests until Herod, and are known as the Hasmonean dynasts.

In enduring and resisting persecution the Jews of this time showed immense heroism, although in defence of things that do not strike us as important, such as circumcision and the wickedness of eating pork.

The time of the persecution by Antiochus IV was crucial in Jewish history. The Jews of the Dispersion were, at this time, becoming more and more hellenized; the Jews of Judea were few;and even among them the rich and powerful were inclined to acquiesce in Greek innovations. But for the heroic resistance of the Hasidim, the Jewish religion might easily have died out. If this had happened, neither Christianity nor Islam could have existed in anything like the form they actually took. Townsend, in his Introduction to the translation of the Fourth Book of Maccabees, says:
"It has been finely said that if Judaism as a religion had perished under Antiochus, the seed-bed of Christianity would have been lacking; and thus the blood of the Maccabean martyrs, who saved Judaism, ultimately became the seed of the Church. Therefore as not only Christendom but also Islam derive their monotheism from a Jewish source, it may well be that the world today owes the very existence of monotheism both in the East and in the West to the Maccabees." [Footnote: The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English. Edited by R. H. Charles. Vol. II, p. 659.]

The Maccabees themselves, however, were not admired by later Jews, because their family, as high priests, adopted, after their successes, a worldly and temporizing policy. Admiration was for the martyrs. The Fourth Book of Maccabees, written probably in Alexandria about the time of Christ, illustrates this as well as some other interesting points. In spite of its title, it nowhere mentions the Maccabees, but relates the amazing fortitude, first of an old man, and then of seven young brothers, all of whom were first tortured and then burnt by Antiochus, while their mother, who was present, exhorted them to stand firm. The king, at first, tried to win them by friendliness, telling them that, if they would only consent to eat pork, he would take them into his favour, and secure successful careers for {316} them. When they refused, he showed them the instruments of torture. But they remained unshakable, telling him that he would suffer eternal torment after death, while they would inherit everlasting bliss. One by one, in each other's presence, and in that of their mother, they were first exhorted to eat pork, then, when they refused, tortured and killed. At the end, the king turned round to his soldiers and told them he hoped they would profit by such an example of courage. The account is of course embellished by legend, but it is historically true that the persecution was severe and was endured heroically; also that the main points at issue were circumcision and eating pork.

This book is interesting in another respect. Although the writer is obviously an orthodox Jew, he uses the language of the Stoic philosophy, and is concerned to prove that the Jews live most completely in accordance with its precepts. The book opens with the sentence:
"Philosophical in the highest degree is the question I propose to discuss, namely whether the Inspired Reason is supreme ruler over the passions; and to the philosophy of it I would seriously entreat your earnest attention."
Alexandrian Jews were willing, in philosophy, to learn from the Greeks, but they adhered with extraordinary tenacity to the Law, especially circumcision, observance of the Sabbath, and abstinence from pork and other unclean meats. From the time of Nehemiah till after the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, the importance that they attached to the Law steadily increased. They no longer tolerated prophets who had anything new to say. Those among them who felt impelled to write in the style of the prophets pretended that they had discovered an old book, by Daniel or Solomon or some other ancient of impeccable respectability. Their ritual peculiarities held them together as a nation, but emphasis on the Law gradually destroyed originality and made them intensely conservative. This rigidity makes the revolt of Saint Paul against the domination of the Law very remarkable.

The New Testament, however, is not such a completely new beginning as it is apt to seem to those who know nothing of Jewish literature in the times just before the birth of Christ. Prophetic fervour was by no means dead, though it had to adopt the device of pseudonymity in order to obtain a hearing. Of the greatest interest, in this respect, is the Book of Enoch, [Footnote: For the text of this book, in English, see Charles, op. cit., whose introduction also invaluable.] a composite work, due to various authors, the {317} earliest being slightly before the time of the Maccabees, and the latest about 64 B.C. Most of it professes to relate apocalyptic visions of the patriarch Enoch. It is very important for the side of Judaism which turned to Christianity. The New Testament writers are familiar with it; Saint Jude considers it to be actually by Enoch. Early Christian Fathers, for instance Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, treated it as canonical, but Jerome and Augustine rejected it. It fell, consequently, into oblivion, and was lost until, early in the nineteenth century, three manuscripts of it, in Ethiopic, were found in Abyssinia. Since then, manuscripts of parts of it have been found in Greek and Latin versions. It appears to have been originally written partly in Hebrew, partly in Aramaic.

Its authors were members of the Hasidim, and their successors the Pharisees. It denounces kings and princes, meaning the Hasmonean dynasty and the Sadducees. It influenced New Testament doctrine, particularly as regards the Messiah, Sheol (hell), and demonology.

The book consists mainly of "parables, " which are more cosmic than those of the New Testament. There are visions of heaven and hell, of the Last Judgement, and so on; one is reminded of the first two Books of Paradise Lost where the literary quality is good, and of Blake Prophetic Books where it is inferior.

There is an expansion of Genesis VI, 2, 4, which is curious and Promethean. The angels taught men metallurgy, and were punished for revealing "eternal secrets." They were also cannibals. The angels that had sinned became pagan gods, and their women became sirens; but at the last, they were punished with everlasting torments.

There are descriptions of heaven and hell which have considerable literary merit. The Last Judgement is performed by "the Son of Man, who hath righteousness" and who sits on the throne of His glory. Some of the gentiles, at the last, will repent and be forgiven; but most gentiles, and all hellenizing Jews, will suffer eternal damnation, for the righteous will pray for vengeance, and their prayer will be granted.

There is a section on astronomy, where we learn that the sun and moon have chariots driven by the wind, that the year consists of 364 days, that human sin causes the heavenly bodies to depart from their courses, and that only the virtuous can know astronomy. Falling stars are falling angels, and are punished by the seven archangels.

Next comes sacred history. Up to the Maccabees, this pursues the {318} course known from the Bible in its earlier portions, and from history in the later parts. Then the author goes on into the future: the New Jerusalem, the conversion of the remnant of the gentiles, the resurrection of the righteous, and the Messiah.

There is a great deal about the punishment of sinners and the reward of the righteous, who never display an attitude of Christian forgiveness towards sinners. "What will ye do, ye sinners, and whither will ye flee on that day of judgement, when ye hear the voice of the prayer of the righteous?""Sin has not been sent upon the earth, but man of himself has created it." Sins are recorded in heaven. "Ye sinners shall be cursed for ever, and ye shall have no peace." Sinners maybe happy all their lives, and even in dying, but their souls descend into Sheol, where they shall suffer "darkness and chains and a burning flame." But as for the righteous, "I and my Son will be united with them for ever."

The last words of the book are: "To the faithful he will give faithfulness in the habitation of upright paths. And they shall see those who were born in darkness led into darkness, while the righteous shall be resplendent. And the sinners shall cry aloud and see them resplendent, and they indeed will go where days and seasons are prescribed for them."

Jews, like Christians, thought much about sin, but few of them thought of themselves as sinners. This was, in the main, a Christian innovation, introduced by the parable of the Pharisee and the publican, and taught as a virtue in Christ's denunciations of the Scribes and Pharisees. The Christians endeavoured to practise Christian humility; the Jews, in general, did not.

There are, however, important exceptions among orthodox Jews just before the time of Christ. Take, for instance, "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, " written between 109 and 107 B.C. by a Pharisee who admired John Hyrcanus, a high priest of the Hasmonean dynasty. This book, in the form in which we have it, contains Christian interpolations, but these are all concerned with dogma. When they are excised, the ethical teaching remains closely similar to that of the Gospels. As the Rev. Dr. R. H. Charles says: "The Sermon on the Mount reflects in several instances the spirit and even reproduces the very phrases of our text: many passages in the Gospels exhibit traces of the same, and St. Paul seems to have used the book as a vade mecum" {319}(op. cit., pp. 291-2). We find in this book such precepts as the following:

"Love ye one another from the heart; and if a man sin against thee, speak peaceably to him, and in thy soul hold not guile; and if he repent and confess, forgive him. But if he deny it, do not get into a passion with him, lest catching the poison from thee he take to swearing, and so then sin doubly. ... And if he be shameless and persist in wrong-doing, even so forgive him from the heart, and leave to God the avenging."

Dr. Charles is of opinion that Christ must have been acquainted with this passage. Again we find:

"Love the Lord and your neighbour."

"Love the Lord through all your life, and one another with a true heart."

"I loved the Lord; likewise also every man with all my heart." These are to be compared with Matthew XXII, 37-39. There is a reprobation of all hatred in "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs"; for instance:

"Anger is blindness, and does not suffer one to see the face of any man with truth."

"Hatred, therefore, is evil; for it constantly mateth with lying." The author of this book, as might be expected, holds that not only the Jews, but all the gentiles, will be saved.

Christians have learnt from the Gospels to think ill of Pharisees, yet the author of this book was a Pharisee, and he taught, as we have seen, those very ethical maxims which we think of as most distinctive of Christ's preaching. The explanation, however, is not difficult. In the first place, he must have been, even in his own day, an exceptional Pharisee; the more usual doctrine was, no doubt, that of the Book of Enoch. In the second place, we know that all movements tend to ossify;who could infer the principles of Jefferson from those of the D.A.R.? In the third place, we know, as regards the Pharisees in particular, that their devotion to the Law, as the absolute and final truth, soon put an end to all fresh and living thought and feeling among them. As Dr. Charles says:

"When Pharisaism, breaking with the ancient ideals of its party, committed itself to political interests and movements, and concurrently therewith surrendered itself more and more wholly to the study {320} of the letter of the Law, it soon ceased to offer scope for the development of such a lofty system of ethics as the Testaments [of the Patriarchs] attest, and so the true successors of the early Hasids and their teaching quitted Judaism and found their natural home in the bosom of primitive Christianity."

After a period of rule by the High Priests, Mark Antony made his friend Herod King of the Jews. Herod was a gay adventurer, often on the verge of bankruptcy, accustomed to Roman society, and very far removed from Jewish piety. His wife was of the family of the High Priests, but he was an Idumaean, which alone would suffice to make him an object of suspicion to the Jews. He was a skilful timeserver, and deserted Antony promptly when it became evident that Octavius was going to be victorious. However, he made strenuous attempts to reconcile the Jews to his rule. He rebuilt the Temple, though in a hellenistic style, with rows of Corinthian pillars; but he placed over the main gate a large golden eagle, thereby infringing the second Commandment. When it was rumoured that he was dying, the Pharisees pulled down the eagle, but he, in revenge, caused a number of them to be put to death. He died in 4 B.C., and soon after his death the Romans abolished the kingship, putting Judea under a procurator. Pontius Pilate, who became procurator in A.D. 26, was tactless, and was soon retired.

In A.D. 66, the Jews, led by the party of the Zealots, rebelled against Rome. They were defeated, and Jerusalem was captured in A.D. 70. The Temple was destroyed, and few Jews were left in Judea.

The Jews of the Dispersion had become important centuries before this time. The Jews had been originally an almost wholly agricultural people, but they learnt trading from the Babylonians during the captivity. Many of them remained in Babylon after the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, and among these some were very rich. After the foundation of Alexandria, great numbers of Jews settled in that city; they had a special quarter assigned to them, not as a ghetto, but to keep them from danger of pollution by contact with gentiles. The Alexandrian Jews became much more hellenized than those of Judea, and forgot Hebrew. For this reason it became necessary to translate the Old Testament into Greek; the result was the Septuagint. The Pentateuch was translated in the middle of the third century B.C.; the other parts somewhat later. {321}

Legends arose about the Septuagint, so called because it was the work of seventy translators. It was said that each of the seventy translated the whole independently, and that when the versions were compared they were found to be identical down to the smallest detail, having all been divinely inspired. Nevertheless, later scholarship showed that the Septuagint was gravely defective. The Jews, after the rise of Christianity, made little use of it, but reverted to reading the Old Testament in Hebrew. The early Christians, on the contrary, few of whom knew Hebrew, depended upon the Septuagint, or upon translations from it into Latin. A better text was produced by the labours of Origen in the third century, but those who only knew Latin had very defective versions until Jerome, in the fifth century, produced the Vulgate. This was, at first, received with much criticism, because he had been helped by Jews in establishing the text, and many Christians thought that Jews had deliberately falsified the prophets in order that they should not seem to foretell Christ. Gradually, however, the work of Saint Jerome was accepted, and it remains to this day authoritative in the Catholic Church.

The philosopher Philo, who was a contemporary of Christ, is the best illustration of Greek influence on the Jews in the sphere of thought. While orthodox in religion, Philo is, in philosophy, primarily a Platonist; other important influences are those of the Stoics and Neopythagoreans. While his influence among the Jews ceased after the fall of Jerusalem, the Christian Fathers found that he had shown the way to reconcile Greek philosophy with acceptance of the Hebrew Scriptures.

In every important city of antiquity there came to be considerable colonies of Jews, who shared with the representatives of other Eastern religions an influence upon those who were not content either with scepticism or with the official religions of Greece and Rome. Many converts were made to Judaism, not only in the Empire, but also in South Russia. It was probably to Jewish and semi-Jewish circles that Christianity first appealed. Orthodox Judaism, however, became more orthodox and more narrow after the fall of Jerusalem, just as it had done after the earlier fall due to Nebuchadrezzar. After the first century, Christianity also crystallized, and the relations of Judaism and Christianity were wholly hostile and external; as we shall see, Christianity powerfully stimulated anti-Semitism. Throughout the Middle {322} Ages, Jews had no part in the culture of Christian countries, and were too severely persecuted to be able to make contributions to civilization, beyond supplying capital for the building of cathedrals and such enterprises. It was only among the Mohammedans, at that period, that Jews were treated humanely, and were able to pursue philosophy and enlightened speculation.

Throughout the Middle Ages, the Mohammedans were more civilized and more humane than the Christians. Christians persecuted Jews, especially at times of religious excitement; the Crusades were associated with appalling pogroms. In Mohammedan countries, on the contrary, Jews were not in any way ill treated. Especially in Moorish Spain, they contributed to learning; Maimonides (1135-1204), who was born at Cordova, is regarded by some as the source of much of Spinoza's philosophy. When the Christians reconquered Spain, it was largely the Jews who transmitted to them the learning of the Moors. Learned Jews, who knew Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic, and were acquainted with the philosophy of Aristotle, transmitted their knowledge to less learned schoolmen. They transmitted also less desirable things, such as alchemy and astrology.

After the Middle Ages, the Jews still contributed largely to civilization as individuals, but no longer as a race. {323}
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The ABC of Relativity   1925


Feb 2023: I was surprised to find I had no review in this file of Russell on Relativity. My first edition was published in London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, Ltd; New York, Harper & Bros). I had a later edition, edited by Felix Pirani, but the principles of relativity had not changed.

What's here is from a file I wrote in about 2000.

These notes should be useful in tracing Russell's thoughts. However I think relativity is simply wrong, based on the error of thinking mass increases with velocity. See How Much of Modern Physics is a Fraud?

- Note: cycles in intellectual fashion: Printing history: 1925, 1925, 1927, 1931 then 2nd edition 1958, 1959, 1964, 1969: suggests two batches of say six years separated by a 25 or 30 year 'generation'? The next republication date seems to be 1989. - Note the Russell book wasn't used at school when I was there. It had been originally been published in parts; I doubt if it had much impact, since it wasn't heavy with impressive maths.
      Seems to be largely plagiarised ('based on' perhaps more polite) from Einstein's book, of I think 1920; same stuff on geometry, Euclid, Galileo, Maxwell's equations and electromagnetism etc. The derivation of mc^2 as an approximation from 1/sqr(1-v^2) is here. So is the emphasis on trains.
      Also influenced by Eddington; e.g. 213 in 1st edition on common sense and a table. There are extracts from Eddington.
      Disappointingly, Russell uses 'geodesics' in explaining non-Euclidean geometry; and yet surely this is wrong - everyone knows lines on the earth's surface aren't straight!
      On size of the Universe; apparently Einstein's version (this is in 1st edition; also de Sitter and others) says light takes 1000 M years to travel round; I presume this may have been increased since then, as the age of the sun is supposed to be 6 bn years or so.
      He seems to have got his chemistry wrong: he says 150 1st edn 'four hydrogen atoms can come together to make one helium atom, but a helium atom has rather less than [i.e. measurably] four times the mass of one hydrogen atom' - but in fact of course helium only has two electrons, not four, so his first statement is wrong.
      Main point is the removal of fixed measuring derived from the sense of touch, e.g. ruler laid between a and b, [or 'straight line' from 'stretched linen'] and replacement with idea of light rays as geodesics. And idea of extracting a constant from objects in relative motion to each other; the constant is 'an interval' of 'space-time'. Much play on the fact that e.g. person in a train can consider himself at rest; or at moving 60 m.p.h. to destination; or, from the sun's point of view, thousands of miles per hour round the sun; or from a galactic viewpoint .. etc. Relativity doesn't say it's equivalent to say earth goes round sun or sun goes round earth; but it is equivalent to say earth goes round sun or entire heavens rotate round earth.
            - CONTENTS:
      1 TOUCH AND SIGHT: THE EARTH AND THE HEAVENS
      2 WHAT HAPPENS AND WHAT IS OBSERVED
      3 THE VELOCITY OF LIGHT
      4 CLOCKS AND FOOT-RULES
      5 SPACE-TIME
      6 THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY
      7 INTERVALS IN SPACE-TIME
      8 EINSTEIN'S LAW OF GRAVITATION
      9 PROOFS OF EINSTEIN'S LAW OF GRAVITATION
      10 MASS, MOMENTUM, ENERGY, AND ACTION
      11 THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE
      12 CONVENTIONS AND NATURAL LAWS
      13 THE ABOLITION OF 'FORCE'
      14 WHAT IS MATTER?
      15 PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES

      - 16: [NOTE: MISUNDERSTANDING:] 'A certain type of .. person is fond of asserting that 'everything is relative'.' This is of course nonsense, because, if everything were relative, there would be nothing for it to be relative to. However, .. it is possible to maintain that everything in the physical world is relative to an observer. This view, true or not, is not that adopted by the 'theory of relativity.' Perhaps the name is unfortunate; certainly it has led philosophers and educated people into confusions. .. the new theory.. is wholly concerned to exclude what is relative and arrive at a statement of physical laws that shall in no way depend upon the circumstances of the observer. ..'
      - 20, 21: '.. cosmic rays.. Some of these.. called mesons disintegrate in flight, and.. the faster a meson is moving, the longer it takes to disintegrate, from the point of view of a scientist on the earth. .. we have to draw a different line from that which is customary between what belongs to the observer and what belongs to the occurrence he is observing.. there is good ground for this assertion [that estimates of time intervals between events, fully allowing for speed of light, depend on the speed of the observer] - first of all, in experiment, and - what is remarkable - ground in reasonings which could have been made at any time, but were not made until experiments had shown that the old reasonings must be wrong.'
      - Idea that geometry is now a branch of physics; it's not separable, as Euclid thought, but empirical. p 62: Mentions Pythagoras founded a religion, and was contemporaneous with Confucius and Buddha. p 75: 'It is important to realize that geometry, as taught in schools since Greek times, ceases to exist as a separate science, and becomes merged into physics.'
      - Idea that mankind's evolution, or evolution of intelligent life, depends on not perceiving 'the universal flux': e.g. p 12: if built on atomic scale, 'we' would perceive nothing but clouds of electrons; if built on scale of the sun 'with correspondingly slow perceptions' 'we' would see stars come and go 'like morning mists' [And, presumably, though he doesn't say this, planets and moons revolving so fast as to be like gas?] 'The notion of comparative stability .. is due to the fact that we are about the size we are, and live on a planet of which the surface is not very hot...'
      - Michelson-Morley experiment explained at length, and the business about 'aether wind' which always seemed a rather silly argument, but at any rate proved that the velocity of light is constant. p 29: '.. illustration.. fly touches pool.. causes ripples.. centre of the circle at any moment is the point touched by the fly. If the fly moves.. [and] if the ripples were waves of light, and the fly were a skilled physicist, it would find that it remained at the centre of the ripples, however it might move. .. a skilled physicist by the pool would judge as [with] ordinary ripples, that the centre was not the fly. .. if another fly touched the water at the same spot at the same moment, it also would find it remained the centre of the ripples.. This pool corresponds to the aether; the fly .. to earth; the contact to the signal which Michelson and Morley sent out; and the ripples to the light-waves. .. seems quite impossible.. no wonder that, although the M-M experiment was made in 1881, it was not rightly interpreted until 1905. .. p 30: THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY OF EXPLAINING SUCH FACTS, AND THAT IS, TO ASSUME THAT .. CLOCKS ARE AFFECTED BY MOTION
      - Intervals can be 'time-like' or 'space-like', or zero in a case where a ray of light takes in two things, such as, or rather always, where something is in a position to be seen
      - One verification of the principle was slight precession in orbit of mercury; Russell doesn't seem to explain this, merely notes it. Another was the famous total eclipse of the sun in 1919, also that May 29th best date in sense that bright stars are near the sun, and 1919 eclipse was on that date. Einstein predicted twice the displacement of particle [presumably photon] theory. Russell states the displacement is so very small that some scientists still doubt the result.
      - Special theory accounted for electromagnetic radiation i.e. light in particular, but only with constant relative motion; 'interval'^2 = distance light would go^2 - distance between events^2. This is the same as the Lorentz contraction; Einstein provided an explanation for the formula
      - 50: Assuming the correctness of Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism there should have been discoverable effects of motion through the aether; in fact, there were none. .. 'Maxwell's equations' .. have remained standing.. Maxwell's arguments in their favour were so shaky that the correctness of his results must almost be ascribed to intuition. .. odd difficulty that Maxwell's equations were more accurate than they should be. A very similar difficulty was explained by Galileo at the very beginning of modern physics. .. in the cabin of a moving ship, the weight falls in relation to the cabin.. Galileo explained how this happens, to the great indignation of the disciples of Aristotle. In orthodox physics.. a uniform motion in a straight line has no discoverable effects. This was, in its day, as astonishing a form of relativity as that of Einstein to us.'
      - 61: [Acceleration:] '.. facts [about acceleration] are familiar, and they led Galileo and Newton to regard an accelerated motion as something radically different, in its own nature, from a uniform, motion. But this distinction could only be maintained by regarding motion as absolute, not relative. If all motion is relative, the earth is accelerated relatively to the lift just as truly as the lift relatively to the earth. Yet the people on the earth have no sensations in the pits of their stomachs when the lift starts to go up. This illustrates the difficulty of our problem. ...'
      [i.e. General theory applies with any movement, acceleration including spinning. My notes say: took about ten years.]

PROOFS OF EINSTEIN'S LAW OF GRAVITATION -129 in 1st edn has '.. The coming of daylight corresponds to the coming of Einstein', an image I came across elsewhere (referring to someone else; probably a different topic) -139 in 1st edn has footnote on "force" no longer regarded as fundamental in dynamics, and compares with "sunrise" and "sunset"

      - 94 ff, from 10 MASS, MOMENTUM, ENERGY, AND ACTION: [Explanation of idea of interconversion between mass and energy:] when we substitute space-time for time, we find that the measured mass (as opposed to the proper mass) is a quantity of the same kind as the momentum in a different direction; it might be called the momentum in the time direction. The measured mass is obtained by multiplying the invariant mass by the time traversed in travelling through unit interval; the momentum is obtained by multiplying the same invariant mass by the distance traversed (in the given direction) in travelling through unit interval.
      .. The conservation of measured mass is the same thing as the conservation of energy. This may seem surprising, since at first sight mass and energy are very different things. To explain how this comes about is not easy: nevertheless we will make the attempt.
      .. latter half of 19 C.. 'conservation of energy'.. acquired its position through Joule's discovery of the 'mechanical equivalent of heat'.. Broadly speaking, .. all forms of energy were reduced to two, which were called.. 'kinetic' and 'potential.' ..
      The kinetic energy .. is half the mass multiplied by the square of the velocity. ..
      The potential energy is more difficult to define. It represents any state of strain.. a weight lifted to a height and kept suspended.. Its potential energy is equal to the kinetic energy which it would acquire in falling the same distance.. a comet.. moves much faster when it is near the sun than when it is far from it.. its kinetic energy is greater.. On the other hand its potential energy is greatest when it is farthest freeway the sun, .. The sum of the kinetic and potential energies of the comet are constant.. the total amount of potential energy is to some extent arbitrary.. We are concerned with a profit-and-loss account, which is unaffected by the amount of the assets with which we start.
      Both the kinetic and the potential energies of a given set of bodies will be different for different observers. In classical dynamics, .. for each observer, the total energy was constant. .. But in relativity dynamics the matter becomes more complicated. We cannot .. adapt the idea of potential energy to the general theory of relativity.. We have seen that independence of the choice of co-ordinates is a guiding principle in the general theory.., and the conservation law is suspect because it conflicts with this principle. Whether this means that conservation is of lesser fundamental importance than was thought hitherto, or whether a satisfactory conservation law still lies hidden in the mathematical complexities.. is a question which still has to be resolved.
      ...
      .. let m be the proper mass of a particle, v its velocity relative to the observer. Then its measured mass will be
      m/(1-v^2)^.5 while its kinetic energy will be mv^2 / 2 .. we may take the energy to be m + mv^2 / 2. Now if v is a small fraction of the velocity of light, [this] is almost exactly equal to m/(1-v^2)^.5. .. it is better to alter our definition of energy, and take it to be m/(1-v^2)^.5, because this is the quantity for which the law analogous to conservation holds. .. The traditional formula must be regarded as an approximation, of which the new formula gives the exact version. In this way, energy and measured mass become identified. ..
      I come now to the notion of 'action'.. energy multiplied by time.. In relativity mechanics, .. a 'region' must no longer be taken to be merely a volume, but a volume lasting for a time.. It follows that, given the density, a small region in the new sense contains, not a small mass merely, but a small mass multiplied by a small time, that is to say, a small amount of 'action.' .. Principle of Least Action.. states that, in passing from one state to another, a body chooses a route involving less action than any slightly different route..'
      - 110 ff: [from 12 CONVENTIONS AND NATURAL LAWS] ''One of the most difficult matters in all controversy is to distinguish disputes about words from disputes about facts: it ought not to be difficult, but in practice it is. .. In the 17 C there was a terrific debate as to what 'force' is; to us now, it was obviously a debate as to how the word 'force' should be defined.. [Note: cp William James' example of 'going round'] A man punting walks along the boat but keeps in a constant position with reference to the river-bed so long as he does not pick up his pole. The Lilliputians might debate endlessly whether he is walking or standing still; the debate would be as to words, not as to facts. .. [Note: what follows is a theory of science; cp e.g. Popper] We want to express physical laws in such a way that it shall be obvious when we are expressing the same law by reference to two different systems of co-ordinates.. This is accomplished by he method of tensors.. Of the possible laws, we choose the simplest one which predicts the actual motion of bodies correctly: logic and experience combine in equal proportions in obtaining this expression. But the problem of arriving at genuine laws of nature is not to be solved by the method of tensors alone; a good deal of careful thought is wanted.. Some of this has been done, especially by Eddington,..
      To take a simple illustration: suppose.. lengths in one direction were shorter than in another. .. Does such a hypothesis have any meaning? .. It won't 'look' shorter, because your eye will have been affected in the same way.. This element of convention survives in the laws that you arrive at after you have made your decision as to measures, and often it takes subtle and elusive forms. To eliminate the element of convention is, in fact, extraordinarily difficult; the more the subject is studied, the greater the difficulty is seen to be.
      A more important example is the question of the size of the electron. We find experimentally that all electrons are the same size. How far is this a genuine fact ascertained by experiment, and how far is it a result of our conventions of measurement? .. [Note: another sceptical hypothesis follows; same sort of thing as e.g. assuming universe is shrinking all the time exactly to scale] We may dismiss any hypothesis which would affect all electrons equally; for example, it would be useless to suppose that in one region of space-time they were all larger than in another. Such a change would affect our measuring appliances .. and would therefore produce no discoverable phenomena. This is as much as to say that it would be no change at all. ..
      [Note: 'models'] Eddington describes the process concerned in the more advanced portions of the theory of relativity as 'world-building.' The structure to be built is the physical world as we know it; the economical architect tries to construct it with the smallest quantity of material. ... [Note: following relevant to idea that Greeks' idea of substance fixed them in a rut?] Our raw material consisted merely of events; but.. it is not surprising that we should come to believe in 'bodies.' .. owing to their permanence are practically important.. our knowledge is limited not only by convention.. by also by the selectiveness of our perceptual apparatus.
      In particular, .. symmetry may be .. created by conventions as to measurement, and there is no reason to suppose that they represent any property of the real world. .. Eddington.. 'The conventions of measurement introduce an isotropy [=similar in all directions] and homogeneity into measured space which need not .. have any counterpart in the relation-structure which is being surveyed. ..
      The limitations of knowledge introduced by the selectiveness of our perceptual apparatus may be illustrated by the indestructibility of energy. This.. by experiment.. seemed a well-founded empirical law of nature. .. it turns out that, from our space-time continuum we can construct a mathematical expression causing it to appear indestructible. The statement that energy is indestructible.. becomes a proposition of linguistics and psychology. .. 'energy' is the name of the mathematical expression in question. As a proposition of psychology: .. we notice what is roughly the mathematical expression in question.. This is much less than physicists used to think they knew about energy.
      .. What then is left of physics? .. we may distinguish three departments.. .. relativity, generalized as widely as possible. Next.. laws which cannot be brought.. within .. relativity. Thirdly.. geography.
      .. relativity.. tells us.. events.. have a four-dimensional order, and that.. there is a relation called 'interval'..
      The part [outside relativity] is large and important. there is nothing to show .. why there should be electrons and protons; relativity cannot give any reason why matter should exist in little lumps. This is the province of the quantum theory.. [which] accounts fairly satisfactorily for the properties of matter on a very small scale. ..
      - 116: Finally we come to geography, in which I include history. The separation.. rests upon the separation of time from space: .. I shall use the one word geography in this extended sense. ..
      - 119-120: 'Eddington.. admirable lucidity.. A field of force represents the discrepancy between the natural geometry of a co-ordinate system and the abstract geometry arbitrarily ascribed to it.'
      - 127: [Matter] 'In the old view, a piece of matter was something which survived all through time, while never being at more than one place at a given time. This way of looking at things is obviously connected with the complete separation of space and time in which people formerly believed. When we substitute space-time .. we shall.. expect to derive the physical world from constituents which are as limited in time as in space. Such constituents are called 'events.' An event does not persist and move.. it merely exists for its little moment and then ceases. .. The whole series of these events makes up the whole history of the particle, and the particle is regarded as being its history..'
      - 129: 'Common sense imagines that when it sees a table it sees a table. This is a gross delusion. ..'
      - 130: [Note: now seen to be wrong; surely it was wrong when written, too:] '.. what occurs within the atom (if anything occurs there) it is absolutely impossible to know: there is no conceivable apparatus by which we could obtain even a glimpse of it. An atom is known by its 'effects'.. [Is this compatible with the invention of, I think, tracking microscopes, which show individual atoms or molecules, and with e.g. cloud chamber experiments and bombardment by hydrogen nuclei etc?] .. '
      - 138: [Chapter 'PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES': '.. the abstract character of our physical knowledge may seem unsatisfactory.. but.. Abstraction, difficult as it is, is the source of practical power. A financier, whose dealings with the world are more abstract than those of any other 'practical' man, is also more powerful than any other practical man. He can deal in wheat or cotton.. all he needs to know is whether they will go up or down...'
      - 135: '.. inference.. a horse is surprised beyond measure if you take an unusual turning..'

RUSSELL BERTRAND: WHAT I BELIEVE [1925] - In 1947, Russell made a radio broadcast under the title 'What I Believe', presumably by the BBC (see Crawshay-Williams); But I don't know if this was taken from this book. The contents were reprinted in 1957 in 'Why I Am Not A Christian'.

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Review of   Bertrand Russell   On Education   first published 1926. New format 1960; I'm assuming the text was largely identical, but it may well have been slightly changed. At any rate, my comments are based on the 1960 version.
May have formed part of the expansion of universities after 1945. But it misses many important things.
Paperback version pages up to 171. Unindexed. No bibliography, but there are references to works, usually footnoted but not endnoted.

Five Years Later... Revisionist Review, including Jews

It's worth making the point that Russell was not a scientist, and makes statements on children's perspicacity and the foolishness of ignorant adults and such subjects as sexuality which are taken from Jewish writers, Russell considering them up-to-date and scientific. Russell liked Montessori—his autobiography has a passage on blue and yellow 'making green'; colour wasn't understood well at the time.
Russell wrote that at a very early age, I saw through the Victorian humbug and hypocrisy with which I was surrounded. This turns out to be untrue, and I'll explain why.

One of the main load-bearing structures of Victorian England's humbug and hypocrisy was censorship of Jews. And this censorship was fantastically far-reaching, as it is now. Hilaire Belloc's The Jews was one of the few books published in England on the topic. Other 'thinkers', such as Shaw and Wells, made no inroads; some others, such as Nesta Webster and Sir Walter Scott, were ignored or written-out. It is an astonishing story.

The third and final, and shortest, portion of On Education, 'Intellectual Education', has a section on 'Last School Years'. Russell writes: I should make three broad divisions in school: (i) classics, (2) mathematics and science, (3) modern humanities. This last should include modem languages, history, and literature. Russell says nothing about religion; this includes nothing on Jewish 'sacred' books and nothing on critiques of religion. Such topics as Quakers, Jesuits, Moslems, Roman Catholicism, the Reformation as Christian-Jewish rearrangements of money, appear to have no allocation of time.
      It's not of course that Russell was unaware of the 'humbug' of the Anglican Church. His section on 'The School Curriculum' has: What is valuable is great familiarity with certain examples of good literature—such familiarity as will influence the style, not only of writing, but of thought. In old days the Bible supplied this to English children, certainly with a beneficial effect upon prose style; which is a matter of opinion; the Bible is packed with violence, elaborate circumlocutions, and obvious lies. Well worth understanding, in fact, but not as influencing the style of thought.

The short chapter on TRUTHFULNESS (To produce the habit of truthfulness should be one of the major aims of moral education.) Really? Russell's chapter 'SEX EDUCATION' has similar questions hanging over it. They are exactly what Jews like!
      Here's Russell on cruelty in 'AFFECTION AND SYMPATHY': But the story of Abraham preparing to sacrifice Isaac, or of the she-bears killing the children whom Elisha cursed, naturally rouses the child's sympathy for another child. If such stories are told, they should be told as showing the depths of cruelty to which men could descend long ago. I once, as a child, heard a sermon of an hour's duration entirely devoted to proving that Elisha was right in cursing the children. Fortunately, I was old enough to think the parson a fool; otherwise I should have been driven nearly mad with terror. The story of Abraham and Isaac was even more dreadful, because it was the child's father who was cruel to him. At this point we have to discuss Judaism; and much of the point of Judaism is its advocacy of cruelty.
      Here's Russell again, in 'AFFECTION AND SYMPATHY': A mental habit of fearlessness due to expectation of kindness should be firmly established before the child is made to face the existence of unkindness. To choose the moment and the manner requires tact and understanding ; it is not a matter which can be decided by a rule. There are, however, certain maxims which should be followed. To begin with, stories such as Blue- beard and Jack the Giant Killer do not involve any knowledge of cruelty whatever, and do not raise the problems we are considering. To the child they are purely fantastic, and he never connects them with the real world in any way. No doubt the pleasure he derives from them is connected with savage instincts, but these are harmless as mere play-impulses in a powerless child, and they tend to die down as the child grows older. But when the child is first introduced to cruelty as a thing in the real world, care must be taken to choose incidents in which he will identify himself with the victim, not with the torturer. Something savage in him will exult in a story in which he identifies himself with the tyrant ; a story of this kind tends to produce an imperialist. ... But in telling about wars, sympathy, at first, should be with the defeated. I should begin with battles in which it is natural to feel on the side of the beaten party—for instance, the battle of Hastings in teaching an English boy. I should emphasize always the wounds and suffering produced. I should gradually lead the child to feel no partisanship in reading about wars, and to regard both sides as silly men who had lost their tempers, and ought to have had nurses to put them to bed till they were good. I should assimilate wars to quarrels among the children in the nursery. In this way I believe children could be made to see the truth about war, and to realize that it is silly. This is ludicrously remote from Jewish teaching!


Bear in mind that the first publication date, which seems to be 1926, was about ten years after Jews had acted together from the USA, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and probably Japan and China and India, using Jewish-controlled money, gold, and loans generally to control the world. By that time mass murder had set into Russia and the Baltic and have not yet been dislodged.

RW 26 Aug 2022


The blurb, which appears not to have been written by Russell, is an accurate brief summary:
... first, the training of character to be fearless and affectionate, by wise parenthood and nursery schools, where contact with other children is as important as skilled guidance;
    then, the development of the intellect, in which delight is balanced with the need for accuracy, and utility with disinterestedness, the supreme good and fount of progress.

We also have 'Knowledge wielded by love', and 'Do we love our children enough to make them ... 'free citizens of the universe'?' And the claim that he was able to check his ideas against 'the findings of psychology', which include W H R Rivers and Montessori, but also of course Freud who (p. 26) supplied Russell's apparent belief that a sound character should and could be established by the age of six.

Russell writes that '... at a very early age, I saw through the Victorian humbug and hypocrisy with which I was surrounded, and vowed that, if ever I had children, I would not repeat the mistakes that were being made with me. To the best of my ability I am keeping this vow.' (In his chapter 'Truthfulness').
    Removing humbug was not Russell's only motive in looking at education. He quotes (for example) Rousseau and Locke, Nietzsche and Christians and Kant as people with differing aims for their educatees. And he outlines children as 'limbs of Satan', and 'Children of Wrath' and 'Children of Grace', and notes that damnation of unbaptized infants was Church policy in England—though, typically, he thought everyone believed that, and not just that it was a device to retain believers. Russell's concern for remote times is sketchy; nothing much about private tutors, dancing masters or fencing masters, legal training, or mediaeval schools. He's not even very accurate on the nineteenth century: compare H G Wells's personal experience and detail on schools which anyone could open, and which, as in the USA later, wasted and weakened and frittered away so much potential.

It's important to see that Russell was concerned with what might be called official or formal education: presumably throughout history both young and old learned things—apprentices, cabin boys, gardeners, builders, farmers, needlewomen, cooks, water carriers, herders, hunters, wood cultivators—but Russell is concerned with historical elites, or at least the uses of what surplus wealth communities might have for non-day-to-day activities. Russell thinks one of the best aspects of the education of gentlemen and aristocrats was disinterested learning; perhaps he was thinking of the 'Grand Tour'.
    It seems fair to view Russell as one-dimensional in discussing remote societies: perhaps because statistics as a branch of mathematics was barely forming in Russell's youth, his views on old China (sceptical, ancient texts, no science) and modern Japan (strained, forced to modernise by US naval threat), and ancient Greece (intelligent, rather dogmatic aristocrats) and Jesuits (guess!) all seem to understate the range of personal types characteristic of long-established groups.

Russell believed in the tabula rasa attitude; babies have a few instincts but not much else, though he knew the 'sexual instinct' matured late. He lived before the age of popular computing, and the age of cheap travel and easy forced migration, and was equally unaware of the brain as a device, the still-unresolved complications of impulses and emotions, and race differences. Page 24: 'The fact is that children are not naturally either 'good' or 'bad'. They are born only with reflexes and a few instincts; out of these ... habits are produced, which may be either healthy or morbid.' There's a very important mistake here in Russell; there are genetic differences in anything that needs some sort of response: some people are more irritable, tolerant, violent, energetic, kindly than others, and these attributes must be racially or tribally distributed. 'Habits' play a large part in Russell, though he provides no convincing reason(s) why some events should lead to habits, and others not, or why some habits became (he thought) almost irreversibly fixed. For example, (p. 62; the chapter on 'Fear') '.. one night there was a terrific gale.. He [2½ year old boy] woke in terror... I gave him a night-light. ... we talked to him very carefully about the absence of terror in the dark... If we had been more indulgent, we should probably have made him sleep badly, perhaps for life.'
    The expression 'spoilt' or 'ruined' child may have emerged from this attitude, with a suggestion similar to losing virginity, but in a multi-dimensional way. Something like that can happen to adults, implies Russell: 'Rigid truthfulness in adults towards children is ... absolutely indispensable if children are not to learn lying. Parents who teach that lying is a sin, and who nevertheless are known to lie by their children, naturally lose all moral authority...'

Russell liked to think intellectual curiosity was instinctive and abundant. If it was lacking—the 'old idea was that children could not possibly wish to learn'—'this was entirely due to skill in pedagogy. By dividing what has to be learnt—for instance, reading and writing—into suitable stages, every stage can be made agreeable to the average child.' (p 22). His daughter Katherine at the time was about 2; it's obvious from the autobiographical material in her book on Russell that she had no idea of his thoughts. I wonder if he was too busy to revise his book.
    Russell says it's natural for children to learn from slightly older children, since adult achievements are difficult to mimic—this of course works with many other groups, colleagues, and trainees.

Russell says little about technology; the obvious importance at that time of metal smelting, steam engines, car mechanics, sanitary plumbing, electric lighting and heating, refrigeration, town planning, the start of radio, bypass him. Russell was hopeless at practical activities (see e.g. R Crawshay-Williams' Russell Remembered) and, probably as a result, regarded science as a matter of reading, rather than including details of equipment and testing, and was therefore rather unaware of the possibilities of changes, discoveries, and progress.
    And Russell understates money as a motive. He states The Fairchild Family (Mary Sherwood; 3 vols 1818, 1842, 1847) has a passage in which the son is punished for being insufficiently interested in the Latin needed to become a clergyman. Russell is annoyed and contemptuous, having inherited a fortune thirty-five years earlier, but seems not to realise that many Britons (including Patrick Brontë) regarded the Church of England as as a high-earning lifetime career.



Russell had a writer's inclination to select words for characteristics he thought desirable, in somewhat the way a trainer of racehorses or guide-dogs for the blind might list speed or faithfulness. This may, or may not, be useful in practice. Pages 35-44 list vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence for character; and, for intellect, pages 133-137 list 'curiosity, open-mindedness, belief that knowledge is possible though difficult, patience, industry, concentration, and exactness'.

Russell's 'Education of Character'—11 chapters, the longest part of the book—of course has some oddities, mostly from his carrying on traditional attitudes without much analysis. Chapter IV, 'Fear', assumes courage is desirable. '... I am taking a purely behaviourist definition: a man is courageous when he does things which others might fail to to owing to fear. ... Courage due to the will produces nervous disorders, [sic; nerves were not popularly understood] of which 'shell-shock afforded numerous instances. ...' This seems to prove that a man who jumps from a precipice shows courage, rather than stupidity. However, Russell's examples are courage in 'mountaineering, for manipulating an aeroplane, or for managing a small ship in a gale'.

The chapter on Truthfulness (chapter VIII, p.87) starts 'To produce the habit of truthfulness should be one of the major aims of moral education. ... truthfulness in speech... but also in thought.' Later: '... Truthfulness is something of a handicap in a hypocritical society; but the handicap is more than outweighed by the advantages of fearlessness, without which no one can be truthful. We wish our children to be upright, candid, frank, self-respecting...' This must have laughed at, or slyly applauded, by (for example) Jews at that time secretly flooding into Britain, controlling money, controlling the press. Imagine a soldier in the 'Great War' saying in a frank honest way, "I say, sir, if we obey we'll all be shot—a waste of men": he'd have been shot. Or imagine a Russian woman forced into a brothel frankly expressing dislike to a Jew intent on rape. It's fair to say Russell was hopeless as an analyst.
    The 'Great War' brought immense changes, which Russell failed to recognise. He was largely cushioned from them: he was too old to be conscripted, and had no business which the authorities wished to take over, and he had little idea of the significance of Jewish loans, or death duties which devastated many English families. And these things of course were insignificant in comparison with events in Germany, Hungary, and the USSR (which he always called 'Russia'). He wrote at some point that the Great War had caused many German children to have rickets, a ridiculous understatement of the effects of British blockades. Russell had no idea of the forces behind the scenes, mostly of course Jewish propaganda, promoting 'nationalism' in the aggressive sense.

All this is somewhat depressing. A cheerful chapter is 'The Nursery School', pp. 122-128, as expressed in The Nursery School by Margaret McMillan, though I'd guess her accounts of 7-year-olds reading and spelling nearly perfectly, being tall and straight [i.e. I think without rickets], writing and expressing themselves well and helping other children sounds overstated. Russell gives details of costs, and recommends that women use their new vote for the (((Labour Party))).

The final six chapters are Russell on 'Intellectual Education'. There is, of course, nothing on Internet or mobile phones or online archives, or even radio; his world was books, encyclopaedias, journals, and newspapers. He uses Dr Ballard (The Changing School, 1925, Hodder & Stoughton) as a source; for example (p 135) stating that test results in the 1880s and early 1890s were better—something repeated later, though Russell is entirely ignorant of racial differences in groups of pupils. Russell thought specialization should start in pupils aged 15. I think it's fair to say he had no concept of serious general education, which perhaps might have been possible then as now. And he had no way to try to prepare pupils to predict or guess at future changes. His view of teaching of history is painfully simple. Anyway; that's enough!

Was Russell successful? The challenge at the time he wrote was to be what Churchill would call the 'Second World War'. Russell's assumption that the truth could always be found by reading all aspects of a subject—faced with commercial and political pressures, which he ought to have known of—was, simply, wrong; he should have known as a result of his experiences of the 'Great War' that academics and religious people and teachers were almost all 'broken reeds'. In the face of the Jewish policies of death maximisation, assisted with large numbers of venal puppets, his efforts, despite the oratorical flourishes, were ineffectual. He was himself too cowardly to follow his own advice of facing appalling truths by examining evidence.

There's a hollowness in Russell' views, perhaps attributed to his lonely childhood. An aspect of schools is the possibility of forming lifelong habits, friends, interests. Looking online at (say) Malvern College gives a rather cut-down insight into linkages—between staff, ex-pupils and their activities, suggestions for careers which others weren't even aware of, links with overseas schools of the same brand, famous and/or dead 'old boys'. In Britain, Eton and Harrow must have played a larger part in allowing Jews to infiltrate in secret. The 'fagging' system of of getting young boys to clean up for older boys left lifelong emotions. "It's not what you know—it's who you know". The Freemasonry of hidden links is missing from Russell.

RW 21 Nov 2017
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Russell in non-cheery mode. But modulated by his Jewish hand-holders, including Marx, whom of course he didn't understand. Here he mentions the possibility of white extinction. Russell did not grasp the importance of Jews and paper money worldwide, which must presumably have changed his interpretation of ‘capitalism’.

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Review of   Bertrand Russell   Marriage and Morals   first published 1929.


In Russell's Autobiography, about thirty-five years later, Russell states that is no longer capable of being dogmatic about marriage; he didn't know what to think of it.

It has to be said this book is agonisingly dull, partly because of his modular chapter approach, which makes much similar material appear in many chapters. The book does at least have an index, and 21 chapters with explanatory names.

Russell's interpretational framework tries to be anthropological and long-term, but fails, or at least makes many assumptions which are insecure.
      He assumes there was a process of discovery of paternity; this idea seems to have come from an anthropologist who was told by some group of people that they didn't know about fatherhood. It seems they were too polite to mention it. Russell thinks matrilineal societies must have preceded patrilineal societies, and that the discovery of fatherhood enabled a man to visualise himself as a patriarch, after death.
      Rather amazingly, Russell states ... the discovery of fatherhood led to the subjection of women as the only means of securing their virtue—a subjection first physical and then mental, which reached its height in the Victorian age. The world is starting to learn (after the Jewish wars century's censorship) just how much of the world has been forced and enslaved.
      Russell took Margaret Mead on Samoa seriously; the machinations of Jews of the Boas type were far over his head. This is odd, since Mead was so obviously improbable, not being able to speak the languages and getting information from giggly girls. Russell also took Freud and what was called Marxism seriously; he discusses 'economic causation', not in the sense of efficiency and care, but in the Jewish sense of Jews vs goyim, and Jew exploitation. Not surprisingly he expresses some unhappiness over Freudian and economic determinism. But he gives priority, always, to Jews, or so-called Jews.
      The book Marriage and Morals does not mention Margaret Mead; her 'Coming of Age' book was also published in 1929 and Russell did not, then or later, identify Mead's fraudulence. Russell belonged to a naïve era; there's very little scepticism in his outlook. He quotes from Malinowski on paternity, and I think on 'sacred prostitution'. This latter could be an interesting topic, connected perhaps with Jewish money-making, but this sort of thing is far outside Russell's reach.
      Russell gives the titles of three books by Malinowski on Trobriand Islanders—Sex and Repression in Savage Society, The Father in Primitive Psychology, and The Sexual Life of Savages in North-West Melanesia. And states among other things that 'Unmarried men and girls live a life of complete free love'. Much of this is clearly nonsense (and may be related to Christian nonsense: ‘men as God's children’ being incommunicable to the savages).
      Perhaps Russell just liked to be controversial, or to appear to be well-read: after all, Britain supposedly had many years of experience with two empires, and might have been expected to have competent authors (of the Rivers type) on all aspects of empires and their people, compared with a Jew from Poland. Poor Rivers was killed in the 'Great War', leaving the ground clear for Jewish 'thinkers' like Malinowsi and Boas, and cryptos like Mead. Roughly speaking, a primitive tribe marked with beards and distinctive clothing who liked examining women's underclothes arranged a system in which coevals were awarded 'professorships' with lifelong parasitic income.
      There were also British archaeologists, no doubt with views on the moon and sun. But Russell always prefers aliens.

There are many aspects of life which Russell omits. One of these is race; there's only about a page in his chapter on eugenics. Probably this is explained by Russell's wanting to present a continuity across all races, perhaps traceable to Biblical and Jewish ignorance. He has nothing useful to say. His chapter on eugenics is rather empty; his presents a science fiction form of genetics with a tiny proportion of men and 1 in 4 women and no families, but dismisses 'positive eugenics' on the ground that he thinks democracy is against it.
      On eugenics, Russell unthinkingly takes the view, probably from the etymology of the word, that the aim would be to improve the race in some way. The Jewish attitude of harming all non-Jews is unknown to BR.
      Russell misses out all the more repulsive-to-western-eyes possibilities of life: cannibalism, castration, kidnapping of young males for Janissaries or black armies, child slaves and lifelong slaves, targeted murders, Jewish-style killings by stealth, kidnapping of women, use of sterilisation (as recommended by Jews against Germans), pederasty, exploitative fatherings as Rothschilds are accused of on the off-chance one might be clever, mass rapes, forced mixed race miscegenation, sex with 3 year olds as permitted by Judaism. However, he does mention child murder, which he thinks was fairly common.

Russell discusses the Liberation of Women, but his views simply take Jewish nonsense as truth. Bax, a lawyer, had published books on the situation of women, but Russell of course as an isolated aristocrat had little interest in law or legal history. Jews have no objection to lies; the 'rule of thumb' myth about beating women is the sort of thing Russell might have believed in.

Russell was credulous about books and newspapers: he felt his role was to be an aesthete and intellectual, selecting from the offerings made by inferior class scribblers, presumably doing their rather pitiful best to explain their superiors. He simply had no idea that systematic propaganda may exist. This attitude remained with Russell all his life; his credulity about nuclear weapons helped Jews pump out nonsense for many decades. When Russell took his action against Americans in Vietnam, he was unable to understand the effects of such warmongers as the Sulzbergers and Kissinger and Murdoch.
      Russell's credulity (referred to above—Germans, wars, 'Nazis', Jew murderers pretending to be socialist, nuclear bombs etc) explains his naive attitude to nominal beliefs. Obviously, Christianity was imposed by Jews; Russell has no idea that Paul probably wanted to harm non-Jews, and wanted them to have few or no children and not have happy lives with many children. Russell even pretends the Bible is clearly written: The views of St. Paul on marriage are set forth, with a clarity that leaves nothing to be desired, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. His (e.g.) 4th verse is 'The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband: and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife.' Yes, of course! Saul makes no mention of children; so he's not that clear, is he?
      Russell has a tiresome way of omitting sensible attitudes, if he feels he can ridicule them. For example, a community may not want to support bastards. Or a woman might want to be married for company and routine, rather than be on her own. Or marriage may need to have have one simple ceremony, rather than hosts of lawyers that a community can't support. Or censorship may be needed of such topics as the best way to rape, or techniques of murder. Or The Taboo on Sex Knowledge which raises complicated issues such as anal sex.

An interesting view of aristocracies in absent from Russell, oddly when you consider he had quite a few relative, including some with powerful positions, such as Lord Portal of the WW2 bombing campaign. The point I'm making, which I think is rarely explained clearly, is the effect of primogeniture on societies. A family may have dozens of fairly close relatives, but if only one is allowed to inherit, there are likely to be very many disappointed hangers-on. (There are variants such as 'gavelkind' with inheritance to the youngest son. And ultimogeniture. And separating inheritance among all children). The traditional view, which seems correct, is that non-inheritors went into the Church or tried their luck in white man's grave areas overseas.
      I hardly need state that BR had no opinion on such things as the Kahal System of Jews, his limitations being part of the entire mental furniture of Victorians.

Russell is of course ludicrously naive about Jews. He says (p 139) Great religious leaders, with the exception of Mohammed—and Confucius, if he can be called religious—have in general been very indifferent to social and political considerations, and have sought rather to perfect the soul by meditation, discipline, and self-denial. This is nowhere near serious comment on so-called Jews and their effects.

RW 3 June 2018


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Review of   Bertrand Russell   The Conquest of Happiness   published 1930
‘It is in the belief that many people who are unhappy could become happy by well-directed effort that I have written this book.’
Russell wrote this book to try to make money: his autobiography says it was aimed at unsophisticated people, 'common-sense advice as to what an individual can do to overcome temperamental causes of unhappiness, as opposed to what can be done by changes in social and economic systems'. It seems to have worked: together with Marriage and Morals (1929) he said he had large sales and made money, though no figures are given for either—and within a few years he had money problems. He said that psychiatrists praised his book highly, and indeed there are slightly worrying suggestions on how to tackle forms of lunacy.

For a book of 1930, thirty years after the Boer Wars and and fifteen after the huge upheavals of the 'Great War', this is ordinary and surprisingly indifferent to many aspects of the world, which even unsophisticated people could not have avoided, such as military call-ups and deaths and high tax levels. Russell makes no mention of fanaticisms, in particular the Fed-enforced rise of Jews. His chapter Fear of Public Opinion, for example, gives advice that could be positively dangerous, even in sheltered countries.
      Chapter XIII, The Family, refers in a footnote to The Retreat from Parenthood by Jean Ayling, which deals 'with remarkable insight and constructive ability' to the problem affecting 'the professional classes' of the clash between career and child-rearing. Internet sources tell me that the authoress was in fact Dorothy Wrinch, who had studied maths and logic with Russell for a time.

The format is exactly in keeping with Russell's atomistic outlook, his 'microscopic intensity':-

PART I   CAUSES OF UNHAPPINESS
What Makes People Unhappy?/ Byronic Unhappiness/ Competition/ Boredom and Excitement/ Fatigue/ Envy/ The Sense of Sin/ Persecution Mania/ Fear of Public Opinion

Russell liked country life, at least when he had staff, or help, or wives to ease his daily activities. He had a whole sub-philosophy of nature, which he includes in this book in Boredom and Excitement, including descriptions of the long slow processes of the seasons, and pleasure in countryside—he describes a two-year-old kneeling in wet grassy ground in a 'strange ecstacy', and says Shakespeare's lyrics are 'filled with this same joy'. Whether seasons are part of the experience of life, or something found mainly in the northern hemisphere, isn't questioned by Russell. He regards appreciation of nature as part of a proper human life. But he doesn't face the fact that it does not give long-term understanding of changes in peoples.
      Russell's classifications imply a lot about his own life: his chapter on Competition, and 'the struggle for life', does not face the fact that many people are very dependent on others; he simply brushes it off, appropriately for someone with the prospect of large inheritances.

Russell's chapter on fatigue makes a claim which might be contrasted with the Jewish outlook: Even great sorrows can be survived; troubles which seem as if they must put an end to happiness for life fade with the lapse of time until it becomes almost impossible to remember their poignancy. Jews, or their leaders, seem to have the opposite outlook; great sorrows, including faked sorrows, may be enlarged with the lapse of time.

      Chapter VI, 'Envy', has disturbingly unimpressive passages. He thinks envy is 'one of the most universal and deep-seated' passions. And he thinks it is 'the basis of democracy'. Russell misses the part played by Jews in advocating what they call democracy, something rather terrifyingly widespread, which Jews use to advance what they think are their own interests.

      Chapter VIII, 'Persecution Mania', is highly relevant to Jews, though of course Russell makes no such observation. Let me quote:

We are all familiar with the type of person, man or woman, who, according to his own account, is perpetually the victim of ingratitude, unkindness, and treachery. People of this kind are often extraordinarily plausible, and secure warm sympathy from those who have not known them long. There is, as a rule, nothing inherently improbable about each separate story that they relate. The kind of ill-treatment of which they complain does undoubtedly sometimes occur. What in the end rouses the hearer’s suspicions is the multiplicity of villains whom it has been the sufferer’s ill-fortune to meet with. In accordance with the doctrine of probability, different people living in a given society are likely in the course of their lives to meet with about the same amount of bad treatment. If one person in a given set receives, according to his own account, universal ill-treatment, the likelihood is that the cause lies in himself,...

Persecution mania is always rooted in a too exaggerated conception of our own merits. ... These illustrations suggest four general maxims, which will prove an adequate preventive of persecution mania if their truth is sufficiently realized. The first is: remember that your motives are not always as altruistic as they seem to yourself. The second is: don’t over-estimate your own merits. The third is: don’t expect others to take as much interest in you as you do yourself. And the fourth is: don’t imagine that most people give enough thought to you to have any special desire to persecute you. I shall say a few words about each of these maxims in turn. Suspicion of one’s own motives is especially necessary for the philanthropist and the executive; such people have a vision of how the world, &c &c

It might be amusing to see Jewish opinions on this book. Incidentally, here's one of the instances in this book of Russell being serious:
Nothing can rob a man of the happiness of successful achievement in an important piece of work ... There are many forms of such satisfaction. ... The creation of an organization may be a work of supreme importance. So is the work of those few statesmen who have devoted their lives to producing order out of chaos, of whom Lenin is the supreme type in our day.
Supreme? In Russell's own words, 'The phrases which are customary on the platform and in the Party Press have gradually come to him to seem to express truths, and he mistakes the rhetoric of partisanship for a genuine analysis of motives.'

PART II   CAUSES OF HAPPINESS
Is Happiness Still Possible?/ Zest/ Affection/ The Family/ Work/ Impersonal Interests/ Effort and Resignation/ The Happy Man

Most people, when asked to generalise about life, presumably draw largely on things they've been told and experiences they've had. For example, the 'Seven Deadly Sins' might appear in a book of this type: sloth, pride, vainglory for example. Russell's opening chapter overviews life, including sin, narcissism and megalomania. ('Since no man can be omnipotent, a life dominated by love of power can hardly fail, sooner or later, to meet with obstacles that cannot be overcome.') Envy perhaps is of this type: Russell wrote somewhere that he thought envy an 'abominable emotion'. Russell had a policy on uprooting the 'sense of sin', to reduce or remove '... in practically every case ... the moral teaching ... before he was six years old': 'a man should make up his mind ... what he rationally believes, and should never allow contrary irrational beliefs to pass unchallenged..'   Russell does not attempt to generalise about harmful practices, or how to uproot them, though he was nearly 60 at the time and had some experience of varied mores and educations.
      In the same sort of way, some of Russell's categories have other sources: 'Competition' is probably based on Victorian economic accounts.
      And also in the same sort of way, Russell—and most people describing generalities—slips into standard accounts, for example Emily Bront&ediar; as immensely strong-minded.

Some of these chapters must have had more concern to Russell than to average people: Byronic unhappiness, persecution mania and fear of public opinion seem unlikely to affect average people, and conversely Russell has nothing much on getting and keeping jobs below high money-making levels, and regards work as something rather highbrow, involving impersonal interests, rather than 'work' in most people's sense. He thinks generally scientists are rather happy, and artists rather unhappy, in the then-modern world. In fact, I'd guess many of the purchasers of Russell's book read it to see what members of the aristocracy felt.
      Russell includes quite a bit on sex, but judging by Ronald Clark's biography, omitted quite a lot more. One wonders whether some of his opinions were not publishable.
      Russell says almost nothing about membership of organizations, and the related happiness or unhappiness. He has no advice for army, navy, or air force people, or career academics, or clerics. People in the army often have no self-motivation; they have to be told what to do. Plymouth Brethren, orthodox and other Jews, Roman Catholics, Freemasons often pass the whole of lives in intense groups, often enough corrupt and scheming, but Russell has nothing much to say (except that some monks would be as happy if they were forced to be crossing-sweepers, an occupation now lost from industrial countries). People of that type probably regarded this book as a complete irrelevance to their lives in their hives.
      On the 'disorganized and derailed' family, Russell has statistics on the birthrates in 'highly civilized countries', and the attraction of careers for women, so that maternity, he thinks, means considerable loss to women. (Teaching seems to be the career he chiefly has in mind for 'educated women'). As with many progressives of the time, he mentions no problems of pregnancy, disease or jealousy. His views on the joys of parenthood are mostly literary, though he interprets statistical figures too. I find his indifference to facts of war deaths, and the huge gap left by the Great War in the male population pyramid, amazing; perhaps he was just out of touch with any normal people.
      He gives a few facts —professional women in Sweden 1919-1922, and Wellesley College, USA, women graduates 1896-1913, had birth rates only about 1/3 what might be needed—and concludes that the most civilzed people are the most sterile. Russell in fact seems to have read Coudenhove-Kalergi and may be counted as a crypto-Jew. He quotes from Jean Ayling's The Retreat from Parenthood; Ayling my be a pseudonym for one of Russell's lovers. I've just noticed and will quote from the rather unintelligent Occidental Observer: Tim Folke March 23, 2024: Regarding large families, a number of moral societies in recent times have encouraged married couples to have three or more children (Hungary, NS Germany, Russia). Moral societies? More like Jew-controlled societies, wanting increased births after Jewish depredations. However, Ayling seems to have no idea of the possibilities of subsidising children, or reducing tax, or not having wars.

An oddity in this book is Russell's non-Darwinian outlook: he doesn't make much attempt to view people as a biological species with an enormously long inheritance, to draw inferences about child care, combativeness, races, secrecy, comfort, food and so on. There are, for example, no warnings against Jewish lies and infiltration, or tricks aimed at getting sex, or secrecy in selection and promotion of employees.
      Another oddity is his avoidance of serious issues: the 'Great Crash' had taken place, and the 'Great War' started only about 15 years before, but Russell does not have any helpful advice—partly perhaps because he himself had no armour against these things. He provides no intellectual self-defence hints against newspapers and radio and 'education'.
      Russell's conception of happiness is self-centred, a bit like the Greek who lived in a barrel; he wrote (in Power) that the individual is, in effect, of most importance. At the time he wrote, Jews were mass-murdering Russians, and presumably were happy doing it. Membership of a large group, and the presumably related happinesses of secret delights in violence and schadenfreuden and taking over, are excluded. So is happiness in taking and obeying orders, which some people like, but which is outside Russell's scheme (though he does compare religious types to men forced to be crossing-sweepers). So is happiness in membership of a church, and the necessary suppression of intellectual curiosity.

So this is a difficult book to review. Comments on received views, surveys of historical change, encouragement of rebellion, anecdotes, and descriptions of character types go into the brew. But one feels—or at least I feel—that very important material is swept under the carpet. For example, one of the big events of Russell's life was receiving his inheritance at age 21. I forget the details, but it seems relevant to his own happiness.

RW 4 Nov 2017

A much-talked-about topic is 'pathological altruism'. Here's Russell, in his chapter on 'Persecution Mania', where he gives maxims on not being too serious. He writes: ‘It used to be customary for invalid ladies to expect at least one of their daughters to sacrifice themselves completely in performing the duties of a nurse, even to the extent of forgoing marriage. This is to expect of another a degree of altruism which is contrary to reason, since the loss to the altruist is greater than the gain to the egoist.’—Russell's view of altruism seems irrational here; from the point of view of his invalid lady, as with Jews in the USSR, there may be no limit at all to the 'degree of altruism'.

It's worth noting (I've finished an article on Jewish propaganda) that a theme of Russell's, on journalists forced to take a position on a conservative newspaper, must feel unhappiness, a guilty conscience. Or something. In fact the press was more or less Jew-controlled.

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Review of   Bertrand Russell   Education and the Social Order   published 1932. Republished 1933; 1947, 1951, 1956 etc
Rather Bad Book; Fails at Every Point. Precursor to (((American))) (((Correctness)))
Russell writes as someone who has swallowed all of Marx without having developed any counter-arguments, perhaps because of personal isolation from people, perhaps through limited interest in other people's writings. Note that the book was not reprinted after 1933; it says nothing whatever about post-World War I counters to what is now clearly Jewish influence. I *think* Russell was straining for new subject matter, this book being what he thought was an improved On Education.

The main problem is his use of the word 'economic'. Russell thinks pretty much all activity is 'economic'; or at least says so, in a way reminiscent of Jews, then, in the USSR. Blacksmiths, builders, brewers, farmers, auctioneers, and everyone else, are all 'economic'. Then we have 'capitalism', which he can't define, and 'class'; Russell has the view that classes must form according to economic purposes. He does not distinguish industrialists from financiers, though it seems obvious enough they aren't the same. In fact, probably the word 'capitalism' was pushed intentionally to hide the difference. He thinks (p 142) that great organizations need 'a definite type of ability .. executive or administrative ... the kind of skill required at the top will be always the same.' Whether this is true or not, it's an essential part of Russell's mindset: this definite ability will be successful with the Lancashire cotton trade, tackling air defences, exploring central Asia, transporting timber from British Columbia. I doubt if this is true, but in any case Russell doesn't like this skill applied to education; suddenly the administrators lose their skill and can't allow for variations in children.
      Burnham's Managerial Revolution was I think 1941. May have been a way to hide Jewish money.

Russell (p 145) has emphatic views, very like 2000ish political correctness, but only from the viewpoint recommended for useful idiots: 'It is obvious now, to every thinking person, that every nation would be happier if all armed forces everywhere were disbanded and all disputes between nations were settled by an international tribunal and all tariffs were abolished and all men could move freely from one country to another. Science has so altered our technique as to make the world one economic unit. ... each nation makes itself artificially poor by economic isolation. ..' This of course was written before Keynes' General Theory was published in 1936.

Russell's view of the history of education is rather sketchy and cartoonish and uninterested: nothing on apprenticeships, training, learning from parents, all informal education—and, generally, many thousands of years of presumably simple education.
    There is a five-page slapdash index, not as useful as might be hoped, but better than On Education. Russell thinks Frederick II started secular (i.e. non-Christian) education, spurred on by Mohammedan influence in passing on Greek and Latin works. There is material on Catholicism, which Russell thinks started as a revolutionary movement. The Jewish roots do not interest or exist for Russell.

Let me list the chapter headings here, though the meanings may not be obvious: I The Individual versus the Citizen / II The Negative Theory of Education/ III Education and Heredity/ IV Emotion and Discipline/ V Home versus School / VI Aristocrats, Democrats, and Bureaucrats/ VII The Herd in Education/ VIII Religion in Education/ IX Sex in Education/ X Patriotism in Education/ XI Class-feeling in Education/ XII Competition in Education/ XIII Education under Communism/ XIV Education and Economics/ XV Propaganda in Education/ XVI The Reconciliation of Individuality and Citizenship

It's a ragbag of a book, but has a great deal of miscellaneous interest, though it is hard work to tease out Russell's multiple attitudes and multiple serious omissions.
    Russell thinks aristocrats were always idle rich. He thinks (p 199) there are three chief sources of wealth outside the USSR—land and natural monopolies, inheritance in the family, and business enterprises. Despite his efforts to refine the philosophical ideas of sets, he confuses and misclassifies: he doesn't notice differences between the opium wars for a few Jews in China, and British-built infrastructure in India; or biologically essential needs, and relaxation and trivia and comfort; or such knowledge as the wealth of all parts of a country, and loans and other legal but hidden facts—information as power is absent from Russell—the logical links missing from the maxim 'knowledge is power' are missing in Russell.
    More failures by Russell to analyse and differentiate include: Wars which add to debt owed to Jews, and wars with some other purpose; or education which is empowering, vs education which, even if difficult and challenging, remains unhelpful; or religions powered by careerists, vs more genuine belief systems. His chapter on religion is of course anti-Christian, but, as with (((freethinkers))) in Britain then and now, is careful to avoid frank discussions on other religions, notably Jews. His view on slavery is traditional post-1833 Britain, and as with 'imperialism', doesn't examine detail. His chapter on education under communism is taken from one book published in the USSR, and has painful myopia: only 5% of Russians actually attend the school he describes, for example—presumably Jews?—and Russell seems largely unaware of differences between peoples—the Russian Empire had a wide variety of states and local arrangements, including of course Jews, just as the (((British Empire))) had local criminal gangs, local military groups, and protectorates, colonies, republics, and so on. His interpretation of state education is of course from Plato; he doesn't attempt to describe how it might work. And of course his views on money don't include its possible, and true in practice, uses in making money for its handlers, which is not the same as 'capitalism'.

From EMOTION AND DISCIPLINE: A man is called sane when he is as sane as the average of his contemporaries; but in the average man many of the mechanisms which determine his opinions and actions are quite fantastic; so much so that in a world of real sanity they would be called insane. Unfortunately BR gives no examples.

From THE HERD IN EDUCATION: Most Jews, even in the most liberal societies, have been subjected during boyhood to insults on account of their race, and these insults remain in their memory, colouring their whole outlook upon life and society. A boy may be taught at home to be proud of being a Jew: he may know with his intellect that Jewish civilization is older than that of most Western nations, and that the contribution of Jews has been, in proportion to their numbers, incomparably greater than that of Gentiles.

Throughout the Western world boys and girls are taught that their most important social loyalty is to the State of which they are citizens. —Not Jews

From PATRIOTISM IN EDUCATION: History ought to be taught in exactly the same way in all countries of the world, and history text-books ought to be drawn up by the League of Nations, with an assistant from the United States, and another from Soviet Russia. History should be world history rather than national history, and should emphasize matters of cultural importance rather than wars. In so far as wars must be taught, they should not be taught only from the point of view of the victor, and of heroic deeds. The pupil should linger on the battle-field among the wounded, should be made to feel the plight of the homeless in devastated regions, and should be made aware of all the cruelties and injustices for which war affords an opportunity.
  Not a likely suggestion to be taken up! Jews would not like it!

    The book has some interests, but its lack of focus makes it hard to take seriously, except as a series of historical interpretations, which may or may not be true, and aspirations, which are largely copied or modified from authors accepted as official experts. Russell makes many statements which are wrong. It was not reprinted after 1933, which I take to be Russell unable to deal with Hitler.

RW 24 Nov 2017


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Review of   Bertrand Russell   Freedom and Organization 1814-1914   This is the original title   published 1934

History of the Nineteenth Century by Bertrand Russell and Patricia Spence. Impelled by Russell's affection for Victorian England, and by the disaster of the 'Great War'. But totally ignorant of facts about Jewish and other finance, and costs of important events.
[This book was reissued in 1965 by George Allen & Unwin as an Unwin Paperback in two volumes, 'Legitimacy versus Industrialism 1814-1848' and 'Freedom versus Organization 1776-1914'. I don't know if there were changes in the text.
      Allen & Unwin seem to have added 1814-1848, which does not appear in the original. Revolutions in 1848 barely appear in the first edition and its following impressions.]
Added 16 May 2020: The following extract is from Miles W Mathis's piece, rubyridge.pdf (dated May 13, 2022):
Just like Gerry, the Spences in the peerage are ridiculously well scrubbed, with none of them leading anywhere. Although there are 123 of them, not one has any history and they seem to come out of nowhere. I researched every single one. This would confirm the name is a variation of Spencer, used by Spencers who wish to hide. They are related to all the same families as the Spencers. ... Also, I remind you that Bertrand Russell's wife [well, one of his wives-RW] was a Spence. She was known as Peter and smoked a pipe. They were married on ... January 18, aces and eights. Did you catch that? She was known as Peter. Randy Weaver also called himself Peter. It is beginning to look like yet another ... marker. ['Peterman' is British slang for a safecracker, I've read-RW]

It's possible that Russell's book-to-be was a worry for the Jewish overseers; maybe Patricia Spence (birth name Marjorie, by the way) was sent to avoid giveaways about Jews. Bear in mind the date, 1933, and the planting of Hitler, and building of Freemason's Hall in London, and the astonishing Jewish plunders in the eastern hemisphere, which we now see had ramifications in both China and Japan. Spence's work, ('... half the research, a large part of the planning, small portions of the actual writing, ... [and] innumerable valuable suggestions') and what she took from Oxford, is not given at all. Ronald Clark for example has a lot of detail on Russell's chaotic 'love life', but says nothing about the inputs to Russell's history book. His outline plans are described to his publisher, who of course would head Russell off.
      A good example of the possible practical effect is the first chapter, on the Congress of Vienna, on which Kissinger wrote a PhD. The Rothschilds are believed to have threatened, or offered, some control over Europe, which Russell avoided, very possibly assisted by Peter Spence's 'research'. His bibliography avoids the few books which pointed to Jewish manipulations: Belloc, Nesta Webster for example. The USA Federal Reserve is omitted. So are such names as Bernard Baruch. The US 'Civil War' is treated as if slavery was the real issue.
      If Russell was viewed a a potential truth-seeker, Jewish schemes might have been imperilled. Peter Spence may have had a critical role in smothering Russell.

(It occurs to me that George Spencer Brown, author of Laws of Form, a book praised highly by Russell, may have been praised because of an aristocratic connection).

Bertrand Russell on the 19th Century
Russell seems to have taken his history very seriously; few thinkers have written long and detailed books of his sort. (I'm avoiding the possibility that he was just another liar for Jews). I'll try to explain here how Jew practices fill in many puzzles left by his books, in the light of post-2000 Jew awareness.

Readers wanting a summary of Russell on the 19th century should look at his Conclusion at the end of his main text. It is short, and without Russell's long and second-hand intellectual portraits of individuals and their supposed ideas.
      Russell was remarkably indifferent to many aspects of England, despite his love of England. For example, he says little of the East India Company, or the other merchant venturers. He says I think nothing of British shipping, despite the fact that in about 1900 British shipping was regarded as by far superior to the rest of the world. In this, he seems to echo his grandfather's silence on Cartwright, 'inventor of the power loom'.

      Russell knew nothing of the 'Kehila' (or other spellings) system. If he had, he might have wondered if the dominance of Europe might have led to a more opulent version. And this would have included, not just towns, but nations. Hence Hegel on Stadts, expanded into States.
      Russell knew nothing of Jewish surnames, enforced in Germany. Belloc mentioned these names.
      He doesn't wonder whether some individuals were Jews. What about Bismarck, for example?
      Russell was aware of 'cultural imperialism'; his History of Western Philosophy comments on the Roman Empire and its shadow remains. It is rather astonishing that he had no similar view of the Bible and its books in obscure languages.

Russell was incurious as to the final effects of algorithms of behaviour, as exemplified by the Talmud. Its endpoint is a 'Moschiah'. But what happens next? It is analogous to the case of people obsessed with making money. If they make it, what do they do next?

Russell was not very good on legal subtleties. After a few centuries of what seemed stable laws, new changes were taking place in the way 'democracy' was operated. 'Representative government' was turning into something not at all representative of the electorate.

Cartoon 2021. I don't know if it had precursors.
Here's Russell summarising material on 'the slave trade' but also child labour:
The English attitude about the Slave Trade is a psychological curiosity, since the very men who did most for its abolition opposed every attempt to mitigate the horrors of English industrialism. The only concession that such men as Wilberforce were prepared to make on the subject of child labour was that children should have time on Sundays to learn the truths of the Christian religion. Towards English children they were pitiless; towards negroes they were full of compassion. I do not care to suggest an explanation, since the only ones that occur to me are intolerably cynical. But the fact deserves to be noticed, as an outstanding example of the complexity of human sentiment.

It's known now that Jewish racial feelings are anti-non-Jew. Anti-white, and anti-black—except where they think they can benefit. They weren't 'full of compassion' to negroes! Russell says nothing about slavery of whites, or ownership of slave ships by Jews. And it's known now that we should follow the money, including payments made to people such as Wilberforce by Jews over a long period, with arrangements to keep quiet.

It's also known now that Jewish ownership of publicity can suppress information more-or-less indefinitely. I give some extracts from Russell, for example on Rockefeller and Marx, and Marx's alleged expulsions, which show Russell as almost unbelievably gullible.

Russell's Freedom and Organization says at one point that no European government wanted the 'Great' War. In fact, of course, Jews wanted war and worked for it.

Russell seems unaware of the powerful appeal that money has for supposedly religious types. See for example my review of Mrs Sherwood's The Fairchild Family.

I don't want to labour the point here. I urge readers to read Russell sympathetically, but try to step back and see where he might have been misled. Try to understand the impact of the Jewish 'Bank of England' when it was new. Try to grasp the psychology of the Kahal, and the way it was expanded as it became clear that Europe was leading the world. See if you can guesstimate profits to be made from financiers of wars. Understand the ways in which secret societies, freemasons, academics, writers can be made into paid corrupted agents. Understand how religions can be cover for payments. Understand how money can turn thugs into mercenaries. Understand how vague rhetorical flourishes can conceal horrors. Be aware that Jews change names, addresses, life experiences. Even if you see no option but co-operate with people selling lies, at least understand what you're doing.

Russell on democracy makes interesting reading, though as ever he sidesteps the essential issues, such as whether it is numerically possible, and whether it is psychologically possible. This book has three sections—DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND, JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY, AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY—with character sketches (Jackson's is not very credible; Jefferson's ignores Freemasonry) and asides on banks and abstract material on credit as affecting a whole community. Cromwellian democracy takes the religious cover stories seriously.
      His chapter on slavery in the USA is also detailed, but often with the wrong detail.

I'll list here the contents (capitalisation in the original)
PART ONE: The Principle of Legitimacy
    I. NAPOLEON'S SUCCESSORS
    II. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
    III. THE HOLY ALLIANCE
    IV. THE TWILIGHT OF METTERNICH

PART TWO: The March of Mind [This looks very much like the advance of Jewish ideas - RW]
  Section A: The Social Background
    V. THE ARISTOCRACY
    VI. COUNTRY LIFE
    VII. INDUSTRIAL LIFE
  Section B: The Philosophical Radicals
    VIII. MALTHUS
    IX. BENTHAM
    X. JAMES MILL
    XI. RICARDO
    XII. THE BENTHAMITE DOCTRINE
    XIII. DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND
    XIV. FREE TRADE
  Section C: Socialism
    XV. OWEN AND EARLY BRITISH SOCIALISM
    XVI. EARLY TRADE UNIONISM
    XVII. MARX AND ENGELS
    XVIII. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
    XIX. THE THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE
    XX. THE POLITICS OF MARXISM

PART THREE: Democracy and Plutocracy in America
  Section A: Democracy in America
    XXI. JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY
    XXII. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST
    XXIII. JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY
    XXIV. SLAVERY AND DISUNION
    XXV. LINCOLN AND NATIONAL UNITY
  Section B: Competition and Monopoly in America
    XXVI. COMPETITIVE CAPITALISM
    XXVII. THE APPROACH TO MONOPOLY

PART FOUR: Nationalism and Imperialism
    XXVIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY
    XXIX. BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY
    XXX. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE
    XXXI. IMPERIALISM
    XXXII. THE ARBITERS OF EUROPE
Conclusion | Bibliography | Index

Admirers of Russell presumably read this book as another specimen of his style, wit, and insight.

The book is in Russell's modular style, which provides a framework; whether the framework is accurate is another matter. And whether the modules fully match each other, is yet another matter. The book is available free online, and I don't have time or inclination for a full review. Here are some revisionist comments, which readers might find helpful.

Russell's information is all derivative; he regarded the task of historians as brilliant commentary on spadework done by many others. If they are honest and competent, that's fine. If they miss details, it's less fine—for example, 'capitalism' must have needed travel, communication, legal, geographical, and no doubt other subtleties, which Russell tends to ignore, even if he knew them.
      Bibliography: Russell's first chapter on the Congress of Vienna relies on letters and memoirs, I suppose a close thing to original documents if they were well-edited. Russell's chapters on the USA have nothing whatever on developments such as the 'Fed', concentrating on US high finance insofar as it was known to authors. He mentions many books on Germany as a threat; I doubt there are any on encirclement and other menaces. Russell lists only four titles on general history: Treitschke on 19th-century Germany, Lavisse & Rambaud on the 19th century, C A Fyffe on modern Europe, and his military-minded friend G M Trevelyan on 19-century Britain.
      Russell's early life, in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, of course left its mark on him.

    His arrangement of topics is largely retrospective, as interpreted through English-speaking historians and news sources. So that (for example) the unification of Germany and the 'German Empire' emerge, presumably menacingly to the world.

Examples: He takes it for granted that the US Civil War was caused by slavery. He assumes the 'Congress of Vienna' (Henry Kissinger allegedly did a PhD on this) was a tussle between European powers, with no Rothschild interest. He regards Napoleon as purely a soldier of fortune—he has no idea of forces behind the 'French Revolution', and generally assumes any war was fought necessarily, because the opponents were unreasonable—the modern model of funding both sides is completely missing. Russell has a rather negligent attitude to law, regarding it as an effect of ideas, rather than a cause of events—when in fact laws may well have long-term consequences, not understood at the time. He doesn't understand the dynamics of religions, taking an established church view that they sit there, doing not much, taking a bit of money, but otherwise harmless and ineffectual.

Enclosures, Speenhamland Scheme, Poor Laws, Child Labour are described in The Social Background, but for my taste the descriptions are in the 'culture of critique' tradition of carping unhelpful criticism. What should they have done?

His chapters on the Philosophical Radicals (include Bentham, James Mill and Ricardo, with Francis Place and John Stuart Mill and Francis Burdett and doctrines of Mandeville and Hume and Helvetius in other roles).
    From a modern perspective, most of this material is Jew-related if discussed honestly: James Mill worked for the East India Company, probably writing a scrubbed paid history. Ricardo of course was a Jew, who made a lot of money. Bentham's doctrines, for example the greatest happiness for the greatest number principle, and democracy, were probably designed to advance Jews, under the pretext of advancing people generally. Russell is hide-the-Jew oriented all the way through: he hardly mentions the Opium Wars, has a bit on Irish famine, mentions India's penal code (drawn up by Macaulay, he says), has nothing on the Bank of England, says Stonewall Jackson couldn't understand bankers, says little on Jews and the Boer Wars, says nothing about the Ottoman Empire (one of the Jewish Zionist causes of the Great War), and treats aristocracies as self-enclosed, despite continual Jewish penetration.

On Marx, Russell said in Dear Bertrand Russell you 'will find my opinions on Marx in the relevant chapters' of Freedom and Organization. And Part Two... Section C: Socialism includes four chapters, starting with chapter XVII MARX AND ENGELS. Note that Russell assumed Marx was connected with 'socialism' rather than 'communism'.

It's fascinating to see Russell's long chapter SLAVERY AND DISUNION, which has nothing on the long-term history of slavery, including of whites, and Jewish ownership and breeding with female slaves in the USA. And nothing significant on race differences: I doubt if Russell spoke seriously to blacks any time in his life. And of course the cause of the US War is simply assumed by Russell to be slavery; he mentions a few legal decisions, such as Dred Scott, but has no idea of the costs of war, and no description of the fantastic destructiveness in the USA.

Another interesting chapter is XXVIII THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY. Russell concerns himself mainly with Italy and Germany (of course), but starts with nationalism in England, from Henry VIII. Looking dispassionately, it makes sense to start from the idea that most of the work in any group is everyday; only a fairly small proportion of people look into power structures. I'd suggest, in view of Jewish financial dominance since (say) Amsterdam and the Dutch Empire, Jews were a main force behind nationalism. I'd guess they thought they could bribe and corrupt fewer, more powerful, self-important figureheads than large numbers of smaller ones. The emergence of royal houses and monarchs looks very much connected with Jews, as Cromwell, the death of Charles I, the Bank of England, and the 'Restoration of the Monarchy' with Charles II, show.
      The unification of Italy is attributed largely to Giuseppe Mazzini, who supposedly loved Italy, but spent most of his life in England as a writer, somewhat like Lenin. He reads like a typical Jewish writer—vague, impressive-sounding, repetitive, sloganising, designed to be emotionally appealing and flattering to the intended audience. (Russell's Autobiography mentions that Russell possessed Mazzini's watch-case, which had been given to Russell's mother). There's a trick, used for example in Pulitzer Prizes, where someone's account of an event is used to fix it and be quotable; Russell unthinkingly took a similar attitude, ascribing to some traditionally-accepted scribbler the origin of some movement, ignoring deeply-hidden motives.
      German unification is described, as might be expected, in a hostile and lengthy manner. Remarkably, Russell omits such events as the hugely destructive Thirty Years War, which I think Hitler omitted to mention too. Fichte reads like Mazzini, but German. Russell is indignant that Treitschke admires the ancient Prussian nobility, who 'obtained every penny of their incomes [from Jews]'. Russell doesn't seem to know that Jews en masse were relatively recent additions to most of the German countryside.
      Russell is scathing about Slavs, with their mystic consciousness and dark forests—he doesn't bother to describe them. Russell doesn't seem to think much of long-term survival and endurance and ordinary life.
      The whole chapter is worth reading, but in a critical spirit. This is not an easy task.

• A difficult book, since everything in it, including the omissions, is Jew-naive Whig history. Useful as a guide to British official academic (not administrative, not politically-informed) people; it needs careful reading to decode the movements and beliefs and actions, to reveal Jewish machinations. Russell has part of a page on the Affaire Dreyfus, which he presents with complete naïveté. (Read this for the reverse.) Russell was aware that earlier military histories had been made out of date by economic histories, but, in fact, regrettably, he was himself in the same tradition—don't talk about money.


Some Leftover Notes
From about 1980. Since then, awareness of Jews spotlights Russell's limitations. It's even possible that he was a covert Jew carrying out the intentional Jewish lying about all periods of history with Jewish involvement. Note the complete omission of Jews in religions, the invasion of England by Jews arranged by Cromwell, the omission of Jews promoting such ideas as 'bloodless revolution', democracy, 'education', and feeble theories of economics, populations, and government.

• From Ronald Clark's biography: 507: '.. he offered to call it 'One, Two, Three-Bang', remarking that this would be a fairly accurate title. You could add, as a sub-title, "An historico-economic investigation of the Socio-Political causes of the War 1914-1918".'
• From Russell's Preface: 'my collaborator, Peter Spence, who has done half the research, a large part of the planning, and small portions of the actual writing, besides making innumerable valuable suggestions.'
• Scribbles, dated about 1977. May have been taken from talk with George Potter on the 'Whig Interpretation of History'. Nothing (of course) on Jews.
1714: natural ?term of Macaulay's History of Glorious Revolution
1814: end of Napoleonic Empire. - Cult of Napoleon/ Edinburgh Review [this may be mistake for Westminster Review 1824-1907]/ Holland House/ Bradlaugh/ Fox/ Lady Holland/ Macaulay and Whigs etc
1830: 'Bourgeois revolution in France like bloodless revolution in England' moral
1859: Macaulay's death
- Ups and downs of Whig theory - 1688 bloodless Whig revolution (exp. of Stuarts) made England exceptional was the new Whig philosophy etc etc;

PART ONE: LEGITIMACY
[Scenesetting chapters of great interest, though a bit wordy and unwieldy; there are I think only seven men considered. His first chapters are on Napoleon's Successors, and on the Congress of Vienna. His views on the 'French Revolution' and the rise of Napoleon are implicit, and seem conventional. Heinrich 'Henry' Kissinger it seems wrote his PhD dissertation on the Congress of Vienna, which (assuming he was allowed something like full flow,) must have had information on Jews in all the relevant countries, especially Russia. Depressingly, Russell shows a complete absence of awareness of the realities.]

PART TWO: THE MARCH OF MIND | Section A: The Social Background | V The Aristocracy | VI Country Life | VII Industrial Life
- 55-6 'At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the English were sharply divided into different classes and different kinds of occupation. [The idea of two very different types—as in the start of the Communist Manifesto, is a caricature by Marx and Engels, no doubt copied from earlier writers just one example of the Jewish policy of selecting groups to be made into opponents. Even Russell's book's title is an example - RW] Industrial life, both that of employers and that of wage-earners, was practically unknown to the rest of the community. [sic; note use of 'community'] In the country there were the three classes of landlords, farmers, and labourers. The smaller landlords were country gentry; the larger landlords formed the aristocracy. Political power, ever since the Revolution of 1688, had been almost wholly concentrated in the aristocracy, which, by means of the system of rotten boroughs, controlled the House of Commons as well as the House of Lords. Since about 1760, the aristocracy, by a shameless use of the power of Parliament, had considerably lowered the standard of life among wage-earners. It had also impeded the progress of the middle-class manufacturers, partly from ignorance, partly from jealousy of new power, partly from a desire for high rents. But most of this had been done in a semi-conscious, almost somnambulistic fashion, .. With the beginning of our period, however, a new strenuousness comes into vogue.. earnestness and virtue of the Victorians...'
      [Note: doesn't seem to occur to Russell that 1 older methods inevitably must be slower - transport, heating, even cooking, etc, all more difficult and time consuming; 2 that representatives won't be like the people they nominally represent]

      - 57-64: [THE ARISTOCRACY]
- 57: 'The Whigs and Tories, the two parties into which the aristocracy was divided, had originally been composed, respectively, of the enemies and friends of the Stuarts, with the result that, after the fall of James II, the Whigs had held almost uninterrupted power for nearly a century. But the Tories crept back into office under the aegis of George III, consolidated their rule by opposition to the French Revolution, and kept the Whigs in opposition until 1830. The division.. was social as well as political.. they differed considerably in their traditions and in their attitude to the rising middle class. ..' [Russell seems not to explain the persistence of the division]
- 59-63: [Holland House, from Creevey Papers & from Greville. Russell says 'It must not be supposed that all Whig society was as intellectual..' but gives little information of overview type; he just says there was 'an eighteenth-century freedom of morals' with several lovers mentioned, inc. Byron & Sir Francis Burdett & Lady Oxford.
      60: Account by Greville of sitting next to Macaulay, without knowing who he was, and noting the conversation: .. self-educated men conceited and arrogant 'from their being ignorant of how much other people know; not having been at public schools, they are uninformed of the course of general education.' [note: remark against industry?].. Alfieri.. Julius Caesar Scaliger.. Scaliger's wound.. Loyola wounded at Pampeluna.. utmost familiarity with every topic.. Primogeniture in this country.. and particularly in ancient Rome.. .
      61: '.. Melbourne.. incredibly cultivated. Take this as a sample... 'Allen spoke of the early reformers, the Catharists, and how the early Christians persecuted each other; Melbourne quoted Vigilianus's letter to Jerome, and then asked Allen about the 11th of Henry IV, an Act passed by the Commons against the Church, and referred to the dialogue between the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Ely at the beginning of Shakespeare's Henry V, which Lord Holland sent for and read, Melbourne knowing it all by heart and prompting all the time.''

- 65-70: [COUNTRY LIFE:]
- 65-66: [Jane Austen & sole interest in religion as a matter for 'livings' in the 'gift' of 'all the richer characters in her books']
- [Ends with Poor Law, Speenhamland scheme etc]

- 71-78 [INDUSTRIAL LIFE. Only two classes; landowners & manufacturers. Latter seem to be only cotton & mines.]
- 71-2: '.. upper classes.. My grandfather, at one period of his life, had for his tutor Dr Cartwright, the inventor of the power loom, which introduced machinery and the factory system into the weaving trade. [Penson, 'Economics..' 96, 1913, dates this invention 1785] .. His reminiscences.. not a word is said about the power loom.. Even so late as 1844, this feeling is amusingly expressed by Kinglake in Eothen, in an imaginary interview between an English traveller and a Turkish Pasha: .. [Note: military use of trains:] 'brigades of artillery are dropped into a mighty chasm called Euston Square, and at the biting of a cartridge, they rise up again in Manchester, or Dublin, or Paris, or Delhi, ..]

PART TWO: THE MARCH OF MIND SECTION B: THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS

- 79-88: [VIII MALTHUS: 3 Pages of this from 'Melincourt' including Common Prayer references]
- 87: '.. If a man's greatness is to be measured by his effect upon human life, few men have been greater than Malthus.'


- 89-100: [IX BENTHAM: Interesting example of Russell weaving a good story from other sources; Works (quite a bit, both personal & notes on 'association principle' & 'greatest happiness principle', on which Russell spends much time), Robert Owen (bit), Francis Place (a lot), Halévy (quite a lot and who emphasizes French pre-revolution thought - and also says Bentham influenced the Indian penal code 28 years after his death, Voltaire, Helvétius - presumably what's in OCEL as 'philosophes' of 'L'Encyclopédie'. Incidentally, his book on Thomas Hodgskin is here, dated 1903; William Thompson seems not to have had a book to himself), Borrow (tiny bit), Hazlitt (large quotation on Bentham's huge fame in France, Spain, Latin America)
2008 note: I can't find anywhere exactly how utilitarianism etc were made into a legal code, nor how British law was changed, despite this being Bentham's importance. For that matter the Code Napoleon is unindexed and I think unmentioned]
- 89: .. sixty years old when he was converted to the principle of democracy.. Rich father/ 'great pains with Jeremy's education'/ 'He fell in love.. his father.. objected because she was not rich. Jeremy gave her up rather than devote himself to money-making, but he suffered severely.. unbelievably shy.. I think, the abiding influence of his conflicts with his father and his renunciation of emotional happiness.'
- 92: .. He read Helvetius in 1769 and immediately determined to devote his life to the principles of legislation. ..
When he came to know Beccaria On Crimes and Punishments, he thought even more highly of him than Helvetius:
'Oh, my master.. you who speak reason about laws, when in France there was spoken only jargon: a jargon, however, which was reason itself as compared with the English jargon; .. so many useful excursions into the path of utility, .'
- 99-100: [Mandeville:] '.. (so all economists of that period contended) .. as a general rule, a man can best further the general interest by pursuing his own. This doctrine, which afforded the theoretical justification for laissez faire, arose, like some other very sober doctrines, out of a jeu d'esprit. Mandeville.. 1723, developed, not too solemnly, the doctrine of 'private vices, public benefits' in which he maintained that it is by our selfishness that we promote the good of the community. Economists and moralists appropriated this doctrine, while explaining that Mandeville should not have spoken of 'private vices', since egoism could only be accounted a vice by those who had failed to grasp the true principles of psychology. Thus the doctrine of the natural harmony of interests.. came to be adopted.. We shall see.. how Ricardo unwittingly gave it its death-blow, and laid the foundations [Note: Russell occasionally includes these rather sad metaphors; a 'bulwark' against Russia, early in this book, is another] for the opposite doctrine of the class war. ..'


- 101-109: [X JAMES MILL:]
- 101: [Background included Scottish patron, 'struck by the boy's abilities', apparently to become a minister [presumably Scotch], journalism with anti-Jacobin, and support for ten years by Bentham, who lent him a house & later a subsidised house, until his history of India was published in 1818, [Russell says I think nothing about this work, though it took as long as his own PM] & '..employed by the East India Company throughout the remainder of his life.'
- 101: [Influences on Mill: Radical, though before Bentham; Hartley; Malthus and Ricardo; and 'Like all his kind, he greatly admired Helvetius, from whom he accepted the current doctrine of the omnipotence of education. ..'
- 102: [J S Mill's autobiography 'one of the most interesting books ever written']
102-3: J S Mill's education, the account from 3 to 14 taken I suppose from his autobiography; Russell seems to believe everything he says; I'm a bit more sceptical of the claims 102: 'one of my greatest amusements was experimental science; in the theoretical, however, not the practical sense..'
- 105: '.. Unselfish and stoical devotion to the doctrine that every man seeks only his own pleasure is a curious psychological paradox. Something not dissimilar was to be found in Lenin and his most sincere followers. ..'
- 106: '.. When various conclusions are, with their evidence, presented with equal care and with equal skill, there is a moral certainty [sic], ... that the greater number will judge right, and that the greatest force of evidence.. will produce the greatest impression.' There is a happy innocency about this confession of faith; it belongs to the age before Freud and before the growth of the art of propaganda. Oddly enough, in Mill's day his confidence was justified by the event. .. in almost all important respects, the course of British politics down to 1874 was such as they advocated. .. in our more lunatic period, it reads like the myth of a Golden Age.'
- 108: [What J Mill did:] '.. brought together Bentham and Malthus and Ricardo and the lower-middle-class Radicalism of Francis Place, who, in turn, was closely associated with the upper-class Radicalism of Sir Francis Burdett. The doctrine of Hartley and Helvetius, with such parts of Hume as could be fitted into doctrinaire orthodoxy, gave the intellectual respectability of a philosophical basis to the excitement of the mob in the Westminster elections. [i.e. cf 94 not House of Commons, but Westminster - I think] .. James Mill's function was that of mortar, ..'
109: '.. benevolence supplied the emotional stimulus, but remained in the background, and at no point overpowered reason. He accepted without difficulty opinions according to which much suffering is inevitable; where those opinions were sound, this was a strength, but where they were false, a weakness. ..'


- 110-115 XI RICARDO
- 110 [cf above, Mandeville] '.. His chief work was The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, published in 1817. This book became.. the canon..; it was found that the devil could quote scripture: both Socialists and Single-Taxers derived their proposals from his doctrines. The socialists appealed to his theory of value, the Single-Taxers to his theory of rent. .. by discussing the distribution of wealth among the different classes of society, he incidentally made it clear that different classes may have divergent interests. ...'
- [Two theories only are considered: his theory of rent, & his theory of value.
Rent means landowner-style rent only, ground rent, so it's not at all complete. Russell explains it differentially; marginal land (presumably including remoteness/ travelling costs) yields no revenue to the landlord as the price for its grain only covers the production costs. So the best land's rent is determined by its greater fertility; or something. Let's see: 111 '.. the rent of an acre.. is the amount by which the value of the crop that can be raised.. exceeds the value of the crop that can be raised on an acre of the worst land in cultivation.' There seems circularity here. Similarly: '.. Corn Laws.. If it had been possible to import grain, the worst agricultural land would have gone out of cultivation. Consequently the difference between the best land and the worst that would have remained in cultivation would have diminished, and rents would have fallen. So much was, of course, obvious to the landowners, who controlled Parliament.' [This all seems dubious to me, as the supply would change! Consider case also where all land is about identical..? Also, on ground rent, how is the extra value above the 'worst' land be found?]
'.. further consequences.. If the importation of grain were to occur as a result of abolishing the import duty, the capital now employed on the worst land would flow [sic] into industry, where it would make the exports required to pay for the imported grain. This new employment of capital would necessarily be more profitable than the old, since, if not, it would not pay to import grain instead of producing it at home. There would.. be an increase of the national wealth accompanied by a fall in rents; there would be more to divide, and.. an increased proportion would go to the industrious classes. This perfectly sound argument naturally appealed to manufacturers, but not to landowners. It was only after the Reform Bill had transferred political power to the middle class that free-traders could obtain control of Parliament. When, in 1846, free trade in corn was introduced, its consequences were found to be such as the economists had predicted. ..'
- 112: [Ricardo could have been more radical; industrious rich however weren't revolutionaries, and distrusted the State 'owing, no doubt, to the fact they did not control it.'
Henry George & single tax was 'perfectly logical' - private ownership of land abolished, all rent to the State. 'This inference.. was not.. even considered by Ricardo']
- 112: [Now, Ricardo's theory of value, which Russell says 'Ricardo answered: They will have the same value if the same amount of labour has been required to produce them.'
'.. In certain cases, Ricardo's theory is quite right, while in certain others it is quite wrong; in the commonest kind of case, it is more or less right, but not wholly. [Russell accepts money 'worth' as identically equal to value; his examples include a bushel of wheat from good vs poor land, which takes he says less labour; and a gold nugget picked up by accident; & over the page a picture by Leonardo, where 'the supply cannot be increased'].
[Russell thinks the only other factor in value apart from labour is the amount of competition; he seems to assume raw materials with competition are indefinitely available & indefinitely cheap:]
113-4: 'Let us take some instance in which, apart from the rent of land, monopoly plays almost no part - say the manufacture of cotton cloth as it was in Ricardo's day. .. There were many manufacturers, all keenly competing.. [sic; not in India etc!]; the raw material was produced under fairly uniform conditions, and sold by the growers competitively. The labour involved in making the necessary machinery was, of course, part of the labour involved in making the cloth; here, also, there was.. plentiful.. iron ore, belonging to many mines which were in no way combined, and.. many firms making textile machinery. .. Royalties to inventors formed, however, a very small part of the cost of a given piece of cotton cloth. On the whole, the price would be determined pretty accurately by the amount of labour involved in making it. [Note that Russell ignores demand; consider e.g. fashions]
...
Where there is monopoly with power to increase supply, the producer has to consider [production].. .. the more he charges the less he will sell, and.. there is some price which gives him the maximum profit. But this has nothing to do with cost of production, except that cost of production sets a minimum..' [i.e. for financially closed-off company]


- 116-124: XII THE BENTHAMITE DOCTRINE
117: 'Politically, the creed.. contained three main articles: laisser faire, democracy, and education. Laisser faire, as a principle, was invented in France during the ancien régime, but it disappeared during the Revolution, and Napoleon had no use for it. In the England of 1815, however,the same conditions existed which had produced it in the France of Louis XVI: an energetic and intelligent middle class politically controlled by a stupid government. ..'..'
124: 'Utilitarianism' because e.g. of the Court of Chancery.. 'Bentham applied this test to all the old lumber of English law, preserved only to provide income for lawyers. .' [Just a few or many examples. Russell, writing on 'democracy', fascinates me. He uses no general analytical method, but rather has a long-fixed store of arguments on each topic, to be deployed with his literary skill. Classes, industry, rural and town groups, quakers, churches, Cromwell, socialism, Chartists, aristocrats, the poor, educational approaches appear and vanish. Huge events scarcely appear: the US Civil War, the devastating 30 years war, the opium trade in China, and the East India Companies are noted, but no lessons are drawn.
      Russell seems to have had no conception of the ways democracy might be controllable: The Times was first printed in 1814 by cylinder presses; by 1900, linotype machines (and typewriters) were in production. Cheap pulp paper dates from 1840s-1900. By age 30, Russell would have been aware of these things, and have formed views on the owners and writers. When he wrote this book, aged about 60, the BBC had only existed for about ten years. It is asking a lot that he might have been aware of their immense possibilities for evil. I'm drawing attention to the link between cheap newspapers and the move to 'democracy', just as I've mentioned the link between the abolition of slavery.
      And note that Russell was never aware of Jewish ambitions. Everything Jews wanted censored—possibly excepting the Vietnam War—was ignored by Russell. He never suspects that central banks are important, or that movements have been funded, often hugely, by Jews. Or that American democracy was a sham right from the start. He does quote Doubleday, the Chartist, on loss of wealth in England, after the civil war. That's about it.]


- 125-131: XIII DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND: Up to votes for rural labourers in 1885
- 126: Universal suffrage up to Henry VI mid-reign, lost in civil wars - though accuracy is open to doubt; example of appeal to the past. [Russell for some reason implies such appeals are Golden Age things, and compares Wat Tyler's rebellion & return to Adam and Eve - surely John Ball? But if true, the argument seems reasonable enough.


- 132-151: [XIV FREE TRADE. Interesting chapter but lacking Chomskyan point about forcing agreement on poor countries (Note: censorship: & with little on raw materials - this topic perhaps partly censored?)
Final pages look at Adam Smith, List, Rockefeller, Darwin, Smiles, Spencer.
COBDEN an example a member of a group in the right [i.e. benefiting people generally] on one issue (& therefore able to be convincing) but who's dropped when he attempts to carry out full beliefs (notably internationalism).
COBDEN DISAPPOINTMENT with Middle Class jingoism..]
- 134-136: Crimean War & long poem by Tennyson, against Bright & I suppose Cobden, cp by Russell to madness over First World War. Continuing dispute which 'idealists' unfortunately have 'on the whole, won the day.'
- 137: [Radical but mainstream writers e.g. in particular Cobbett (and Bright), and their influence (and Cobbett's disappointment when middle classes became imperialistic)]
- 140-1: [Control by ignorant landowners; example of railroad in Britain 'unsuccessful' as apparently typically because the route may have been visible from 'Lady Hastings' place']
- 141: 'Of the corruption in American business and politics, Cobden seems to gave been unaware, although it had existed ever since Washington's first Presidency. ..'
- 143-4: [Clapham's Economic History book quoted spanning 1810 to 1890 in Britain from which Russell concludes 'the importance of Cobden in raising wages can hardly be denied.']
- 147: Popularity in Spain, Italy, Germany of Cobden, and less so elsewhere (and not with Treitschke)
- 148: 'The principle.. failed to take account of certain laws of social dynamics. In the first place, competition tends to issue in somebody's victory, with the result that it ceases... In the second place, there is a tendency for the competition between individuals to be replaced by competition between groups, since a number of individuals can increase their chances of victory by combination. .. two important examples, trade unionism and economic nationalism. .. Both in America and Germany, it was obvious to industrialists that they could increase their wealth by combining to extract favours from the State; they thus competed as a national group [sic] against national groups in other countries. ...'

Russell thought Marx was fiercely intellectual in predicting coalescence of power groups. But in fact throughout history most power groups have drooped and failed. Russell didn't see that the secret world-wide positioning of Jews had led to ever-increasing Jewish power.
      One of their secrets was to fund both sides in wars, and recover loans from both sides. So there was a net transfer to Jews, plus destruction in both war parties. But if this becomes widely known, other power groups may make their own plans. Personally, I hope so. But of course Marx, as a rich Jew familiar with Jewish money power in the Rothschild era, avoided this prediction!



      Section C: Socialism


      [XVII MARX AND ENGELS:]
- 183: '.. age of nineteen.. he had written three volumes of poems [sic] to his Jenny, translated large parts of Tacitus and Ovid, and two books on the Pandects, written a work of three hundred pages on the philosophy of law, perceived that it was worthless, written a play, and 'while out of sorts, got to know Hegel from beginning to end,' [NB: Hegel died in 1831, c 6 years before this letter to his father] besides reading innumerable books on the most diverse subjects.' [NB: Seems to be a clash here with another of Russell's judgements on Marx, where he says in effect he was abundantly qualified in ignorance]
- 183: 'Hegel had died in 1831.. influence in Germany was still very great. But his school had broken into two sects, the Old and Young Hegelians, and in 1839 his system was destructively criticized by Feuerbach, who reverted from Hegel's Absolute Idealism to a form of materialism, .. Young Hegelians were distinguished from old by their radicalism. In academic Germany, especially among the young, it was a time of very intense intellectual activity. While Germany, from the standpoint of learning, was ahead of the rest of the world, it was politically and economically far behind England. The censorship was preposterous, and the middle classes had no political power. [Struwwelpeter and, I suspect, Max und Moritz belong to this period] It resulted inevitably that the intelligent young were radical if not revolutionary, and that they were very open to political ideas coming from abroad, especially from France. Marx in his youth was not isolated, but was one of a group of eager young men, ..'
- 184: 'Marx first sought a career in journalism. In 1842 he became a contributor, and soon afterwards the editor, of the Rheinische Zeitung, and now he first became aware of problems for which nothing in academic philosophy offered any solution. The first .. that came to his attention was the question of a law for the imprisonment of the poor for stealing wood from the forest. He realized that economic questions had been unduly neglected.. When .. [it] was suppressed by the censorship in January 1843, Marx.. decided to become acquainted with Socialism.'
- 184: '.. Socialism at the time [1843] was predominantly French. English Socialism, under the leadership of Robert Owen, had become mainly secularist and anti-Christian. Owen.. had always been opposed to political methods, and radical politics in England was left to the Chartists, whose programme did not directly concern itself with economic questions. In France.. the movement inaugurated by Saint Simon and Fourier had continued and was full of vigour. Marx made the acquaintance of the leaders, of whom the most important were Proudhon and Louis Blanc. .. It must be said that Socialism before Marx was not worthy of any great degree of intellectual respect. ..'

      [Footnote from A J P Taylor: 'Proudhon (1809-65) coined two immortal phrases: 'Property is theft' & 'universal suffrage is counter-revolution.' He advocated co-operative societies instead of political revolution and put his faith in Napoleon III. His followers gave Marx trouble during the 1st International.' Saint-Simon and Fourier described socialist utopias. Robert Owen preached cooperation & ran a cotton mill on idealistic lines. His followers founded Utopian colonies in the U.S. In old age he became a spiritualist.']
- 185: 'The belief in an intimate relation between philosophy and politics.. remained part of his [Marx's] creed. 'Philosophy.. cannot be realized without the uprising of the proletariat; and the proletariat cannot rise without the realization of philosophy.' To English-speaking people, who do not take philosophy seriously, this must seem an odd sentiment, unless they have learnt to accept the Communist creed.'
- 185: 'His friendship with Engels began.. in Paris, in.. 1844. Engels was two years younger than Marx, and had been subjected to the same intellectual influences in his university years. But his father was a cotton spinner with factories both in Germany and in Manchester [sic], and Engels had been sent to Manchester to work in the family business. This had given him first-hand knowledge of up-to-date industrialism... He was at this time writing his book on the condition of the English working class. This book uses powerfully the same kind of material that Marx afterwards used in the first volume of Capital. .. It makes it possible to judge of the importance to be attached to Engels in the joint work of the two men. Marx had been, .. too academic. .. Engels invariably minimized his share in all that the two men did together, but undoubtedly it was very great. ..'
- 186: 'Engels.. [had been] converted [to communism] by a man named Moses Hess, who was prominent among the German radicals. ..'
- 186: '.. Marx made friends with Heine, who much admired him and became a Communist. The Continental intellectuals of that day were far more advanced politically than those in England, no doubt because the middle classes had less power, and because revolution was the obvious first step in progress. .'
- 186: 'In January 1845, at the request of the Prussian Government, Marx was expelled from Paris, and therefore went to Brussels. .. conducted Communist propaganda.. various bodies such as the Workers' Educational Society [sic; surely 'Association'?], .. The Federation of the Just, which met in Great Windmill Street in London, developed into the Communist League, which included in its programme, 'the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the dominion of the proletariat, the abolition of a class society, and the introduction of an economic and social order without private property and without classes.' In December 1847, this body decided that Marx and Engels should draw up a statement of its aims. The whole importance of the Communist League.. is due to this decision, since its outcome was the Communist Manifesto.

[Note on proletariat who must have been regarded as unimpressive 'goyim' types by Jews; probably thuggish and stupid, low forms of life. The post-1945 policy by Jews of helping immigration invasions into white countries can be regarded as a similar idea, of Jews supposedly liking and helping proletariats. Of course neither case has been successful.]

[Note on the word “Bourgeois”
      The Jewish rabbinical view, embodied in the Kahal system, is that what's theirs is mine, and what's yours will be mine, after the Kahal has done its work.
      A 'bourgeois' is a person or group who is non-Jewish and owns money or assets. The ownership is viewed by Jews as shocking and temporary and up for spoliation.
      Jews during both world wars regarded many goyim—small businessmen, some soldiers and sailors, teachers, medicos, flight and engineering people etc as bourgeois or petit bourgeois. In Russia, peasants were not regarded as bourgeois; they didn't own disposable assets. No doubt there were fine distinctions varying with situations—rich or poor women, clerks, musicians, salesmen. There must have been many a discussion on things like inheritance and death 'duties', income tax, property prices. Imagine the salivating rabbis!]
      The Communist Manifesto, as regards style, vividness, compression, and propagandist force, is the best thing that Marx ever did. It has the buoyancy and swiftness characteristic of the eve of a revolution; it has the clarity due to a newly-won theoretical insight. ..

      I do not know of any document of equal propagandist force. And this force is derived from intense passion intellectually clothed as inexorable exposition.

      It was the Communist Manifesto that gave Marx his position in the Socialist movement, and he would have deserved it even if he had never written Das Kapital. ..'
- 187: 'Few movements in history have disappointed all participants more completely than the revolutions of 1848. ..'
- 188: 'Marx's life is sharply divided into two periods by the failure of the 1848 revolutions, which deprived him of immediate hopefulness and turned him into an impoverished exile. ...'
- 189: [Letter published in New Statesman & Nation 1933, from Marx to his daughter. (Another Russell book, 'Religion and Science', quotes from a magazine - in that case, the Listener.)]


      [XVIII DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM:]
- 196: [Russell states in advance that he intends to prove (1) Materialism.. may be true, though it cannot be known to be so; (2) .. elements of dialectic .. from Hegel made him regard history as a more rational process than it has in fact been, convincing him that all changes must be in some sense progressive, and giving him a feeling of certainty in regard to the future... (3) .. but for the influence of Hegel it would never have occurred to him that a matter so purely empirical [i.e. as economic development] could depend upon abstract metaphysics; (4) .. economic interpretation of history, .. seems to me very largely true, and a most important contribution to sociology; I cannot.. regard it as wholly true, or feel any confidence that all great historical changes can be viewed as developments.' (i.e. I think he means in the sense of contributing to 'progress')]
- 198: 'The philosophy advocated in the earlier part [of Eleven Theses on Feuerbach, 1945] is that which has since become familiar to the philosophical world through the writings of Dr Dewey, under the name of pragmatism or instrumentalism. .. their opinions as to the metaphysical status of matter are virtually identical. ..

      The conception of 'matter', in old-fashioned materialism, was bound up with the conception of 'sensation.' Matter was regarded as the cause of sensation, and originally also as its object... Sensation was regarded as something in which a man is passive, and merely receives sensations from the outside world. This conception.. is .. so the instrumentalists contend - an unreal abstraction.. Watch an animal receiving impressions.. its nostrils dilate, its ears twitch, its eyes are directed.., its muscles become taut.. All this is action, mainly to improve the informative quality of impressions, partly such as to leas to fresh action.. And as a cat with a mouse, so is a textile manufacturer with a bale of cotton. The bale .. is an opportunity for action, it is something to be transformed. The machinery by which it is to be transformed is explicitly and obviously a product of human activity. Roughly speaking, all matter, according to Marx, is to be thought of as we naturally think of machinery: it has a raw material giving opportunity for action, but in its completed form it is a human product.

      Philosophy has taken over from the Greeks a conception of passive contemplation.. Marx maintains that we are always active.. we are never merely apprehending our environment, but always at the same time altering it. ..

      I think it may be doubted whether Engels quite understood Marx's views on the nature of matter and on the pragmatic nature of truth; ..'


      XIX The Theory of Surplus Value


      XX THE POLITICS OF MARXISM:
- 226: 'Marx's doctrine of the class war was one of the forces that killed 19 C liberalism in Europe, by frightening the middle classes into reaction, and by teaching that political opinions are, and always must be, based upon economic bias rather than any consideration of the general good. In America.. old fashioned liberalism./. but..

      .. there are four points in his theory .. of such importance as to prove him a man of supreme intelligence.

      The first is the concentration of capital, passing gradually from free competition to monopoly.

      The second is economic motivation in politics, which now is taken almost for granted, but was, when he propounded it, a daring innovation.

      The third was the necessity for the conquest of power by those who are not possessed of capital. This follows from economic motivation, and is to be contrasted with Owen's appeal to benevolence.

      The fourth is the necessity of acquisition by the State of all the means of production, with the consequence that Socialism must, from its inception, embrace a whole nation, if not the whole world. Marx's predecessors aimed at small communities.. but he perceived the futility of all such attempts.'

PART THREE: DEMOCRACY AND PLUTOCRACY IN AMERICA Section B: Competition and Monopoly in America
- 99 ff: [Note: Russell's Jew-free Character sketch of Rockefeller, b 1839] 'John, a careful, serious, shy boy, loved his mother and imbibed her virtues. He became deeply religious, a teetotaller, and a non-smoker; he never used profane language.. It may be doubted whether, in all his ninety-five years, he has ever done anything that would have been disapproved of in his Sunday school..'



PART 2: NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM | VIII The Principle of Nationality | IX BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY
- 153: 'Liberalism and the principle of nationality suffered joint defeat in 1848, but soon revived. In Italy, in 1859 and 1860, they won, in alliance, a spectacular victory in the unification of almost the whole country, with parliamentary government under the constitutional rule of Victor Emmanuel. (Venetia was won in 1866, and Rome in 1870.)
      A similar liberal-nationalistic development was to be expected in Germany, where the victory of reaction after 1848 did not seem likely to be permanent. But the course of events in Germany was not according to the preconceived pattern. The principle of legitimacy, a hampering legacy of the Congress of Vienna, was thrown over by the Conservative Government of Prussia, which found satisfaction for German nationalism with only a few concessions to Liberalism. The separation of nationalism from liberalism, and of conservatism from the principle of legitimacy, was an important achievement, which profoundly affected European development. It was mainly due to the personal influence of Bismarck, who, on this account, must be reckoned one of the most influential men of the 19th century. ..'
- 164: 'Bismarck had no respect for the principle of legitimacy. He stood simply for Prussian interests, and was quite willing to make friends with Napoleon III, 'the man of sin' as Conservatives called him, if that would help him to make Prussia great. Writing to his arch-Conservative friend and former patron Gerlach, in 1857, he says:
      [Note: revolutionary power:] How many entities are there left in the political world to-day that have not their roots in revolutionary soil? Take Spain, Portugal, Brazil, all the American Republics, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Greece, Sweden, and England, the latter with her foot even to-day consciously planted on the glorious revolution of 1688. Even for that territory which the German princes .. have won partly from Emperor and Empire, partly from their peers the barons, and partly from the estates of their own country, no perfectly legitimate title of possession can be shown, ...
      ... Unlike the upholders of legitimacy. He had no international principle. How the French chose to be governed was no concern of his; whether they had a Bourbon, a Bonaparte, or a Republic.. were.. not questions that concerned a patriotic Prussian, except in so far as they affected France's power for mischief. In this he differed from Conservatives and Liberals alike, but he taught the world to adopt his principles. Following his precepts, the Tsar, at a later date, was not afraid to ally himself with the atheistical republican government of France.
      .. For war with France, the ground had to be carefully prepared. The military preparations could be safely left to Moltke; for although the two men often wrangled, Bismarck took care that his diplomacy should only produce wars that Moltke felt confident of winning. With the help of the military alliances with South German States, and after the experience of two wars, Moltke was ready to promise victory if he was allowed two or three years of preparation. The other problems were diplomatic. It was necessary to ensure the neutrality of the other Great Powers. Russia was secured by the promise to support revision of the Treaty of 1856 as regards the closing of the Straits. England might have sympathized with her ally of the Crimean War, but Napoleon was tricked by Bismarck into an expression, in writing, of the desire to annex Belgium, which, published at the crucial moment, effectively prevented English assistance to France. Austria and Italy remained doubtful to the end, and were only converted to the German cause by Napoleon's military misfortunes. Italy would have sided with France if the Emperor had consented to Victor Emmanuel's occupation of Rome, but he refused, under the influence of Eugénie's ultramontane fanaticism. This it was left to Luther's countrymen, at Sedan, to end the temporal sovereignty of the Pope.
      The final stages leading up to the rupture with France were managed by Bismarck with consummate skill. .. one was as clever as the other was silly, and the clever rogue made the other's roguery apparent to all Europe, while successfully concealing his own. ..
      The war, as every one knows, resulted, for Germany, in the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and the formation of the Empire; for France, in the payment of a huge indemnity, the establishment of the Third Republic, and the Paris Commune - extirpated with inconceivable barbarity by the new government of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.
      The Empire, which embraced all Germany except German Austria, had a federal constitution very similar to that of the North German Federation established in 1867. The King of Prussia was German Emperor, the Prime Minister of Prussia was Imperial Chancellor; he and the other ministers were responsible to the Emperor alone, not to Parliament. There was a Federal Diet (Bundesrat), consisting of delegations appointed by the several States; and there was a Parliament (Reichstag) directly elected by manhood suffrage. The Reichstag had control of finance, and laws required its assent, but the initiative in legislation belonged to the Bundesrat. Bismarck was Chancellor until 1890, and in practice the constitution scarcely limited his omnipotence. The middle classes had been tamed, ...
      His achievement in the years 1862 to 1871 is perhaps the most remarkable feat of skill in the history of statesmanship. He had to manage the King, whose wife and son and daughter-in-law were all bitterly hostile. He had to convert the nation, which at first hated him and his policies. He had to make Nationalism Conservative instead of Liberal, militaristic instead of humanitarian, monarchical instead of democratic. He had to secure the victory of Prussia against the Danes, the Austrians, and the French, in spite of the fact that none of the other powers wished him to succeed. He could not allow the King to understand his policy, because it was not such as an honest old soldier would approve. He could not let the world understand it, because the world would have defeated it if it had understood it. At every moment he was liable to grave disaster. .. there was not in any country another statesman who understood the diplomatic game as he did. Even Disraeli, as subsequently appeared, was a child in his hands. ..'
- 218-220: [Character of Holstein, including resignation threats and homosexual blackmail. The Kaiser only succeeded in meeting him once.. The Kaiser, after his fall, said that the dismissal of Bismarck was like rolling away a granite block and revealing the vermin underneath. .. From 1890, when Bismarck fell, till 1906, German foreign policy was Holstein's. He advised the rejection of Chamberlain's offer of alliance; he inspired the Morocco policy which Bülow forced upon the unwilling Kaiser. He did not recommend the Kruger telegram, which was the Kaiser's own doing, but foresaw that the responsibility would fall upon the Foreign Secretary, Marschall, whom he wished out of the way... his twisted hatreds did much to bring about the atmosphere of war..'



IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS

Collection dated 1935, but individual essays have their own (in some cases multiple) sources and dates.  

I.   IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS
II.   "USELESS" KNOWLEDGE
III.   ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS
IV.   THE MODERN MIDAS
V.   THE ANCESTRY OF FASCISM

I recommend this shortish essay to anyone interested in decoding 'philosophy', since Russell is widely regarded as a brilliantly clear writer.

Evidently Russell had no idea of the way belief systems can be promoted by money; he believes Christianity is characterised by good behaviour and rights for all; he thinks a few men represent most French and most Germans. He has no grasp of the influence of inventions—think electric light and 'cave man'—because he had no practical ability. He overestimates Hume (… at the very moment when the Temple of Reason seemed to be nearing completion, a mine was laid by which, in the end, the whole edifice was blown sky-high. The man who laid the mine was David Hume. His Treatise of Human Nature, … published in 1739...)   And so on; just a small sample.

Today, Wikipedia and Google and the Anglosphere are full of absurd misinformation of events after 1917—very keen to obscure truths abut Jewish mass-murders, and about jew collaborations around the world, including Germany.


Here's a passage from The Ancestry of Fascism:
    An important element in the causation of the revolt against reason is that many able and energetic men have no outlet for their love of power, and therefore become subversive. Small States, formerly, gave more men political power, and small businesses gave more men economic power. Consider the huge population that sleeps in suburbs and works in great cities. Coming into London by train, one passes through great regions of small villas, inhabited by families which feel no solidarity with the working class; the man of the family has no part in local affairs, since he is absent all day submitting to the orders of his employers; his only outlet for initiative is the cultivation of his back garden at the week-end. Politically, he is envious of all that is done for the working classes, but, though he feels poor, snobbery prevents him from adopting the methods of Socialism and trade unionism. His suburb may be as populous as many a famous city of antiquity, but its collective life is languid, and he has no time to be interested in it. To such a man, if he has enough spirit for discontent, a Fascist movement may well appear as a deliverance.
      I've highlit the word 'deliverance' as I'm certain I've seen another version with '
      godsend
' there. I mention this because I've never seen it elsewhere. Obviously, with metal type having to be used to reset new editions, there's scope for concealed editing.

VI.   SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS, OR COMMUNISM AND FASCISM
VII.   THE CASE FOR SOCIALISM
VIII.   WESTERN CIVILIZATION
IX.   ON YOUTHFUL CYNICISM
X.   MODERN HOMOGENEITY
XI.   MEN VERSUS INSECTS
XII.   EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE
XIII.   STOICISM AND MENTAL HEALTH
XIV.   ON COMETS
XV.   WHAT IS THE SOUL?



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Review of Bertrand Russell's Religion and Science 1935

New Version!

Three simple points.

1. Russell really thought that the two Jewish propaganda systems in Germany and 'Russia' in 1935 were new 'religions'. For some reason, he was less concerned with Italy and Japan, and of course had no grasp of the position of Jews in the U.S.A., and didn't consider that the U.S.A. was developing a new religion.
      In the first few pages, he discusses the 'great historical religions' and decides they all have a Church, a creed, and a code of personal morals. Russell (born 1872) never outgrew the Victorian outlook. I've heard it said that 4,200 religions are recognised now; I don't want to go into how well this has been analysed—I'd guess, not very. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam were all pushed by Jews—an astonishing achievement. And they all have land and money aspects, ignored by Russell, who doesn't seem to have noticed that (for example) the Church of England owned a high proportion of England's land, which it used to pay its members. Probably he regarded discussion of money as impolite. Jews captured the money system in the U.S.A. by the Federal Reserve system; and the Jewish habit of spreading themselves in an irregular layer across the world enabled them to direct money to any target they aimed at. In 1935, they were straining themselves to create wars between two sides, which would damage themselves and leave more power with Jews. Russell was not able to notice this; he thought Germany and the USSR wanted to fight each other. It was essential that Jews should keep their plans secret; it's only recently that Hitler and his group has been identified as Jews themselves, as with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin.

2. Russell dates science from the 16th century, with Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and others. I've listed his chapter headings below. (And they are available from archive.org). He thinks science grew spontaneously, but has no convincing theory why it happened. It's possible it was planned more carefully than he thought; it may be that the controllers of the world flattered scientists, while treating them as intellectual beasts of burden.
      An excellent aspect of Russell's book is his descriptions of states of mind in the past, for example, that saturating effect of the Bible on mental life, though he fails to notice the way it was forced on the world.
      Less attractive is his treatment of more recent science, such as biology and medicine and mental science, which are still incomplete. He is also influenced by the Jews behind doubtful physics, such as Einstein and the engineering types behind supposed nuclear physics. Russell has no idea of the possibilities of biological war in the past; the 'Black Death' being one possible example.

3. Inevitably, Russell veers off into what's rather feebly called philosophy. He talks of soul and body (he lived before computers showed how objects can appear to think), determinism (in my opinion determinism is true, but Russell assumed it had to be calculable), mysticism (Russell didn't emphasise that deep feelings are just another biochemical effect), and cosmic purpose (left over from God).
      Russell is vague on the separation between science and empiricism. Anyone with scientific experience knows that many things are not explained fully: exactly what does stainless steel do? Why are titanium implants accepted by muscle tissue? Why do EPROMs have bits 'burnt in' by high current? Electricity in ‹industry and daily life — including such matters as power stations, broadcasting, and electric light — is based upon the work of Clerk Maxwell’ writes Russell. He never found precision. He never regarded thinking and behaving as a mixture of things accepted by many people, and beliefs left from earlier life, and beliefs accepted for practical reasons.

9-jan-2021

Russell's relatively short book on the historical clashes between religion and science, meaning in practice between Christianity—with emphasis on Roman Catholicism and Protestantism—vs Science.

Not much on non-Christian religions; and nowhere near enough on Jews. Russell was aware that the sciences had increasing issues with corruption; he was not naively pro-science. He did not predict Jewish absurdities, for example on race being non-existent. Re-reading Russell I was led to wonder whether Jewish medicine has always been aimed at killing goyim; lack of salt, putting fluoride in water, and Bill Gates' phoney science point that way.

Published by 'Home University Library' (edited by H A L Fisher, Gilbert Murray, and Julian Huxley) not his usual Allen and Unwin.

I recommend this to Americans in particular, many of whom have had such books hidden from them. Both Catholics and Protestants in the USA are still pitifully gullible; Russell's book, though 85 years old, is punchy with the force of a long-lived man with a lively mind.


By Bertrand Russell FRS; published by Thornton Butterworth in London. Advertised as late as 1970 as an 'Oxford Book'.

References
      INDEX [Only four pages of double columns: names and topics such as:—Acosta, Father Joseph/ Prof Alexander/ Descartes/ Eratosthenes/ Father Clavius/ Gadarene swine/ various Popes like Calixtus III, Innocent VIII and so on/ Hitler/ Hobbes/ Hegel/ Hell/ Lecky/ Lightfoot/ Playfair/ Pope/ Rameses/ Siena/ quantum mechanics]

White's Warfare of Science with Theology seems to have been the source of much of Russell's information; listed by Bury as 1896, 2 vols. Lecky's History of Rationalism in Europe is by a standard Victorian author. The Bible, Aristotle, and Galen are mentioned. Other more specific titles include Copernicus On the revolutions../ 1489 Malleus Maleficarum/ Galileo's Dialogues../ Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and Henry V/ 1673 book by de Angelis/ Alexander Pope's Essay on Man/ Newton Principia/ Kant 1755 Natural History and Theory of the Heavens../ Laplace Systeme.. 1796/ 1681 Burnet Sacred Theory of the Earth/ 1749 Buffon Natural History/ Hutton Theory of the Earth 1788/ Lyell Principles of Geology first published 1830/ Joseph Acosta, 1590, Natural and Moral History of the Indies/ 1859 William Gillespie The Theology of Geologists../ Hugh Miller Testimony of the Rocks [no date quoted]/ Gosse Omphalos/ Rivers Medicine, Magic and Religion 1924/ Burton's History of Scotland vols 7 & 8 mentioned/ Needham, History of Embryology/ Waley, The Way and its Power.

CONTENTS OF 'RELIGION AND SCIENCE' IN DETAIL:

      CHAPTER I — GROUNDS OF CONFLICT
      [Russell does his best to describe religions:] -page 8: Each of the great historical religions has three aspects: (1) A Church, (2) A creed, and (3) a code of personal morals. Well, maybe. Russell in his traditional way says nothing about money and assets—tithes, livings, Bishops' palaces, granges, vicarages... And nothing about the part played by violence and force in 'conversions'. These of course are serious omissions, which the Jewish originators of course were aware of.

      CHAPTER II — THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION
      'Copernicus has the honour, perhaps scarcely deserved, of giving his name to the Copernican system. In the year 1500 he was a mathematical professor in Rome; three years later he returned to Poland, where he was employed in reforming the currency and combating the Teutonic Knights. His spare time in 1507 to 1530 was spent composing 'On the Revolutions of Heavenly Bodies' [sic; correct title surely 'De Revolutionibus'] published in 1543.'
      'Kepler's two laws were published in 1609 and the third one .. in 1619'
      'Father Clavius.. satellites of Jupiter.. to see.. men had to make an instrument..'
      Galileo's 'Dialogues on Two Systems of the World' completed 1630, published in 1632
      'Shakespeare's Julius Caesar and Henry V.. take it for granted.. comets are heralds of disaster..'
      'Pope Calixtus III, Pope from 1455-1458.. greatly perturbed by the Turkish capture of Constantinople.. connected this disaster with the appearance of a great comet.. addition to the litany.. 'from the Turk and the comet, good Lord deliver us'
      'Cranmer wrote to Henry VIII in 1532 about a comet.. 'what strange things these tokens do signify'. .. In 1680 there was an unusually alarming one.. some Scottish divine said they were 'judgments for sins'
      'In 1673 father Augustine de Angelis rector of the Clementine College at Rome published a book on meteorology, saying that comets are not heavenly bodies.. they must originate in the earth's atmosphere.. everything heavenly is eternal and incorruptible, he thought..'
      '.. diary of Ralph Thoresby FRS in the year 1682.. when Halley's comet was making the appearance which enabled its orbit to be calculated.. fit us for whatever changes it may portend.. not ignorant that such meteors proceed from natural causes yet are they also frequently the presages of natural calamities..' [a British compromise, comments Russell]
      .. the final proof that comets were due to natural causes was due to three men.. a Swiss named Doerfel, showed the orbit of 1680 was approximately a parabola. Halley showed the 1682 comet, which aroused terror in 1066 and at Constantinople had a very elongated orbit .. period of 76 years. Newton's Principia in 1687 showed the laws of gravitation accounted for all this.
      '.. for Deists, everything without exception was regulated by natural law. Pope's Essay on Man: '.. general laws, the exceptions few'.. but when the demands of orthodoxy are forgotten, the exceptions disappear. 'From nature's chain whatever link you strike/ Tenth or ten thousandth breaks the chain alike.' The reign of law, as conceived in the time of Queen Anne, is associated with political stability and belief that the era of revolutions is past.'
      '.. 1755.. book by Kant.. called Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or Investigation of the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Whole Structure of the Universe, treated according to Newtonian Principles .. very remarkable work.. in some respects anticipates the results of modern astronomy.. not well received.. Kant was only 31.. hadn't a particular reputation'
      '.. Laplace's nebular hypothesis 1796: Exposition du Systeme du Monde.. also wrote 'Celestial Mechanics


      CHAPTER III — EVOLUTION
THE sciences have developed in an order the reverse of what might have been expected. What was most remote from ourselves was first brought under the domain of law, and then, gradually, what was nearer: first the heavens, next the earth, then animal and vegetable life, then the human body, and last of all (as yet very imperfectly) the human mind. In this there is nothing inexplicable. Familiarity with detail makes it difficult to see broad patterns; the outlines of Roman roads are more easily traced from aeroplanes than from the ground. A man's friends know what he is likely to do better than he does himself; at a certain turn in the conversation, they foresee the dreadful inevitability of one of his favourite anecdotes, whereas to himself he seems to be acting on a spontaneous impulse by no means subject to law. The detailed acquaintance derived from intimate experience is not the easiest {49} source for the generalized kind of knowledge which science seeks. Not only the discovery of simple natural laws, but also the doctrine of the gradual development of the world as we know it, began in astronomy; but the latter, unlike the former, found its most notable application in connection with the growth of life on our planet. The doctrine of evolution, which we are now to consider, though it began in astronomy, was of more scientific importance in geology and biology, where, also, it had to contend with more obstinate theological prejudices than were brought to bear against astronomy after the victory of the Copernican system.
      It is difficult for a modern mind to realize how recent is the belief in development and gradual growth; it is, in fact, almost wholly subsequent to Newton. In the orthodox view, the world had been created in six days, and had contained, from that time onwards, all the heavenly bodies that it now contains, and all kinds of animals and plants, as well as some others that had perished in the Deluge. So far from progress being a law of the universe, as most theologians now contend, there had been, so all Christians believed, a terrible combination of disasters at the time of the Fall. God had told Adam {50} and Eve not to eat of the fruit of a certain tree, but they nevertheless did eat of it. In consequence, God decreed that they and all their posterity should be mortal, and that after death even their remotest descendants should suffer eternal punishment in hell, with certain exceptions, selected on a plan as to which there was much controversy. From the moment of Adam's sin, animals took to preying on each other, thistles and thorns grew up, there began to be a difference of seasons, and the very ground was cursed 80 that it no longer yielded sustenance to Man except as the result of painful labour. Presently men grew so wicked that all were drowned in the Flood except Noah and his three sons and their wives. It was not thought that man had grown better since, but the Lord had promised not to send another universal deluge, and now contented Himself with occasional eruptions and earthquakes.
      All this, it must be understood, was held to be literal historical matter of fact, either actually related in the Bible, or deducible from what was related. The date of the creation of the world can be inferred from the genealogies in Genesis, which tell how old each patriarch was when his oldest son {51} was born. Some margin of controversy was permissible, owing to certain ambiguities and to differences between the Septuagint and the Hebrew text; but in the end Protestant Christendom generally accepted the date 4004 B.C., fixed by Archbishop Usher. Dr. Lightfoot, Vice.Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, who accepted this date for the Creation, thought that a careful study of Genesis made even greater precision possible; the creation of man, according to him, took place at 9 a.m. on October 23. This, however, has never been an article of faith; you might believe, without risk of heresy, that Adam and Eve came into existence on October 16 or October 30, provided your reasons were derived from Genesis. The day of the week was, of course, known to have been Friday, since God rested on the Saturday.
      Within this narrow framework science was expected to confine itself, and those who thought 6,000 years too short a time for the existence of the visible universe were held up to obloquy. They could no longer be burned or imprisoned, but theologians did everything possible to make their lives unhappy and to prevent the spread of their doctrines.
      Newton's work . the Copernican system {52} having been accepted . did nothing to shake religious orthodoxy. He was himself a deeply religious man, and a believer in the verbal inspiration of the Bible. His universe was not one in which there was development, and might well, for aught that appeared in his teaching, have been created all of a piece. To account for the tangential velocities of the planets, which prevent them from falling into the sun, he supposed that, initially, they had been hurled by the hand of God; what had happened since was accounted for by the law of gravitation. It is true that, in a private letter to Bentley, Newton suggested a way in which the solar system could have developed from a primitive nearly uniform distribution of matter; but so far as his public and official utterances were concerned, he seemed to favour a sudden creation of the sun and planets as we know them, and to leave no room for cosmic evolution.
      From Newton the eighteenth century acquired its peculiar brand of piety, in which God appeared essentially as the Lawgiver, who first created the world, and then made rules which determined all further events without any need of His special intervention. The orthodox allowed {53} exceptions: there were the miracles connected with religion. But for the deists everything, without exception, was regulated by natural law. Both views are to be found in Pope's Essay on Man. Thus in one passage he says:

The first Almighty Cause Acts not by partial, but by gen'ral laws; The exceptions few.

But when the demands of orthodoxy are forgotten, the exceptions disappear:

From Nature's chain whatever link you strike,
Tenth, or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.
And if each system in gradation roll
Alike essential to th' amazing whole,
The least confusion not in one, but all
That system only, but the whole must fall.
Let earth unbalanc'd from her orbit fly,
Planets and suns run lawless through the sky;
Let ruling angels from their spheres be hurl'd,
Being on being wreck'd, and world on world;
Heav'n's whole foundations to their centre nod,
And Nature tremble, to the throne of God!

The Reign of Law, as conceived in the time of Queen Anne, is associated with political stability and the belief that the era of revolutions is past. When men again began to desire change, their conception of the workings of natural law became less static. {54}
      The first serious attempt to construct a scientific theory of the growth of the sun, the planets, and the stars, was made by Kant in 1755, in a book called General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or Investigation of the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Whole Structure of the Universe, treated according to Newtonian Principles. This is a very remarkable work, which, in certain respects, anticipates the results of modern astronomy. It begins by setting forth that all the stars visible to the naked eye belong to one system, that of the Milky Way or Galaxy. All these stars lie nearly in one plane, and Kant suggests that they have a unity not unlike that of the solar system. With remarkable imaginative insight, he regards the nebulae as other similar but immensely remote groups of stars . a view which is now generally held. He has a theory . in part mathematically untenable, but broadly on the lines of subsequent investigations . that the nebulae, the galaxy, the stars, planets, and satellites, all resulted from condensation of an originally diffuse matter about regions in which it happened to have somewhat more density than elsewhere. He believes that the material universe is infinite, which, he says, is the {55} only view worthy of the infinity of the Creator. He thinks that there is a gradual transition from chaos to organization, beginning at the centre of gravity of the universe, and slowly spreading outwards from this point towards the remotest regions . a process involving infinite space and requiring infinite time.
      What makes this work remarkable is, on the one hand, the conception of the material universe as a whole, in which the galaxy and the nebulae are constituent units, and on the other hand the notion of gradual development from an almost undifferentiated primal distribution of matter throughout space. This is the first serious attempt to substitute evolution for sudden creation, and it is interesting to observe that this new outlook appeared first in a theory of the heavens, not in connection with life on the earth.
      For various reasons, however, Kant's work attracted little attention. He was still a young man (thirty-one years old) at the time of its publication, and had as yet won no great reputation. He was a philosopher, not a professional mathematician or physicist, and his lack of competence in dynamics appeared in his supposing that a self-contained system {56} could acquire a spin which it did not originally possess. Moreover, parts of his theory were purely fantastic . for example, he thought that the inhabitants of the planets must be better the farther they were from the sun, a view which is to be commended for its modesty as regards the human race, but is not supported by any considerations known to science. For these reasons, Kant's work remained almost unnoticed until a similar but more professionally competent theory had been developed by Laplace.
      Laplace's famous nebular hypothesis was first published in 1796, in his Exposition du Système du Monde, apparently in complete ignorance that it had been in a considerable degree anticipated by Kant. It was, for him, never more than an hypothesis, put forward in a note, "with the mistrust which must be inspired by everything that is not a result of observation or calculation"; but, though now superseded, it dominated speculation for a century. He held that what is now the system of the sun and the planets was originally a single diffuse nebula; that gradually it contracted, and in consequence rotated faster; that centrifugal force caused lumps to fly off, which became planets; and that the same process, repeated, gave rise to {57} the satellites of the planets. Living, as he did, in the epoch of the French Revolution, he was a complete freethinker, and rejected the Creation altogether. When Napoleon, who conceived that belief in a heavenly Monarch encouraged respect for monarchs on earth, observed that Laplace's great work on Celestial Mechanics contained no mention of God, the astronomer replied: "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis." The theological world was, of course, pained, but its dislike of Laplace was merged in its horror of the atheism and general wickedness of revolutionary France. And in any case battles with astronomers had been found to be rash.
      The development of a scientific outlook in geology was, in one respect, in a contrary direction to that in astronomy. In astronomy the belief that the heavenly bodies were unchanging gave place to the theory of their gradual development; but in geology belief in a former period of rapid and catastrophic changes was succeeded, as the science advanced, by a belief that change had always been very slow. At first, it was thought that the whole history of the earth had to be compressed into about six thousand years. In view of the evidence afforded by sedimentary rocks and deposits of lava and so on, it was necessary, in order to fit into the time scale, to suppose that catastrophic occurrences had formerly been common. How far geology lagged behind astronomy in scientific development may be seen by considering its condition in the time of Newton. Thus Woodward, in 1695, explained the sedimentary rocks by supposing the whole terrestrial globe to have been taken to pieces and dissolved at the flood, and the strata to have settled down from this promiscuous mass as any earthy sediment from a fluid." He taught, as Lyell says, [is this Russell's way of saying BR is quoting??] that "the entire mass of fossiliferous strata contained in the earth's crust had been deposited in a few months." Fourteen years earlier (1681), the Rev. Thomas Burnet, who subsequently became Master of Charterhouse, had published his Sacred Theory of the Earth; containing an Account of the Original of the Earth, and of all the general Changes which it hath already undergone, or is to undergo, till the Consummation of all Things. He believed that the Equator had been in the plane of the ecliptic until the flood, but had then been pushed into its present oblique position. (The more theologically correct view is that of Milton, that {59} this change took place at the time of the Fall.) He thought that the sun's heat had cracked the earth, and allowed the waters to emerge from a subterranean reservoir, thereby causing the flood. A second period of chaos, he maintained, was to usher in the millennium. His views should, however, be received with caution, as he did not believe in eternal punishment. More dreadful still, he regarded the story of the Fall as an allegory, so that, as the Encyclopaedia Britannica informs us, "the king was obliged to remove him from the office of clerk of the closet." His error in regard to the Equator, and his other errors also, were avoided by Whiston, whose book, published in 1696, was called: A New Theory of the Earth; wherein the Creation of the World in Six Days, the Universal Deluge, and the General Conflagration, as laid down in the Holy Scriptures, are shown to be perfectly agreeable to Reason and Philosophy. This book was partly inspired by the comet of 1680, which led him to think that a comet might have caused the flood. In one point his orthodoxy was open to question: he thought the Six Days of Creation were longer than ordinary days.
      It must not be supposed that Woodward, Burnet, and Whiston were inferior to the {60} other geologists of their day. On the contrary, they were the best geologists of their time, and Whiston, at least, was highly praised by Locke.
      The eighteenth century was much occupied by a controversy between two schools, the Neptunists, who attributed almost everything to water, and the Vulcanists, who equally over-emphasized volcanoes and earthquakes. The former sect, who were perpetually collecting evidences of the Deluge, laid great stress on the marine fossils found at great altitudes on mountains. They were the more orthodox, and therefore the enemies of orthodoxy tried to deny that fossils were genuine remains of animals. Voltaire was especially sceptical; and when he could no longer deny their organic origin, he maintained that they had been dropped by pilgrims. In this instance, dogmatic free thought showed itself even more unscientific than orthodoxy.
      Buffon, the great naturalist, in his Natural History (1749), maintained fourteen propositions which were condemned by the Sorbonne theological faculty in Paris as "reprehensible, and contrary to the creed of the Church." [Note: Russell doesn't actually say what 'condemned by the Sorbonne' means; was it legally binding in some way? Were there penalties?] One of these, which concerned geology, affirmed: "That the present mountains and {61} valleys of the earth are due to secondary causes, and that the same causes will in time destroy all the continents, hills, and valleys, and reproduce others like them." Here "secondary causes" means all causes other than God's creative fiat; thus in 1749 it was necessary to orthodoxy to believe that the world was created with the same hills and valleys, and the same distribution of land and sea, as we find now, except where, as in the case of the Dead Sea, a change had been wrought by miracle.
      Buffon did not see fit to enter into a controversy with the Sorbonne. He recanted, and was obliged to publish the following confession: "I declare that I had no intention to contradict the text of Scripture; that I believe most firmly all therein related about the creation, both as to order of time and matter of fact; I abandon everything in my book respecting the formation of the earth, and generally, all that may be contrary to the narration of Moses." It is evident that, outside the domain of astronomy, the theologians had not learned much wisdom from their conflict with Galileo.
      The first writer to set forth a modern scientific view in geology was Hutton, whose Theory of the Earth was first published in {62} 1788, and in an enlarged form in 1795. He assumed that the changes which have occurred in past times on the surface of the earth were due to causes which are now in operation, and which there is no reason to suppose more active in the past than in the present. Although this was in the main a sound maxim, Hutton carried it too far in some respects, and not far enough in others. He attributed the disappearance of continents to denudation, with consequent deposition of sediment on the bottom of the sea; but the rise of new continents he attributed to violent convulsions. He did not sufficiently recognize the sudden sinking of land or its gradual rise. But all scientific geologists since his day have accepted his general method of interpreting the past by means of the present, and attributing the vast changes which have occurred during geological time to those very causes which are now observed to be slowly altering coastlines, increasing or diminishing the height of mountains, and raising or lowering the ocean-bed.
      It was chiefly the Mosaic chronology that had kept men from adopting this point of view at an earlier date, and the upholders of Genesis made vehement onslaughts on Hutton and his disciple Playfair. "The {63} party feeling," says Lyell, [Principles of Geology, eleventh edition, Vol. I, p. 78.] "excited against the Huttonian doctrines, and the open disregard of candour and temper in the controversy will hardly be credited by the reader, unless he recalls to his recollection that the mind of the English public was at that time in a state of feverish excitement. A class of writers in France had been labouring industriously for many years, to diminish the influence of the clergy, by sapping the foundations of the Christian faith; and their success, and the consequences of the Revolution, had alarmed the most resolute minds, while the imagination of the more timid was continually haunted by dread of innovation, as by the phantom of some fearful dream." By 1795, almost all the well-to-do in England saw in every un-Biblical doctrine an attack upon property and a threat of the guillotine. For many years, British opinion was far less liberal than before the Revolution.
      The further progress of geology is entangled with that of biology, owing to the multitude of extinct forms of life of which fossils preserve a record. In so far as the antiquity of the world was concerned, geology and theology could come to terms by agreeing that the six "days" were to be interpreted {64} as six "ages." But on the subject of animal life theology had a number of very definite views, which it was found increasingly difficult to reconcile with science. No animals preyed on each other until after the Fall all animals now existing belong to species represented in the ark; [Footnote: This opinion was not without its difficulties. St. Augustine confessed himself ignorant as to God's reason for creating flies. Luther, more boldly, decided that they had been created by the Devil, to distract him when writing good books. The latter opinion is certainly plausible.] the species now extinct were, with few exceptions, drowned in the flood. Species are immutable, and each has resulted from a separate act of creation. To question any of these propositions was to incur the hostility of theologians.
      Difficulties had begun with the discovery of the New World America was a long way from Mount Ararat, yet it contained many animals not to be found at intermediate places. How came these animals to have travelled so far, and to have left none of their kind on the way? Some thought that sailors had brought them, but this hypothesis had its difficulties, which puzzled that pious Jesuit, Joseph Acosta, who had devoted himself to the conversion of the Indians, but was having difficulty in preserving his own {65} faith. He discusses the matter with much sound sense in his Natural and Moral History of the Indies (1590), where he says "Who can imagine that in so long a voyage men woulde take the paines to carrie Foxes to Peru, especially the kind they call 'Acias,' which is the filthiest I have seene? Who woulde likewise say that they have carried Tygers and Lyons? Truly it were a thing worthy the laughing at to thinke so. It was sufficient, yea, very much, for men driven against their willes by tempest, in so long and unknowne a voyage, to escape with their owne lives, without busying themselves to carrie Woolves and Foxes, and to nourish them at sea." [Footnote: Quoted from White's Warfare of Science with Theology.] Such problems led the theologians to believe that the filthy Acias, and other such awkward beasts, had been spontaneously generated out of slime by the action of the sun; but unfortunately there is no hint of this in the account of the ark. But there seemed no help for it. How could the sloths, for instance, which are as unhurried in their movements as their name implies, have all reached South America if they started from Mount Ararat?
      Another trouble arose from the mere {66} number of the species that came to be known with the progress of zoology. The numbers now known amount to millions, and if two of each of these kinds were in the ark, it was felt that it must have been rather overcrowded. Moreover, Adam had named them ail, which seemed a severe effort at the very beginning of his life. The discovery of Australia raised fresh difficulties. Why had all the kangaroos leapt across the Torres Straits, and not one single pair remained behind? By this time, the progress of biology had made it very difficult to suppose that sun and slime had brought forth a pair of complete kangaroos, yet some such theory was more necessary than ever.
      Difficulties of this kind exercised the mind of religious men all through the nineteenth century. Read, for example, a little book called The Theology of Geologists, as exemplified in the cases of Hugh Miller, and others by William Gillespie, author of The Necessary Existence of God, etc., etc. This book by a Scottish theologian was published in 1859, the year in which Darwin's Origin of Species appeared. It speaks of "the dread postulates of the geologists," and accuses them of a "head and front of offending fearful to contemplate." The main problem with which {67} the author is concerned is one raised by Hugh Miller's Testimony of the Rocks, in which it is maintained that "untold ages ere man had sinned or suffered, the animal creation exhibited exactly its present state of war." Hugh Miller describes vividly, and with a certain horror, the instruments of death and even torture employed against each other by species of animals which were extinct before man existed. Himself deeply religious, he finds it difficult to understand why the Creator should inflict such pain upon creatures incapable of sin. Mr. Gillespie, in face of the evidence, boldly reaffirms the orthodox view, that the lower animals suffer and die because of man's sin, and quotes the text, "By man came death," to prove that no animals died until Adam had eaten the apple. [Footnote: This was the view of all sects. Thus Wesley says that, before the Fall, "the spider was as harmless as the fly, and did not lie in wait for blood."] [Extraordinary stuff! - RW]
      After quoting Hugh Miller's descriptions of warfare among extinct animals, he exclaims that a benevolent Creator could not have created such monsters. So far, we may agree with him. But his further arguments are curious. It seems as though he were denying the evidence of geology, but in the end his courage fails him. Perhaps {68} there were such monsters, after ail, he says but they were not created directly by God. They were originally innocent creatures led astray by the Devil; or perhaps, like the Gadarene swine, they were actually animal bodies inhabited by the spirits of demons. This would explain why the Bible contains the story of the Gadarene swine, which has been a stumbling.block to many.
      A curious attempt to save orthodoxy in the field of biology was made by Gosse the naturalist, father of Edmund Gosse. He admitted fully all the evidence adduced by geologists in favour of the antiquity of the world, but maintained that, when the Creation took place, everything was constructed as if it had a past history. There is no logical possibility of proving that this theory is untrue. It has been decided by the theologians that Adam and Eve had navels, just as if they had been born in the ordinary way. [Footnote: Perhaps this was the reason why Gosse called his book Omphalos.] Similarly everything else that was created could have been created as if it had grown. The rocks could have been filled with fossils, and have been made just such as they would have become if they had been due to volcanic action or to sedimentary {69} deposits. But if once such possibilities are admitted, there is no reason to place the creation of the world at one point rather than another. We may have all come into existence five minutes ago, provided with ready.made memories, with holes in our socks and hair that needed cutting. But although this is a logical possibility, nobody can believe it; and Gosse found, to his bitter disappointment, that nobody could believe his logically admirable reconciliation of theology with the data of science. The theologians, ignoring him, abandoned much of their previous territory, and proceeded to entrench themselves in what remained.
      The doctrine of the gradual evolution of plants and animals by descent and variation, which came into biology largely through geology, may be divided into three parts. There is first the fact, as certain as a fact about remote ages can hope to be, that the simpler forms of life are the older, and that those with a more complicated structure make their first appearance at a later stage of the record. Second, there is the theory that the later and more highly organized forms did not arise spontaneously, but grew out of the earlier forms through a series of modifications; this is what is specially meant by {70} "evolution" in biology. Third, there is the study, as yet far from complete, of the mechanism of evolution, i.e., of the causes of variation and of the survival of certain types at the expense of others. The general doctrine of evolution is now universally accepted among biologists, though there are still doubts as to its mechanism. The chief historical importance of Darwin lies in his having suggested a mechanism . natural selection . which made evolution seem more probable; but his suggestion, while still accepted as valid, is less completely satisfying to modern men of science than it was to his immediate successors.
      The first biologist who gave prominence to the doctrine of evolution was Lamarck (1744.1829). [No titles named.] His doctrines, however, failed to win acceptance, not only on account of the prejudice in favour of the immutability of species, but also because the mechanism of change which he suggested was not one which scientific men could accept. He believed that the production of a new organ in an animal's body results from its feeling a new want; and also that what has been acquired by an individual in the course of its life is transmitted to its offspring. Without the second hypothesis, the first would {71} have been useless as part of the explanation of evolution. Darwin, who rejected the first hypothesis as an important element in the development of new species, still accepted the second, though it had less prominence in his system than in Lamarck's. The second hypothesis, as to the inheritance of acquired characters, was vigorously denied by Weissmann, [Russell mentions him again in this chapter - maybe the Germans had more importance here than nationalistic Brits incline to tell; name also spelt Weismann] and, although the controversy still continues, the evidence is now overwhelming that, with possible rare exceptions, the only acquired characters that are inherited are those that affect the germ cells, which are very few. The Lamarckian mechanism of evolution cannot therefore be accepted.
      Lyell's Principles of Geology, first published in 1830, a book which, by its emphatic statement of the evidence for the antiquity of the earth and of life, caused a great outcry among the orthodox, was nevertheless not, in its earlier editions, favourable to the hypothesis of organic evolution. It contained a careful discussion of Lamarck's theories, which it rejected on good scientific grounds. In later editions, published after the appearance of Darwin's Origin of Species (1859), the theory of evolution is guardedly favoured.
      Darwin's theory was essentially an extension to the animal and vegetable world of {72} laisser-faire economics, and was suggested by Malthus's theory of population. All living things reproduce themselves so fast that the greater part of each generation must die without having reached the age to leave descendants. A female cod-fish lays about 9,000,000 eggs a year. If all came to maturity and produced other cod-fish, the sea would, in a few years, give place to solid cod, while the land would be covered by a new deluge. Even human populations, though their rate of natural increase is slower than that of any other animals except elephants, have been known to double in twenty-five years. If this rate continued throughout the world for the next two centuries, the resulting population would amount to five hundred thousand millions. But we find, in fact, that animal and plant populations are, as a rule, roughly stationary; and the same has been true of human populations at most periods. There is therefore, both within each species and as between different species, a constant competition, in which the penalty of defeat is death. It follows that, if some members of a species differ from others in any way which gives them an advantage, they are more likely to survive. If the difference has been acquired, it will not be {73} transmitted to their descendants, but if it is congenital it is likely to reappear in at least a fair proportion of their posterity. Lamarck thought that the giraffe's neck grew long as a result of stretching up to reach high branches, and that the results of this stretching were hereditary; the Darwinian view, at least as modified by Weismann, is that giraffes which, from birth, had a tendency to long necks, were less likely to starve than others, and therefore left more descendants, which, in turn, were likely to have long necks . some of them, probably, even longer necks than their already long-necked parents. In this way the giraffe would gradually develop its peculiarities until there was nothing to be gained by developing them further. Darwin's theory depended upon the occurrence of chance variations, the causes of which, as he confessed, were unknown. It is an observed fact that the posterity of a given pair are not all alike. Domestic animals have been greatly changed by artificial selection: through the agency of man cows have come to yield more milk, racehorses to run faster, and sheep to yield more wool. Such facts afforded the most direct evidence available to Darwin of what {74} selection could accomplish. It is true that breeders cannot turn a fish into a marsupial, or a marsupial into a monkey; but changes as great as these might be expected to occur during the countless ages required by the geologists. There was, moreover, in many cases, evidence of common ancestry. Fossils showed that animals intermediate between widely separated species of the present had existed in the past; the pterodactyl, for example, was half bird, half reptile. Embryologists discovered that, in the course of development, immature animals repeat earlier forms; a mammalian foetus, at a certain stage, has the rudiments of a fish's gills, which are totally useless, and hardly to be explained except as a recapitulation of ancestral history. Many different lines of argument combined to persuade biologists both of the fact of evolution, and of natural selection as the chief agent by which it was brought about.
      Darwinism was as severe a blow to theology as Copernicanism. Not only was it necessary to abandon the fixity of species and the many separate acts of creation which Genesis seemed to assert; not only was it necessary to assume a lapse of time, since the origin of life, which was shocking to the {75} orthodox; not only was it necessary to abandon a host of arguments for the beneficence of Providence, derived from the exquisite adaptation of animals to their environment, which was now explained as the operation of natural selection, but, worse than any or all of these, the evolutionists ventured to affirm that man was descended from the lower animals. Theologians and uneducated people, indeed, fastened upon this one aspect of the theory. "Darwin says that men are descended from monkeys!" the world exclaimed in horror. It was popularly said that he believed this because he himself looked like a monkey (which he did not). When I was a boy, I had a tutor who said to me, with the utmost solemnity:
      "If you are a Darwinist, I pity you, for it is impossible to be a Darwinist and a Christian at the same time." To this day in Tennessee, it is illegal to teach the doctrine of evolution, because it is considered to be contrary to the Word of God.
      As often happens, the theologians were quicker to perceive the consequences of the new doctrine than were its advocates, most of whom, though convinced by the evidence, were religious men, and wished to retain as much as possible of their former beliefs. {76}
      Progress, especially during the nineteenth century, was much facilitated by lack of logic in its advocates, which enabled them to get used to one change before having to accept another. When all the logical consequences of an innovation are presented simultaneously, the shock to habits is so great that men tend to reject the whole, whereas, if they had been invited to take one step every ten or twenty years, they could have been coaxed along the path of progress without much resistance. The great men of the nineteenth century were not revolutionaries, either intellectually or politically, though they were willing to champion a reform when the need for it became overwhelmingly evident. This cautious temper in innovators helped to make the nineteenth century notable for the extreme rapidity of its progress.
      The theologians, however, saw what was involved more clearly than did the general public. They pointed out that men have immortal souls, which monkeys have not; that Christ died to save men, not monkeys; that men have a divinely implanted sense of right and wrong, whereas monkeys are guided solely by instinct. If men developed by imperceptible steps out of monkeys, at {77} what moment did they suddenly acquire these theologically important characteristics? At the British Association in 1860 (the year after The Origin of Species appeared), Bishop Wilberforce thundered against Darwinism, exclaiming "The principle of natural selection is absolutely incompatible with the word of God." But all his eloquence was in vain, and Huxley, who championed Darwin, was generally thought to have beaten him in argument. Men were no longer afraid of the Church's displeasure, and the evolution of animal and vegetable species was soon the accepted doctrine among biologists, although the Dean of Chichester, in a University sermon, informed Oxford that "those who refuse to accept the history of the creation of our first parents according to its obvious literal intention, and are for substituting the modern dream of evolution in its place, cause the entire scheme of man's salvation to collapse"; and although Carlyle, who preserved the intolerance of the orthodox without their creed, spoke of Darwin as an "apostle of dirt-worship."
      The attitude of unscientific lay Christians was well illustrated by Gladstone. It was a liberal age, although the Liberal leader did his best to make it otherwise. In 1864, {78} when an attempt to punish two clergymen for not believing in eternal punishment failed because the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council acquitted them, Gladstone was horrified, and said that, if the principle of the judgment was followed up, it would establish "a complete indifference between the Christian faith and the denial of it." When Darwin's theory was first published, he said, expressing the sympathetic feelings of one also accustomed to governing: "Upon grounds of what is termed evolution God is relieved of the labour of creation; in the name of unchangeable laws He is discharged from governing the world." He had, however, no personal feeling against Darwin; he gradually modified his opposition, and once, in 1877, paid him a visit, during the whole of which he talked unceasingly about Bulgarian atrocities. When he was gone, Darwin, in all simplicity, remarked: "What an honour that such a great man should come to visit me!" Whether Gladstone carried away any impression of Darwin, history does not relate.
      Religion, in our day, has accommodated itself to the doctrine of evolution, and has even derived new arguments from it. We are told that "through the ages one {79} increasing purpose runs," and that evolution is the unfolding of an idea which has been in the mind of God throughout. It appears that during those ages which so troubled Hugh Miller, when animals were torturing each other with ferocious horns and agonizing stings, Omnipotence was quietly waiting for the ultimate emergence of man, with his still more exquisite powers of torture and his far more widely diffused cruelty. Why the Creator should have preferred to reach His goal by a process, instead of going straight to it, these modern theologians do not tell us. Nor do they say much to allay our doubts as to the gloriousness of the consummation. It is difficult not to feel, as the boy did after being taught the alphabet, that it was not worth going through so much to get so little. This, however, is a matter of taste.
      There is another and a graver objection to any theology based on evolution. In the 'sixties [1860s] and 'seventies [1870s], when the vogue of the doctrine was new, progress was accepted as a law of the world. Were we not growing richer year by year, and enjoying budget surpluses in spite of diminished taxation? Was not our machinery the wonder of the world, and our parliamentary government a {80} model for the imitation of enlightened foreigners? And could anyone doubt that progress would go on indefinitely? Science and mechanical ingenuity, which had produced it, could surely be trusted to go on producing it ever more abundantly. In such a world, evolution seemed only a generalization of everyday life.
      But even then, to the more reflective, another side was apparent. The same laws which produce growth also produce decay. Some day, the sun will grow cold, and life on the earth will cease. The whole epoch of animals and plants is only an interlude between ages that were too hot and ages that will be too cold. There is no law of cosmic progress, but only an oscillation upward and downward, with a slow trend downward on the balance owing to the diffusion of energy. This, at least, is what science at present regards as most probable, and in our disillusioned generation it is easy to believe. From evolution, so far as our present knowledge shows, no ultimately optimistic philosophy can be validly inferred. {81} [end of chapter III]


      CHAPTER IV — DEMONOLOGY AND MEDICINE
      82: The scientific study of the human body and its diseases had to contend with a mass of superstition, largely pre-Christian, but supported until quite modern times by the whole weight of ecclesiastical authority. Sometimes a divine visitation was a punishment for sin; more often the work of demons. Much less support could be found in the gospels; the rest of the theory is developed by the Fathers, or grew naturally out of their doctrines. St Augustine maintained that "all diseases of Christians are to be ascribed to the demons; chiefly do they torment fresh baptised Christians, yea, even the guiltless new-born infants." It must be understood that, in the writings of the Fathers, "demons" mean heathen deities, who were supposed to be enraged by the progress of Christianity. The early Christians by no means denied the existence of the Olympian gods, but supposed them servants of Satan - a view which Milton adopted, in Paradise Lost. Gregory Nazianzen maintained that medicine is useless, but the laying on of consecrated hands is often effective. Similar views were expressed by other Fathers. [No source to that quotation]
      .. relics.. Middle Ages.. the bones of St Rosalia, which are preserved in Palermo, have for many centuries been found effective in curing disease; but when examined by a profane anatomist, they turned out to be the bones of a goat. Nevertheless, the cures continued. We now know that certain kinds of diseases can be cured by faith, while others cannot. No doubt "miracles" of healing do occur and unscientific atmosphere legends soon magnify the truth and obliterate the distinction between the hysterical diseases which can be cured in this way and the others which demand a treatment based upon pathology.

      White, Warfare of Science..: '.. An unusually complete instance, the supposed miracles of St Francis Xavier, the friend of Loyola, the first and most eminent of Jesuit missionaries in the east, who spent many years in India, China, and Japan, and died in 1552. .. [Letters complain about difficulties with the languages etc] In 1622 when he was canonized it became necessary to prove to the satisfaction of the Vatican authorities that he had performed miracles; without such proof no-one could become a saint. The Pope officially guaranteed the gift of tongues, and was specially impressed by the fact that Xavier made lamps burn with holy water instead of oil. This was the same Pope, Urban VIII, who found what Galileo said incredible. The legend continued to grow, till in the biography published by Father Bouhours in 1682 we learn that the saint raised fourteen persons from the dead. By 1872 Father Coleridge at the Society of Jesus reaffirmed the gift of tongues in a biography. From this example it is evident how little reliance can be placed upon the accounts of marvels in the periods when the documents are less numerous than in the case of St Francis Xavier. .. they were believed by Protestants as well as Catholics. .. Charles II touched about 100,000 persons for the King's Evil.. His Majesty's surgeon published an account of sixty cures thus effected, another surgeon himself saw, so he says, hundreds of cures due to the King's touch, many of them cases which had defied the ablest surgeons. There was a special service in the Prayer Book provided for occasions when the King exercised his miraculous power of healing. These powers duly descended to James II, William III, and Queen Anne, but apparently were unable to survive the Hanoverian Succession. .. Plagues and pestilences.. The chief practitioners of the scientific studies of medicine were Jews, who derived their knowledge from Mohammedans... Dissection was virtually forbidden, in consequence of a misunderstood Bull of Boniface VIII..
      The treatment of mental disorders, as may be imagined, was peculiarly superstitious, [Note: mental disorders? - could be brain damage, or genetic, or caused by maltreatment; or obsessive etc etc - difficult to generalise surely?] and remained so longer than any other branch of medicine. Insanity was regarded as due to diabolical possession - a view for which authority could be found in the New Testament. .. exorcism.. touching a relic.. holy man's command to the demon to come forth. ... 'spew-water'.. savouring of magic.. foul odours were used.. disgusting substances.. the formula of exorcism became longer and longer and more filled with obscenities. By such means, the Jesuits of Vienna, in 1583, cast out 12,652 devils. ... prevention of sleep was a recognized method.. Bible.. Exodus XXII, 18, 'thou shalt not suffer a witch to live'.. Wesley said that giving up of witchcraft is in effect giving up the Bible.. [Footnote: Unless we accept the view which was waged against belief in witchcraft when it was decaying that the word translated as 'witch' actually means 'poisoner', but this does not dispose of the Witch of Endor.]
      Rivers, 'Medicine, Magic and Religion' 1924: .. who tries to distinguish.. 'When I speak of magic, I shall mean a group of processes in which man uses rites which depend for their efficacy on his own power or on powers believed to be inherent in or attributes of certain objects or processes which are used in these rites. Religion on the other hand will comprise a group of processes the efficacy of which depends upon the will of some high power, some power whose intervention is sought by rites of supplication and propitiation.' Russell says this definition is suitable when dealing with people who, on the one hand, believe in the strange power of certain inanimate objects, such as sacred stones, and, on the other hand, regard all non-human spirits as superior to man. Neither of these is quite true of Medieval Christians or Mohammedans. Strange powers, it is true, were attributed to the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life, but these could almost be classed as scientific; they were sought by experiment, and their expected properties were scarcely more wonderful than those which have been found in radium. And magic as understood in the Middle Ages constantly invoked the aid of spirits, but of evil spirits. Among the Melanesians, distinction of good and evil spirits does not seem to exist, whereas in the Christian doctrine it was essential. Satan as well as the Deity could work miracles, but Satan worked them to help wicked men while the Deity worked them to help good men. This distinction as it appears from the Gospels was already familiar to the Jews from the time of Christ, since they accused him of casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. Sorcery and witchcraft in the Middle Ages were primarily, though not exclusively, ecclesiastical offences, and their peculiar sinfulness lay in the fact that they involved an alliance with the infernal powers. Oddly enough, a devil could sometimes be induced to do things which would have been virtuous if done by anybody else. In Sicily there are (or recently were) puppet plays which have come down in unbroken tradition from medieval times. In 1908 I saw one of these at Palermo, dealing with the wars between Charlemagne and the Moors.. Pope secured the Devil's help.. the Devil was seen in the air giving victory to the Christians. In spite of this excellent result, the Pope's action was wicked and Charlemagne was shocked by it, though he took advantage of the victory.]
      It is held nowadays by some of the most serious students of witchcraft [Russell quotes no sources] that it was a survival in Christian Europe of pagan cults and the worship of pagan deities who had become identified with evil spirits of Christian demonology. While there is much evidence that elements of paganism became amalgamated with magic rites, there are grave difficulties in the way of attributing witchcraft mainly to this source. Magic was a crime punishable in pre-Christian antiquity. There was a law against it in the Twelve Tables in Rome. So far back as the year 1100 BC, certain officers of certain women of the harem [sic] of Rameses III were tried for making a waxen image of that king and pronouncing magic spells over it with a view to causing his death. Apuleius the writer was tried for magic in AD 150 because he had married a rich widow, to the great annoyance of her son. Like Othello, however, he succeeded in persuading the court that he had used only his natural charms. When Innocent VIII in 1484 issued a Bull against witchcraft he appointed two inquisitors to publish .. in 1489 Malleus Maleficarum, the hammer of female malefactors. They maintained that maintained that witchcraft is more natural to women than to men because of the inherent wickedness of their hearts. It is estimated that in Germany alone between 1450 and 1550 100,000 witches were put to death, mostly by burning. [Russell, perhaps typically, gives Germany as an example; why not England or Italy?] .. Towards the end of the 16 C Flade, Rector of the University of Trèves, Chief Judge of the Electoral Court, after condemning countless witches, began to think perhaps their confessions were due to the desire to escape from the tortures of the rack, with the result that he showed unwillingness to convict. He was accused of having sold himself to Satan.. tortured.. in 1589.. strangled.. burnt.
      Protestants were quite as much addicted as Catholics to persecution of witches. In this matter James I was peculiarly zealous. He wrote a book on demonology in the first year of his reign in England. Cope was Attorney-General and Bacon was in the House of Commons. He caused the law to be made more stringent by a statute which remained in force until 1736. Sir Thomas Browne who was a medical witness in a prosecution declared in Religio Medici 'I have ever believed, and do now know, that there are witches; they that doubt them do not only deny them, but spirits, they are bleakly and of consequence a sort, not of infidels, but of atheists'. [NB: I've read a later edition of Browne present the opposite opinion]
      Lecky, History of Rationalism in Europe .. Lecky pointed out a disbelief in ghosts and witches was one of the most prominent characteristics of scepticism in the 17 C, at first nearly confined to men who were avowedly freethinkers. In Scotland the persecution was much greater. Burton's History of Scotland.. tempests which had beset James I on his voyage from Denmark .. a certain Dr Fian confessed under torture they were produced by witches who had put to sea in a sieve from Leith. .. first invented the new torture of pulling out fingernails and thrusting needles in.. Dr Fian.. kept denying what he had formerly avouched and so he was burnt. .. 1736 Act repealed witchcraft in Scotland at the same time as in England though the belief was still vigorous. .. R quotes professional textbook of law of 1730.. 'nothing seems plainer to me than that there may be, and have been, witches and that perhaps such are now actually existing.' .. What happened in 1736.. there was a secession from the Established Church of Scotland.. their leaders in 1736 published a statement on the depravity of the age.. complained about dancing and the theatre, and the penal statutes which had been repealed contrary to.. Exodus. There is a remarkable simultaneity in the cessation of punishments. There were as many executions for witchcraft during the Commonwealth as in all the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts. .. With the Restoration, scepticism became fashionable.. The last execution in 1682.. though it is said there were others as late as 1712.. 1712 trial in Hertfordshire.. the judge directed the jury to disbelief the possibility but they convicted him.. the conviction was quashed.. In Scotland it became rare after the end of the 17 C... the last burning of a witch was in 1722 or 1730. In France, the last burning was 1780. In New England there was a fierce outbreak of witch-hunting at the end of the 17 C. Everywhere the popular belief continued and still survives in some remote rural areas. The last case of the kind in England was in 1863 in Essex, when an old man was lynched by his neighbours as a wizard. Legal recognition of witchcraft as a possible crime survived longest in Spain and Ireland. In Ireland, the law against witchcraft was not repealed until 1821. In Spain a sorcerer was burnt in 1780
      .. Lecky points out the curious fact that belief in the possibility of black magic was not defeated by arguments on the subject, but by the general spread of the belief in the reign of law. He even goes so far as to say that, in the specific discussion of witchcraft, the weight of argument was on the side of its upholders. This is perhaps not surprising when you remember that the Bible could be quoted by the upholders, while the other side could hardly venture to say that the Bible was not always to be belief. Moreover the best scientific minds did not occupy themselves with popular superstitions, partly because they had more positive work to do, partly because they feared to arouse antagonism.
      .. Newton's work caused men to belief that God had originally created nature and decreed nature's laws so as to produce the results that He intended without fresh intervention, except on great occasions, such as the revelation of the Christian religion. Protestants held that miracles occurred during the first century or two of the Christian era and then ceased. If God no longer intervened miraculously, it was hardly likely that He would allow Satan to do so. There were hopes of scientific meteorology which would leave no room for old women on broomsticks as the causes of storms. ... Lightning and thunder.. 1755 Massachusetts earthquakes.. Rev Dr Price attributed them to the 'iron points invented by the sagacious Mr Franklin. There is no getting out of the mighty hand of God'. [This example I think in Gardner too]
      .. [Medicine; which I suppose is vaguely connected with demonology] Anatomy and physiology were necessary to start with.. these in turn were not possible without dissection, which the Church opposed.. Vesalius who first made anatomy scientific succeeded in escaping official censure because he was physician to the Emperor Charles V.. feared his health might suffer if he was deprived of his favourite practitioner.. during that reign the Conference of Theologians [who are these?] gave it as there opinion that dissection was not sacrilege. Philip II was less of a valetudinarian, and he saw no reason to protect a suspect, so Vesalius got no more bodies. The Church believe that there is in the human body one indestructible bone which is the nucleus of the resurrection body; Vesalius on being questioned confessed he had never found such a bone. This was bad, but perhaps not bad enough. The medical disciples of Galen, who had become as great an obstacle to progress in medicine as Aristotle in physics, pursued Vesalius with a relentless hostility and at length found opportunity to ruin him. .. Spanish grandee's corpse was being examined the heart supposedly showing some signs of life.. accused of murder and denounced to the Inquisition.. allowed to do penance by pilgrimage to the Holy Land.. on the way home he was shipwrecked and died of exhaustion. .. Fallopius was one of his pupils...
      Physiology developed later than anatomy, and may be taken as becoming scientific with Harvey 1578-1657. Like Vesalius, he was a court physician, to James I and then to Charles I, but he was not persecuted. In Spanish universities the circulation of the blood was still denied at the end of the 18 C, and dissection was still no part of medical education. .. The old theological prejudices reappeared when awakened by any startling novelties. [Note: cp VD, AIDS etc] Inoculation against smallpox aroused a storm of protest from divines. The Sorbonne protested against it on theological grounds. An Anglican clergyman published a sermon in which he said that Job's boils were caused by inoculation by the devil. And Scottish ministers joined in the manifesto saying that it was 'endeavouring to baffle the divine judgement.' .. The effect in diminishing the death rate was so notable that theological terrors failed to outweigh fear of the disease. The controversy began to die down when the discovery of vaccination revived it. Clergymen regarded vaccination as bidding defiance to heaven itself, even to the will of God, and at Cambridge University sermons preached against it. So late as 1885, when there was a severe outbreak of smallpox in Montreal, the Catholic part of the population resisted vaccination with the support of their clergy. One priest said that it was caused by having a carnival last winter, 'feasting with flesh which offended the Lord.'
      .. anaesthetics.. [information source not given; possibly White again] .. Simpson.. 1847.. was reminded that Genesis 3, 16 said 'in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children'; how could she sorrow if she is under the influence of chloroform? In any case, God put Adam into a deep sleep.. In Japan women are expected to endure the pains of labour.. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that to many men there is something enjoyable in the sufferings of women, and therefore a propensity to cling to any theological or ethical code which makes it their duty to suffer patiently even when there is no valid reason for not avoiding pain. The harm that theology has done is not to create cruel impulses but to give them the sanction of what professes to be a lofty ethic and to confer an apparently sacred character on practices which have come down from more ignorant and barbarous ages.
      106: .. Opinions on such subjects as birth control and the legal permission of abortion are still influenced by Biblical texts and ecclesiastical decrees. See, for instance, the encyclical on marriage, issued a few years ago by Pope Pius XI. "Those who practise birth control" he says "sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious. Small wonder therefore if Holy Writ bears witness that the divine Majesty regards with the greatest detestation this horrible crime and at times has punished it with death." .. goes on to quote Augustine, on Genesis 13, 8 to 10. No further reasons for the condemnation of birth control are thought necessary. As for economic arguments, "we are deeply touched but no difficulty can arise that justifies putting aside the law of God which forbids all acts intrinsically evil."
      .. Needham, 'History of Embryology'.. formerly held by theologians that the male embryo acquires a soul at the fortieth day and the female at the eightieth. Now the best opinion is that it is the fortieth day for both sexes. .. Interruption of pregnancy, even if it is considered necessary to save the woman's life, is no justification, because of the law of nature, the precept of God thou shalt not kill.. goes on at once to explain that this does not condemn war or capital punishment.. Over most of the field, the battle for scientific independence has been won. No-one now thinks it impious to avoid pestilences and epidemics by sanitation and hygiene, and though some still maintain that diseases are sent by God, they do not argue that it is therefore impious to try to avoid them. The consequent improvement in health and in increase of longevity is one of the most remarkable and admirable characteristics of our age. Even if science had done nothing else for human happiness, it would deserve our gratitude on this account. Those who believe in the utility of theological creeds would have difficulty in pointing to any comparable advantage that they have conferred upon the human race.


      CHAPTER V — SOUL AND BODY
      [This chapter is very largely philosophical, starting with the Pythagoreans who influenced Plato, and Aristotle; and Museus, Orpheus as quoted in the Republic by Plato; Aquinas; Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel..]
      Aquinas 1225-1274 [no books of his mentioned] .. Teachers and educational institutions controlled by the Vatican must make it clear that the only true system is that of the seraphic doctor. The utmost permissible licence is to suggest, as his translator does, that he is joking when he discusses what happens at the resurrection of the body to a cannibal whose father and mother were cannibals. Clearly the people whom he and his parents ate have a prior right to the flesh composing his body, so that he will be left destitute when each claims his own. This is a real difficulty for those who believe in the resurrection of the body, which is affirmed by the Apostles Creed. It is a mark of the intellectual enfeeblement of orthodoxy in our age that it should retain the dogma while treating as a mere pleasantry a grave discussion of awkward problems connected with it. .. Objection to cremation.. my brother.. cremated at Marseilles.. the undertaker had hardly any previous cases of it..
      115: .. 'Substance' is a notion derived from syntax, and syntax is derived from the more-or-less unconscious metaphysic of the primitive races who determined the structure of our languages. Sentences are analysed into subject and predicate and it is thought that, while some words may occur either as subject or predicate, that here are others which (in some not very obvious sense) can only occur as subjects; these words - of which proper names are the best examples - are supposed to denote "substances". The popular word for the same idea is "thing" or "person" when applied to human beings. The metaphysical conception of substance is only an attempt to give precision to what common sense means by a thing or a person. .. Socrates was wise, Socrates was Greek, Socrates taught Plato.. in all these statements we attribute different attributes to Socrates. .. Socrates has exactly the same meaning in all these sentences, and the man Socrates is thus something different from his attributes, something in which attributes are said to 'inhere'. Natural knowledge only enables us to recognise a thing by its attributes: if Socrates had a twin with exactly the same attributes we should not be able to tell them apart. Nevertheless a substance is something other than the sum of its attributes. This appears most clearly from the doctrine of the Eucharist. In transubstantiation the attributes of the bread remain but the substance belongs to the body of Christ. In the period of the rise of modern philosophy, all the innovators from Descartes to Leibniz except Spinoza took great pains to prove their doctrines were consistent with transubstantiation. The authorities hesitated for a long time but finally decided that safety was only to be found in scholasticism. It thus appeared that, apart from revelation, we could never be sure whether a thing or person seen at one time was or was not identical with a thing or person seen at another time. We were in fact exposed to the risk of a perpetual comedy of errors. Under Locke's influence, his followers took a step upon which he did not venture. They denied the whole utility of the notion of substance. Socrates, they said, insofar as we can know anything about him, is known by his attributes. When you have said when and where he lived, what he looked like, what he did and so on, you have said all there is to say about him. There is no need to suppose an entirely unknowable core, in which his attributes inhere, like pins in a pin-cushion. ... The conception of substance as something having attributes but distinct from any and all of them was retained by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, also, though with greatly diminished emphasis, by Locke. It was however rejected by Hume, and has gradually been extruded both from psychology and from physics. ... [More of this in this chapter, but it doesn't seem to fit well in with the scheme of the book. Kant; Descartes; perception; memory; physics] ... the Roman Catholic belief that the soul survives the death of the body is a doctrine which has been widely held by Christians and non-Christians, by civilized men and by barbarians. The Pharisees believed in immortality among the Jews at the time of Christ, but the Sadducees who adhered to an older tradition did not. In Christianity the belief in the life everlasting has always held a very prominent place: the soul enjoyed felicity after a period of purifying suffering in purgatory. According to Roman Catholic belief, others endure unending torments in Hell..
      .. In modern times.. liberal Christians often incline to the view that hell is not eternal has come to be held by many clergymen in the Church of England since the Privy Council in 1864 decided that it was not illegal for them to do so. But until the middle of the 19 C very few professing Christians doubted the reality of eternal punishment. .. The fear of Hell was, and to a lesser extent still is, a source of the deepest anxiety, which much diminished the comfort to be derived from belief in survival. The motive of saving others from hell was urged as a justification of persecution; for if a heretic, by misleading others, could cause them to suffer damnation, no degree of earthly torture could be considered excessive if employed to prevent so terrible a result. For, whatever may now be thought, it was formerly believed, except by a small minority, that heresy was incompatible with salvation. The decay in the belief in hell was not due to any new theological arguments, nor yet to the direct influence of science, but to the general diminution of ferocity which took place during the 18th and 19th Cs. It is part of the same movement which led shortly before the French Revolution to the abolition of judicial torture in many countries and which in the early 19th C led to the reformation of the savage penal code by which England had been disgraced. In the present day, even among those who still believe in hell, the number of those who are condemned to suffer its torments is thought to be much smaller than was formerly held. Our fiercer passions nowadays take a political rather than a theological direction.
      It is a curious fact that, as the belief in hell has grown less definite, belief in heaven has also lost vividness. Although heaven is still a recognized part of Christian orthodoxy, much less is said about it in modern discussions than about evidences of divine purpose in evolution. Arguments in favour of religion now dwell more upon its influence in promoting a good life here on earth, than on its connection with the life hereafter. The belief that this life is merely a preparation for another, which formerly influenced morals and conduct, has now ceased to have much influence, even on those who have not consciously rejected it.
      [.. psychical research:] I have not myself sufficient knowledge on the subject to judge of the evidence already available, but it is clear that there could be evidence which would convince reasonable men. To this however certain provisos must be added. In the first place the evidence at the best would only prove that we survive death, not that we survive for ever. In the second place, where strong desires are involved, it is very difficult to accept the testimony even of habitually accurate persons; of this there was much evidence during the war, and in all times of great excitement. In the third place, if, upon other grounds, it seems unlikely that our personality is not dying with our body, we shall require much stronger evidence of survival than we should if we thought the hypothesis antecedently probable. Not even the most ardent believer in spiritualism could pretend to have as much evidence of survival as historians can adduce to prove that witches did bodily homage to Satan, yet hardly anyone now regards the evidence of such accounts as even worth examining.
      The difficulty for science arises from the fact that there does not seem to be such an entity as the soul or self. As we saw, it is no longer possible to regard soul and body as two "substances" having that endurance through time which metaphysicians regarded as logically bound up with the notion of substance. Nor is there any reason in psychology to assume a "subject" in contact with an "object". An atom is now merely the convenient way of grouping certain occurrences. ...
      140: .. These two ways of defining a person.. one of them being each person's private experience.. other derives from the body.. these two ways conflict in cases of what is known as dual personality. In such cases, what seems to outside observation to be one person is subjectively split in two. Sometimes neither knows anything of the other; sometimes one knows the other but not vice versa. In cases where neither knows anything of the other there are two persons if memory is used as the definition, but only one if the body is used. There is a regular gradation to the extreme of dual personality through absent-mindedness, hypnosis, and sleep-walking. This makes a difficulty in using memory as the definition of personality, but it appears that lost memories can be recovered by hypnotism or in the course of psycho-analysis, so perhaps the difficulty is not insuperable.
      ... habit.. personality being a matter of organisation.. We may regret the thought that we shall not survive..

      CHAPTER VI — DETERMINISM
      [Another very philosophical chapter, starting with the definition of 'science'] .. Determinism has a two-fold character. On the one hand it is a practical maxim for the guidance of scientific investigators; on the other hand it is a general doctrine as to the nature of the universe. The practical maxim may be sound even if the general doctrine is untrue or uncertain. .. The maxim advises men to seek causal laws, that is to say rules connecting events at one time with events at another. In our everyday life we guide our conduct by rules of this sort, but the rules that we use purchase simplicity at the expense of accuracy. If I press the switch, the electric light will come on, unless it is fused; if I strike a match, it will burn, unless the head flies off; and so on. Such rules will not do for science, which wants something invariable. This ideal was fixed by Newtonian astronomy, where, by the means of the law of gravity, the past and the future positions of the planets can be calculated throughout periods of indefinite vastness. ... smaller degree of regularity of periodic recurrence.. nevertheless, causal laws have been discovered in chemistry and electromagnetism, in biology and even in economics. This discovery of causal laws is the essence of science, and therefore there can be no doubt that scientists do right to look for them. [I'd assumed from one of his essays that he didn't believe in 'cause'; but perhaps it was 'first cause' that he regarded as obsolete; there's a letter in 'Dear Bertrand Russell' open to just the same ambiguity of interpretation] .. Causal laws themselves do not necessarily involve the complete determination of the future by the past. It is a causal law that the sons of white people are also white, but if this was the only law of heredity known we should not be able to predict much about the sons of white parents. Determinism as a general doctrine asserts that complete determination of the future by the past is always possible, theoretically, if we know enough about the past and about causal laws. It is difficult if not impossible to state this precisely: when we try to do so, we find ourselves asserting that this or that is "theoretically possible"; no-one knows what "theoretically" means, and it is no use to assert that "there are" laws which determine the future, unless we add that we may hope to find them out. The future obviously will be what it will be, and in that sense is already determined: an omniscient God such as the orthodox believe in, must now know the whole course of the future; there is, therefore, if an omniscient god exists, a present fact - namely its foreknowledge - from which the future could be inferred. This however lies outside what can be scientifically tested. If the doctrine of determinism is to assert anything that can be made probable or improbable by evidence, it must be stated in relation to our human powers. If we are to have a doctrine that can be tested, [note: relevant to Popper?] it is not enough to say that the whole course of nature must be determined by causal laws. This might be true, and yet indiscoverable - for example, if what is more distant had more effect than what is nearer, we should then need a detailed knowledge of the most distant stars before we could foresee what was going to happen on earth. If we are to be able to test our doctrine, we must be able to state it in relation to a finite part of the universe... We cannot know the whole universe... Things from outside may always crash in and have unexpected effects.. We could attempt to escape from this difficulty in the following manner. Let us suppose we know everything that is happening at the beginning of 1936, within a certain sphere of which we occupy the centre. We will assume, for the sake of definiteness, that the sphere is so large that it takes just a year for light to travel from the circumference to the centre; then, since nothing travels faster than light, everything that happens at the centre of the sphere in 1936 must, if determinism is true, be dependent only on what was inside the sphere at the beginning of the year. ... We can therefore now state the hypothesis of determinism, though I am afraid the statement is rather complicated. The hypothesis is as follows:
      There are discoverable causal laws such that, given sufficient (but not superhuman) powers of calculation, a man who knows all that is happening within a certain sphere at a certain time can predict all that will happen at the centre of the sphere during the time it takes light to travel from the circumference of the sphere to the centre.
      I want it to be clearly understood that I am not asserting this principle to be true; I am only asserting that it is what must be meant by determinism if there is to be any evidence either for it or against it. I do not know whether the principle is true, and no more does anybody else; it may be regarded as an ideal which science has held before itself, but it cannot be regarded, unless on some a priori ground, as either certainly true or certainly false. Perhaps, when we come to examine the arguments that have been used for and against determinism, we shall find that what people have had in mind was something rather less definite than the principle at which we have arrived.
      For the first time in history, determinism is now being challenged by men of science on scientific grounds.. through the study of the atom by the new methods of quantum mechanics. The leader of the attack has been Sir Arthur Eddington.. according to quantum mechanics, it cannot be known what an atom will do in given circumstances; there are a definite set of alternatives open to it, and it chooses sometimes one, sometimes another.. It now appears that all these laws may be merely statistical.. the atoms chose among possibilities in a certain proportion.. being, a giant who could not see individual men.. never became aware of an aggregate of less than a million.. he would notice that Mr Dixon was in bed and did not take his usual train, and the next day Mr Simpson.. the average is not affected..
      [several more examples:] ... mechanics.. large bodies.. behaviour is only probable and approximate.. 157: a determinist might say it is analogous to male and female births.. in Great Britain there are about 21 male for every 20 female births.. although not necessarily in any one family.. everybody believes that there are causes which determine sex in each separate case; we think that the statistical law.. proportion .. must be a consequence of laws which apply in individual cases.. tossing a penny.. the calculation is too complicated for us so we do not know what will happen in any particular case.. long before quantum mechanics were invented, statistical laws already played an important part in physics.. gas consists of vast number of molecules moving at random.. when the average speed is great, the gas is hot; when it is small the gas is cold..
      160: The theory of probability is in a very unsatisfactory state, both logically and mathematically; I do not believe there is any alchemy by which it can produce regularity in large numbers out of pure caprice in each single case. If the penny really chose by caprice whether to fall heads or tails, have we any reason to say that it would choose one about as often as the other? Might not caprice lead just as well always to the same choice? This is no more than a suggestion, since the subject is too obscure for dogmatic statements.
      163: [Other things vaguely related to religion:] The emotional importance supposed to belong to free will seems to me to rest mainly upon certain confusions upon thought. People imagine that, if the will has causes, they may be compelled to do things that they did not wish to do. This of course is a mistake; the wish is the cause of action, even if the wish itself has causes. We can't do what we would rather not do, but it seems unreasonable to complain of this limitation. It is unpleasant when our wishes are thwarted, but this is no more likely to happen if they are caused than if they are uncaused. Not does determinism warrant the feeling that we are impotent. Power consists in being able to have intended effects, and this is neither increased nor diminished by the discovery of causes of our intentions.
      Believers in free will always, in another mental compartment, believe simultaneously that volitions have causes. They think, for example, that virtue can be inculcated by good upbringing, and that religious education is very useful to morals. They believe that sermons do good, and that moral exhortation may be beneficial. Now it is obvious that, if virtuous volitions are uncaused, we cannot do anything whatever to promote them. To the extent to which a man believes that it is in his power, or in any man's power, to promote desirable behaviour in others, to that extent he believes in psychological causation and not in free will. In practice, the whole of our dealings with each other are based upon the assumption that men's actions will result from antecedent circumstances. Political propaganda, the criminal law, the writing of books urging this or that line of action, would all lose their raison d'etre if they had no effect upon what people do. The implications of the free will doctrine are not realised by those who uphold it. We say "Why did you do it?" and expect the answer to mention beliefs and desires which caused actions. When a man does not himself know why he acted as he did, we may search his unconscious for a cause, but it never occurs to us that there may have been no cause.
      ... It is said that introspection makes us immediately aware of free will. Insofar as this is taken in a sense which precludes causation, it is a mere mistake. What we know is that, when we have made a choice, we could have chosen otherwise - if we had wanted to do so. We cannot know by mere introspection whether there were or were not causes of our wanting to do what we did. In the cases of actions which are very rational, we may know their causes. When we take legal or medical or financial advice and act upon it, we know the advice is the cause of our action. But in general the causes of our acts are not to be discovered by introspection; they are to be discovered, like those of other events, by observing their antecedents and discovering some law of sequence. It should be said, further, that the notion of "will" is very obscure, and is probably one that would disappear from a scientific psychology. Most of our actions are not preceded by anything that feels like an act of will; it is a form of mental disease to be unable to do simple things without a previous decision. We may, for instance, decide to walk to a certain place, and then, if we know the way, the putting of one foot before another until we arrive proceeds of itself. It is only the original decision that is felt to involve "will". When we decide after deliberation, two or more possibilities have been in our minds, each more or less attractive, and perhaps each more or less repulsive; in the end, one has proved the most attractive, and has overpowered the others. When one tries to discover volition by introspection, one finds a sense of muscular tenseness, and sometimes an emphatic sentence: "I will do this". But I, for one, cannot find in myself any specific kind of mental occurrence that I could call "will". ... ...
      168: [Note: asymmetry:] Perennial controversies, such as that between determinism and free will, arise from the conflict of two strong but logically irreconcilable passions. Determinism has the advantage that power comes through the discovery of causal laws; science, in spite of its conflict with theological prejudice, has been accepted because it gave power. Belief that the course of nature is regular also gives a sense of security; it enables us up to a point to foresee the future and prevent unpleasant occurrences. When illnesses and storms were attributed to capricious diabolical agencies, they were much more terrifying than they are now. All these motives lead men to like determinism. But while they like to have power over nature, they do not like nature to have power over them. If they are obliged to believe that, before the human race existed, laws were at work which, by a kind of blind necessity, produced not only men and women in general but oneself with all one's idiosyncrasies, saying and doing at this moment whatever one is saying or doing - they feel robbed of personality, futile, unimportant, slaves of circumstances, unable to vary in the slightest degree the part assigned to them by nature from the very beginning. From this dilemma, some men seek to escape by assuming freedom in human beings and determinism everywhere else, others by ingeniously sophistical attempts at a logical reconciliation of freedom with determinism. In fact, we have no reason to adopt either alternative, but we also have no reason to suppose the truth, whatever it may be, is such as to combine the agreeable features of both, or is in any degree determinable by relation to our desires. [End of chapter]

      CHAPTER VII — MYSTICISM
      [First sentence:] The warfare between science and theology has been of a peculiar sort. At all times and places - except in late 18th C France and Soviet Russia - the majority of scientific men have supported the orthodoxy of their age. Some of the most eminent have been in the majority. Newton, though an Arian, was in all other respects a supporter of the Christian faith. Cuvier was a model of Catholic correctness. Faraday was a Sandymanian, [sic; surely Sandemanian] ... The warfare was between theology and science, not men of science. Even when the men of science held view which were condemned, they generally did their best to avoid conflict. Copernicus, as we saw, dedicated his book to the Pope; Galileo retracted; Descartes, though he thought it prudent to live in Holland, took great pains to remain on good terms with ecclesiastics, and by calculated silence escaped censure for sharing Galileo's opinions. In the 19th C most British men of science still thought that there was no essential conflict between their science and those parts of the Christian faith which liberal Christians still regarded as essential - for it had been found possible to sacrifice the literal truth of the Flood, and even of Adam and Eve. The situation at the present day is not very different from what it has been at all times since the victory of Copernicus. Successive scientific discoveries have caused Christians to abandon one after another of the beliefs which the Middle Ages regarded as integral parts of the faith, and these successive retreats have enabled men of science to remain Christians unless their work is on that disputed frontier which the warfare has reached in our day. Now, as at most times during the last three centuries, it is proclaimed that science and religion have become reconciled: the scientists modestly admit that there are realms which lie outside science, and the liberal theologians concede that they would not venture to deny anything capable of scientific proof. There is, it is true, still a few disturbers of the peace: on one side, fundamentalists and stubborn Catholic theologians; on the other side the more radical students of such subjects as biochemistry and animal psychology, who refuse to grant even the comparatively modest demands of the more enlightened churchmen. But on the whole, the fight is languid compared to what it was. The newer creeds of Communism and Fascism are the inheritors of theological bigotry; and perhaps in some region of the unconscious, bishops and professors feel themselves jointly interested in the maintenance of the status quo.
      173: ... [Point about the BBC - this of course was radio:] The present relations between science and religion as the State wishes them to appear may be ascertained from a very instructive volume, Science and Religion, a symposium consisting of twelve talks broadcast by the BBC in the autumn of 1930. Outspoken opponents of religion were of course not included since (to mention no other argument) they would have pained the more orthodox among the listeners. There was, it is true, an excellent introductory talk by Professor Julian Huxley, which contained no support for even the most shadowy orthodoxy, but it also contained little that liberal churchmen would now find objectionable. .. The speakers.. Professor Malinowski's pathetic avowal of a balked longing to believe in God and immortality.. Father O'Hara's bold assertion that the truths of revelation are more certain than those of science.. Canon Streeter.. "a remarkable thing about the foregoing lectures.. their general drift had been in the same direction.. the idea that science by itself is not enough." Whether this unanimity is a fact about science and religion, or about the authorities who control the BBC, may be questioned. .. J Arthur Thomson says science never asks why.. Professor J S Haldane holds that 'it is only within our selves, in our active ideals of truth, right, charity, and beauty, and consequent fellowship with others, that we find the revelation of God.'       [Russell doesn't quote theologians, 'since their concurrence is to be expected'] .. 175: When Canon Streeter says that science is not enough, in one sense he is uttering a truism: science doesn't include art or friendship or various other valuable elements in life but of course more than this is meant. There is another rather more important sense in which science is not enough, which seems to me also true. Science has nothing to say about values. It cannot prove such propositions as 'it is better to love than to hate' or 'kindness is more desirable than cruelty'. But the authors I have quoted certainly mean to assert something further, which I believe to be false. "Science does not pretend to be arbiter of truth" implies there is another non-scientific method of arriving at the truth. Dean Inge is explicit on revelation. The proof of religion then is experimental, he said, speaking of the testimony of the mystics. He says a progressive knowledge of God under the three attributes by which he has revealed to mankind what are sometimes called the absolute or eternal values, goodness or love, truth, and beauty. If that is all, you will say, there is no reason why religion should come into conflict with natural science at all. One deals with facts, the other values. This is not quite true. We have seen science poaching upon ethics, poetry, and what not. Religion cannot help poaching either. That is to say, religion must make assertions about what is and not only about what ought to be. This opinion, by Inge, is implicit in the words of Thomson and Malinowski.
      .. [Men of science's experiments; how the experiment was performed, so others can repeat it:] 179: Russell asserted in Mysticism and Logic that mystics vary greatly in the capacity for giving verbal expression. He thinks the following three points are maintained by all of them: 1. that all division and separateness is unreal, and that the universe is a single indivisible unity; 2. that evil is illusory, and that the illusion arises through falsely regarding a part as self-subsistent; 3. that time is unreal, that reality is eternal, not in the sense of being everlasting, but in the sense of being wholly outside time. I do not pretend this is a complete account of the matters on which all mystics concur, but the three propositions I have mentioned may serve as representatives of the whole. [.. what should we make of this, to a jury?] We shall find that, in the first place, while the witnesses agree up to a point, they disagree when that point is passed, although they are just as certain as when they agree. For example, visions in a which a virgin appears. Truths revealed by the archangel Gabriel, if you are Christian or Mohammedan, or the Taoists say that all government is bad. ... ... There is also a definite physical discipline called Yoga, which is practised in order to produce the mystic certainty. Breathing exercises are the most important feature.. [book he quotes is Waley, The Way and the Power, as regards yoga in China. At some point he also quotes William James on nitrous oxide, which produces a similar feeling. (Nothing on more recently publicised or discovered things like LSD, psilocybin). Great deal of stuff on what is 'unreal', with the meaning and distinctions of words:] There must be nothing in reality corresponding to the apparent distinction between earlier and later events. To say that we are born and then grow and die must be jut as false as to say that we die, then grow small and finally we are born. ... [Mostly concerned with Dean Inge, 'for whom on many grounds I have very high respect'.]
      184: [Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy on Parmenides, great tradition, from Parmenides to Hegel:] What is, is uncreated and indestructible, for it is complete, immovable, and without end. Also, Parmenides said, there is a vague Unknowable, as with Herbert Spencer. [Also mentions the Bishop of Birmingham]
      [Last few lines of the chapter:] I cannot admit any method of arriving at truth other except that of science, but in the realm of the emotions I do not deny the value of the experiences which have given rise to religion. Through association with false beliefs, they have led to much evil as well as good. Freed from this association, it may be hoped that good alone will remain.

      CHAPTER VIII — COSMIC PURPOSE
[Carries on from the previous chapter; Sir J Arthur Thomson. I thought I'd found a quote here to the effect that it's perfectly right that science has nothing to say on things like good and bad and so on, but then neither does anything else. Perhaps I was thinking of the end of Chapter IX]
      190: .. Cosmic purpose.. doctrines.. theistic.. pantheistic could not be considered emergent. The first, which is the simplest and most orthodox, holds that God created the world and decreed the laws of nature because he foresaw that in time some good would be evolved. In this view, the purpose exists consciously in the mind of the creator, but remains external to his creation. In the pantheistic form, god is not external to the universe, but is merely the universe considered as a whole. There cannot therefore be an act of creation but there is a kind of creative force in the universe. .. In the emergent form, the purpose is more blind. At an earlier stage, nothing in the universe foresees a later stage but a kind of blind impulsion leads to those changes to bring more developed forms into existence. [Mentions BBC talks again: Bishop of Birmingham [Dr Barnes] is theistic, Haldane is pantheistic, and Prof Alexander is the emergent form. 'Although Bergson and Professor Lloyd Morgan are perhaps more typical representatives.']
      .. Barnes.. rationality in the universe akin to the rational mind of man. This makes us doubt whether the cosmic process is not directed by mind. There has obviously in this vast panorama been progress which has culminated in the creation of civilised man. Is that progress the outcome of blind forces? It seems to be fantastic to say yes. [Russell continues with omnipotence and so on, and the conception of purpose being a natural one to apply to a human being..] But omnipotence is subject to no such limitations if God really thinks well of the human race - an unplausible hypothesis, it seems to me. Why not proceed as in Genesis to create man at once? What is the point of ichthyosaurs, dinosaurs [sic], diplodoci, mastodons, and so on. Dr Barnes himself confesses that the purpose of a tapeworm is a mystery. What about rabies and hydrophobia and so on? It is no answer to say that the laws of nature inevitably produce evil as well as good, for god decreed the laws of nature. ..
      .. [Dean Inge] .. Outspoken Essays.. at least two volumes.. presages Haldane's views are connected with Hegel, and like everything Hegelian, it is not very easy to understand. .. According to Haldane, there is no such thing strictly speaking as dead matter, or living matter. .. [Possibly something similar in Wells' Mind at the End of its Tether: idea that non-living matter is hot, energetic, radioactive, and it's only in the late decaying stage of matter that you get life. This is also in 'War of the Worlds']
      .. [Haldane. Russell opposes a book The Mechanistic Conception of Life by Jacques Loeb, French, 1912, talking about reproduction on purely mechanical principles.. also.. Encyclopedia Britannica.. pages and pages about memories, psychology, space, the mind, and so on. Here's a statement that leaves Russell gasping:] 208: Like all who follow Hegel, he is anxious to show that nothing is really separate from anything else. .. if one accepts this argument then each man's past and future should co-exist with his present, and that the space in which we all live is also inside each of us. He also has a further step to take in the proof that "personalities do not exclude one another". He says an active ideal of truth, justice, charity, and beauty is always present in us.. The ideal is moreover one ideal, although it has different aspects. It is these common ideals and the fellowship they create from which comes a revelation of god. That leaves me gasping. .. Does he really think that Hitler and Einstein have one ideal, though it has different aspects? Hitler's ideas come mainly from Nietzsche, in whom there is every evidence of complete sincerity. ..
      .. Professor Alexander.. the emergent view.. close affinity with that of Bergson's Creative Evolution.. Bergson holds that determinism is mistaken because in the course of evolution genuine novelties emerge, which could not have been predicted in advance, or even imagined. .. various difficulties make the philosophy of emergent evolution unsatisfactory. Perhaps the chief of these is that, in order to escape from determinism, prediction is made impossible, and yet the adherents predict the future existence of god. They are exactly in the position of Bergson's shellfish which wants to see, although it doesn't know what seeing is.
      Prof Alexander maintains that we have a vague awareness of "deity" in some experiences which he describes as "numinous". The feeling which characterises such events is, he says, "a sense of mystery at something which may terrify us or may support us in our helplessness, but at any rate, which is other than anything we know by our own senses or our own reflection. He gives no reason for attaching importance to this feeling, or for supposing that, as his theory demands, mental development makes it become a larger element in life. From anthropologists one would infer the exact opposite. ... The argument is extraordinarily thin. There have been, it is urged, three stages in evolution: matter, life, and mind. .. There is no reason to suppose that the world has finished evolving; there is very likely to be at some stage a 4th age and a 5th and 6th and so on, one would suppose. But no. With the fourth phase, evolution is to be complete. Now matter could not have foreseen life and life could not have foreseen mind, but mind can dimly foresee the next stage, particularly if it is the mind of a Papuan or a Bushman. It is obvious that all this is the merest guesswork. It may happen to be true, but there is no rational reason for supposing so. The philosophy of emergence is quite right in saying the future is unpredictable, but having said this it at once proceeds to predict the future.
      .. James Jeans.. considers it doubtful whether there is life anywhere else. If it is the purpose of the cosmos to evolve mind, we must regard it as rather incompetent in producing so little in such a long time. .. Second law of thermodynamics, telling us that on the whole energy is passing from the more concentrated to less concentrated forms, and that in the end it will have all passed into a form from which further change is impossible. Therefore life will cease. .. Jeans says 'the three centuries which have elapsed since Giordano Bruno suffered martyrdom for believing in the plurality of worlds have changed our conception of the universe almost beyond description. But they have not brought us appreciably nearer to understanding the relation of life to the universe. ... Throwing humility aside, shall we venture to imagine that it is the only reality which creates instead of being created by the colossal masses of the stars and the nebulae, and the almost inconceivably long vistas of astronomical time?' [Russell goes on to consider that, and also discusses what he calls 'the last question', which is 'are we really so splendid as to justify such a long prologue?' Isn't there something absurd in the spectacle of human beings holding a mirror before themselves and thinking what they behold is so excellent as to prove a cosmic purpose must have been aiming at it all along? Lions and tigers destroy fewer lives than we do, and they are much more beautiful. How about ants; they manage the corporate state much better than any fascist. What about nightingales, larks, and deer? They are not cruel, unjust, or war-mongering. Believers in cosmic purpose make much of our supposed intelligence, but their writings make one doubt it...
      .. Man as a curious accident in a backwater is intelligible; his mixture of virtues and vices is such as might be expected to result from a fortuitous origin; but only abysmal self-complacency can see in man a reason which Omniscience could consider adequate as a motive for the creator. ... [the Copernican revolution not having done its work yet.]

      CHAPTER IX — SCIENCE AND ETHICS
[Again, very philosophical; mentions Waley's book again]
      233: Let us take the legislator first. I will assume for the sake of argument that the legislator is personally disinterested. That is to say, when he recognises one of his desires as being concerned only with his own welfare, he does not let this influence him in framing the laws, for example his code is not designed to increase his personal fortune, but he has other desires which seem to him impersonal. He may believe in an ordered hierarchy from king to peasant, or from mine-owner to black indentured labour. He may believe that women should be submissive to men. He may hold that the spread of knowledge to lower classes is dangerous. .. He will then, if he can, so construct his code that conduct promoting the ends which he values shall as far as possible be in accordance with individual self-interest; that he will establish a system of moral instruction which will, where it succeeds, make men feel wicked if they pursue other purposes than his. Thus "virtue" will come to be in fact, though not in subjective estimation, subservience to the desires of the legislator, insofar as he considers these desires worthy to be universalized. [Footnote: Compare the following advice by a contemporary of Aristotle, Chinese not Greek, from Waley: A ruler should not listen to those who believe in people having opinions of their own, and in the importance of the individual. Such teachings cause men to withdraw to quiet places and hide away in caves or on mountains, there to rail at the prevailing government, sneer at those in authority, belittle the importance of rank and emoluments, and despise all who hold official posts.] The standpoint and method of the preacher are necessarily somewhat different, because he does not control the machinery of the State, and therefore cannot produce an artificial harmony between his desires and those of others. His only method is to try to rouse in others the same desires that he feels himself, and for this purpose his appeal must be to the emotions, as Ruskin caused people to like Gothic architecture, not by argument, but by the moving effect of his rhythmical prose. Uncle Tom's Cabin helped people think slavery an evil by causing them to imagine themselves as slaves. Every attempt to persuade people that something is good (or bad) in itself, not merely in its effects, depends upon the art of rousing feelings, not upon an appeal to evidence. In every case the preacher's skill consists in creating in others emotions similar to his own - or dissimilar, if he is a hypocrite. I am not saying this as a criticism of the preacher, but as an analysis of the central character of his activity.
      [Goes into subjective ethics:] 237: When a man says "This is good in itself" he seems to be making a statement just as much as if he said "This is square" or "This is sweet." I believe this to be a mistake. [This of course was what Santayana persuaded him of]. It is a form of the doctrine which is called the subjectivity of values. The doctrine consists in maintaining that if two men differ about values, there is not a disagreement as to any kind of truth, but a difference of taste. If one man says I think oysters are good and another says I think they are bad, we recognise that there is nothing to argue about. The theory in question holds that all differences in values are of this sort, although we do not naturally think them so, when we are dealing with matters that seem to us more exalted than oysters. The chief ground for adopting this view is the complete impossibility of finding any arguments to prove that this or that has intrinsic value. .. The consequences of this doctrine are considerable. In the first place, there can no such thing as sin in any absolute sense. What one man calls sin, another may call virtue, and though they may dislike each other on account of this difference, neither can convict the other of intellectual error. ..
      - 240: [Something I've been unable to follow:] Those who believe in "objective values" often contend that the view which I have been advocating has immoral consequences. This seems to me to be due to faulty reasoning. There are, as has already been said, certain ethical consequences of the doctrine of subjective values, of which the most important is the rejection of vindictive punishment and the notion of "sin", but the general consequences which are feared, such as the decay of all sense of moral obligation, are not to be logically deduced. Moral obligation, if it is to influence conduct, must consist not merely of a belief, but of a desire. A desire, I may be told, is the desire to be "good" in the sense which I no longer allow. But when we analyse the desire to be "good" it generally resolves itself into a desire to be approved, or alternatively, to act so as to bring about certain general consequences which we desire. We have wishes which are not purely personal, and if we had not, no amount of ethical teaching would influence our conduct, except through fear of disapproval. The sort of life that most of us admire is one which can be guided by large impersonal desires; now such desires can, no doubt, be encouraged by example, education, and knowledge, but they can hardly be created by the mere abstract belief that they are good, or discouraged by an analysis of what is meant by "good". ... human race etc..
      .. I conclude that, while it is true that science cannot decide questions of value, it is because they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know.

      CHAPTER X — CONCLUSION
[Short; eight pages]
      244: .. We have seen in the period since Copernicus whenever science and theology have disagreed, science has proved victorious. [NB: I'm not sure that he has actually proved that] We have seen also that where practical issues were involved, as in witchcraft and medicine, science has stood for a diminution of suffering while theology has encouraged man's natural savagery. [Russell notes at some point that the Black Death in 1348 caused superstition.. scientific medicine was practised by the Jews who had got their knowledge from the Mohammedans. He mentions Pope Pius V] The spread of the scientific outlook as opposed to theological has indisputably made, hitherto, for happiness. 244: The issue is now, however, entering upon a wholly new phase, and this for two reasons. First, that scientific technique is becoming more important in effects than the scientific temper of mind; secondly, that newer religions have taken the place of Christianity and are repeating the errors of which Christianity has repented.
      245: .. The scientific temper of mind is cautious, tentative, and piecemeal. It doesn't imagine that it knows the whole truth. But out of theoretical science, a scientific technique has developed, and a scientific technique has none of the tentativeness of the theory. Physics has been revolutionised during the present century by relativity and quantum theory, but all the inventions based upon the old physics are still found satisfactory. The application of electricity to industry in daily life including.. power stations, broadcasting.. and electric light is based on the work of Clerk Maxwell, published over sixty years ago, and none of these inventions has failed to work because .. Clerk Maxwell's views were in many ways inadequate. .. practical experts who employ scientific technique .. governments and large firms.. acquire a quite different temper from that of the men of science; a temper full of the sense of limitless power, of arrogant certainty, and a pleasure in manipulation even of human material. It is the very reverse of the scientific temper, but it cannot be denied that science has helped to promote it.
      246: .. The direct effects of scientific technique also have been by no means wholly beneficial. On the one hand they have increased the destructiveness of weapons of war, and the proportion of a population that can be spared from peaceful industry for fighting and the manufacture of munitions. On the other hand, by increasing the productivity of labour, they have made the old economic system which depended on scarcity very difficult to work, and by the violent impact of new ideas they have thrown ancient civilisations off their balance, driving China into chaos and Japan into ruthless imperialism on the western model. Russia, in a violent attempt to establish a new economic system, and Germany, in a violent attempt to maintain the old one. These evils of our time are all due in part to scientific technique, and therefore ultimately to science.
      .. [section apparently praising religion:] The warfare between science and Christian theology, in spite of an occasional skirmish on the outposts, is nearly ended, and I think most Christians would admit their religion is the better for it. Christianity has been purified of inessentials inherited from a barbarous age, and nearly cured of the desire to persecute. There remains among more liberal Christians, an ethical doctrine which is valuable: an acceptance of Christ's teaching that we should love our neighbours, and the belief that in each individual there is something deserving respect, even if it is no longer to be called a soul. There is also, in the churches, a growing belief that Christians should oppose war. But.. new religions have arisen with the persecuting zeal of vigorous youth [sic] and with this greater readiness to oppose science as characterised the Inquisition at the time of Galileo. If you maintain in Germany that Christ was a Jew or in Russia that the atom has lost its substantiality and become a mere series of events you are liable to very severe punishment. The persecution of intellectuals in Germany and in Russia has surpassed in severity anything perpetrated by the churches during the last 250 years.
      .. The science which in the present day bears the brunt of persecution most directly, is economics. In England - now, as always, an exceptionally tolerant country - a man whose views on economics are obnoxious to the government will escape all penalties if he keeps his opinion to himself, or expresses them only in books of a certain length. But even in England the expression of Communist opinions in speeches or cheap pamphlets exposes a man to loss of livelihood and occasional periods in prison. Under a recent Act, which so far has not been used to its full extent, not only the author of writings which the government considers seditious, but any man who possesses them, is liable to penalties, on the ground that he may contemplate using them to undermine the loyalty of His Majesty's Forces ...
      .. Germany.. Russia.. Galileo.. If there had been a country where the men of science could have persecuted Christians, perhaps Galileo's friends would not have protested .. intolerant.. only against that of the opposite party.. In that case his friends would have exalted his doctrines into a dogma..
      .. economics.. It may be urged that persecution nowadays is political and economic rather than theological, but that would be unhistorical. Luther's attack on indulgences caused vast financial losses to the Pope. Henry VIII's revolt deprived him of a large revenue which he had enjoyed since Henry III. Elizabeth persecuted Roman Catholics because they wanted to replace her by Mary Queen of Scots or Philip II. Science weakened the hold of the church and in many countries led to the confiscation of much ecclesiastical property. .. other new truth is often inconvenient to some vested interests. The Protestant doctrine that it is not necessary to fast on Fridays was vehemently resisted by Elizabethan fishmongers, but it is in the interest of the community at large that new truths should be freely promulgated. The threat to intellectual freedom is greater in our day than at any time since 1660, but it does not now come from Christian churches. It comes from governments which owing to the modern danger of anarchy and chaos have succeeded to the sacrosanct character formerly belonging to ecclesiastical authorities. It is the clear duty of men of science to protest against the new forms of persecution rather than congratulate them on the decay of older forms. .. [Comments on what's really happening in Russia, and Germany] .. New truth.. important.. most important of our intelligent but wayward species.



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Power by Bertrand Russell;
NB a new British paperback edition has a painfully embarrassing cover design—with an electric power plug. The 1960s paperback by Allen & Unwin, illustrated above, showed what looked like a coin with Alexander the Great brandishing a shield and spear, a neat combination of propaganda, military and economic powers.
 

Review of   Bertrand Russell   Power: A New Social Analysis   published October 1938

Note: This review is also published within my collected reviews of most of Russell's books here.

Bertrand Russell wanted to invent a new science of human power. Review notes: June 26, 2010/ 4 Sept 2013/ 4 Sept 2014/ 18 March 2015/ 4 July 2015/ 18 Sept 2015/ 16 November 2017 on Germany, Jews, and WW2/ 2 May 2018/ 11 May 2018/ and later comments, up to 17 Jan 2024
Russell intended this book to found a new science, of human power, in the societal sense. Power meaning 'the production of intended effects'. (His definition, not mine. He seemed to assume power-loving men would always know what they wanted, and how to get it).


LONG REVIEW WARNING!

Power is well worth reading. Five stars for breadth of content. I collected some books with the title Power or something similar, but found nothing comparable. One problem of course is that when education is corralled by Jews, discussion of Talmudic beliefs will be censored out.
      But there's more to Russell: one attraction of Russell is his aura of aristocratic family with centuries of rule, or at least familiarity with rulers, combined with suggestions of immense erudition and wisdom. Many people must have felt his words carried more weight than legions of John Smiths. Russell often gives examples which glimpse the truth.
      For example, he says in The Biology of Organizations ‘Small States exist, not by their own power, but through the jealousies of large ones; Belgium, e.g., exists because its existence is convenient for England and France.’ and one feels he may have had inside knowledge. (He might have added that large states, and even whole chunks of countries, exist because of race differences). As another example, he writes ‘Italy after the fall of Napoleon became filled with secret societies...’ suggesting a conclusion drawn from comprehensive examinations of secret societies. Another example is his admiration of democracy, as a method of registering the rights of people who have been ignored in the past. The idea that 'democracy' is just a Jewish scheme is missing from Russell.
      But Power has innumerable difficulties; which I'll try to sketch out, starting from the chapter headings –

I THE IMPULSE TO POWER/ II LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS
These chapters try to integrate practical needs (e.g. houses have to be built somewhere) with giving and taking orders.

There's a problem with Russell's analysis. He takes it as given that leaders have the same motives as followers. (A concrete example might be Churchill, and most Britons). Leaders may gain followers by pretence, something of course rather obvious now. Such tricks are largely out of Russell's range, unless perhaps he submerged them as unsuited to plebeians.

Russell is emphatic (following Darwin) that man is an animal, but differs from other animals in having 'imagination'. He cannot just mean the ability to conjure up images in 'the mind's eye', since some forms of mental ability, for example a speech, or a law, are not images. In fact Russell ignores differences in knowledge, both things around people, and the scope of their awarenesses. Jews have often outsmarted people simply by knowing how things work, who's who in geographically distinct areas, and how to communicate such things as escape routes.
      And Russell ignores the fact that the possibility and the development of language differentiates man from other animals. Thus predators and prey illustrate what happens when one animal wants to eat another. But planning and commanding and discussion needs language for anything more difficult. Special or secret languages—and the possibilities of languages within other species—aren't discussed by Russell.
      Russell saw no reason to differentiate between 'men'. If you consider monkeys, they very roughly have similar strength, limbs, vision, calorie consumption, and anatomy, to 'men'. A visitor from Mars might be puzzled that they build no houses and make no music. Russell had no theory to begin to explain differences in 'imagination', and resulting differences in ambition, and in struggles for power.
On the very first page: ‘In day-dreams there is no limit to imagined triumphs, and if they are regarded as possible, efforts will be made to achieve them.’—thus Russell, accepting the idea that people can think blue-sky infinite visions, and the Cromwell, Alexander, Lenin &c were following their dreams. Probably the truth is nearer the Miles Mathis view, that behind-the-scenes people coerce thoughts and behaviours into a narrow permitted range. And have done so for millennia.

Worth noting that Russell (like us) belongs to a stage in anatomy when the brain was not understood; he distinguishes anatomy from human motivations, without knowing whether these latter are genetically determined. Russell does not see the biological nature of life as imposing limitations: it's obvious that people have their own surroundings, their own sights and sounds and landscapes and associates, and their own spheres of knowledge—concrete things which impose limits. In 500 AD Britain was divided amongst tribes; modern ease of travel has changed that, but, if things collapse, who can say whether this will not happen again?

Russell has what seems now a strange attitude to human beings; possibly this is explained by the transition from a religious view to Darwinian. He says for example ' ... each of us would like to conceive of it [social co-operation] after the pattern of the co-operation between God and His worshippers, with ourself in the place of God. ...' and 'Every man would like to be God, if it were possible.' Not quite the same as pecking order, or monkey bands.

'Some men's characters lead them always to command, others always to obey; between these extremes lie the mass of average human beings..' (Russell seems pretty completely to discount competence, strength, dexterity, and learning and understanding the ways things are done). Russell mentions the family, for example in China, but there's more scope for kidnapping, adoption, rape, unassignable parents, making orphans, castration and so on than he seems to realise; he follows Plato in only tinkering with the family. He thinks the 'confidence necessary to be a leader' has commonly been 'a hereditary position of command'—he says nothing of education through books, or training of princes.
      An explanation of Russell's unreal overview is that he neglects the part played by laws, in all senses from the most casual to the most elaborate. People are to some extent mediated or influenced by laws, but Russell has no analysis of legal systems; this is I'd guess a result of Jewish pressure on intellectual investigation. For example, 19th century novels (familiar to Russell) usually have some emphasis on lawyers, usually shown as honest and dutiful. They may show laws in (for example) India, the USA, Russia. He seems to have simply assumed—as a beneficiary of the system—that laws need no analysis.

Russell is unrealistic in appraising the natural limits of learning; how can people with no experience of (e.g.) planning or judging schemes or technical issues or languages gain 'power' in these things? I think he assumes, as his model, schools and training, which people may or may not choose and may or may not succeed in. But this seems to omit large parts of life; strata and classes and groups. Russell dodges the issue: '... the men who are active in public events' desire to obtain power. ...' He talks as though 'public events' are obvious to everyone, which they aren't, and that power-loving types will work for and operate them. He says nothing about closely-controlled secret training; Jews for example have had their own secret schooling and language and learning, kept secret from 'goyim'.

And Russell is unrealistic in assessing knowledge. He writes 'A large proportion of the human race... is obliged to work so hard in obtaining necessaries that little energy is left over for other purposes;...' but this may contain a subtle error. How hard, in fact, do people in 'Third World' countries, as they have come to be called, work? I've seen it stated that 'slash and burn' primitive agriculturalists work much less hard than modern whites. And what would they do with spare energy if they had it? Imagination may be 'the goad that forces human beings into restless exertion', but imaginations are limited.
      But there is a very important point here, since 'energy left over for other purposes' must include all cultural achievements in the broadest sense. Some will be time-wasting; some cruel; some family-related, for example. With modern techniques, enormous scope has opened up—and this includes vast frauds.

Russell doesn't distinguish carefully between people who aim to influence powerful people, and people who aim at overall communities of some sort. Jews seem to be inbred into attacking human hierarchies, for example. But differences of this sort are all subsumed under 'power'.

Russell is not impressed by 'economic causation'. He writes: when a moderate degree of comfort is assured, both individuals and communities will pursue power rather than wealth: they may seek wealth as a means to power, or they may forgo an increase of wealth in order to secure an increase of power, but in the former case as in the latter their fundamental motive is not economic. This is not as helpful as might be thought. What is a 'community'? The activities of Jews have focussed attention on the possibilities of some parts of an apparent community acting against other parts. What is a 'moderate degree of comfort'? Russell writes as though human societies have always had the option of increased 'comfort'; very likely a mistake, given that many people, including Russell, believed that most people don't ever have new ideas.

He regards people as being influenceable in three ways—direct force, economic effects—goodies vs fines—and beliefs. He goes on to look at variations on these themes...


Russell identifies Hitler, Cromwell, Lenin, and Napoleon as 'some of the ablest leaders known to history'. Anyone familiar with 'revisionist' schools of thought must be pained at those names, all of which, apart perhaps from Napoleon, were puppets of Jews. Russell made no attempt to study Jews. The index to the book (not in the Unwin paperback) lists many events, but not authors, who tend to be named in the text, and of course these are largely Victorian, but all are Jew-unaware. For example Cambridge Mediaeval History is Russell's source on Roman Catholicism.


Russell says: A sense of of solidarity sufficient to make government by discussion possible can be generated without difficulty in a family, such as the Fuggers or Rothschilds, in a small religious body such as the Quakers, in a barbarous tribe, or in a nation at war or in danger of war. But outside pressure is all but indispensable: the members of a group hang together for fear of hanging separately. A common peril is much the easiest way of producing homogeneity. But Russell does not discuss whether small hostile groups should be tolerated.


Russell (writing after the 'Great War' but before the 'Second World War'—named by Churchill)—feared more mechanised warfare. Here's his book Which Way to Peace?. Russell, in a new world with heavy vehicles powered by petrol/gasoline, heavy airplanes, aircraft carriers, huge bombs, feared 'men ... whose love of power has been fed by control over mechanism.' In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire these powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils'. He starts with an account of Mussolini 'in the Abyssinian War': typically of Russell, unpleasant things are attributed to foreigners.
      Russell is unable to be precise, and stays with oratory. However he is aware that gunpowder and cannon ended the era of castles. I don't think he found any modern generalisations.

III THE FORMS OF POWER/ IV PRIESTLY POWER/ V KINGLY POWER/ VI NAKED POWER/ VII REVOLUTIONARY POWER/ VIII ECONOMIC POWER/ IX POWER OVER OPINION

CHAPTER III. THE FORMS OF POWER
This chapter is easily overlooked, because it takes casual and easy glances over types of human power. These are not defined very precisely—not a very Russellian thing to do. Russell seems to have regarded his descriptions as rather obvious and undebatable, judging by his trot through.
      He distinguished three types of power over individuals, A force, B rewards and punishments, and C influence on opinions. And he distinguished between organizations by the kinds of power that they exert. Then he distinguished traditional power from newly-acquired power. Which leads him to 'revolutionary power', which of course is natural for someone in the recent period of Jewish domination: 'The reign of terror in France illustrates the revolutionary kind of tyranny, the corvée [compulsory labour for the Seigneur] the traditional kind.'   And he looked at the power of organizations and the power of individuals, which led to considerations of 'democracy'.
      All this is well enough, but isn't quite right, though its limitations tend to take time to be noticed, unless it's just me. Let me give a few disconnected examples:
  • Some organizations have members who do not accept the supposed aims of the organization: there may be pupils or students who don't like what they're taught, or policemen or soldiers who find the aims of their organizations drifting away from what they expect, or lawyers expected to support new and unwanted impositions. The ways Jews operate (secrecy, distributed centers, The Kahal system, blackmail, power of the purse, corrupting or replacing the upper membership, violence) often, or perhaps always, causes disaffection in many employees.
  • It seems that from 1913 Jews set up and controlled the Federal Reserve. However, few people understood this. So does this now count as part of 'traditional power'?
  • 'Democracy' in a vague sense is assumed to be real under various conditions, not usually stated clearly. But is the right to vote for a party which has to be expensive to exist part of 'democracy'?
  • Military power must necessarily be backed by reasonably modern equipment, which has to be manufactured. The necessary methods may well be more or less monopolies. Surely this has to be taken into account when assessing military power?
  • Russell assumed that a 'next war' (this was written in 1938) would be likely to be followed by a 'crop of revolutions', even more so than the First World War. He assumed there were revolutions, but it's arguable that the whole thing was planned internationally by Jews and local collaborators, such as Freemasons. (Russell has a paragraph on people behind the scenes: 'courtiers, intriguers, spies, and wire-pullers'. Which doesn't begin to represent conspiratorial truths).
  • These examples show there's something or things missing from Russell's analysis.

Russell identifies 'power' as a central concept, like energy in physics, presumably derived in the same way by slowly noticing phenomena have things in common. He doesn't consider extensions of biological features: he does not (e.g.) examine sight and feeling and hearing and the brain, though he gives a bit of space to Aesopian analogies—performing animals, and the pig version of a 'Judas goat' (squealing 'pig with a rope round its middle hoisted into a ship', as examples.
      BUT there's a very serious error in there. When forms of energy are interconverted, for example electricity to light, or sound to effects on ears, or potential energy into motion, the conversions are equal. This is completely different from human power, where some forms of power change are unequal. Russell, consciously or not, gives the completely wrong impression of smooth transitions to all activity.

But (Karlfried, July 2020 OccidentalObserver)
There are many populations in nature in which 99% are led and 1% are the leaders. In biology we call this organisation of the beings (Lebewesen) of a kind a “herd” (Herde) and many mammals live that way, for example elephants or deer. For mankind this is also the natural way to live.

Quite often he uses metaphors evidently based on things like kinetic energy, or stored energy. It's never quite clear whether his examples are idiosyncratic, one-off, unrepeatable illustrations which are only used e.g. to show power coalescing into ever-larger units, or whether the processes they illustrate are in principle considered to be capable of recurring. For instance, he says at one point that given a totalitarian state, all the forms of power he's considered become outdated and only of historical interest. He says somewhere else China has 'always been an exception to all rules'. He says the most successful democratic politicians are those who become dictators: 'Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler owed their rise to democracy.'—omitting the small matter of the 'Great War' and its causers, and the incompleteness and novelty of 'democracy'.
      Russell had no idea that Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler were propped up behind the scenes. The idea they were able leaders, started by democracy, is false, but useful as propaganda against democracy, which has been turned on and off in the modern periods.

Most historians are (or are believed to be) experts in just one period, country, or subject. Russell in effect follows this presumption: he has no general consideration of transitions, though he has bits here and there: The usual plan [of innovators] is to minimize the elements of novelty in their system. The usual plan is to invent a more or less fictitious past and pretend to be restoring its institutions. In 2 Kings xxii we are told how the priests 'found' the Book of the Law, and the King caused a 'return' to observance of its precepts. ... Russell seems unaware of the Khazar idea. Russell is not aware of the possibility of large-scale fakes: if Fomenko and others are even partially true, much of history was simply copied with modifications. Note also the omission of transitions may show Jewish influence: Jewish academics are likely to discourage examination of ruin and collapse. Here's a fuller passage by Russell showing his underestimation of 'Jewish' influence:

[Innovators] at any rate those who have had most lasting success—have appealed, ... to tradition and have done whatever lay in their power to minimize the elements of novelty in their system. The usual plan is to invent a more or less fictitious past and pretend to be restoring its institutions. In 2 Kings xxii we are fold the priests 'found' the Book of the Law, and the King caused a 'return' to observance of its precepts. The New Testament appealed to the authority cf the Prophets; the Anabaptists appealed to the New Testament; the English Puritans, the English Puritans, in secular matters, appealed to the supposed institutions of England before the [Norman] Conquest. The Japanese, in A.D. 645, 'restored' the power of the Mikado; in 1868, they 'restored' the constitution of A.D. 645. A whole series of rebels, throughout the Middle Ages and down to the 18 Brumaire, 'restored' the republican institutions of Rome. Napoleon 'restored' the empire of Charlemagne, but this was felt to be a too theatrical, and failed to impress even that rhetorically-minded age.

It's worth noting that Russell says a lot about 'traditional power', but without assigning it a chapter of its own.

Traditional Power.   My explanation for Russell's omission.

Struck me in July 2021, after numerous Jewish assertions about a 'reset', or 'the Great Reset'. Many times, Jews and collaborators have succeeded in introducing changes, after which of course they were condemned to tell lies more or less in perpetuity, about the old system, and what happened to it. Russell had no wish to dip into these waters; he was very happy with Victorian England.
      As a few examples of resets, consider England post-1066, when William the Bastard and his Jews had to seem better than what came earlier. Another reset was after Dutch Jews invaded Britain and took over London, with fires, plagues, famine, wars, Cromwell's 'Protectorate', and the insertion of the translated Bible. There's much more, but of course it's mostly hidden. Oxford colleges mostly date from this period; impoverishment and great country houses coming along. Russell didn't look on this as an imposed system; he preferred to think it was 'traditional'. Post-1945 Britain, assets gone and empire vanished, was another reset, but of course there was heavy emphasis in media and education and new laws on pretending it was traditional, with a fake national monarchy and fake victory.
      The same sort of thing happened e.g. in the mid-19th century in the USA after the 'Civil War'. And in China after the Jews defeated it to form 'Communism'. And Russia after about 1917.


When I first read this book (about fifty years ago!) I was disappointed in Russell's use of such outmoded ideas as 'kings'. I thought he should have worked out a more general, mathematical, system. Russell regards Egypt, and Babylonia in part, as the supreme end-point of the 'evolution' of 'kingship', with the Pyramids as the physical product. The word 'evolution' is worrying: for all we know, Egypt may have been the final development of a 100,000 years process, and perhaps therefore the most impressive example, only recently perturbed through some collapse. And 'kings' may have needed specific circumstances, such as geographical security, and security appropriate to their weapons technology. Some of the works of Miles Mathis suggest that kingmakers, from long-term dynasties, are more important than temporary kings in the same way that presidents and leaders of political parties are often or usually less important than their backers.

Russell on 'Kingly Power' starts very weakly, with grandiose statements which are not backed by evidence, though they sound plausible to the quick reader. He's keen to say that kingship 'evolved' though there are problems, because human beings don't have inbuilt multi-generational memories.
      Russell gets back to his familiar ground—classics, the church, modern times—when he states that the natural consequence of a fall in kingly power is the formation of an 'oligopoly'. This word is taken from economics, an 'oligopoly' being a less dramatic version of 'monopoly'. It suggests a smallish number of powerful companies, rather than a single monopoly. Important note: Russell implicitly elides away the possibility of a large number of co-operating people; in particular, he has no analysis of Jewish power, or of large secret groups, such as Freemasons. Whether this is deliberate, I don't know. Thomas Carlyle (Heroes and Hero-Worship, and his book on Cromwell) points the same way; so does Nietzsche. Both these writers were widely-promoted, I'd expect because of this misdirection.
      Russell describes the increase in kingly power in the Middle Ages (e.g. Magna Carta to keep unruly nobles in order) but doesn't explain how one person could accomplish this. My guess is that the role of Jews as kingmakers (in exchange for hidden looting rights) has been downplayed. Just as Jews in defining and promoting 'nations' in the 19th century has been not noted, and Jews at the time of Caesar were downplayed. Russell writes, in Priestly Power, ‘Most of the bankers, owing to their large transactions in collecting the papal revenue, were already on the side of the Pope’ [this was about 1260; Russell mentions Guelphs and Ghibellines, Urban IV and Manfred, failing, like most 'historians', to separate then-current names from the actual processes.]
      There has been a change of meaning in 'banker' which we may date from 1913, when Russell was about 40 and seems to have not been informed by Keynes, from an organisation which deals in bullion and valuables into an organisation which prints money under its own control.

When Kings and Kingmakers are concealed—'Sometimes his mana is such that no subject may look upon him...—they can be overlooked more or less indefinitely, perhaps in their island or mountain territory. For example, since about 1920 Arab oil territories seem to have been ruled by Jews, masquerading as Arabs.

'Priestly power' omits all consideration of science; and yet surely astronomy and calendars, or knowledge of food and agriculture and animals, were the bases of many traditional priesthoods; the working-out of the year's length calendars and eclipses and planetary movements for example is a considerable achievement, which is generally ignored, just as most people ignore discoveries which led to present benefits. Russell writes The truth is that the respect accorded to men of learning was never bestowed for genuine knowledge, but for the supposed possession of magical powers. This was Russell's way to try to reconcile the power of science with the employee status of scientists.

In a remarkable passage, Russell writes Greece and Rome were peculiar in antiquity owing to their almost complete freedom from priestly power. In Greece, such religious power as existed was closely concentrated in the oracles, especially Delphi [long passage on bribery of the 'Pythoness'] ... free thought ultimately made it possible for the Romans ... to rob Greek temples of most of their wealth and all of their authority. ... A remarkable passage, since at the time the usual view was that these countries had been almost the inventors of civilisation. Russell didn't and perhaps couldn't recognise this oddity. He certainly was aware of it: a laconic endnote The greatest age of Greece was brought to an end by the Peloponnesian War. [Note added in 1917] ends his Mathematics and the Mathematicians.
      But Russell does not mention the Jewish religion insofar as Greece and Rome were affected. It's possible the falls of both Greece and Rome were the result of Jewish loans to both (or many) sides in wars. This link brings up passages by Herbert Spencer on tax burdens. This theory is not present anywhere in Russell, as far as I know; he discusses things like public morals, women not having children, the enfeebling effects alleged of prolonged wars, and Caesar allegedly 'snapping his fingers' at his creditors, but not the remoter implications of money and its control.
      We might rewrite the passage above: 'Greece and Rome appeared free from Jewish influence, until it expanded inserted itself and caused widespread ruin'.

      Russell liked civilisation, and yet seems to accept the fall of Greece and Rome and the painfully long subsequent reign of fanatical Jews and Christians.
      It's noticeable that such things as far easier travel and knowledge of maps have had a diminishing effect on Greece and Rome, once mainstays of academic life under Jewish influence. Look at Sparta and the Athenian area on modern maps, and see how tiny they are. Look at the work on the Odyssey and see how the evidence suggests Odysseus only navigated around Greek islands.

His separation of 'priestly power' from 'kingly power' seems to be a tribute to Christianity (but this is itself a tribute to Jews) and perhaps 'medicine men' or 'shamans'. In most societies, surely, there was not such a notable demarcation.
      Here's Russell on the Papacy: it was ‘not hereditary, and ... not troubled with long minorities ... A man could not easily rise to eminence in the Church except by piety, learning, or statesmanship; consequently most Popes were men considerably above the average in one or more respects. ...’ Well, maybe. But all the early Popes were 'circumsized Jews' as Gibbon says. Russell entirely ignores wealth, especially in the form of wealthy families.
      Russell irritatingly ignores other lessons on priestly power, notably the Greek Church, and the Russian and other Orthodox churches, and the roots of Islam, which appear to be Jewish.

Russell gives 'naked power' a foundation-stone status to his structure, rather than one of the forms of power which can transmute. He thinks 'naked power' is fundamental. And yet surely there are costs associated with military power: resources needed for manpower, upbringing, weaponry, food, training, risks and so on. Russell comes close to censoring out the relation between money and force. And his use of the phrase 'naked power' is worryingly elastic; not just killings and direct force, but this: '.. a Socialist may feel it unjust that his income is less than that of his employer; in that case, it is naked power that compels him to acquiesce.' Russell seemed to believe that anyone 'convinced' by reading and oratory could step into the shoes of a rival and is only prevented by sheer force.

Russell on 'naked power'
In simple cases, one-on-one, Russell is largely correct. As in the animal world (not 'kingdom'!) older and stronger creatures can usually overwhelm younger and feebler creatures. In the wider interpretation, not just looking at one species or perhaps a few, small animals have some advantages; plants have some advantages; symbiosis has some advantages. In human beings, there are complications with groups and with the effects of memories in future.
      But in cases where there's no clear interest, we can apply Russell's own analysis into force, propaganda, and economic power. In the case of important wars, large-scale naked power is preceded by preparation:
      Force may be used to jail opponents, organise crowds to harm and discourage groups who might be in opposition, and to pressgang or conscript men technical people.
      Propaganda obviously may be used against the rival targets. They may be demonised, possibly accurately, possibly not—many Americans seem to have been hypnotised by the word 'commie' into doing what they were told in Vietnam, when they knew nothing about the place. Propaganda may be operated for years, or centuries. There is or was a monument in Washington D.C. with names of Americans on it; there are monuments across England with names of men who 'fell', often paid for by Jews. Hardly anyone in England knows about the Civil Wars, as a result of propaganda. Another use for propaganda is raising morale: the would-be soldiers are offered money, food, uniforms, sex with the enemy, and so on.
      Economic power is applied is the simpler forms of pay, food and so on, but there are other long-term influences, typically now used by Jews and secret collaborators of the Freemason type. Food production and transport, housing, business organisations, can be typical large-scale targets. Many small businesses may be taken over, for example, as part of preparation for wars. But war loans over centuries, control over legal systems, control over raw materials, and control over central banks are exmples of long-term effects usually not noticed by untrained people.

      It's worth quoting Russell on 'the great abominations of human history' to show the extent to which he had been duped by Jewish attitudes and lies: '... not only ... war, but others equally terrible if less spectacular. Slavery and the slave trade, the exploitation of the Congo, the horrors of early industrialism, cruelty to children, judicial torture, the criminal law, prisons, workhouses, religious persecution, the atrocious treatment of the Jews, the merciless frivolities of despots [but not frivolities of ordinary people!], the unbelievable iniquity of the treatment of political opponents in Germany and Russia at the present day [i.e. 1930s]—all these are examples of the use of naked power against defenceless victims.' Russell accepted all the traditional Jewish lies via their media, but more important is his casual remark, in passing, about war. The 'Great War' ended about twenty years before Russell wrote; Russell was as engaged in opposing it as was possible for someone outside the inner circles. There were direct deaths, injuries, deaths caused by blockades, and deaths attributed to influenza rather than impoverishment. Something like 10 million dead, 20 million wounded, 10 million civilians. Russell barely mentions them, and does not mention Islamic mass slaughters in his list. These attitudes are just as Jews like it—no mention of goyim, and an alliance with Islam when they think it's to their advantage.
    Russell doesn't seem to recognise smaller uses of force, such as his example of St Ambrose being backed by a large force of, presumably, 'thugs'. In Russell's 20s, the Boer Wars were supported at home by threats against pro-Boers. The police may be instructed more or less secretly to favour one side: white women killed by blacks in modern-day USA, for example, get no publicity in controlled media; drug distribution may be controlled, and in non-medical cases arranged in a vague pyramid, supported by the police; and propaganda organisations may use a similar system, usually run by Jews as far as I know, typically to support Jews. Russell's analysis of 'naked power' omits all this sort of thing.
    I think, though I'm not sure, that Russell has a rather schoolboyish attitude to 'winning' and 'losing' wars, possibly traceable indirectly to the 19th century public school education system in Britain in which Greek and Latin literature was given primacy, and Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles left uncriticized, and Caesar's histories regarded as a valuable training manual—see H Trevor-Roper. There must have been many wars where the targets were met, but what happened next was not calculated; for example Spanish ships captured gold and often took it home, but they had little skill in using the gold sensibly. Most Americans in the 20th century and onward had no idea what to do with their Jew-backed 'victories'.
      Russell writes Pursuing the history of his [landowner's] title backwards, we come ultimately to some man who acquired the land by force—either .. of a king in favour of some courtier, or a large-scale conquest such as those of the Saxons and Normans. This is reminiscent of people who wander around enviously in country houses, without any idea of the complications of running such places.

His category of 'revolutionary power' was no doubt influenced by the USSR, which reinforced the idea (from the 'French Revolution') that revolutions were to be expected at intervals. Russell writes somewhere of 19th century European governments ‘opposing the ideas of the French Revolution’—but he thought these were (e.g.) Liberté, égalité, fraternité and démocratie, rather than inventing 'nations', and permitting Jewish financial frauds, and allowing Jew collaborations to plunder treasuries.
      It's unlikely that revolutions are anything like as common as Russell seemed to think. The 'Russian Revolution' (when Russell was about 45) stamped itself into Russell for the rest of his life. This is an illusion—shared by many writers and journalists of the time—caused by the Jewish coup in Russia being mislabelled a 'revolution'. (And of course by the equally mislabelled 'French Revolution' opening the nineteenth century). He includes early Christianity, the Reformation and 'Rights of Man' revolution, this latter, leaning heavily on Tom Paine—let's hope not too optimistically.
      Russell has, perhaps unconsciously from his childhood, absorbed the view that Jesus was an heroic isolated figure, struggling against huge odds against an evil system, with only his personality to lead, eventually, to triumph. A different view—that 'Jesus' was made up, and that the Roman Emperor decided to invent an artificial religious system designed to be acceptable to most tribes and groups, to try to hold his empire together, and which he was in a position to enforce, would seem far more convincing. So is the view that Jews became early Popes, and invented and led Christianity themselves, with intervals of simulated mutual hostility.
      It's worth making a point here on Russell's interpretation of the novelty of Christianity: '... the most important of Christian doctrines was ‘we ought to obey God rather than man.’ ... a precept to which nothing analogous had previously existed, except among the Jews. It only struck me recently that, if Jews can persuade people they are official experts on God, they can infiltrate their own interests. Since then they can persuade people what is meant by 'obeying God'. Except among the Jews.
      With the Reformation, Russell views the reformers like this: '... the ardent innovator ... Such men have seldom been believers in free speech. They have been willing themselves to suffer martyrdom, but have been equally willing to inflict it... in the past, determined men could speak freely in spite of governments... etc.' The view that many Europeans were increasingly irritated by the Church taking ever-more money from them, and provoking a perfectly reasonable calculated reaction, is not present in Russell.
      REVOLUTIONARY POWER (Chapter VII) has four examples: I Early Christianity, II The Reformation, III The French Revolution and Nationalism, IV Socialism and The Russian Revolution. It's clear, now, that I, III, and IV were largely Jewish movements, operating secretly, and to this day therefore considered 'controversial'. II The Reformation (which must include the Renaissance before it) is less clear. Russell talks of 'The State' as something whose power went up as the power of 'The Church' went down. He does not separate out all the components. 'The State' seems to be everything not part of everyday life, which includes activities on the side of the 'nationals', but plus activities by hostile elite members, notably Jews. He's of course right in attributing these events to the feeling that the old system 'has become obsolete', but without noticing that it was Jews who felt this. The Renaissance was left out (and the Aufklärung) in effect possibly because Jews were or seemed less obvious.
    This category incidentally also shows Russell assumes things will evolve for the better—his whole book shows developments as tending to be beneficial. Thus he says e.g. 'Monarchy consequently remained weak until it had got the better of both the Church and the feudal [i.e. Germanic] nobility'. Russell is weak on the actual geography of the world: he doesn't consider e.g. Europe as subdivided by mountains and other obstacles, and thus packed with 'defensible space', as opposed to say the steppes of Russia or prairies of north America.

    Russell is in my view weak in his chapter on ECONOMIC POWER; his description of 'economic power' in its most 'ultimate analysis' is this: '... economic power ... consists in being able to decide ... who shall be allowed to stand upon a given piece of land and to put things into it and take things from it ...' His examples are oil, gold, iron ore, rent and crops and ownership, and industrial lock-outs. I've omitted labour, and military work, which Russell mentions, but Russell seems stuck in the mindset of some economists, talking of 'land, labour, and capital', and probably with farm productivity in mind or landed aristocracies. Much of economics is concerned with processing materials, packing and storing and moving them, organising and building, and innovating, and planning, for all of which Russell seems to have little accurate overview.

'Economic Power' seems to me largely a collection of miscellaneous accounts of financial and legal arrangements. He includes Berle & Means, with 1930s 'modern executives analogous to kings and Popes. '.. by a very careful ... investigation they [conclude] ... that two thousand individuals control half the industry of the United States.' This uses 'control' in a misleading sense, I think. The phrase 'separation of ownership from control' is deliberately misleading: paper money owned by Jews allows any assets to be bought out, sooner or later. The managers are temporary, even though in a sense while they are employed they have some control. Separation of ownership from day-to-day running sounds more accurate. Russell says of what's now Zimbabwe: '... Rhodesian goldfields belong to certain rich men because the British democracy thought it worth while to make these men rich by going to war with Lobengula.' Russell may be assuming here that Lobengula was in some sense a legitimate owner of the area; though this seems unlikely.
    Russell notes that fines make some options unattractive. But he is far less aware of the way in which token jobs can be handed out, quite a serious consideration today; for example 'positive discrimination' by race to blacks and Jews, or the handing out of 'work' to unqualified people for political reasons, go unmentioned, even speculatively. There have been plenty of nepotistical eras; it's disappointing to find Russell has little comment on such short-cuts to power.
    Russell doesn't seem aware of some possibilities in organised groups which have economic effects: he says 'The power of trade unions is the converse of the power of the rich' but of course some unions, such as the NUJ now in Britain, and 'UNISON', and unions of 'public servants', are more opposed to the poor than the rich. Unions of civil servants can enforce astonishing frauds on the public. Russell's verbalisms don't manage to capture the fluid sets of the real world.

    Russell regards credit as the ability to transfer a consumable surplus from group A to group B, but doesn't mention the time element—which could be many centuries of debt, many centuries of production which never existed at the time of the original credit, 'consumable surpluses' perhaps extending over centuries. He doesn't mention the problem of trust in paper money and credit. He describes then-modern corporate capitalism as presented by Berle and Means, but without defining 'capitalism' or having evidence why financial power should coalesce—not surprising as he had no idea about the Federal Reserve and similar structures. He follows (I think) R H Tawney of Religion and the Rise of Capitalism in assuming the Catholic Church (then possibly the wealthiest organisation ever) in thinking the Church has a 'debtor's morality'. The issue must have been more complicated than that. Russell assumes 'usury' simply means interest, but there appear to be technical issues of definition of which he knew nothing. For example, The Merchant of Venice specifically says of usury (the precise wording isn't known)
And if the sums are not repaid on time
Then, as forfeit, they would take everything;
All that the man has earned in his lifetime...

This is I think a reference to the Shetar, 'in English Law': When incorporated into English practice, the notion from Jewish law that debts could be recovered against a loan secured by "all property, movable and immovable" was a weapon of socio-economic change that tore the fabric of feudal society and established the power of liquid wealth in place of land holding. Note the extreme and fixed nature here, which is characteristic of Jews when given free rein: the Fed was and is allowed vast freedom in printing money. And extermination is a recommended Jewish policy. The Kahals extorted as much as they could. Their traditional tax is a general 10%. I think it's true to say that carefully detailed contracts with limitations are unnatural to Jews and natural for the west, and perhaps all others.

    There is just one mention (in effect) of Jewish money power. And even that is in the wrong chapter. Russell writes: 'The word 'tyrant' did not, originally, imply any bad qualities ... but only an absence of legal or traditional title. ... The first age of tyranny was that in which coinage first came into use, and this had the same kind of effect in increasing the power of rich men as credit and paper money have had in recent times. It has been maintained [footnote: See P.N. Ure, The origin of Tyranny] ... that the introduction of currency was connected with the rise of tyranny...' In all of Russell's writings, I know of only one other comment of that sort, though I don't have the source, in which Russell described paper money power, in the 1930s I think, allowed to be in the hands of private groups, as 'very unwise'.
    Let me just quote Russell on economic power within states, showing Russell did not understand Jewish power:–

    Economic power within a State, although ultimately derived from law and public opinion, easily acquires a certain independence. It can influence law by corruption and public opinion by propaganda. It can put politicians under obligations which interfere with their freedom. It can threaten to cause a financial crisis. But there are very definite limits to what it can achieve. [Julius] Caesar was helped to power by his creditors, who saw no hope of repayment except through his success; but when he had succeeded he was powerful enough to defy them. Charles V borrowed from the Fuggers the money required to buy the position of Emperor, but when he had become Emperor he snapped his fingers at them and they lost what they had lent. The City of London, in our own day, has had a similar experience in helping German recovery; and so has Thyssen in helping to put Hitler into power.
Julius Caesar seems to have been assassinated because of Jewish entanglements. The City of London, i.e. the Jewish money power, calculated the results of both Great War, the insertion of Hitler, and the Second World War, all of which they won.

    Russell talks about 'coloured labour': 'Let us consider.. the power of the plutocracy in a democratic country. It has been unable to introduce Asiatic labour in California, except in early days in small numbers...' For some reason, he splits 'power over opinion' from creeds. It's worth noticing this is a Christian outlook, as many 'creeds' are not of a nature that can be separated from actions—Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism interlock with their followers' habits. Russell's concept of 'power over opinion' is in essence rulers over subjects, within nations: deliberate lies by subgroups—Jews being the obvious example, then and now—are elided away: '.. the Churches, business advertisers, political parties, the plutocracy, and the State' comprise systematic large-scale propaganda in democratic countries, according to Russell. His entire discussion of power over people's minds is in terms of religion, as in his following chapter: lies, spying, concealment, academic fraud and so on are barely mentioned. On secret societies, he as was traditional mentions Communists and Fascists, but says Italy was filled with secret societies, after Napoleon; no discussion of the vast network of Freemasons.


      Russell makes a big blunder in Chapter IX 'POWER OVER OPINION'. He says: ‘ ... a creed never has force at its command to begin with, and the first steps in the production of a wide-spread opinion must be taken by means of persuasion alone. ...’ I expect this attitude—minority conversion, then wide belief, then force to make it spread— comes from the supposed history of early Christianity, and subsequent spread around Europe. It's now clear that successful creeds are usually secretly promoted. A good example is the absurd idea of many sexes, often called 'LGBT' or other acronyms, which is backed secretly with Jewish paper money. Gullible people thing "Oh, everybody's talking about this!" with no understanding of the source. Successful creeds need organisers, printed or spoken propaganda, buildings. ownership and all the rest, so it's no surprise that so-called Christianity has tithes, donations, salaries, official positions, and so on.
      Russell wasn't able to discount his own background: he says 'Armies are useless unless the soldiers believe in the cause for which they are fighting...' and forgets Russians forced by Jew-run groups in the lines behind tasked to kill deserters, and forgets compulsory conscription in America, and press-gangs in Britain.
      Russell says ('Power over Opinion', p 94 my paperback): 'It is customary nowadays to decry Reason as a force in human affairs, yet the rise of science is an overwhelming argument on the other side.'
The Impact of Science on Society has a summary of Russell's view: Science ... has existed for about 300 years; as a source of economic technique, for about 150 years. [i.e. from about 1650, and from about 1800]. In this brief period it has proved itself an incredibly powerful revolutionary force. ...
      Russell largely assumes 'science' is part of the mentality of pedants and accredited officials. It doesn't occur to him that 'philosophy' might have achieved much the same, and far, far earlier. Business techniques might, some would try to argue.
Anyway, without pulling Russell apart rather roughly, the effects have been staggering. In my view, the dawning of revisionist analysis probably will have similar enormous effects, at least if civilisation survives.
Russell's arguments are on Copernican astronomy, Galileo's theory of falling bodies, and geology as useful in mining. But such arguments applied through the entire middle ages! Russell doesn't consider anti-science views, or knowledge islands kept the preserve of groups.
    To show Russell's underlying error here, consider this: .. Belief, when it is not simply traditional, is a product of several factors: desire, evidence, and iteration. When either the desire or the evidence is nil, there will be no belief; ... To produce a mass belief ... all three elements must exist in some degree; ... More propaganda is necessary to cause ... belief for which there is little evidence than ... for which the evidence is strong, if both are equally satisfactory to desire... This omits intentional lies and all forms of top-down propaganda. How many people desired to believe in moon landings, or U.S. bases round the world, or nuclear weapons, or Jewish paper money, or wicked Vietnamese peasants? Russell would probably say that believers felt flattered that their country is strong, or something similar. But in fact the belief is produced simply by being told it's true, of course with large-scale iteration, and, in the case of false flag psychological operations, faked and uncheckable evidence. This process certainly worked with Russell!
    It also omits paid beliefs, which may be slogans, credos, manifestoes, ill-defined statements, aspirations, or whatever, which Russell almost always ignores. He also ignores money as a source of power: the 'use of force', to Russell, is always violence, but intermediate stages such as the funding of movements and bribing of politicians, are generally ignored. I'm not sure why: Was he so certain of his own income that he simply had no grasp of other people being in a modern phrase 'incentivized'? Surely not. Perhaps it was an uneasy feeling that, once desire to believe was linked with money, then the roots of money deserve examination? Anyway, clearly 'desire, evidence, and iteration' should be replaced by something like 'desire, evidence, iteration, and widely-defined self-interest'.

    More on this; sorry! The plain facts of having somewhere to go to be employed, or being cared for by parents, or learning a language when young which is their parents', show that many 'beliefs' simply exist without any opposition; just as joining a Church needed no evidence from a 19th-century Oxford graduate beyond offering a living. This seems obvious; but it's important. Did US young men go off to the US Civil War because they had detailed schedules of what might be right? No, they were told to go, paid, equipped, but had no detailed knowledge at all.

[From Chapter IX, Power over Opinion]:

There are, however, some important instances of influence on opinion without the aid of force at any stage. Of these the most notable is the rise of science. At the present day, science, in civilized countries, is encouraged by the State, but in its early days this was not the case. Galileo was made to recant, Newton was stopped by being made Master of the Mint, Lavoisier was guillotined on the ground that “la République n’a pas besoin de savants.” Nevertheless these men, and a few others like them, were the creators of the modem world; their effect upon social life has been greater than that of any other men known to history, not excluding Christ and Aristotle. The only other man whose influence was of comparable importance was Pythagoras, and his existence is doubtful.
      It is customary nowadays to decry Reason as a force in human affairs, yet the rise of science is an overwhelming argument on the other side. The men of science proved to intelligent laymen that a certain kind of intellectual outlook ministers to military prowess and to wealth; these ends were so ardently desired that the new intellectual outlook overcame that of the Middle Ages, in spite of the force of tradition and the revenues of the Church and the sentiments associated with Catholic theology. The world ceased to believe that Joshua caused the sun to stand still, because Copernican astronomy was useful in navigation; it abandoned Aristotle’s physics, because Galileo’s theory of falling bodies made it possible to calculate the trajectory of a cannon-ball; it rejected the story of the flood, because geology is useful in mining; and so on. It is now generally recognized that science is indispensable both in war and in peace-time industry, and that, without science, a nation can be neither rich nor powerful.

[Note Russell's attitude to science. There are many theories as to the rise of science (and the rise of technology). I'd guess a popular theory is that events happened to work together, and/or that exceptional people had exceptional ideas. But Russell seems to think of it in a 'governing class' way, as being intentionally encouraged. There must be a lot of truth in this; it's painfully clear by now, under the influence of Internet, that many scientific frauds have occurred, and they are liable to increase in intensity. Possibly science will be snuffed out, education being non-existent, or shallow, or unimportant, or a matter of slogans and repetition.]

On Reason (capitalised!) Russell wrote The world ceased to believe that Joshua caused the sun to stand still, because Copernican astronomy was useful in navigation; it abandoned Aristotle's physics, because Galileo's theory of falling bodies made it possible to calculate the trajectory of a cannon-ball; it rejected the story of the flood, because geology is useful in mining; and so on. It is now generally recognized that science is indispensable both in war and in peace-time industry 3 and that, without science, a nation can be neither rich nor powerful.
      All this effect on opinion has been achieved by science merely through appeal to fact: what science had to say in the way of general theories might be questionable, but its results in the way of technique were patent to all. Science gave the white man the mastery of the world, which he has begun to lose only since the Japanese acquired his technique.
      From this example, something may be learnt as to the power of Reason in general. In the case of science. Reason prevailed over prejudice because it provided means of realizing existing purposes, and because the proof that it did so was overwhelming. Those who maintain that Reason has no power in human affairs overlook these two conditions.

I quote this at length because it includes many confusions of thought. By 'the world ceased to believe' he meant parts of the world under Jewish influence. He confuses 'science' with technical mastery—and omits the question of who 'owns' and applies it. From his account, 'Reason' means noticing something has happened; whether science caused it, or witchcraft, or money, is not considered. The important fact that technology has been recognised in a comparatively short time—think of aborigines faced with TV or aircraft—isn't noted by Russell. It took 1000 years for Christianity tofinish invading Europe, by contrast.

      Perhaps politicians will have their 'atlas bones' removed by witchdoctors, and poisons will be injected by screaming fanatics, and powered vehicles cease to exist, and corpses get eaten if food science dies.


      All this effect on opinion has been achieved by science merely through appeal to fact: what science had to say in the way of general theories might be questionable, but its results in the way of technique were patent to all. Science gave the white man the mastery of the world, which he has begun to lose only since the Japanese acquired his technique.
      From this example, something may be learnt as to the power of Reason in general. In the case of science, Reason prevailed over prejudice because it provided means of realizing existing purposes, and because the proof that it did so was overwhelming. Those who maintain that Reason has no power in human affairs overlook these two conditions. If, in the name of Reason, you summon a man to alter his fundamental purposes—to pursue, say, the general happiness rather than his own power—you will fail, and you will deserve to fail, since Reason alone cannot determine the ends of life. And you will fail equally if you attack deep-seated prejudices while your argument is still open to question, or is so difficult that only men of science can see its force. But if you can prove, by evidence which is convincing to every sane man who takes the trouble to examine it, that you possess a means of facilitating the satisfaction of existing desires, you may hope, with a certain degree of confidence, that men will ultimately believe what you say. This, of course, involves the proviso that the existing desires which you can satisfy are those of men who have power or are capable of acquiring it.
. . .
      The opposition between a rational and an irrational appeal is, in practice, less clear-cut than in the above analysis. Usually there is some rational evidence, though not enough to be conclusive; the irrationality consists in attaching too much weight to it. Belief, when it is not simply traditional, is a product of several factors: desire, evidence, and iteration. When either the desire or the evidence is nil, there will be no belief; when there is no outside assertion, belief will only arise in exceptional characters, such as founders of religions, scientific discoverers, and lunatics. To produce a mass belief, of the sort that is socially important, all three elements must exist in some degree; but if one element is increased while another is diminished, the resulting amount of belief may be unchanged. More propaganda is necessary to cause acceptance of a belief for which there is little evidence than of one for which the evidence is strong, if both are equally satisfactory to desire; and so on.

Russell had very fixed ideas on religion. He doesn't seem to have grasped that the idea of one single unique 'God' was just a Jewish belief, in in fact psy-op, given the total lack of evidence for 'God' or even any possibility that such things as 'God' could exist. He mentions the king's head on coins as propaganda; but not slogans of the 'one people under God' type. He thinks fear of death was the, or a, motive in creating religions, ignoring the fact that people might individually believe that—or anything else—without wanting a paid club of weekly subscribers.
      Russell thinks the establishing of a religion is a kind of see-saw, starting from the slow establishment of force, then the use of force, then general belief:- an attitude obviously taken from Roman Catholicism. And an attitude completely ignoring the possibility that the sequence was planned throughout as a military-style operation.

      Russell continues:   It is through the potency of iteration that the holders of power acquire their capacity of influencing belief. Official propaganda has old and new forms. The Church has a technique which is in many ways admirable, but was developed before the days of printing, and is therefore less effective than it used to be. The State has employed certain methods for many centuries: the King’s head on coins; coronations and jubilees; the spectacular aspects of the army and navy, and so on. But these are far less potent than the more modern methods: education, the press, the cinema, the radio, etc. These are employed to the utmost in totalitarian States, but it is too soon to judge of their success.
      I said that propaganda must appeal to desire, and this may be confirmed by the failure of State propaganda when opposed to national feeling, as in large parts of Austria-Hungary before the War, in Ireland until 1922, and in India down to the present time. Propaganda is only successful when it is in harmony with something in the patient: his desire for an immortal soul, for health, for the greatness of his nation, or what not. Where there is no such fundamental reason for acquiescence, the assertions of authority are viewed with cynical scepticism. One of the advantages of democracy, from the governmental point of view, is that it makes the average citizen easier to deceive, since he regards the government as his government. Opposition to a war which is not swiftly successful arises much less readily in a democracy than under any other form of constitution. In a democracy, a majority can only turn against the government by first admitting to themselves that they were mistaken in formerly thinking well of their chosen leaders, which is difficult and unpleasant.


I've quoted most of this passage, a fairly complete account of Russell's view of 'Reason'. The passage in slightly red text condenses his mistake (or, more kindly, omission). His concealed assumption is that all sides of evidence are available, even if underplayed or not well-known. BUT in serious cases, the evidence for one side is completely hidden, or hidden as effectively as possible. At the time I type this, [2021 to 2022 -RW] there has been official propaganda about a mythical disease and an injection supposed to counter it. The only information opposing these lies is officially hidden; it's only through Internet and private sources that other evidence can be heard at all.
      And this situation is far less extreme than during the World Wars. Russell underestimates the powers of censorship.
      Consider inventions and discoveries: some may be lost, but recovering them means much more than thoughtfully balancing possibilities. If the discovery of metal smelting techniques had been lost, in the past, who knows how long it might have taken to rediscover them?

    Russell knew by description, but did not feel, the extent to which propaganda can seep into every corner of life, I suppose because easier printing, and media such as radio and film and distributed TV, were not part of his life, and were regarded as crude and simple by intellectuals, except when officially supported, for example the King James Bible, in which case it was established. Jews have a powerful motive to downplay propaganda; see for example Chomsky on Propaganda, which omits important Jewish instances. Russell gives 'a classic example of the transformation of propaganda power into economic power', which turns out to be minor instances of a Pope telling debtors it was their Christian duty not to pay their debts.

Russell gives examples of mixtures of types of power, in everyday life. He uses animals to illustrate (e.g. pigs hoisted onto ships, donkey and stick and carrot, flock of sheep following a leader which was dragged into a ship, and trained performing animals). I'll quote here Russell on Germany (note that he uses the slang 'Nazi'):

Let us apply these Aesopian analogies to the rise of Hitler. The carrot was the Nazi programme (involving, e.g., the abolition of interest); the donkey was the lower middle class. The sheep and their leader were the Social Democrats and Hindenburg. The pigs (only so far as their misfortunes are concerned) were the victims in concentration camps, and the performing animals are the millions who make the Nazi salute.

    This is all highly misleading. Germany's loss after Britain declared war—the 'Great War'—left deaths and chaos and starvation; the idea that 'the lower middle class' was a well-defined bloc twenty years later cannot be correct. Russell's contempt for millions of German and Austrian voters doesn't match his support for democracy. But probably most important is his misstatement of NSDAP policy: it was not 'the abolition of interest' but the removal of Jewish money power and corruption—interest was not 'abolished'. Russell omits the most important aspects of the 'Nazi' programme, in his 'Britzi' way.
    (It strikes me that Russell made little effort in his animal analogies. For example, a horse may be attracted by carrots and driven by a stick; but a horse may also be faced with a firm sheltered path, a downward slope, and a friendly herd in the distance).

X CREEDS AS SOURCES OF POWER/ XI THE BIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS/ XII POWERS AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENTS/ XIII ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL
Russell considers 'The classic example of power through fanaticism is the rise of Islam'

Russell's mistake on Islam. Russell wrote (in Chapter X: Creeds as Sources of Power)

The classic example of power through fanaticism is the rise of Islam. Mohammed added nothing to the knowledge or to the material resources of the Arabs, and yet, within a few years of his death, they had acquired a large empire by defeating their most powerful neighbours. Undoubtedly, the religion founded by the Prophet was an essential element in the success of his nation. At the very end of his life, he declared war on the Byzantine Empire. “The Moslems were discouraged: they alleged the want of money, or horses, or provisions: the season of harvest, and the intolerable heat of the summer: 'Hell is much hotter,' said the indignant prophet. He disdained to compel their service; but on his return he admonished the most guilty, by an excommunication of fifty days” (Gibbon, [Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire] Chap. L).

Fanaticism, while Mohammed lived, and for a few years after his death, united the Arab nation, gave it confidence in battle, and promoted courage by the promise of Paradise to those who fell fighting the infidel.

But although fanaticism inspired the first attempts of the Arabs, it was to other causes that they owed their prolonged career of victory. The Byzantine and Persian Empires were both weakened by long and indecisive wars; and Roman armies, at all times, were weak against cavalry. The Arab horsemen were incredibly mobile, and were inured to hardships which their more luxurious neighbours found intolerable. These circumstances were essential to the first successes of the Muslim.

In fact, it seems Jews decided to invent and fund Islam, as their own controlled band of thieves. Here's my account, presenting Islam as a successor of the same policy which led to the near-east takeover of Christianity. Russell's presentation is superficial.

which added nothing to Arabic economic power or technique, but nevertheless 'won'. It's a typical example from history taken from these not very satisfactory chapters. (Russell never comes up with the Judaic equivalent). Russell was trying to decide whether fanaticism is likely to succeed, and comes up with the classic liberal denial of this possibility: 'the cases in which fanaticism has brought nothing but disaster are much more numerous than those in which it has brought even temporary success. It ruined Jerusalem in the time of Titus, and Constantinople in 1453 ... It brought about the decay of Spain.. through the expulsion of the Jews and Moors ... the most successful nations, throughout modern times, have been those least addicted to the persecution of heretics. [This was a popular opinion in the 19th century] ... it is necessary to find a compromise between two opposite truisms. The first.. is: men who agree in their beliefs can co-operate more whole-heartedly than men who disagree. The second is: men whose beliefs are in accordance with fact are more likely to succeed than men whose beliefs are mistaken. ..' Russell has no model of intra-national conflicts. He assumes—a serious error, which wrecks his entire analysis—that anyone within a geographical boundary works for the interests of everybody there. In this way, Jews and their associates such as Christians and Freemasons are left out of Russell's picture. Russell's six or so pages on this issue make quite painful reading: Russell is totally unaware of the possibilities of unified group actions, and has no idea of instinctive networking—he always discusses beliefs as if they are thought up and adopted individually. Apart from Judaic beliefs, we might consider the caste system in India; Russell has nothing to say, useful or otherwise, about it.
      Russell, as someone with minimal knowledge of practical matters, is over-keen to assign causes to simple ideas. He thinks Spain was weakened by kicking out Jews and Muslims. It doesn't occur to him that Jews and Muslims attacked Spain from outside; causing it seems damage particularly to coastal Spain. It doesn't occur to him that Jewish-run Britain's attacks on Spain might have weakened it. He doesn't mention (e.g.) genetic weaknesses in the Hapsburgs.

Russell says, to repeat, ‘the most successful nations, throughout modern times, have been those least addicted to the persecution of heretics.’ Problems with this include the difficulties in assessing 'persecution' of ideas. Who knows how much damage the BBC has done, for example, by its censorship? And what are the important types of 'heresy'?—If someone says Churchill was a monster, is that 'heretical'? And what is a 'successful' country—one with a stratum of very rich people? In modern times, Mugabe in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe was not 'persecuted' by the British. Nor were Jewish oligarchs who'd lived in Russia. Were these examples of 'success'?

Russell liked the idea that fanaticism was self-defeating. Here he is on two European examples: ‘... the history of the French Revolution is analogous to that of the Commonwealth [supposedly under Oliver Cromwell] in England: fanaticism, victory, despotism, collapse, and reaction. Even in these two most favourable instances, the success of the fanatics was short-lived.’ As always, Russell has no idea that there are powers behind the movements, who got what they wanted in each country, and then took the path of least effort. And Russell as always assumes that men and races are similar: the fanatics may have exterminated many, but Russell assumes it makes no difference.
      Russell came from a more-or-less aristocratic family; but he seems to have been rather limited temporally. Possibly because jews have a habit of destroying documents, letters, evidence generally, and thus stunting long-term awareness. In the case of fanaticism, his few examples are short term. It may be the case that fanaticism can persist for thousands of years—as indeed jewish activities suggest.

Russell vaguely liked creeds; probably his outlook was suggested by the Church of England. He says ‘Social cohesion demands a creed, or a code of behaviour, or a prevailing sentiments, or, best, some combination ...’ which is irritatingly vague.

Russell has long passages on the medieval Roman Catholic Church, probably the basis of his later History of Western Philosophy. He quotes Gibbon, but not Gibbon's views of the long-term effects of the Church. He thinks the most important Christian doctrine was 'We ought to obey God rather than man.' He does not attempt to trace the divergent opinions on what happened in Palestine.

XI THE BIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS/ XII POWERS AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENTS show Russell looking at 'organization theory' as it was known to USA Jews.

Important Note on 'The Biology of Organizations:
I suspect the expression was used to make all human constructions seem 'natural', a 'part of nature'. But it's not hard to find organizations for which there seems no biological equivalent. Consider a company which grows under the power of money, with bits distributed around a city, country, or world: it is hard to see any biological analogy. Or consider Kings or Aristocrats who join up with new lands, so they have a patchwork of areas nominally under their control. Or the taking over of a factory, where the owner knew how to do all of the processes, with some bureaucratic managers; is there anything like that in biology?
This includes constructions such as 'democracy', 'trade unions', and 'political parties'. Russell missed the entire topic of Jews aiming to take over the upper reaches of governments; it's obvious, now, that early proponents of democracy were insincere, wanting to arrange things so parties controlled by money would gain power. The Jewish late-20th century expression, the 'post-democratic era', is a small part of the evidence. It's a sad business to read 1900-ish books on the conduct of elections, with fine detail on correct procedures, with 2000-ish elections in Britain, with immigrants being told that can vote, where to put their mark, and funded thugs potentially present.
Here's Russell on 'democracy' in the 1930s: Now ... men are pledged to orthodoxy, and failure to keep this pledge usually involves both political extinction and financial loss. Two kinds of loyalty are demanded: to the programme ... and to the leaders. The programme is decided in a manner which is nominally democratic, but is very much influenced by a small number of wire-pullers. It is left to the leaders to decide, ... whether they shall attempt to carry out the programme; if they decide not to do so, it is the duty of their followers to support their breach of faith by their votes, while denying ... that it has taken place. ... this system ... has given to leaders the power to thwart their ... supporters, and to advocate reforms without having to enact them.   Russell wrote this just a few years before the Second World War, and it applied from about 1900. It seems odd that he had no very grave views on defects of theories of 'democracy'.L/

      Russell thought trade unions distributed power to workers, when in fact Jew-funded union leaders, and funded leaders in schools and universities, arranged things to suit jews.
      Parts of this chapter reflect events in the 1930s. For example, 'In Italy a very drastic capital levy is being introduced, whereas a much milder form of the same measure, when proposed by the British Labour Party, caused a capitalist outcry which was completely successful.' From today's perspective, one guesses that Italian Jews took over non-Jewish capital, while Britain did not need that, being already controlled by Jews. Or something like that: it would need someone au fait with the financial systems of both countries at the time to decode Russell, who presumably quoted news sources available to him.
      'Now, [i.e. after aristocratic parties] especially in the Labour Party, men are pledged to orthodoxy, and failure to keep this pledge usually involves both political extinction and financial loss. Two kinds of loyalty are demanded: to the programme, in the opinions professed; and to the leaders, in the action taken from day to day. The programme is decided in a manner which is nominally democratic, but is very much influenced by a small number of wire-pullers. It is left to the leaders to decide, in their parliamentary or governmental activities, whether they shall attempt to carry out the programme; if they decide not to do so, it is the duty of their followers to support their breach of faith by their votes, while denying, in their speeches, that it has taken place. It is this system that has given to leaders the power to thwart their rank-and-file supporters, and to advocate reforms without having to enact them.' That's Russell on British politics since I suppose about 1900. As always Russell hasn't a clue about Jews.
      Russell has interesting passages on roads and empires in 'The Biology of Organizations'. These are of course historical artefacts, in a way different from sea-lanes which may vary in the way air travel does. I'm a bit disappointed that he omits tracks in Watkins's 'ley' sense, perhaps because they were regarded as silly at the time, though they provide a basis for times before roads.

Powers and Forms of Governments Russell looks at the power structures of all organisations, though he soon elides this into national governments only. (I had to recheck the chapter title—'Powers and Forms of Governments'—for its plural of 'Governments'). On organisations, Russell regards law and medicine purely as professions with internal rules, but is not aware of the possibilities of legal frauds and corruption and medical frauds. In Britain in the 1930s, they were unthinkable, or at least unspeakable. He had no idea of the immense longevity of Galen's influence on so-called medicine, for example.
    His analysis of organisations, and their internal government and density of control over members, assumes general good behaviour, and fails to deal with criminals, determined long-term liars, vicious invasions, vicious subversives, and the sort of behaviour attributable to Jews. It therefore fails to get to grips with the most serious problems.
    Another issue is the purpose of organisations. (Russell allows organisations to have 'unconscious' purposes, though disappointingly gives no examples. He doesn't seem to know that very secret organisations can exist). Russell was aware of multiple purposes: somewhere he says a railway company has the purpose of providing rail travel, but also of making a profit. In truth, who can say what the purpose of the BBC is? State propaganda? Jewish propaganda? Profit-making? Secure lifetime employment? Or the purpose of (say) a cancer research establishment now: is it to maximise revenue from fake research? To avoid finding a cure? What is the function of a 'civil service'? Or, to take an example current at the time, the 'Focus Group' which appears to have been Jewish was funding Churchill to take Britain into war with Germany, so that Jews wouldn't lose their money-making capacities from Germany and elsewhere. Churchill didn't build up an organisation (as Napoleon III did). Nor did civil servants and politicians carry out their duties of checking on the nominal reasons Churchill wanted war. Russell's view of organisations resembles his view of nations: he thought of them as neat subsets with firm boundaries with members mostly working together, and had no place for interactions and secret overarching groups such as Freemasons and Common Purpose. Russell does not face the issue that organisations may work against their members: military commanders may plan deaths, media propagandists may wreck their employees' lives, teachers may spend a lifetime telling useless lies, employees may be forced to train foreign replacements, actors' unions may be more interested in promoting myths than increasing actors' pay.
      Russell wrote: 'In capitalistic enterprises there is a peculiar duality of purpose: on the one hand they exist to ... profits for the shareholders.' Perhaps this focuses on Russell's error: everybody has 'a duality of purpose'!
    Here's Russell on the British 'Labour Party': '... The [party] programme is decided in a manner which is nominally democratic, but ... influenced by a small number of wire-pullers. ... the leaders decide... whether they shall attempt to carry out the programme; if they decide not to do so, it is the duty of their followers to support their breach of faith by their votes, while denying, in their speeches, that it has taken place. ...' Russell chooses not to notice Jews and the 'Conservative Party'.

Russell tends to subtly smuggle in some implicit assumptions, usually I think where they support the traditional Anglo-Saxon comfortable myths. He says: 'Human beings['] ... desires, unlike those of bees in a hive, remain largely individual; hence ... the difficulty of social life and the need of government...' which all sounds very reasonable until reflection on groups, languages, customs, and learning cast doubt on 'individual desires': most people copy almost everything, such as food, housing, styles of dress, language, habits. And probably they copy modes of interpersonal relations too. Another implicit assumption is embodied in the word 'government': what about the results of invasions, attacks, pestilential criminal gangs, bombings, and violent imposed regimes? Are they 'governments'? He says '... the most successful nations, throughout modern times, have been those least addicted to the persecution of heretics ...' but Russia in 1910 or so had a very casual attitude to Jews in Siberia, such as Lenin: if the Russians had killed every one of them, Russia might have survived the coup and millions of lives might have been saved.
    Here's another implicit assumption: 'In times of peace all governments take steps ... to insure willingness to fight when the moment comes, and loyalty to the national cause at all times.' Russell has no place for treachery, loyalty to bribes, the 'national cause' as something subsidiary: consider for example Ireland giving up all it fought for for a few Jews in the time of the 'European' Union.
    And yet another widespread assumption: '... The advantages of successful war are doubtful, but the disadvantages of unsuccessful war are certain. If ... the supermen at the head of affairs could foresee who was going to win, there would be no wars. ... in every war the government on one side, if not both, must have miscalculated ...' Russell simply has no clue that subsets on one or both nominal sides might benefit from war, and want war.
    Here's Russell (at the end of the chapter 'Organizations and the Individual') on the 'national State', no doubt heavily influenced by the 'Great War' twenty years or so before: 'The contests of States ... are all-in contests. The whole civilized world was shocked by ... the murder of one Lindbergh baby, but such acts, on a vast scale, are to be the commonplaces of the next war ... No other organization rouses anything like the loyalty aroused by the national State. And the chief activity of the state is preparation for large-scale homicide. ...'
    Russell is dishonest about war; he simply will not recognise that some groups (not just technicians) want war. Here's a short extract from the earlier chapter Economic Power: ' ... A nation cannot succeed in modern war unless most people are willing to suffer hardship and many people are willing to die. .. to produce this willingness, the rulers have to persuade their subjects that the war is about something important—so important, in fact, as to be worthy of martyrdom. ...' In fact, powerful countries may lose little, or gain, from war; 'most people' are paid, in many cases more than in peacetime; and the probability of death is not very high.

Russell, as anyone trying to analyse the mid-term in human existence, has a view on the decline of civilisations. His two main examples are ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy, though he knew about Haiti, and in pessimistic moments during the 'Great War' wondered about Europe. '... the relations of States. There are innumerable instances of small States growing into great empires by conquest, but hardly any of voluntary federation. For Greece in the time of Philip, and Italy in the Renaissance, some degree of co-operation between different sovereign States as a matter of life and death, and yet it could not be brought about. ...' 'In both ages, after ... about a hundred and fifty years, all were extinguished .. by more cohesive nations...' In fact, it's difficult to defend the idea that there were innumerable great empires; or that groups of invading looters were 'cohesive'.

XIV COMPETITION/ XV POWER AND MORAL CODES/ XVI POWER PHILOSOPHIES/ XVII THE ETHICS OF POWER
Four more chapters dealing with (roughly) people's attitudes to power. 'Competition for power is of two sorts: between organizations, and between individuals for leadership within an organization. Competition .. only arises when they have objects which are more or less similar, but incompatible'. Russell lived of course during a time of great expansion in technology; competition seemed inevitably to lead to absorption and unification. But he had no general formulation of the balance of forces which may prevent such monopolisation.

Russell thought Marx was fiercely intellectual in predicting coalescence of power groups. But in fact throughout history most power groups have drooped and failed. Russell didn't see that the secret world-wide positioning of Jews had led to ever-increasing Jewish power.
      One of their secrets was to fund both sides in wars, and recover loans from both sides. So there was a net transfer to Jews, plus destruction in both war parties. But if this becomes widely known, other power groups may make their own plans. Personally, I hope so. But of course Marx avoided this prediction.

    'Competition' ought to be the most interesting chapter in Russell's book: he divides influences on people into propaganda, force, and economic influences, and competition can and does happen within each grouping, and also between them. But the chapter fails to work well; it's bitty, and deals only with a few historical events, and these are made to seem only end-points in the switch from one monopolistic group (Stuarts) to another (American industrialists).
    Here's Russell on ideas about competition in the 19th century: '... America [i.e. USA], with the longest Liberal tradition, was the first to enter the stage of trusts, i.e. of monopolies not granted by the State, like those of earlier times ... It was discovered that competition, unless artificially maintained, brings about its own extinction by leading to the complete victory of some one of the competitors. ... broadly speaking, where increase in size ... means increase of efficiency. ...etc..' Russell mentions Rockefeller; elsewhere he mentions Fisk and Gould, and Carnegie, like everyone else in the late 19th century. But Russell does not discuss monopolistic tendencies in finance; as always, he shies away or suppresses such material. He misses the entire movement for realism about Jews and about private central banks.

    The huge weakness in Russell on competition is that he lacks a large overview. Russell starts: 'The nineteenth century, which was keenly aware of the dangers of arbitrary power, had a favourite device for avoiding them, namely competition.' Taking the largest view, clearly any future generations are entirely derived from the contemporary groups of people; short of genetic engineering, there are no other sources. What effects can competition have on the entire human genetic structure? What's the point of shifting ownership from one group to another, if the net resulting effect leads to civilisations which are unsustainable by future people? Russell's discourses include competition in armed force (he thought 'German Nazis' 'proclaimed ... national war is the noblest of human activities') and propaganda (not just economics).
    He gives precise dates for 'freedoms desired by Liberals' (meaning Laissez faire; but excluding the Jewish component—USA 1776, England 1824-1846, France 1871, Germany 1848-1918; Italy the Risorgimento, and 'even in Russia' the February Revolution) and for 'freedom of propaganda... destroyed' (France 1793, Russia 1918, Germany 1933—again excluding the Jewish component. But the missing overview means Russell had mastered a lot of material, but not enough to make a full theory.

Russell on Sympathy as the universalizing force in ethics:–
‘All great moralists, from Buddha and the Stoics down to recent times, treated the good as something to be, if possible, enjoyed by all men equally. They did not think of themselves as princes or Jews or Greeks; they thought of themselves as human beings. Their ethic had always a twofold source: ... they valued certain elements in their own lives; ... [and] sympathy made them desire for others what they desired for themselves. ...
      ... Although men hate one another, exploit one another, and torture one another, they have, until recently, given their reverence to those who preached a different way of life. The great religions that aimed at universality, replacing the tribal and national trusts of earlier times, considered men as men, not as Jew or Gentile, bond or free. ... the principle of universal sympathy conquered first one province, then another. It is the analogue, in the realm of feeling, of impersonal curiosity in the realm of intellect; ...’
It's odd that Russell, capable of doing his best to microanalyse very fine linguistic shades of meaning, could be so dismissive of, for example, differences between men, differences between practical possibilities, differences between sympathies, differences between long- and short-term aims—though he was aware of 'compossibility', for example. He seemed to be at the Dawkins level of falsity—'religions are all the same, with different holidays'—explicitly untrue of Jews. There may possibly be some excuse: Russell made no attempt to study the Talmud or Quran, or much of the Old Testament. But of course he ought to have.
Another oddity is Russell's failure to quantify. People can have a lot of sympathy, or not much, or variations; but general complete sympathy (I doubt) has ever been considered feasible.
    'Power and Moral Codes' (the longest chapter) is Russell on (in effect) the spread of Christianity, or universal sympathy and ethics, a process he considers will continue until the world is conquered by it. Russell has nothing on the genetics and/or characteristics of groups; to some extent groups evolve to match their surroundings, and nominal belief systems may have little effect faced with nature's instincts. Moreover, Russell was aware via Santayana that ethics are not objectively provable. I think all this explains the unsatisfactory length and confusion of the chapter.
    It's interesting to find Russell is aware of Jews, at least in the Old Testament, and mentions Saul, king Agag of the Amalekites, and destruction of everything of the Amalekites, except for Agag and some cattle and goods, which were spared, and the regret of 'the Lord' over this lapse. (Deuteronomy vii 1-4 and 14, and 1 Samuel xv 8-11). Russell assumes the traditional model, that people are more or less similar, and that early Christians wanted to extend sympathy to the world, and encoded this view into Christianity. I don't think he ever compared this theory with Roman Christianity, with its endless wars.
    Just as Russell is unconsciously Christian, Russell is unconsciously nationalistic: his view of world government is that it has to be a federation of states, and considers this is obviously true for everyone. The idea of 'multicultural societies' is almost completely missing, though he notes that Roman Catholicism never worked out a theoretical separation from those things 'that are Caesar's'. Similarly, Russell doesn't deal well with empires, monarchs claiming rule over other kingdoms, multinational companies, forms of expertise which transcend nations, or elites which straddle other groups, including Jews. Since this sort of thing has always been fairly common, it's a serious omission. A related issue is Russell's underestimation of possible civil wars and civil strife.
    Here's a short extract, on wars, illustrating Russell's unconscious and unexamined assumption that nations are solid single units, which conflicts strongly with his view of 'man' as self-interested individuals and groups, rather atomised and with no obvious motive for cohering into large blocs:-
... The advantages of successful war are doubtful, but the disadvantages of unsuccessful war are certain. If, therefore, the supermen at the head of affairs could foresee who was going to win, there would be no wars. But in fact there are wars, and the government on one side, if not on both, must have miscalculated its chance. ...

This passage looks finely analytical at first sight, but Russell has no logical space for such ideas as (i) Taking advantage of alliances which are not meant seriously (such as the announcements about Poland before the Second World War), (ii) Using military groups to make profit for other groups (such as invading China and the destruction during the opium wars, for Jews), and (iii) Wars as money-making schemes for Jews at the expense of their host country (such as the Vietnam 'War' to consolidate Jewish money power in the USA, under the guise of action by 'the USA', while damaging the host and damaging Vietnam and the Vietnamese in the most sordid and cruel fashion. Also the Jewish paper money system in Vietnam was presumably consolidated, and rents, land, companies, cheap labour, prostitution and so on captured by Jews).

Russell's absorption of anti-German propaganda is shown by his refusal to allow Hegel to admire communities, rather than individuals. He is always anxious to assert that a State (in Hegel, this might well be a city state) may be unpleasant. He even wrote (not in this book) that 'nothing could be worse than Hitler'. But of course the fact is some communal action is necessary to achieve very many ends that Russell wanted.
... I consider that whatever is good or bad is embodied in individuals, not primarily in communities. Some philosophies which could be used to support the corporative State—notably the philosophy of Hegel—attribute ethical qualities to communities as such, so that a State may be admirable though most of its citizens are wretched. I think that such philosophies are tricks for justifying the privileges of the holders of power, ...
It seems odd to find Russell supporting a version of something like hero worship, of chosen individuals. Russell may have regarded himself as a 'hero' in this sense: [1] He considered himself a pioneering mathematician. But others did not: George Spencer Brown, who visited Russell, was surprised to find Russell had that belief. [2] Russell regarded Christ as ethically supreme (I think) apart from a few details, such as being nasty to the Gadarene swine. Russell seems to have existed before the idea of 'comparative religion', which itself of course has been perverted. Buddhism seems to admire nirvana; Judaism and Islam are both viciously tribal; Confucius was family- and community-centred; novelties such as Christian Science and Mormonism don't promote love of everyone. But Russell admired ethical innovators of the type of Christ, and believed other people did, too. And this despite what he regarded as 2,000 years of Christian failure.

Russell uses the word 'ethics' in a muscular Christian/Jewish sense: the imperative tense, the ethical thing to do is such-and-such, and I know what it is; rather than an analysis of what 'ethics' means. He says
... Social co-operation is possible in regard to the good things that are capable of being universal—adequate material well-bring, health, intelligence, and every form of happiness which does not consist in superiority to others. ...
The ultimate aim of those who have power (and we all have some) should be to promote social co-operation, not in one group as against another, but in the whole human race. The chief obstacle ... at present is the existence of feelings of unfriendliness and desire for superiority. Such feelings can be diminished either directly by religion and morality, or indirectly by removing the political and economic circumstances which at present stimulate them— ... competition ... between States and ... for wealth between large national industries ...

This is an updated utilitarianism, excluding happiness based on theft, violence, fraud, triumphant war, and so on. It assumes 'good things' are self-evident, and that 'adequate material well-being' is in fact possible. Lewis Fry Richardson (about ten years Russell's junior) may be nearer the mark when he looks at minimising violence, or maximising beauty, or minimising poverty, or maximising wealth per person, or maximising the number of souls, or maximising personal subjective happiness over a lifetime (my examples); or many other imaginable ideals.

Much of this material is 1930s-specific: Spanish Civil War, Stalin, Italy, and so on. Russell is surprisingly insular, and always takes the conventional 'western' side, i.e. 'liberals' plus 'Jews' (in quotations because of the Khazar connection) as against foreigners, something which sits very uneasily with supposed philosophical objectivity. British EmpireHe says nothing much about the 'British' Empire as it was called (i.e. the second, excluding the earlier north American empire), though it must have been a significant part of his worldview. (The 1924 Exhibition at Wembley was only about fifteen years earlier; in 1933 the Japanese walked out of the League of Nations, apparently protesting against the hypocrisy of the British retaining their own Empire). Good King Charles's Golden Days from the Vicar of Bray are mentioned; but the days were not golden for everyone. Thus there's a section on Mussolini fire-bombing in Abyssinia—but not on the British bombing Iraq at the same time. Russell doesn't attempt to distinguish the NSDAP (bottom up) from Italian Fascism (top down), in the conventional manner of doing everything possible not to analyse them. His comments on 'Jews' are completely conventional (and yet he had seen for himself 'Jewish' groups taking over and inventing the USSR, and knew about Bela Kun in Hungary and Kurt Eisner in Germany). Hitler and Stalin are regarded as worshipping Wotan and Dialectical Materialism (in this way Russell is spared the examination of their actual writings and deeds and associates; it's similar to 'oriental despotism', a phrase also used by Russell). Japan has 'dangerous thoughts' as a problem, but apparently nowhere else. Secret societies are attributed in particular to Italy—Freemasonry in France and Britain is ignored, despite being enormously more important. The Spanish Inquisition is frowned upon; and yet Spain was unique in having the problem of dealing with both 'Jews' and Muslims, both holding as a religious axiom a belief in telling lies. Russell is aware of power behind the scenes; but his only named example is Baron Holstein of the German Foreign Office under the Kaiser. Russell says Liberals and democrats led 'the revolt against Spain in Latin America'—when it was part of American imperialism. There are some references in Russell's oeuvre to sadism; note of course that idea is implicitly attributed to a Frenchman. His example of political assassination is by Napoleon III, not any of the numerous 'Jewish' murders, such as British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval, over Jewish money and the then-new USA. 'It would be a mistake to suppose that big business, under Fascism, controls the State more than it does in England, France, or America. On the contrary, in Italy and Germany the State has used the fear of Communism to make itself supreme over big business as over everything else.' — 'communism' is, incorrectly, not attributed by Russell to 'Jews'. He loathes the German philosopher Fichte, giving a quotation on children made impassive by miseducation, and yet many British and especially Jewish 'thinkers' had essentially identical ideas. Fichte and Nietzsche are more or less pointed out as believing they are 'God', and yet the Talmud makes Jews and/or their priests God or his superior. His brief examination of fanaticism includes Biblical references, early Islam, Cromwell, and of course Germany, Japan, and Italy, but carefully avoids fanaticisms of the US and UK (British War with US? Opium Wars? US Civil War? British Empire? Boer Wars? Great War?) and in Talmudic writings. He quotes that Lutherans in Germany had an almost slavish subservience to state power, but does not point out the same thing as regards the Church of England. He says 'freedom of propaganda was destroyed' in France in 1793, Russia in 1918, and Germany in 1993, but has no idea of the extent of suppression by, for example, the BBC. He states that 'commerce has lost its importance' since the days of shipping and trading companies, concealing the way in which many commodities (such as oil) are subsumed under (for example) artificial countries and artificial leaders designed for the purpose.

XVI POWER PHILOSOPHIES
Philosophy being Russell's speciality, it might be expected that this chapter might hold special insights. He uses his phrase in a special sense: first, he states that philosophy is a combination 'of desire with observation'. What he means is that, at any time, some things are not known; and these are liable to be perceived through a subjective lens of one sort or another: desire for knowledge, for virtue, for enjoyment, for beauty, for mystical union, or whatever. But one such lens is the desire for power. Such a philosopher 'seeks to ... decry the part played by facts that are not the result of our own will. ... men who invent theories which veil their own love of power... .' This sounds odd to me; luckily Russell provides four examples: Fichte, who invented, or was said to have invented, German nationalism and who comes under prolonged attack from Russell, probably because he's German; pragmatist's attack on the common view of truth; Bergson, who said 'it is only in action that life can be understood'; and Nietzsche, who (Russell says) stated 'the herd have no value of their own account, but only as a means to the greatness of the hero'. Some readers will notice that at least two well known philosophies, or religions, which Russell does not mention, are explicitly power-based, though not even in any unconscious sense.

Russell appears to misrepresent Fichte. Fichte 'maintains that everything starts from the ego'. And the reader is supposed to say 'Everything starts from Johann Gottlieb Fichte! How absurd!...'. But of course each separate individual has his or her own ego; it's hard to see how evolution could lead to anything else. Anyway, Russell writes 'In this way [i.e. mutual delusion] it is possible for solipsism to become the basis for a certain kind of social life. A collection of lunatics, each of whom thinks he is God, may learn to behave politely to one another. But etc'. To people brought up with most religions tucked away in their background, this seems idiotic. However Jews believe, or say they believe, that they, or Rabbis, are 'God'. A collection of lunatics, indeed.

However, Russell thinks Hitler believed himself to be Wotan, and Stalin 'Dialectical Materialism'. These of course are a long way from his list of rather ineffectual philosophers; Joad, Russell's media-savvy but low quality contemporary, perhaps was nearer the mark with his comment The .. notion of the influence exercised by philosophers upon .. events appeared to me to be arrant nonsense, which nobody who had ever spent five minutes with an accredited philosopher.. could seriously entertain for one moment.... Russell was feeling for something—dislike of cruelty or militarism, perhaps—but did not pin it down in this chapter. And part of his failure was undoubtedly due to his lack of understanding of Jewish extreme tribal ethics, and its extension to Islam.

XVII THE ETHICS OF POWER
It took me some time to understand that many of these chapters are not part of a chain of argument; they are stand-alone, like modules in modern universities, and have the same effect of handily permitting connections to be not drawn. This chapter lists some policies which (in Russell's view) lead to well-ordered communities. Russell has a touching naïveté, lacking in anthropological insight. He considers people who have not been badly treated when young are nearly always satisfied by a career. He doesn't seem to appreciate that wars and so on are, in fact, often started by people who are very 'comfortable' in the material sense. At least, he doesn't appreciate it in this chapter: but in another chapter he knows perfectly well that vast numbers of sons of Muslim leaders had wars with each other. And he assumes a European pattern of education and achievement and career structure, which seems unlikely to apply to primitive peoples, and must have seemed just as unlikely at the time, to Russell. In other writings he stated that democracy couldn't work in Africa—he made fun of Lloyd George for thinking it could.

Russell considers men who are attracted into war because it needs skill, for example in 'bomb throwing'. (This was written before mass heavy bombing). And in effect says men should be offered careers which are unlikely to result in net harm. I don't think he thought this through: his friend J M Keynes helped in the financing of the 'Great War', in effect by getting indebted to Jews in the USA, but Russell doesn't consider Keynes as an example of a careerist attracted into war.
    The rest of the chapter concerns logic: Russell liked Leibniz on 'compossibility', and produces examples, such as: 'Perhaps in time there will be a population in which everybody is fairly intelligent, but it is not possible for all to secure the rewards bestowed on exceptional intelligence'.

XVIII THE TAMING OF POWER
Russell has a page or so on the unsolved problem of power, giving historical examples of the traditional educated type: Confucius, Greek cities' tyranny and democracy etc, theocracies, and so on. It's striking how the 'hostile elite' idea is completely missing, unless 'oligarchy' is counted. Russell asks (in effect) how can cruelties and oppressions be stopped?

Russell has four preconditions—political, economic, and propaganda (shouldn't one of these be force?); and the psychological condition of people. There are about fifteen pages on these preconditions, and arguably they are the most important in the book. Russell sketches out what's needed for worldwide justice and progress.
    At least, that's the idea. In fact, the sections are lists of problems, rather than solutions:
I. POLITICAL CONDITIONS [to 'tame power']. Virtually all of this section is on democracy. However, this is of course an arithmetical issue: the bigger a population, the less 'power' on average each person has. Russell lists a lot of problems with democracy, including minorities with power over majorities, and majorities with power over minorities. In fact, he gives so many examples it's clear that 'democracy' has not been defined. It looks very much like a word without denotation. The thorny problems of democracy—the issues of technical competence, of simple lack of interest, of the fake forms of propagandized 'democracy'—are not even mentioned. One of his post-1945 books talks of England as a 'full democracy', rather astonishingly.
    The end of the section has a characteristically Russellian statement (based on considerations of policing) '.. a confession shall never, in any circumstances, be accepted as evidence.' And he says 'there must be two police forces and two Scotland Yards, one ... to prove guilt, the other to prove innocence..'
II. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. Here's one of Russell's attitude which persisted through his life; there is similar wording in many of his books. 'Marx pointed out that there could be no equalization of power through politics alone [i.e. democracy] while economic power remained monarchical or oligarchic.' Many people must have puzzled over this; after all, if people have a vote, they can vote on economic issues, can't they? In fact this is part of the Jewish push to avoid discussion of Jewish high finance: Sidney Webb brushing aside 'currency cranks' illustrates the point. And it shares with many 'social scientists' the omission of actual physical bodily and mental needs.
    Russell wants state ownership, but hedged with democratic safeguards, giving a long extract from Assignment in Utopia by Eugene Lyons describing the USSR, failing to identify the crucial Jewish activity. Russell considers 'economic activity' to be what big corporations did. He assumes without proof that private ownership with safeguards is worse than state ownership with safeguards. He has nothing to say about the structure of corporations, beyond quoting descriptions. He says little about housing, purely I think because it's not obviously manufacturing and trade and business. And yet of course housing is an essential part of 'economics', with its own special rules. This section is not at all convincing or helpful.
III. PROPAGANDA CONDITIONS. This section is much shorter than the previous section on economics, but is just as unsatisfactory. Russell makes the usual comments on agitation, without breaches of the law. But the really serious issues, including which records should be open to the public, are not addressed. Russell regarded the BBC as a paragon of virtue, most of the time. Then as now, this is staggeringly naive. Russell believed advertisers led the way in modern propaganda, though of course there are huge limitations to the success of commercial advertising. As with Chomsky's Media Control: the Staggering Achievements of Propaganda, Russell concentrates on selling domestic items, not on selling wars, death, and disaster.
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS. '.. Every man and woman in a democracy should be neither a slave nor a rebel, but a citizen..' Russell wants people to be kindly and unfanatical, and educated to be critical. He has an entire page on the desirability of exposing children to different and conflicting points of view. In fact, he seems to have omitted material on Jew realism all his life. (And I wonder whether he tried this on his own children; from what I could see, his daughter Kate Russell had no interest in such things, mainly wanting to romantically 'marry well', and later 'divorce well'). Russell thought advertisers led the way in propaganda, and that newspapers present opposite views from which the truth could be detected. His attitude to ordinary people dated from the start of the Great War in 1914. He knew people were excitable, and frantically applauded the future destruction, and their own deaths, resulting from supposedly glorious war; he knew this—because he'd read Jewish correspondents in newspapers. The sheer magnitude of Jewish lies was a closed book to him. And he had no idea of the length of time spent preparatory to wars: the 19th century English press had anti-German and anti-Russian propaganda on permanent drip-feed. As for kindliness in education, this was not wanted by the people, probably mostly Jews, who wanted war and white deaths. In effect, state education took over from the Church of England (and German equivalents) as a distributed system by which vast numbers of propagandised teachers in turn propagandised their classes.

Russell on 'liberal'. And on 'individual'. Note the difference from the modern American-Jew meaning of the word, and Russell's failure to distinguish between 'individuals', where presumably Jewish individuals are just as important:

      This is the essential difference between the liberal outlook and that of the totalitarian State, that the former regards the welfare of the State as residing ultimately in the welfare of the individual, while the latter regards the State as the end and individuals merely as indispensable ingredients, whose welfare must be subordinated to a mystical totality which is a cloak for the interest of the rulers. Ancient Rome had something of the doctrine of State-worship, but Christianity fought the Emperors and ultimately won [with Jewish money]. liberalism, in valuing the individual, is carrying on the Christian tradition; its opponents are reviving certain pre-Christian doctrines.


Russell had some mathematical skill, so it surprises me he didn't to find try some method of predicting quarrels and perhaps countering them. If group A has power measured as 100 units, and B has 75, and if A fights B, the relative and absolute power balances are likely to change. There's scope for group C to benefit, too. Could two groups always gain by combining? Is there some cost-benefit rule that determines likely alliances? Or is there maybe some approach through set theories, and the showing-up of intersecting sets? Does genetics of human populations help show how exceptional characters affect things?—Russell wrongly assumes all human communities have identical abilities and characters. All minorities are in a sense opposed to everybody else; what is the best balance between assertion of minorities and general interests?
    Russell's atomistic analysis omits the whole problem of complicated human life: there seems no reason why human groups should cohere, or co-operate. He falls back on such ideas as beliefs in common, sentiments of community, but seems to underrate (for example) Hegel, for praising communities or city states. Maybe his upbringing left him feeling lonely and isolated. Throughout his book there's belief in isolated great men which allows him (for example) to claim that makers of revolutions are very different characters from their successors, as a revolution becomes traditional: he has no idea there *may* be a constant pressure behind the scenery and puppet actors.
      Another omission (very common in people educated on traditional lines, probably in all countries with educational institutions) is what could be called analysis of cryptocracies, mysterious or concealed groups. 'Educated' people don't like to admit they have gaps in their knowledge. For most of human life, people must have lived in smallish groups with little awareness beyond their own senses, unaware even that other languages existed. Such events as invasions, press gangs, taxes, battles, and the actions of remote groups of aristocrats could, presumably, not have been understood in any detail. Cryptic regimes must have been common, not necessarily in any sinister sense: many people must have found later in life that their schooling, housing, work and so on had aspects which they didn't know at earlier times in their lives. But true cryptocracy goes deeper—and its practitioners typically are never able to reveal their methods. It must be one of the tragedies of, for example, the Rothschilds, that they can never write honest autobiographies.
    Russell's approach has something in common with 'classical' economics. He certainly seems in need of something like a 'marginal revolution', recognising the importance of changes in power, rather than absolute power. After all, everyone proceeds step by step.
    Russell liked history, and the great advantage of history as a guide, as in Power, is that the events did actually happen—but only if it's reliable history. Nobody uses a theoretical model of human behaviour to guess. But Russell was naive about historians. Russell conforms to the Victorian English view of world history: ancient times; then Greece and its splendour; then Rome and its great (if unintellectual) empire; then—well, the Middle Ages; then the Renaissance, Reformation, and modern Europe. The rest of the world is almost elided away: Russell says nothing about Arabia and its vast slave trade with Africa; nothing about Huns, Mongols, and other migrating tribes and groups; nothing about Turks and the Ottoman Empire; nothing about the Byzantine Church despite its longevity; nothing about the Dutch East India Company; almost nothing about China; a few comments by Rivers on primitive societies.
    Russell's own mock obituary (1936; written after Russell's 60th birthday, and before Power) predicted a BBC organ would describe him as 'the last survivor of a dead epoch.' Unfortunately, he was more or less correct; there is nothing new in this 'new social analysis'. Considering changes such as air warfare, Russell's words were not new, and not even analytical.
    Anyway; disappointing and tantalising. Russell saw that 'abstraction' is better than piecemeal oddments. His attitude is shown by a passing remark in his book on relativity, to the effect that finance is abstract: a financier just has to know if prices will go up or down—a passive view of finance. He considers that Einstein's work was synthesis, in an age of analysis. We can see here how Russell, whose practical skills were zero, was led astray by a Platonic view of ideas of perfection: no doubt, as with structural engineers, abstraction succeeds, leaving architects to decorate. But simple description is not enough: Russell outlines and describes such things as corporations and aristocracies and modern life in modern countries, but doesn't explain how they happened, or why they did not happen in very many places. Russell describes organisations, from chess clubs and racehorse owners to police and big business, but none of these are the same as governments, which may have activities straddling all these things. This is not abstraction; it is more like distraction.

Power needs updating, and in fact rebuilding, with revised human biology, revised history, notably of the 500-year war of 'Jews', a revised approach to what 'power' means and its categories, and revised examples both in time, and from around the world. Russell is in the long European tradition, stretching back to the penetration of Jewish influences after the Americas were discovered. He is about 500 years out of date.

    Something Missing... An important part of the world, but entirely missing from Russell, is the way hierarchies react together. I'll try to illustrate with several examples, chosen to be diverse:
  [1] Business and company hierarchies: new employees see companies in a different way from long-term employees. Dissatisfied employees may see self-employment as an ideal: but people starting self-employment may need to build, or be part of, new organisations. In either case, there's a difference between people at different levels: at the highest level, decisions may involve selling the entire structure, moving it somewhere else, or otherwise doing things which mid-range people may well never even think about.
  [2] If populations in countries increase over time, new possibilities come into being, such as taking account of types of people who previously were too few to take into account. For example, in medicine, diseases may be discovered which only a few people have.
  [3] If countries are controlled by people concerned with conquest, there are obvious possibilities for alliances, any of which may have very difficult details to work through. And there are possibilities for tariffs, boycotts, dumping, promotion of crime, moving of populations.
  [4] Russell has a straightforward view of legal systems: parliament makes and unmakes laws, some people study law, some practitioners are better than others, fines make actions unattractive, some practitioners are struck off, the police are a separate hierarchy (and, according to Russell, there should be another Scotland Yard collecting evidence of innocence). But he's not good on the way laws can and do embody other groups' wishes.
Russell classifies human power in various types (usually as described in traditional history books) but has, in my view, little to say about the way the resulting chains and tangles of people and colleagues interact.

Russell on expulsions of Jews; a serious error which persisted probably up to the use of Internet. Two quotations (from Chapter X: Creeds as Sources of Power) illustrate:

... [Roman Catholic] Fanaticism ... brought about the decay of Spain, first through the expulsion of the Jews and Moors, and then by causing rebellion in the Netherlands and the long exhaustion of the Wars of Religion. ... —Russell assumes that Jews and Moors worked for 'Spain', rather than what they thought were their own interests. And Russell has no idea that secret Jew support assisted the invention and assistance of 'Wars of Religion'.
... The Nazis have exiled most of the ablest Germans, and this must, sooner or later, have disastrous effects upon their military technique. It is impossible for technique to remain long progressive without science, or for the science to flourish with no freedom of thought. ... —this canard continues, and in fact Jewish propaganda on the myth of nuclear weapons must have been designed to assist. In fact, after Jews were partly expelled from Germany as colonizers, German science BENEFITED, to such an extent that only a few years later the Jews' wartime puppets stole innumerable patents from Germany.
      This myth about Jews obviously applied to the USSR, but in addition must apply in the USA, something I only recently noticed. Cell biology and electron microscopy, medicine generally where empiricism failed (cancer etc), specialised money-making frauds and harms (AIDS, polio, SARS, salt, addictive drugs, COVID ...), faked psychology, teaching, 'nuclear physics' and things like NASA , energy studies, deliberate endless lies about history and religions. One of the functions of 'Nobel Prizes' is to pretend American Jews have been intellectual contributors. The main hugely expansive field has been digital electronics, though I doubt Jews played much of a part. Top of Page



image   Review of Bertrand Russell NWO   Bertrand Russell: Authority and the Individual (book 1949)

Signpost en route to world government?, 10 Oct 2010

2024: After this box, I've summarised what I think Russell tried to say. Short summaries only, because Russell tried to say lots, so extracting the message is hard. And some of the things are conflicting, odd, or wrong. Here's my supplement:–

Remember the BBC had an unchallenged monopoly for thirty years. Reith had been free of any serious criticism. And the huge wars, mainly for Jews around the world, and against an array of enemies, had come to a temporary end.

Russell's 3-hour talk is in fact, whether he knew it or not, shaped by the Jewish tikkun olam beliefs. The basis of which is the worthlessness and indistinguishability of the goyim, and the entitlement of the Kahal groups.
    In no special order, Russell praises the naked savage type: '.. aborigines of Australia ... light-hearted and cheerful ... indulgent to his children and kind to his aged parents.' Wrong.
    Russell has no doubts about some Jewish victories: '... the most successful revolutions— ... England in 1688 and ... America in 1776—were carried out by men deeply imbued with the spirit of law.' Wrong on two counts.
    On diversity, Russell swings wildly, through imprecision: '... great German composers arose ... where music was valued, and numbers of lesser men found opportunities.' Same with poets and painters. Russell is very weak on local rivalries and milieux in which science could flourish, a very serious omission.
    And, he says, prophets. Russell talks of moral prophets in a way utterly ignorant of prophets wanting pornography and violence; he had no idea of the shocking realities of Jewish objectives.

Some documents sum up Jewish aims, and I think that, along with the Propaedia of the Encyclopædai Britannica, and H G Wells and others on the United Nations, Authority and the Individual can be viewed as the goy counterpart of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, deceptively mapping out pseudo-ideals for what seem to be all occasions. - RW

This is the text of a BBC radio series—the very first 'Reith Lectures', a series of 6, broadcast in 1948.

Fascinating, but rather baffling mixture. Russell said afterwards that everyone agreed with what he said, so he thought he must have been wrong. The Soviet Union was reportedly furious at social Darwinist references from Sir Arthur Keith.

Anyway Russell's object was to
[1] Promote world government. This was to avoid nuclear war. The sole function of world government was to prevent war. [Note: this is unlike any usual conception of government, and isn't described in any detail]
[2] Permit competition between states. There should be competition, but not war. Everything should be hierarchical, with lower levels allowed the maximum of freedom compatible with the layer(s) above. The internal arrangements of each state, or territory etc, should be their own business only.

That in essence is his world government idea.

Subsidiary to that are various other aims (roughly, 'the individual') Russell thinks
[1] Moral reformers of the first rank usually opposed cruelties, and were themselves opposed by the masses. This is obviously taken straight from Christianity, 'Jesus' and e.g. Wilberforce; Confucians, Taoists, Jews, Muslims would recognise none of this.
[2] Intellectual progress—this means poetic, mystic, artistic, scientific—is necessary, and the best that can be done is insist on free speech. Competition should be intellectual and academic, not economic. (It's not clear where propaganda would slot in—probably it's expected not to flourish. A philosopher's idea of competition, not a businessman's. And of course could conflict with internal arrangements!)
[3] Diversity is important, because it gives material for selection to work on—uniformity is not helpful.
[4] The long view of history suggests units get larger and larger, the entire globe being the obvious limit. (Russell doesn't really consider that maybe this is an artefact of the last couple of thousand years, and may not last, though he does date modern states to the invention of gunpowder, 15th century).
[5] Poverty is a cause of instability. He specifically instances south east Asia, mainly I suppose China and India; the huge population growth in Africa wasn't then clear. (Again, who knows; poverty-stricken hordes in remote areas may well be more stable than worldwide relative equality).

Much of Russell's argument is highly dubious: he says scientists are indifferent to money, which may have been true in Victorian times and earlier, but certainly doesn't apply now, though of course he was thinking of really first rank people. Another oddity is his distinctively 20th century omission of Jews; for instance he says the career of Lenin was astonishing—when of course it was simply a matter of being funded. Interestingly, he says nothing of mass migrations—in those days, expensive ocean liners were almost the only method of migration, so the modern stuff is totally omitted. He offloads (e.g.) shortage of oil and uranium onto the future—with luck, inventors will invent new inventions.

Recommended as the product of someone who spent his life thinking, and was trying to sum up after the immense catastrophes of 20th century wars, though he wrote this book on what turned out to be the eve of the Second, which he clearly expected to happen. Russell thanks (preface to Allen and Unwin first 1949 edition) his wife Patricia Russell for the 'benefit of vital assistance .. as regards details ... and the general ideas' but if this was written in 1939-ish I've lost the source). But it's not even remotely definitive. Russell usually regarded his books as finished objects and never returned with new material.

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Why Men Fight = Principles of Social Reconstruction 1916
Principles of Social Reconstruction was one of Russell's Great War books. The title echoes his Principles of Mathematics (and Plato's Republic); one assumes he felt it was a serious work. He says, in his Autobiography, that his flaring disputes with D H Lawrence helped prompt this book: for all his life Russell considered men love war, at least when prompted. After all, the newspapers through that war told him just that.
    From an Internet perspective, the failure of Russell consists in his inability to identify and separate out Jewish influences: Jewish subversion and aggression and war-mongering, plans for the Middle East, influence on Churches, influence on education, influences on property and love of money, influences on sex and reproduction, are all unknown or ignored by Russell.
      [2020:] Looking in Russell's Autobiography at his musings on this book, it's clear now that the US Jewish publishers may have worried that Russell, an aristocrat with, presumably, extensive connections, might have revealed things about the 'Great War' they wanted to conceal. But his book shows no awareness of such events as the 1913 Federal Reserve, or Talmudic attitudes. It was pretty much a waste of time.

Russell said of this book (Autobiography, vol 2, First chapter The First War): ‘During the summer of 1915 I wrote Principles of Social Reconstruction, or Why Men Fight as it was called in America without my consent. I had no intention of writing such a book, and it was totally unlike anything I had previously written, but it came out in a spontaneous manner. In fact I did not discover what it was all about until I had finished it. It has a framework and a formula, but I only discovered both when I had written all except the first and last words. ...’
    The book was first given as lectures, though Russell doesn't state where, as far as I can find; probably Cambridge. Stanley Unwin wrote to him (Nov 29 1915) offering to publish. ‘This was the beginning of my connection with Allen & Unwin.’
    ‘To my surprise, it [Principles of Social Reconstruction] had an immediate success. I had written it with no expectation of its being read, merely as a profession of faith, but it brought me in a great deal of money, and laid the foundation for all my future earnings.’
March 2017
Here's my online computer version of Principles of Social Reconstruction. For my taste, it makes saddening reason: Russell clearly hadn't a clue.
I suspect this book was one of those attacked by Anthony Ludovici as meaningless emotionally-charged rhetoric, which Ludovici felt modern man should scornfully reject. The Times review (below), a puzzled comment, seems most to the point. The Nation was essentially Jewish, as was the New Statesman; this book established Russell as a 'useful idiot'. His lectures were delivered before the USA entered the 'Great War'. And before Russia was taken over.
This book may have had more influence than is generally supposed, as H G Wells' writing did, because academics disliked Russell for many of his ideas, and in particular, 40-50 years later, his opposition to 'nuclear weapons' and the USA's genocide in Vietnam. And many academics wanted to pretend they were original; this was an aspect of Jewish intrusion and damage to US university life. Russell says somewhere that he was an inventor of sociology. Just a few comments:
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image   Review of Utopians   Bertrand Russell: Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism & Syndicalism

Interesting though inconclusive, 10 Oct 2010

The correct title was 'Roads to Freedom'—'Proposed' was added without his permission by the American publisher. The seed for this book was the First World War, which Russell correctly perceived as a disaster. In the 1950s and 60s this book was available in bookshops (in the UK, published by the now-defunct Allen and Unwin)—the other reviewer presumably remembers this.

As with H G Wells, Russell wanted to consider reconstructing the world ('Principles of Social Reconstruction' was his book on that). His main limitation in my view was his impracticality in a physical sense: he knew little about food and water and buildings and population, and was therefore rather ungrounded—like many people he was over-impressed by verbosity, possibly a Christian heritage—all the material quoted is bookish stuff. (His first book, 'German Social Democracy', had the same fault). Russell admired Marx, regarding him as a first-rate thinker—Russell wasn't the only person to be lured by the novelty of the then-new immigration of Jewish 'intellectuals'. Russell liked Bakunin, and also had hopes for the trade union movement, which within living memory had been illegal. Looking back, I personally think that movement was compromised right from the start, so that 'socialism' mutated into various horrors.

The book isn't too long and I recommend it both for its enthusiasm, but also for mulling over and contemplating the traps lurking in wait for reformers.

Added later:–
‘... The great majority of men and women, in ordinary times, pass through life without ever contemplating or criticising, as a whole, either their own conditions or those of the world at large. They find themselves born into a certain place in society, and they accept what each day brings forth, without any effort of thought beyond what the immediate present requires. Almost as instinctively as the beasts of the field, they seek the satisfaction of the needs of the moment, without much forethought, and without considering that by sufficient effort the whole conditions of their lives could be changed. A certain percentage, guided by personal ambition, make the effort of thought and will which is necessary to place themselves among the more fortunate members of the community; but very few among these are seriously concerned to secure for all the advantages which they seek for themselves. It is only a few rare and exceptional men who have that kind of love toward mankind at large that makes them unable to endure patiently the general mass of evil and suffering, regardless of any relation it may have to their own lives. These few, driven by sympathetic pain, will seek, first in thought and then in action, for some way of escape, some new system of society by which life may become richer, more full of joy and less full of preventable evils than it is at present. But in the past such men have, as a rule, failed to interest the very victims of the injustices which they wished to remedy. The more unfortunate sections of the population have been ignorant, apathetic from excess of toil and weariness, timorous through the imminent danger of immediate punishment by the holders of power, and morally unreliable owing to the loss of self-respect resulting from their degradation. To create among such classes any conscious, deliberate effort after general amelioration might have seemed a hopeless task, and indeed in the past it has generally proved so. But the modern world, by the increase of education and the rise in the standard of comfort among wage-earners, has produced new conditions, more favourable than ever before to the demand for radical reconstruction. It is above all the Socialists, and in a lesser degree the Anarchists (chiefly as the inspirers of Syndicalism), who have become the exponents of this demand. ...’

Russell also says: ‘... The ideals have been elaborated, in the first instance, by solitary writers of books, and yet powerful sections of the wage-earning classes have accepted them as their guide in the practical affairs of the world. ...’

Both these extracts are from Russell's Introduction. It's impossible to tell whether Russell was a useful idiot, retailing Jewish ideas with no clear idea of the sources, or whether he was part of some upper-class plot to integrate Jews (and Freemasons) into the power structure. But awareness of the Jewish 'solitary writers of books' and other Jews makes the origins of his opinions on the 'Great War', and on the previous history of such things as the Dutch invasions and Cromwell, and the British Empire, far clearer.
RW 17 Oct 2021

Some notes made about 1997. 2021 notes in bold.   These notes included a Project Gutenberg online version, with many scanner errors. Despite its length, I've copied it here, as a good example of the influence of Jewish publicity of ideas which seemed new and had no serious criticism, largely hidden by non-English authorship. This is worth musing over, and trying to identify the oratorical parts (for example, the appeal to supposed underdogs, a very Jewish technique, which suggests, without evidence, that things will get better, or at least different, for 'you'. Russell is unaware of bribery, of the sort offered to Freemasons and some foreign governments. And it's interesting to question his lists of problems—another Jewish technique—and his discussions. And to identify content in slogans of 'liberty', 'equality', 'freedom', 'democracy', 'love', 'justice', 'nations', 'creative', 'honour', 'human', ....)

- It strikes me that Russell's sources may have been obtained for him from the Bishopsgate Institute, which in 1905 and 1906 acquired collections in the fields of labour history and co-operative and other ideas (including much manuscript material, including the 'Minute Book of the First International').
- 1948 preface on Russell's views: '.. much less sympathetic to anarchism. The world is now, and probably remain for a considerable time, one of scarcity, where only stringent regulation can prevent destitution. Totalitarian systems in Germany and Russia, with their vast deliberate cruelties, have led me to take a blacker view than I took when younger as to what men are likely to become if there is no forcible control over their tyrannical impulses...'
- '.. Completed in 1918, .. finished in the early months of 1918 when the Germans appeared .. everywhere victorious. The Russians were concluding a separate peace, and in the West [sic] it seemed that the Germans would capture the Channel Ports and drive a wedge between the British and French armies. It is difficult now to remember how sudden was the turn of fortune that led to Allied victory. ...' Russell is completely ignorant of the revisionist view that Jews, distributed round the world and since 1913 buoyed up by the the Federal Reserve backing up Jewish banks, with their subordinate Freemasonry, covertly controlled the War.
-pp 62-63 (in UK edition) look at US labor relations according to 1915 Federal Government Commission report.
-The passage beginning 'The press is the second great factor..' in newsgroup alt.fan.noam.chomsky quoted by harnke@lamar.ColoState.EDU (Benjamin Harnke) dated Fri, 22 Jul 1994, who added 'Sounds like something a young Chomsky might have read, but of course not taking anyone's word for it, as he often tells people not to do about his.'

-From Chap VIII The World as it Could be Made
      Note: naivete re Christianity - all religions are the same! Russell had no idea of the money foundations of Christianity: 'A life lived in this spirit .. [fruitful, sustained by joy, giving affection and respect freely, , concerned with the actual matter that has to be done, aiming at making the world happier, less cruel] 'is the way of life recommended in the Gospels, and by all the great teachers of the word.' [Really? BR doesn't know about Judaism - Soncino translation was about 15 years in the future (from memory); Islam; Buddhism...] '.. the teaching of Christ has been nominally accepted by the world [sic] for many centuries, and yet those who follow it are still persecuted..'

      Note: different sets: Russell has division of evils into three classes. (p 125) [1] Due to physical nature - death, pain, difficulty of subsistence [2] Evils of personal character - ignorance, lack of will, violent passions [3] Evils dependent upon the power of one individual or group over another - tyranny, interference with free development by force or (for example) education.

-Russell in Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (pp 82-84) has exactly the same threefold division: '.. three great spheres of contest .. in the gradual approach towards wisdom. [1] .. contests with nature, the contest between men, and the contests within a man's own self. ... nature ... food .. scientific understanding.. energy .. adventure .. explorations .. possibilities of space-travel.. [2] .. men with other men ... armed combat .. must be ended .. It is not now barbarians who constitute the danger ... [3] .. in the great majority of human beings .. an inner conflict between different impulses and desires which are not mutually compatible. ... changing conditions .. make changes of moral outlook necessary from time to time.. each individual should learn to view groups of human beings other than his own as possible co-operators..' [A footnote implies New Hopes for a Changing World is about the 'gradual approach towards wisdom].

[What follows is a Project Gutenberg e-text. Downloaded Feb 97. Must be from the US version. Despite supposedly being version 10, it had many spelling errors: 'Max' for Marx, 'o£' for of, 'tho' for 'who', 'ad nauseum', quite a few German & French names wrong. 1880 for 1830. I've retained US spelling, and lots of words with -ize, ization, &c. Many hyphens were omitted from ends of lines; I've put in all that I detected. - RW]


PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM [sic; their title]
BY
BERTRAND RUSSELL, F.R.S.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

PART I. HISTORICAL
I. MARX AND SOCIALIST DOCTRINE
II. BAKUNIN AND ANARCHISM
III. THE SYNDICALIST REVOLT

PART II. PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE
IV. WORK AND PAY
V. GOVERNMENT AND LAW
VI. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VII. SCIENCE AND ART UNDER SOCIALISM
VIII.THE WORLD AS IT COULD BE MADE.

INDEX [4 pages; proper names, subjects]

INTRODUCTION
THE attempt to conceive imaginatively a better ordering of human society than the destructive and cruel chaos in which mankind has hitherto existed is by no means modern: it is at least as old as Plato, whose "Republic" set the model for the Utopias of subsequent philosophers. Whoever contemplates the world in the light of an ideal -- whether what he seeks be intellect, or art, or love, or simple happiness, or all together -- must feel a great sorrow in the evils that men needlessly allow to continue, and -- if he be a man of force and vital energy -- an urgent desire to lead men to the realization of the good which inspires his creative vision. It is this desire which has been the primary force moving the pioneers of Socialism and Anarchism, as it moved the inventors of ideal commonwealths in the past. In this there is nothing new. What is new in Socialism and Anarchism, is that close relation of the ideal to the present sufferings of men, which has enabled powerful political movements to grow out of the hopes of solitary thinkers.

It is this that makes Socialism and Anarchism important, and it is this that makes them dangerous to those who batten, consciously or unconsciously upon the evils of our present order of society.

The great majority of men and women, in ordinary times, pass through life without ever contemplating or criticising, as a whole, either their own conditions or those of the world at large. They find themselves born into a certain place in society, and they accept what each day brings forth, without any effort of thought beyond what the immediate present requires. Almost as instinctively as the beasts of the field, they seek the satisfaction of the needs of the moment, without much forethought, and without considering that by sufficient effort the whole conditions of their lives could be changed. A certain percentage, guided by personal ambition, make the effort of thought and will which is necessary to place themselves among the more fortunate members of the community; but very few among these are seriously concerned to secure for all the advantages which they seek for themselves. It is only a few rare and exceptional men who have that kind of love toward mankind at large that makes them unable to endure patiently the general mass of evil and suffering, regardless of any relation it may have to their own lives. These few, driven by sympathetic pain, will seek, first in thought and then in action, for some way of escape, some new system of society by which life may become richer, more full of joy and less full of preventable evils than it is at present. But in the past such men have, as a rule, failed to interest the very victims of the injustices which they wished to remedy. The more unfortunate sections of the population have been ignorant, apathetic from excess of toil and weariness, timorous through the imminent danger of immediate punishment by the holders of power, and morally unreliable owing to the loss of self-respect resulting from their degradation. To create among such classes any conscious, deliberate effort after general amelioration might have seemed a hopeless task, and indeed in the past it has generally proved so. But the modern world, by the increase of education and the rise in the standard of comfort among wage-earners, has produced new conditions, more favorable than ever before to the demand for radical reconstruction. It is above all the Socialists, and in a lesser degree the Anarchists (chiefly as the inspirers of Syndicalism), who have become the exponents of this demand.

What is perhaps most remarkable in regard to both Socialism and Anarchism is the association of a widespread popular movement with ideals for a better world. The ideals have been elaborated, in the first instance, by solitary writers of books, and yet powerful sections of the wage-earning classes have accepted them as their guide in the practical affairs of the world. In regard to Socialism this is evident; but in regard to Anarchism it is only true with some qualification. Anarchism as such has never been a widespread creed, it is only in the modified form of Syndicalism that it has achieved popularity. Unlike Socialism and Anarchism, Syndicalism is primarily the outcome, not of an idea, but of an organization: the fact of Trade Union organization came first, and the ideas of Syndicalism are those which seemed appropriate to this organization in the opinion of the more advanced French Trade Unions. But the ideas are, in the main, derived from Anarchism, and the men who gained acceptance for them were, for the most part, Anarchists. Thus we may regard Syndicalism as the Anarchism of the market-place as opposed to the Anarchism of isolated individuals which had preserved a precarious life throughout the previous decades. Taking this view, we find in Anarchist-Syndicalism the same combination of ideal and organization as we find in Socialist political parties. It is from this standpoint that our study of these movements will be undertaken.

Socialism and Anarchism, in their modern form, spring respectively from two protagonists, Marx and Bakunin, who fought a lifelong battle, culminating in a split in the first International. We shall begin our study with these two men -- first their teaching, and then the organizations which they founded or inspired. This will lead us to the spread of Socialism in more recent years, and thence to the Syndicalist revolt against Socialist emphasis on the State and political action, and to certain movements outside France which have some affinity with Syndicalism- notably the I. W. W. in America and Guild Socialism in England. From this historical survey we shall pass to the consideration of some of the more pressing problems of the future, and shall try to decide in what respects the world would be happier if the aims of Socialists or Syndicalists were achieved.

My own opinion -- which I may as well indicate at the outset -- is that pure Anarchism, though it should be the ultimate ideal, to which society should continually approximate, is for the present impossible, and would not survive more than a year or two at most if it were adopted. On the other hand, both Marxian Socialism and Syndicalism, in spite of many drawbacks, seem to me calculated to give rise to a happier and better world than that in which we live.

I do not, however, regard either of them as the best practicable system. Marxian Socialism, I fear, would give far too much power to the State, while Syndicalism, which aims at abolishing the State, would, I believe, find itself forced to reconstruct a central authority in order to put an end to the rivalries of different groups of producers. The BEST practicable system, to my mind, is that of Guild Socialism, which concedes what is valid both in the claims of the State Socialists and in the Syndicalist fear of the State, by adopting a system of federalism among trades for reasons similar to those which are recommending federalism among nations. The grounds for these conclusions will appear as we proceed.

Before embarking upon the history of recent movements In favor of radical reconstruction, it will be worth while to consider some traits of character which distinguish most political idealists, and are much misunderstood by the general public for other reasons besides mere prejudice. I wish to do full justice to these reasons, in order to show the more effectually why they ought not to be operative.

The leaders of the more advanced movements are, in general, men of quite unusual disinterestedness, as is evident from a consideration of their careers.

Although they have obviously quite as much ability as many men who rise to positions of great power, they do not themselves become the arbiters of contemporary events, nor do they achieve wealth or the applause of the mass of their contemporaries. Men who have the capacity for winning these prizes, and who work at least as hard as those who win them, but deliberately adopt a line which makes the winning of them impossible, must be judged to have an aim in life other than personal advancement; whatever admixture of self-seeking may enter into the detail of their lives, their fundamental motive must be outside Self. The pioneers of Socialism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism have, for the most part, experienced prison, exile, and poverty, deliberately incurred because they would not abandon their propaganda; and by this conduct they have shown that the hope which inspired them was not for themselves, but for mankind.

Nevertheless, though the desire for human welfare is what at bottom determines the broad lines of such men's lives, it often happens that, in the detail of their speech and writing, hatred is far more visible than love. The impatient idealist -- and without some impatience a man will hardly prove effective -- is almost sure to be led into hatred by the oppositions and disappointments which he encounters in his endeavors to bring happiness to the world. The more certain he is of the purity of his motives and the truth of his gospel, the more indignant he will become when his teaching is rejected. Often he will successfully achieve an attitude of philosophic tolerance as regards the apathy of the masses, and even as regards the whole-hearted opposition of professed defenders of the status quo. But the men whom he finds it impossible to forgive are those who profess the same desire for the amelioration of society as he feels himself, but who do not accept his method of achieving this end. The intense faith which enables him to withstand persecution for the sake of his beliefs makes him consider these beliefs so luminously obvious that any thinking man who rejects them must be dishonest, and must be actuated by some sinister motive of treachery to the cause. Hence arises the spirit of the sect, that bitter, narrow orthodoxy which is the bane of those who hold strongly to an unpopular creed. So many real temptations to treachery exist that suspicion is natural. And among leaders, ambition, which they mortify in their choice of a career, is sure to return in a new form: in the desire for intellectual mastery and for despotic power within their own sect. From these causes it results that the advocates of drastic reform divide themselves into opposing schools, hating each other with a bitter hatred, accusing each other often of such crimes as being in the pay of the police, and demanding, of any speaker or writer whom they are to admire, that he shall conform exactly to their prejudices, and make all his teaching minister to their belief that the exact truth is to be found within the limits of their creed. The result of this state of mind is that, to a casual and unimaginative attention, the men who have sacrificed most through the wish to benefit mankind APPEAR to be actuated far more by hatred than by love. And the demand for orthodoxy is stifling to any free exercise of intellect.

This cause, as well as economic prejudice, has made it difficult for the "intellectuals" to co-operate practically with the more extreme reformers, however they may sympathize with their main purposes and even with nine-tenths of their program.

Another reason why radical reformers are misjudged by ordinary men is that they view existing society from outside, with hostility towards its institutions. Although, for the most part, they have more belief than their neighbors in human nature's inherent capacity for a good life, they are so conscious of the cruelty and oppression resulting from existing institutions that they make a wholly misleading impression of cynicism. Most men have instinctively two entirely different codes of behavior: one toward those whom they regard as companions or colleagues or friends, or in some way members of the same "herd"; the other toward those whom they regard as enemies or outcasts or a danger to society.

Radical reformers are apt to concentrate their attention upon the behavior of society toward the latter class, the class of those toward whom the "herd" feels ill-will. This class includes, of course, enemies in war, and criminals; in the minds of those who consider the preservation of the existing order essential to their own safety or privileges, it includes all who advocate any great political or economic change, and all classes which, through their poverty or through any other cause, are likely to feel a dangerous degree of discontent. The ordinary citizen probably seldom thinks about such individuals or classes, and goes through life believing that he and his friends are kindly people, because they have no wish to injure those toward whom they entertain no group-hostility. But the man whose attention is fastened upon the relations of a group with those whom it hates or fears will judge quite differently.

In these relations a surprising ferocity is apt to be developed, and a very ugly side of human nature comes to the fore. The opponents of capitalism have learned, through the study of certain historical facts, that this ferocity has often been shown by the capitalists and by the State toward the wage-earning classes, particularly when they have ventured to protest against the unspeakable suffering to which industrialism has usually condemned them. Hence arises a quite different attitude toward existing society from that of the ordinary well-to-do citizen: an attitude as true as his, perhaps also as untrue, but equally based on facts, facts concerning his relations to his enemies instead of to his friends.

The class-war, like wars between nations, produces two opposing views, each equally true and equally untrue. The citizen of a nation at war, when he thinks of his own countrymen, thinks of them primarily as he has experienced them, in dealings with their friends, in their family relations, and so on. They seem to him on the whole kindly, decent folk. But a nation with which his country is at war views his compatriots through the medium of a quite different set of experiences: as they appear in the ferocity of battle, in the invasion and subjugation of a hostile territory, or in the chicanery of a juggling diplomacy. The men of whom these facts are true are the very same as the men whom their compatriots know as husbands or fathers or friends, but they are judged differently because they are judged on different data. And so it is with those who view the capitalist from the standpoint of the revolutionary wage-earner: they appear inconceivably cynical and misjudging to the capitalist, because the facts upon which their view is based are facts which he either does not know or habitually ignores. Yet the view from the outside is just as true as the view from the inside. Both are necessary to the complete truth; and the Socialist, who emphasizes the outside view, is not a cynic, but merely the friend of the wage-earners, maddened by the spectacle of the needless misery which capitalism inflicts upon them.

I have placed these general reflections at the beginning of our study, in order to make it clear to the reader that, whatever bitterness and hate may be found in the movements which we are to examine, it is not bitterness or hate, but love, that is their mainspring. It is difficult not to hate those who torture the objects of our love. Though difficult, it is not impossible; but it requires a breadth of outlook and a comprehensiveness of understanding which are not easy to preserve amid a desperate contest.

If ultimate wisdom has not always been preserved by Socialists and Anarchists, they have not differed in this from their opponents; and in the source of their inspiration they have shown themselves superior to those who acquiesce ignorantly or supinely in the injustices and oppressions by which the existing system is preserved.

PART I   HISTORICAL

CHAPTER I   MARX AND SOCIALIST DOCTRINE
SOCIALISM, like everything else that is vital, is rather a tendency than a strictly definable body of doctrine. A definition of Socialism is sure either to include some views which many would regard as not Socialistic, or to exclude others which claim to be included. But I think we shall come nearest to the essence of Socialism by defining it as the advocacy of communal ownership of land and capital. Communal ownership may mean ownership by a democratic State, but cannot be held to include ownership by any State which is not democratic. Communal ownership may also be understood, as Anarchist Communism understands it, in the sense of ownership by the free association of the men and women in a community without those compulsory powers which are necessary to constitute a State.

Some Socialists expect communal ownership to arrive suddenly and completely by a catastrophic revolution, while others expect it to come gradually, first in one industry, then in another. Some insist upon the necessity of completeness in the acquisition of land and capital by the public, while others would be content to see lingering islands of private ownership, provided they were not too extensive or powerful.

What all forms have in common is democracy and the abolition, virtual or complete, of the present capitalistic system. The distinction between Socialists, Anarchists and Syndicalists turns largely upon the kind of democracy which they desire. Orthodox Socialists are content with parliamentary democracy in the sphere of government, holding that the evils apparent in this form of constitution at present would disappear with the disappearance of capitalism.

Anarchists and Syndicalists, on the other hand, object to the whole parliamentary machinery, and aim at a different method of regulating the political affairs of the community. But all alike are democratic in the sense that they aim at abolishing every kind of privilege and every kind of artificial inequality: all alike are champions of the wage earner in existing society. All three also have much in common in their economic doctrine. All three regard capital and the wages system as a means of exploiting the laborer in the interests of the possessing classes, and hold that communal ownership, in one form or another, is the only means of bringing freedom to the producers. But within the framework of this common doctrine there are many divergences, and even among those who are strictly to be called Socialists, there is a very considerable diversity of schools.

Socialism as a power in Europe may be said to begin with Marx. It is true that before his time there were Socialist theories, both in England and in France. It is also true that in France, during the revolution of 1848, Socialism for a brief period acquired considerable influence in the State. But the Socialists who preceded Marx tended to indulge in Utopian dreams and failed to found any strong or stable political party. To Marx, in collaboration with Engels, are due both the formulation of a coherent body of Socialist doctrine, sufficiently true or plausible to dominate the minds of vast numbers of men, and the formation of the International Socialist movement, which has continued to grow in all European countries throughout the last fifty years.

In order to understand Marx's doctrine, it is necessary to know something of the influences which formed his outlook. He was born in 1818 at Treves in the Rhine Provinces, his father being a legal official, a Jew who had nominally accepted Christianity. Marx studied jurisprudence, philosophy, political economy and history at various German universities. In philosophy he imbibed the doctrines of Hegel, who was then at the height of his fame, and something of these doctrines dominated his thought throughout his life. Like Hegel, he saw in history the development of an Idea. He conceived the changes in the world as forming a logical development, in which one phase passes by revolution into another, which is its antithesis -- a conception which gave to his views a certain hard abstractness, and a belief in revolution rather than evolution. But of Hegel's more definite doctrines Marx retained nothing after his youth. He was recognized as a brilliant student, and might have had a prosperous career as a professor or an official, but his interest in politics and his Radical views led him into more arduous paths. Already in 1842 he became editor of a newspaper, which was suppressed by the Prussian Government early in the following year on account of its advanced opinions. This led Marx to go to Paris, where he became known as a Socialist and acquired a knowledge of his French predecessors.[1] Here in the year 1844 began his lifelong friendship with Engels, who had been hitherto in business in Manchester, where he had become acquainted with English Socialism and had in the main adopted its doctrines.[2] In 1845 Marx was expelled from Paris and went with Engels to live in Brussels. There he formed a German Working Men's Association and edited a paper which was their organ. Through his activities in Brussels he became known to the German Communist League in Paris, who, at the end of 1847, invited him and Engels to draw up for them a manifesto, which appeared in January, 1848. This is the famous "Communist Manifesto," in which for the first time Marx's system is set forth. It appeared at a fortunate moment. In the following month, February, the revolution broke out in Paris, and in March it spread to Germany. Fear of the revolution led the Brussels Government to expel Marx from Belgium, but the German revolution made it possible for him to return to his own country. In Germany he again edited a paper, which again led him into a conflict with the authorities, increasing in severity as the reaction gathered force. In June, 1849, his paper was suppressed, and he was expelled from Prussia.

He returned to Paris, but was expelled from there also. This led him to settle in England -- at that time an asylum for friends of freedom -- and in England, with only brief intervals for purposes of agitation, he continued to live until his death in 1883.

[1] Chief among these were Fourier and Saint-Simon, who constructed somewhat fantastic Socialistic ideal commonwealths.

Proudhon, with whom Marx had some not wholly friendly relations, is to be regarded as a forerunner of the Anarchists rather than of orthodox Socialism.

[2] Marx mentions the English Socialists with praise in "The Poverty of Philosophy" (1847). They, like him, tend to base their arguments upon a Ricardian theory of value, but they have not his scope or erudition or scientific breadth. Among them may be mentioned Thomas Hodgskin (1787.1869), originally an officer in the Navy, but dismissed for a pamphlet critical of the methods of naval discipline, author of "Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital" (1825) and other works; William Thompson (1785.1833), author of "Inquiry into the Principles of Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness" (1824), and "Labour Rewarded" (1825); and Piercy Ravenstone, from whom Hodgskin's ideas are largely derived. Perhaps more important than any of these was Robert Owen.

The bulk of his time was occupied in the composition of his great book, "Capital."[3] His other important work during his later years was the formation and spread of the International Working Men's Association. From 1849 onward the greater part of his time was spent in the British Museum, accumulating, with German patience, the materials for his terrific indictment of capitalist society, but he retained his hold on the International Socialist movement.

In several countries he had sons-in-law as lieutenants, like Napoleon's brothers, and in the various internal contests that arose his will generally prevailed.

[3] The first and most important volume appeared in 1867; the other two volumes were published posthumously (1885 and 1894).

The most essential of Marx's doctrines may be reduced to three: first, what is called the materialistic interpretation of history; second, the law of the concentration of capital; and, third, the class-war.

1. The Materialistic Interpretation of History.- Marx holds that in the main all the phenomena of human society have their origin in material conditions, and these he takes to be embodied in economic systems. Political constitutions, laws, religions, philosophies -- all these he regards as, in their broad outlines, expressions of the economic regime in the society that gives rise to them. It would be unfair to represent him as maintaining that the conscious economic motive is the only one of importance; it is rather that economics molds character and opinion, and is thus the prime source of much that appears in consciousness to have no connection with them.

He applies his doctrine in particular to two revolutions, one in the past, the other in the future. The revolution in the past is that of the bourgeoisie against feudalism, which finds its expression, according to him, particularly in the French Revolution.

The one in the future is the revolution of the wage earners, or proletariat, against the bourgeoisie, which is to establish the Socialist Commonwealth.

The whole movement of history is viewed by him as necessary, as the effect of material causes operating upon human beings. He does not so much advocate the Socialist revolution as predict it. He holds, it is true, that it will be beneficent, but he is much more concerned to prove that it must inevitably come.

The same sense of necessity is visible in his exposition of the evils of the capitalist system. He does not blame capitalists for the cruelties of which he shows them to have been guilty; he merely points out that they are under an inherent necessity to behave cruelly so long as private ownership of land and capital continues. But their tyranny will not last forever, for it generates the forces that must in the end overthrow it.

2. The Law of the Concentration of Capital.- Marx pointed out that capitalist undertakings tend to grow larger and larger. He foresaw the substitution of trusts for free competition, and predicted that the number of capitalist enterprises must diminish as the magnitude of single enterprises increased.

He supposed that this process must involve a diminution, not only in the number of businesses, but also in the number of capitalists. Indeed, he usually spoke as though each business were owned by a single man. Accordingly, he expected that men would be continually driven from the ranks of the capitalists into those of the proletariat, and that the capitalists, in the course of time, would grow numerically weaker and weaker. He applied this principle not only to industry but also to agriculture. He expected to find the landowners growing fewer and fewer while their estates grew larger and larger. This process was to make more and more glaring the evils and injustices of the capitalist system, and to stimulate more and more the forces of opposition.

3. The Class War. -- Marx conceives the wage earner and the capitalist in a sharp antithesis. He imagines that every man is, or must soon become, wholly the one or wholly the other. The wage earner, who possesses nothing, is exploited by the capitalists, who possess everything. As the capitalist system works itself out and its nature becomes more clear, the opposition of bourgeoisie and proletariat becomes more and more marked. The two classes, since they have antagonistic interests, are forced into a class war which generates within the capitalist regime internal forces of disruption. The working men learn gradually to combine against their exploiters, first locally, then nationally, and at last internationally. When they have learned to combine internationally they must be victorious. They will then decree that all land and capital shall be owned in common; exploitation will cease; the tyranny of the owners of wealth will no longer be possible; there will no longer be any division of society into classes, and all men will be free.

All these ideas are already contained in the "Communist Manifesto," a work of the most amazing vigor and force, setting forth with terse compression the titanic forces of the world, their epic battle, and the inevitable consummation. This work is of such importance in the development of Socialism and gives such an admirable statement of the doctrines set forth at greater length and with more pedantry in "Capital," that its salient passages must be known by anyone who wishes to understand the hold which Marxian Socialism has acquired over the intellect and imagination of a large proportion of working-class leaders.

"A spectre is haunting Europe," it begins, "the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre -- Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies. Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as communistic by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its re-actionary adversaries?" The existence of a class war is nothing new: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." In these struggles the fight "each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." "Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie . . .

has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat." Then follows a history of the fall of feudalism, leading to a description of the bourgeoisie as a revolutionary force. "The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part." "For exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation." "The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe." "The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together." Feudal relations became fetters: "They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder. . . . A similar movement is going on before our own eyes." "The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons- the modern working class -- the proletarians." The cause of the destitution of the proletariat are then set forth. "The cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labor, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and diversion of labor increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases." "Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of laborers, crowded into the factory, are organized like soldiers.

As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State, they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful, and the more embittering it is." The Manifesto tells next the manner of growth of the class struggle. "The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual laborers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them.

They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves." "At this stage the laborers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so." "The collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trades Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots. Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time.

The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another.

It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes.

But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years. This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself." "In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped.

The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family-relations; modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests. All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation.

The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation.

They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole super incumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air." The Communists, says Marx, stand for the proletariat as a whole. They are international. "The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got." The immediate aim of the Communists is the conquests of political power by the proletariat. "The theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property." The materialistic interpretation of history is used to answer such charges as that Communism is anti-Christian. "The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination. Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations, and in his social life?" The attitude of the Manifesto to the State is not altogether easy to grasp. "The executive of the modern State," we are told, "is but a Committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." Nevertheless, the first step for the proletariat must be to acquire control of the State. "We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible." The Manifesto passes on to an immediate program of reforms, which would in the first instance much increase the power of the existing State, but it is contended that when the Socialist revolution is accomplished, the State, as we know it, will have ceased to exist. As Engels says elsewhere, when the proletariat seizes the power of the State "it puts an end to all differences of class and antagonisms of class, and consequently also puts an end to the State as a State." Thus, although State Socialism might, in fact, be the outcome of the proposals of Marx and Engels, they cannot themselves be accused of any glorification of the State.

The Manifesto ends with an appeal to the wage earners of the world to rise on behalf of Communism.

"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!" In all the great countries of the Continent, except Russia, a revolution followed quickly on the publication of the Communist Manifesto, but the revolution was not economic or international, except at first in France. Everywhere else it was inspired by the ideas of nationalism. Accordingly, the rulers of the world, momentarily terrified, were able to recover power by fomenting the enmities inherent in the nationalist idea, and everywhere, after a very brief triumph, the revolution ended in war and reaction. The ideas of the Communist Manifesto appeared before the world was ready for them, but its authors lived to see the beginnings of the growth of that Socialist movement in every country, which has pressed on with increasing force, influencing Governments more and more, dominating the Russian Revolution, and perhaps capable of achieving at no very distant date that international triumph to which the last sentences of the Manifesto summon the wage-earners of the world.

Marx's magnum opus, "Capital," added bulk and substance to the theses of the Communist Manifesto.

It contributed the theory of surplus value, which professed to explain the actual mechanism of capitalist exploitation. This doctrine is very complicated and is scarcely tenable as a contribution to pure theory. It is rather to be viewed as a translation into abstract terms of the hatred with which Marx regarded the system that coins wealth out of human lives, and it is in this spirit, rather than in that of disinterested analysis, that it has been read by its admirers. A critical examination of the theory of surplus value would require much difficult and abstract discussion of pure economic theory without having much bearing upon the practical truth or falsehood of Socialism; it has therefore seemed impossible within the limits of the present volume. To my mind the best parts of the book are those which deal with economic facts, of which Marx's knowledge was encyclopaedic. It was by these facts that he hoped to instil into his disciples that firm and undying hatred that should make them soldiers to the death in the class war. The facts which he accumulates are such as are practically unknown to the vast majority of those who live comfortable lives.

They are very terrible facts, and the economic system which generates them must be acknowledged to be a very terrible system. A few examples of his choice of facts will serve to explain the bitterness of many Socialists:- Mr. Broughton Charlton, county magistrate, declared, as chairman of a meeting held at the Assembly Rooms, Nottingham, on the 14th January, 1860, "that there was an amount of privation and suffering among that portion of the population connected with the lace trade, unknown in other parts of the kingdom, indeed, in the civilized world. . . . Children of nine or ten years are dragged from their squalid beds at two, three, or four o' clock in the morning and compelled to work for a bare subsistence until ten, eleven, or twelve at night, their limbs wearing away, their frames dwindling, their faces whitening, and their humanity absolutely sinking into a stone-like torpor, utterly horrible to contemplate."[4] [4] Vol. i, p. 227.

Three railway men are standing before a London coroner's jury -- a guard, an engine-driver, a signalman.

A tremendous railway accident has hurried hundreds of passengers into another world. The negligence of the employes is the cause of the misfortune. They declare with one voice before the jury that ten or twelve years before, their labor only lasted eight hours a day. During the last five or six years it had been screwed up to 14, 18, and 20 hours, and under a specially severe pressure of holiday-makers, at times of excursion trains, it often lasted 40 or 50 hours without a break. They were ordinary men, not Cyclops. At a certain point their labor-power failed. Torpor seized them. Their brain ceased to think, their eyes to see. The thoroughly "respectable" British jurymen answered by a verdict that sent them to the next assizes on a charge of manslaughter, and, in a gentle "rider" to their verdict, expressed the pious hope that the capitalistic magnates of the railways would, in future, be more extravagant in the purchase of a sufficient quantity of labor-power, and more "abstemious," more "self-denying," more "thrifty," in the draining of paid labor-power.[5] [5] Vol. i, pp. 237, 238.

In the last week of June, 1863, all the London daily papers published a paragraph with the "sensational" heading, "Death from simple over-work." It dealt with the death of the milliner, Mary Anne Walkley, 20 years of age, employed in a highly respectable dressmaking establishment, exploited by a lady with the pleasant name of Elise. The old, often-told story was once more recounted.

This girl worked, on an average, 16 1/2 hours, during the season often 30 hours, without a break, whilst her failing labor-power was revived by occasional supplies of sherry, port, or coffee. It was just now the height of the season. It was necessary to conjure up in the twinkling of an eye the gorgeous dresses for the noble ladies bidden to the ball in honor of the newly imported Princess of Wales. Mary Anne Walkley had worked without intermission for 26 1/2 hours, with 60 other girls, 30 in one room, that only afforded 1/3 of the cubic feet of air required for them. At night, they slept in pairs in one of the stifling holes into which the bedroom was divided by partitions of board. And this was one of the best millinery establishments in London.

Mary Anne Walkley fell ill on the Friday, died on Sunday, without, to the astonishment of Madame Elise, having previously completed the work in hand. The doctor, Mr. Keys, called too late to the death bed, duly bore witness before the coroner's jury that "Mary Anne Walkley had died from long hours of work in an over crowded workroom, and a too small and badly ventilated bedroom." In order to give the doctor a lesson in good manners, the coroner's jury thereupon brought in a verdict that "the deceased had died of apoplexy, but there was reason to fear that her death had been accelerated by over-work in an over-crowded workroom, &c." "Our white slaves," cried the "Morning Star," the organ of the free-traders, Cobden and Bright, "our white slaves, who are toiled into the grave, for the most part silently pine and die."[6] [6] Vol. i, pp. 239, 240.

Edward VI: A statue of the first year of his reign, 1547, ordains that if anyone refuses to work, he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler. The master shall feed his slave on bread and water, weak broth and such refuse meat as he thinks fit. He has the right to force him to do any work, no matter how disgusting, with whip and chains. If the slave is absent a fortnight, he is condemned to slavery for life and is to be branded on forehead or back with the letter S; if he runs away thrice, he is to be executed as a felon. The master can sell him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as any other personal chattel or cattle. If the slaves attempt anything against the masters, they are also to be executed. Justices of the peace, on information, are to hunt the rascals down. If it happens that a vagabond has been idling about for three days, he is to be taken to his birthplace, branded with a red hot iron with the letter V on the breast and be set to work, in chains, in the streets or at some other labor.

If the vagabond gives a false birthplace, he is then to become the slave for life of this place, of its inhabitants, or its corporation, and to be branded with an S. All persons have the right to take away the children of the vagabonds and to keep them as apprentices, the young men until the 24th year, the girls until the 20th. If they run away, they are to become up to this age the slaves of their masters, who can put them in irons, whip them, &c., if they like. Every master may put an iron ring around the neck, arms or legs of his slave, by which to know him more easily and to be more certain of him.

The last part of this statute provides that certain poor people may be employed by a place or by persons, who are willing to give them food and drink and to find them work. This kind of parish-slaves was kept up in England until far into the 19th century under the name of "roundsmen."[7] [7] Vol. i, pp. 758, 759.

Page after page and chapter after chapter of facts of this nature, each brought up to illustrate some fatalistic theory which Marx professes to have proved by exact reasoning, cannot but stir into fury any passionate working-class reader, and into unbearable shame any possessor of capital in whom generosity and justice are not wholly extinct.

Almost at the end of the volume, in a very brief chapter, called "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation," Marx allows one moment's glimpse of the hope that lies beyond the present horror:- As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the laborers are turned into proletarians, their means of labor into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialization of labor and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the laborer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many laborers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many, and in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labor-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime.

Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this, too, grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument.

This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated,[8] [8] Vol. i pp. 788, 789.

That is all. Hardly another word from beginning to end is allowed to relieve the gloom, and in this relentless pressure upon the mind of the reader lies a great part of the power which this book has acquired.

Two questions are raised by Marx's work: First, Are his laws of historical development true? Second, Is Socialism desirable? The second of these questions is quite independent of the first. Marx professes to prove that Socialism must come, but scarcely concerns himself to argue that when it comes it will be a good thing. It may be, however, that if it comes, it will be a good thing, even though all Marx's arguments to prove that it must come should be at fault.

In actual fact, time has shown many flaws in Marx's theories. The development of the world has been sufficiently like his prophecy to prove him a man of very unusual penetration, but has not been sufficiently like to make either political or economic history exactly such as he predicted that it would be.

Nationalism, so far from diminishing, has increased, and has failed to be conquered by the cosmopolitan tendencies which Marx rightly discerned in finance.

Although big businesses have grown bigger and have over a great area reached the stage of monopoly, yet the number of shareholders in such enterprises is so large that the actual number of individuals interested in the capitalist system has continually increased. Moreover, though large firms have grown larger, there has been a simultaneous increase in firms of medium size. Meanwhile the wage-earners, who were, according to Marx, to have remained at the bare level of subsistence at which they were in the England of the first half of the nineteenth century, have instead profited by the general increase of wealth, though in a lesser degree than the capitalists.

The supposed iron law of wages has been proved untrue, so far as labor in civilized countries is concerned. If we wish now to find examples of capitalist cruelty analogous to those with which Marx's book is filled, we shall have to go for most of our material to the Tropics, or at any rate to regions where there are men of inferior races to exploit. Again: the skilled worker of the present day is an aristocrat in the world of labor. It is a question with him whether he shall ally himself with the unskilled worker against the capitalist, or with the capitalist against the unskilled worker. Very often he is himself a capitalist in a small way, and if he is not so individually, his trade union or his friendly society is pretty sure to be so. Hence the sharpness of the class war has not been maintained. There are gradations, intermediate ranks between rich and poor, instead of the clear-cut logical antithesis between the workers who have nothing and the capitalists who have all. Even in Germany, which became the home of orthodox Marxianism and developed a powerful Social-Democratic party, nominally accepting the doctrine of "Das Kapital" as all but verbally inspired, even there the enormous increase of wealth in all classes in the years preceding the war led Socialists to revise their beliefs and to adopt an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary attitude.

Bernstein, a German Socialist who lived long in England, inaugurated the "Revisionist" movement which at last conquered the bulk of the party. His criticisms of Marxian orthodoxy are set forth in his "Evolutionary Socialism."[9] Bernstein's work, as is common in Broad Church writers, consists largely in showing that the Founders did not hold their doctrines so rigidly as their followers have done. There is much in the writings of Marx and Engels that cannot be fitted into the rigid orthodoxy which grew up among their disciples. Bernstein's main criticisms of these disciples, apart from such as we have already mentioned, consist in a defense of piecemeal action as against revolution. He protests against the attitude of undue hostility to Liberalism which is common among Socialists, and he blunts the edge of the Internationalism which undoubtedly is part of the teachings of Marx. The workers, he says, have a Fatherland as soon as they become citizens, and on this basis he defends that degree of nationalism which the war has since shown to be prevalent in the ranks of Socialists. He even goes so far as to maintain that European nations have a right to tropical territory owing to their higher civilization. Such doctrines diminish revolutionary ardor and tend to transform Socialists into a left wing of the Liberal Party. But the increasing prosperity of wage-earners before the war made these developments inevitable. Whether the war will have altered conditions in this respect, it is as yet impossible to know. Bernstein concludes with the wise remark that: "We have to take working men as they are. And they are neither so universally paupers as was set out in the Communist Manifesto, nor so free from prejudices and weaknesses as their courtiers wish to make us believe." [9] Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozial-Demokratie." In March, 1914, Bernstein delivered a lecture in Budapest in which he withdrew from several of the positions he had taken up (vide Budapest "Volkstimme," March 19, 1914).

Bernstein represents the decay of Marxian orthodoxy from within. Syndicalism represents an attack against it from without, from the standpoint of a doctrine which professes to be even more radical and more revolutionary than that of Marx and Engels.

The attitude of Syndicalists to Marx may be seen in Sorel's little book, "La Decomposition du Marxisme," and in his larger work, "Reflections on Violence," authorized translation by T. E. Hulme (Allen & Unwin, 1915). After quoting Bernstein, with approval in so far as he criticises Marx, Sorel proceeds to other criticisms of a different order. He points out (what is true) that Marx's theoretical economics remain very near to Manchesterism: the orthodox political economy of his youth was accepted by him on many points on which it is now known to be wrong. According to Sorel, the really essential thing in Marx's teaching is the class war. Whoever keeps this alive is keeping alive the spirit of Socialism much more truly than those who adhere to the letter of Social-Democratic orthodoxy. On the basis of the class war, French Syndicalists developed a criticism of Marx which goes much deeper than those that we have been hitherto considering. Marx's views on historical development may have been in a greater or less degree mistaken in fact, and yet the economic and political system which he sought to create might be just as desirable as his followers suppose. Syndicalism, however, criticises, not only Marx's views of fact, but also the goal at which he aims and the general nature of the means which he recommends. Marx's ideas were formed at a time when democracy did not yet exist. It was in the very year in which "Das Kapital" appeared that urban working men first got the vote in England and universal suffrage was granted by Bismarck in Northern Germany. It was natural that great hopes should be entertained as to what democracy would achieve. Marx, like the orthodox economists, imagined that men's opinions are guided by a more or less enlightened view of economic self-interest, or rather of economic class interest. A long experience of the workings of political democracy has shown that in this respect Disraeli and Bismarck were shrewder judges of human nature than either Liberals or Socialists. It has become increasingly difficult to put trust in the State as a means to liberty, or in political parties as instruments sufficiently powerful to force the State into the service of the people. The modern State, says Sorel, "is a body of intellectuals, which is invested with privileges, and which possesses means of the kind called political for defending itself against the attacks made on it by other groups of intellectuals, eager to possess the profits of public employment. Parties are constituted in order to acquire the conquest of these employments, and they are analogous to the State."[10] [10] La Decomposition du Marxisme," p. 53.

Syndicalists aim at organizing men, not by party, but by occupation. This, they say, alone represents the true conception and method of the class war.

Accordingly they despise all POLITICAL action through the medium of Parliament and elections: the kind of action that they recommend is direct action by the revolutionary syndicate or trade union. The battle cry of industrial versus political action has spread far beyond the ranks of French Syndicalism. It is to be found in the I. W. W. in America, and among Industrial Unionists and Guild Socialists in Great Britain. Those who advocate it, for the most part, aim also at a different goal from that of Marx. They believe that there can be no adequate individual freedom where the State is all-powerful, even if the State be a Socialist one. Some of them are out-and out Anarchists, who wish to see the State wholly abolished; others only wish to curtail its authority.

Owing to this movement, opposition to Marx, which from the Anarchist side existed from the first, has grown very strong. It is this opposition in its older form that will occupy us in our next chapter.

CHAPTER II   BAKUNIN AND ANARCHISM
IN the popular mind, an Anarchist is a person who throws bombs and commits other outrages, either because he is more or less insane, or because he uses the pretense of extreme political opinions as a cloak for criminal proclivities. This view is, of course, in every way inadequate. Some Anarchists believe in throwing bombs; many do not. Men of almost every other shade of opinion believe in throwing bombs in suitable circumstances: for example, the men who threw the bomb at Sarajevo which started the present war were not Anarchists, but Nationalists. And those Anarchists who are in favor of bomb-throwing do not in this respect differ on any vital principle from the rest of the community, with the exception of that infinitesimal portion who adopt the Tolstoyan attitude of non-resistance.

Anarchists, like Socialists, usually believe in the doctrine of the class war, and if they use bombs, it is as Governments use bombs, for purposes of war: but for every bomb manufactured by an Anarchist, many millions are manufactured by Governments, and for every man killed by Anarchist violence, many millions are killed by the violence of States. We may, therefore, dismiss from our minds the whole question of violence, which plays so large a part in the popular imagination, since it is neither essential nor peculiar to those who adopt the Anarchist position.

Anarchism, as its derivation indicates, is the theory which is opposed to every kind of forcible government. It is opposed to the State as the embodiment of the force employed in the government of the community. Such government as Anarchism can tolerate must be free government, not merely in the sense that it is that of a majority, but in the sense that it is that assented to by all. Anarchists object to such institutions as the police and the criminal law, by means of which the will of one part of the community is forced upon another part. In their view, the democratic form of government is not very enormously preferable to other forms so long as minorities are compelled by force or its potentiality to submit to the will of majorities. Liberty is the supreme good in the Anarchist creed, and liberty is sought by the direct road of abolishing all forcible control over the individual by the community.

Anarchism, in this sense, is no new doctrine. It is set forth admirably by Chuang Tzu, a Chinese philosopher, who lived about the year 300 B. C.:- Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, and fling up their heels over the champaign.

Such is the real nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.

One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of horses." So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them were dead.

The potter says: "I can do what I will with Clay.

If I want it round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square." The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line." But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with clay and wood. Those who govern the empire make the same mistake.

Now I regard government of the empire from quite a different point of view.

The people have certain natural instincts: -- to weave and clothe themselves, to till and feed themselves. These are common to all humanity, and all are agreed thereon.

Such instincts are called "Heaven-sent." And so in the days when natural instincts prevailed, men moved quietly and gazed steadily. At that time there were no roads over mountains, nor boats, nor bridges over water. All things were produced, each for its own proper sphere. Birds and beasts multiplied, trees and shrubs grew up. The former might be led by the hand; you could climb up and peep into the raven's nest. For then man dwelt with birds and beasts, and all creation was one. There were no distinctions of good and bad men. Being all equally without knowledge, their virtue could not go astray. Being all equally without evil desires, they were in a state of natural integrity, the perfection of human existence.

But when Sages appeared, tripping up people over charity and fettering them with duty to their neighbor, doubt found its way into the world. And then, with their gushing over music and fussing over ceremony, the empire became divided against itself.[11] [11] "Musings of a Chinese Mystic." Selections from the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu. With an Introduction by Lionel Giles, M.A. (Oxon.). Wisdom of the East Series, John Murray, 1911.

Pages 66.68.

The modern Anarchism, in the sense in which we shall be concerned with it, is associated with belief in the communal ownership of land and capital, and is thus in an important respect akin to Socialism.

This doctrine is properly called Anarchist Communism, but as it embraces practically all modern Anarchism, we may ignore individualist Anarchism altogether and concentrate attention upon the communistic form. Socialism and Anarchist Communism alike have arisen from the perception that private capital is a source of tyranny by certain individuals over others. Orthodox Socialism believes that the individual will become free if the State becomes the sole capitalist. Anarchism, on the contrary, fears that in that case the State might merely inherit the tyrannical propensities of the private capitalist.

Accordingly, it seeks for a means of reconciling communal ownership with the utmost possible diminution in the powers of the State, and indeed ultimately with the complete abolition of the State. It has arisen mainly within the Socialist movement as its extreme left wing.

In the same sense in which Marx may be regarded as the founder of modern Socialism, Bakunin may be regarded as the founder of Anarchist Communism.

But Bakunin did not produce, like Marx, a finished and systematic body of doctrine. The nearest approach to this will be found in the writings of his follower, Kropotkin. In order to explain modern Anarchism we shall begin with the life of Bakunin[12] and the history of his conflicts with Marx, and shall then give a brief account of Anarchist theory as set forth partly in his writings, but more in those of Kropotkin.[13] [12] An account of the life of Bakunin from the Anarchist standpoint will be found in vol. ii of the complete edition of his works: "Michel Bakounine, OEuvres," Tome II. Avec une notice biographique, des avant-propos et des notes, par James Guillaume. Paris, P.-V, Stock, editeur, pp. v-lxiii.

[13] Criticism of these theories will be reserved for Part II.

Michel Bakunin was born in 1814 of a Russian aristocratic family. His father was a diplomatist, who at the time of Bakunin's birth had retired to his country estate in the Government of Tver. Bakunin entered the school of artillery in Petersburg at the age of fifteen, and at the age of eighteen was sent as an ensign to a regiment stationed in the Government of Minsk. The Polish insurrection of 1830 had just been crushed. "The spectacle of terrorized Poland," says Guillaume, "acted powerfully on the heart of the young officer, and contributed to inspire in him the horror of despotism." This led him to give up the military career after two years' trial. In 1834 he resigned his commission and went to Moscow, where he spent six years studying philosophy. Like all philosophical students of that period, he became a Hegelian, and in 1840 he went to Berlin to continue his studies, in the hope of ultimately becoming a professor. But after this time his opinions underwent a rapid change. He found it impossible to accept the Hegelian maxim that whatever is, is rational, and in 1842 he migrated to Dresden, where he became associated with Arnold Ruge, the publisher of "Deutsche Jahrbuecher." By this time he had become a revolutionary, and in the following year he incurred the hostility of the Saxon Government.

This led him to go to Switzerland, where he came in contact with a group of German Communists, but, as the Swiss police importuned him and the Russian Government demanded his return, he removed to Paris, where he remained from 1843 to 1847. These years in Paris were important in the formation of his outlook and opinions. He became acquainted with Proudhon, who exercised a considerable influence on him; also with George Sand and many other well known people. It was in Paris that he first made the acquaintance of Marx and Engels, with whom he was to carry on a lifelong battle. At a much later period, in 1871, he gave the following account of his relations with Marx at this time:-

Marx was much more advanced than I was, as he remains to-day not more advanced but incomparably more learned than I am. I knew then nothing of political economy. I had not yet rid myself of metaphysical abstractions, and my Socialism was only instinctive. He, though younger than I, was already an atheist, an instructed materialist, a well-considered Socialist. It was just at this time that he elaborated the first foundations of his present system. We saw each other fairly often, for I respected him much for his learning and his passionate and serious devotion (always mixed, however, with personal vanity) to the cause of the proletariat, and I sought eagerly his conversation, which was always instructive and clever, when it was not inspired by a paltry hate, which, alas! happened only too often. But there was never any frank intimacy between as. Our temperaments would not suffer it. He called me a sentimental idealist, and he was right; I called him a vain man, perfidious and crafty, and I also was right.

Bakunin never succeeded in staying long in one place without incurring the enmity of the authorities.

In November, 1847, as the result of a speech praising the Polish rising of 1830, he was expelled from France at the request of the Russian Embassy, which, in order to rob him of public sympathy, spread the unfounded report that he had been an agent of the Russian Government, but was no longer wanted because he had gone too far. The French Government, by calculated reticence, encouraged this story, which clung to him more or less throughout his life.

Being compelled to leave France, he went to Brussels, where he renewed acquaintance with Marx.

A letter of his, written at this time, shows that he entertained already that bitter hatred for which afterward he had so much reason. "The Germans, artisans, Bornstedt, Marx and Engels -- and, above all, Marx -- are here, doing their ordinary mischief.

Vanity, spite, gossip, theoretical overbearingness and practical pusillanimity -- reflections on life, action and simplicity, and complete absence of life, action and simplicity -- literary and argumentative artisans and repulsive coquetry with them: `Feuerbach is a bourgeois,' and the word `bourgeois' grown into an epithet and repeated ad nauseam, but all of them themselves from head to foot, through and through, provincial bourgeois. With one word, lying and stupidity, stupidity and lying. In this society there is no possibility of drawing a free, full breath.

I hold myself aloof from them, and have declared quite decidedly that I will not join their communistic union of artisans, and will have nothing to do with it." The Revolution of 1848 led him to return to Paris and thence to Germany. He had a quarrel with Marx over a matter in which he himself confessed later that Marx was in the right. He became a member of the Slav Congress in Prague, where he vainly endeavored to promote a Slav insurrection. Toward the end of 1848, he wrote an "Appeal to Slavs," calling on them to combine with other revolutionaries to destroy the three oppressive monarchies, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Marx attacked him in print, saying, in effect, that the movement for Bohemian independence was futile because the Slavs had no future, at any rate in those regions where they happened to be subject to Germany and Austria.

Bakunin accused Mars of German patriotism in this matter, and Marx accused him of Pan-Slavism, no doubt in both cases justly. Before this dispute, however, a much more serious quarrel had taken place. Marx's paper, the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung," stated that George Sand had papers proving Bakunin to be a Russian Government agent and one of those responsible for the recent arrest of Poles.

Bakunin, of course, repudiated the charge, and George Sand wrote to the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung," denying this statement in toto. The denials were published by Marx, and there was a nominal reconciliation, but from this time onward there was never any real abatement of the hostility between these rival leaders, who did not meet again until 1864.

Meanwhile, the reaction had been everywhere gaining ground. In May, 1849, an insurrection in Dresden for a moment made the revolutionaries masters of the town. They held it for five days and established a revolutionary government. Bakunin was the soul of the defense which they made against the Prussian troops. But they were overpowered, and at last Bakunin was captured while trying to escape with Heubner and Richard Wagner, the last of whom, fortunately for music, was not captured.

Now began a long period of imprisonment in many prisons and various countries. Bakunin was sentenced to death on the 14th of January, 1850, but his sentence was commuted after five months, and he was delivered over to Austria, which claimed the privilege of punishing him. The Austrians, in their turn, condemned him to death in May, 1851, and again his sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life. In the Austrian prisons he had fetters on hands and feet, and in one of them he was even chained to the wall by the belt. There seems to have been some peculiar pleasure to be derived from the punishment of Bakunin, for the Russian Government in its turn demanded him of the Austrians, who delivered him up. In Russia he was confined, first in the Peter and Paul fortress and then in the Schluesselburg. There be suffered from scurvy and all his teeth fell out.

His health gave way completely, and he found almost all food impossible to assimilate. "But, if his body became enfeebled, his spirit remained inflexible. He feared one thing above all. It was to find himself some day led, by the debilitating action of prison, to the condition of degradation of which Silvio Pellico offers a well-known type. He feared that he might cease to hate, that he might feel the sentiment of revolt which upheld him becoming extinguished in his hearts that he might come to pardon his persecutors and resign himself to his fate. But this fear was superfluous; his energy did not abandon him a single day, and he emerged from his cell the same man as when he entered."[14] [14] Ibid. p. xxvi.

After the death of the Tsar Nicholas many political prisoners were arrested, but Alexander II with his own hand erased Bakunin's name from the list.

When Bakunin's mother succeeded in obtaining an interview with the new Tsar, he said to her, "Know, Madame, that so long as your son lives, he can never be free." However, in 1857, after eight years of captivity, he was sent to the comparative freedom of Siberia. From there, in 1861, he succeeded in escaping to Japan, and thence through America to London.

He had been imprisoned for his hostility to governments, but, strange to say, his sufferings had not had the intended effect of making him love those who inflicted them. From this time onward, he devoted himself to spreading the spirit of Anarchist revolt, without, however, having to suffer any further term of imprisonment. For some years he lived in Italy, where he founded in 1864 an "International Fraternity" or "Alliance of Socialist Revolutionaries." This contained men of many countries, but apparently no Germans. It devoted itself largely to combating Mazzini's nationalism. In 1867 he moved to Switzerland, where in the following year he helped to found the "International Alliance of Socialist Democracy," of which he drew up the program.

This program gives a good succinct resume of his opinions:- The Alliance declares itself atheist; it desires the definitive and entire abolition of classes and the political equality and social equalization of individuals of both sexes. It desires that the earth, the instrument of labor, like all other capital, becoming the collective property of society as a whole, shall be no longer able to be utilized except by the workers, that is to say, by agricultural and industrial associations. It recognizes that all actually existing political and authoritarian States, reducing themselves more and more to the mere administrative functions of the public services in their respective countries, must disappear in the universal union of free associations, both agricultural and industrial.

The International Alliance of Socialist Democracy desired to become a branch of the International Working Men's Association, but was refused admission on the ground that branches must be local, and could not themselves be international. The Geneva group of the Alliance, however, was admitted later, in July, 1869.

The International Working Men's Association had been founded in London in 1864, and its statutes and program were drawn up by Marx. Bakunin at first did not expect it to prove a success and refused to join it. But it spread with remarkable rapidity in many countries and soon became a great power for the propagation of Socialist ideas. Originally it was by no means wholly Socialist, but in successive Congresses Marx won it over more and more to his views. At its third Congress, in Brussels in September, 1868, it became definitely Socialist. Meanwhile Bakunin, regretting his earlier abstention, had decided to join it, and he brought with him a considerable following in French-Switzerland, France, Spain and Italy. At the fourth Congress, held at Basle in September, 1869, two currents were strongly marked. The Germans and English followed Marx in his belief in the State as it was to become after the abolition of private property; they followed him also in his desire to found Labor Parties in the various countries, and to utilize the machinery of democracy for the election of representatives of Labor to Parliaments. On the other hand, the Latin nations in the main followed Bakunin in opposing the State and disbelieving in the machinery of representative government. The conflict between these two groups grew more and more bitter, and each accused the other of various offenses. The statement that Bakunin was a spy was repeated, but was withdrawn after investigation. Marx wrote in a confidential communication to his German friends that Bakunin was an agent of the Pan-Slavist party and received from them 25,000 francs a year. Meanwhile, Bakunin became for a time interested in the attempt to stir up an agrarian revolt in Russia, and this led him to neglect the contest in the International at a crucial moment. During the Franco-Prussian war Bakunin passionately took the side of France, especially after the fall of Napoleon III. He endeavored to rouse the people to revolutionary resistance like that of 1793, and became involved in an abortive attempt at revolt in Lyons. The French Government accused him of being a paid agent of Prussia, and it was with difficulty that he escaped to Switzerland. The dispute with Marx and his followers had become exacerbated by the national dispute. Bakunin, like Kropotkin after him, regarded the new power of Germany as the greatest menace to liberty in the world. He hated the Germans with a bitter hatred, partly, no doubt, on account of Bismarck, but probably still more on account of Marx. To this day, Anarchism has remained confined almost exclusively to the Latin countries, and has been associated with, a hatred of Germany, growing out of the contests between Marx and Bakunin in the International.

The final suppression of Bakunin's faction occurred at the General Congress of the International at the Hague in 1872. The meeting-place was chosen by the General Council (in which Marx was unopposed), with a view -- so Bakunin's friends contend- to making access impossible for Bakunin (on account of the hostility of the French and German governments) and difficult for his friends. Bakunin was expelled from the International as the result of a report accusing him inter alia of theft backed; up by intimidation.

The orthodoxy of the International was saved, but at the cost of its vitality. From this time onward, it ceased to be itself a power, but both sections continued to work in their various groups, and the Socialist groups in particular grew rapidly. Ultimately a new International was formed (1889) which continued down to the outbreak of the present war. As to the future of International Socialism it would be rash to prophesy, though it would seem that the international idea has acquired sufficient strength to need again, after the war, some such means of expression as it found before in Socialist congresses.

By this time Bakunin's health was broken, and except for a few brief intervals, he lived in retirement until his death in 1876.

Bakunin's life, unlike Marx's, was a very stormy one. Every kind of rebellion against authority always aroused his sympathy, and in his support he never paid the slightest attention to personal risk.

His influence, undoubtedly very great, arose chiefly through the influence of his personality upon important individuals. His writings differ from Marx's as much as his life does, and in a similar way. They are chaotic, largely, aroused by some passing occasion, abstract and metaphysical, except when they deal with current politics. He does not come to close quarters with economic facts, but dwells usually in the regions of theory and metaphysics. When he descends from these regions, he is much more at the mercy of current international politics than Marx, much less imbued with the consequences of the belief that it is economic causes that are fundamental. He praised Marx for enunciating this doctrine,[15] but nevertheless continued to think in terms of nations.

His longest work, "L'Empire Knouto-Germanique et la Revolution Sociale," is mainly concerned with the situation in France during the later stages of the Franco-Prussian War, and with the means of resisting German imperialism. Most of his writing was done in a hurry in the interval between two insurrections.

There is something of Anarchism in his lack of literary order. His best-known work is a fragment entitled by its editors "God and the State."[16] In this work he represents belief in God and belief in the State as the two great obstacles to human liberty.

A typical passage will serve to illustrate its style.

[15] "Marx, as a thinker, is on the right road. He has established as a principle that all the evolutions, political, religious, and juridical, in history are, not the causes, but the effects of economic evolutions. This is a great and fruitful thought, which he has not absolutely invented; it has been glimpsed, expressed in part, by many others besides him; but in any case to him belongs the honor of having solidly established it and of having enunciated it as the basis of his whole economic system. (1870; ib. ii. p. xiii.) [16] This title is not Bakunin's, but was invented by Cafiero and Elisee Reclus, who edited it, not knowing that it was a fragment of what was intended to he the second version of "L'Empire Knouto-Germanique" (see ib. ii. p 283).

The State is not society, it is only an historical form of it, as brutal as it is abstract. It was born historically in all countries of the marriage of violence, rapine, pillage, in a word, war and conquest, with the gods successively created by the theological fantasy of nations.

It has been from its origin, and it remains still at present, the divine sanction of brutal force and triumphant inequality.

The State is authority; it is force; it is the ostentation and infatuation of force: it does not insinuate itself; it does not seek to convert. . . . Even when it commands what is good, it hinders and spoils it, just because it commands it, and because every command provokes and excites the legitimate revolts of liberty; and because the good, from the moment that it is commanded, becomes evil from the point of view of true morality, of human morality (doubtless not of divine), from the point of view of human respect and of liberty. Liberty, morality, and the human dignity of man consist precisely in this, that he does good, not because it is commanded, but because he conceives it, wills it and loves it.

We do not find in Bakunin's works a clear picture of the society at which he aimed, or any argument to prove that such a society could be stable.

If we wish to understand Anarchism we must turn to his followers, and especially to Kropotkin -- like him, a Russian aristocrat familiar with the prisons of Europe, and, like him, an Anarchist who, in spite of his internationalism, is imbued with a fiery hatred of the Germans.

Kropotkin has devoted much of his writing to technical questions of production. In "Fields, Factories and Workshops" and "The Conquest of Bread" he has set himself to prove that, if production were more scientific and better organized, a comparatively small amount of quite agreeable work would suffice to keep the whole population in comfort.

Even assuming, as we probably must, that he somewhat exaggerates what is possible with our present scientific knowledge, it must nevertheless be conceded that his contentions contain a very large measure of truth. In attacking the subject of production he has shown that he knows what is the really crucial question. If civilization and progress are to be compatible with equality, it is necessary that equality should not involve long hours of painful toil for little more than the necessaries of life, since, where there is no leisure, art and science will die and all progress will become impossible. The objection which some feel to Socialism and Anarchism alike on this ground cannot be upheld in view of the possible productivity of labor.

The system at which Kropotkin aims, whether or not it be possible, is certainly one which demands a very great improvement in the methods of production above what is common at present. He desires to abolish wholly the system of wages, not only, as most Socialists do, in the sense that a man is to be paid rather for his willingness to work than for the actual work demanded of him, but in a more fundamental sense: there is to be no obligation to work, and all things are to be shared in equal proportions among the whole population. Kropotkin relies upon the possibility of making work pleasant: he holds that, in such a community as he foresees, practically everyone will prefer work to idleness, because work will not involve overwork or slavery, or that excessive specialization that industrialism has brought about, but will be merely a pleasant activity for certain hours of the day, giving a man an outlet for his spontaneous constructive impulses. There is to be no compulsion, no law, no government exercising force; there will still be acts of the community, but these are to spring from universal consent, not from any enforced submission of even the smallest minority.

We shall examine in a later chapter how far such an ideal is realizable, but it cannot be denied that Kropotkin presents it with extraordinary persuasiveness and charm.

We should be doing more than justice to Anarchism if we did not say something of its darker side, the side which has brought it into conflict with the police and made it a word of terror to ordinary citizens.

In its general doctrines there is nothing essentially involving violent methods or a virulent hatred of the rich, and many who adopt these general doctrines are personally gentle and temperamentally averse from violence. But the general tone of the Anarchist press and public is bitter to a degree that seems scarcely sane, and the appeal, especially in Latin countries, is rather to envy of the fortunate than to pity for the unfortunate. A vivid and readable, though not wholly reliable, account, from a hostile point of view, is given in a book called "Le Peril Anarchiste," by Felix Dubois,[17] which incidentally reproduces a number of cartoons from anarchist journals. The revolt against law naturally leads, except in those who are controlled by a real passion for humanity, to a relaxation of all the usually accepted moral rules, and to a bitter spirit of retaliatory cruelty out of which good can hardly come.

[17] Paris, 1894.

One of the most curious features of popular Anarchism is its martyrology, aping Christian forms, with the guillotine (in France) in place of the cross.

Many who have suffered death at the hands of the authorities on account of acts of violence were no doubt genuine sufferers for their belief in a cause, but others, equally honored, are more questionable.

One of the most curious examples of this outlet for the repressed religious impulse is the cult of Ravachol, who was guillotined in 1892 on account of various dynamite outrages. His past was dubious, but he died defiantly; his last words were three lines from a well-known Anarchist song, the "Chant du Pere Duchesne":- Si tu veux etre heureux, Nom de Dieu! Pends ton proprietaire.

As was natural, the leading Anarchists took no part in the canonization of his memory; nevertheless it proceeded, with the most amazing extravagances.

It would be wholly unfair to judge Anarchist doctrine, or the views of its leading exponents, by such phenomena; but it remains a fact that Anarchism attracts to itself much that lies on the borderland of insanity and common crime.[18] This must be remembered in exculpation of the authorities and the thoughtless public, who often confound in a common detestation the parasites of the movement and the truly heroic and high-minded men who have elaborated its theories and sacrificed comfort and success to their propagation.

[18] The attitude of all the better Anarchists is that expressed by L. S. Bevington in the words: "Of course we know that among those who call themselves Anarchists there are a minority of unbalanced enthusiasts who look upon every illegal and sensational act of violence as a matter for hysterical jubilation.

Very useful to the police and the press, unsteady in intellect and of weak moral principle, they have repeatedly shown themselves accessible to venal considerations. They, and their violence, and their professed Anarchism are purchasable, and in the last resort they are welcome and efficient partisans of the bourgeoisie in its remorseless war against the deliverers of the people." His conclusion is a very wise one: "Let us leave indiscriminate killing and injuring to the Government -- to its Statesmen, its Stockbrokers, its Officers, and its Law." ("Anarchism and Violence," pp. 9.10. Liberty Press, Chiswick, 1896.) The terrorist campaign in which such men as Ravachol were active practically came to an end in 1894. After that time, under the influence of Pelloutier, the better sort of Anarchists found a less harmful outlet by advocating Revolutionary Syndicalism in the Trade Unions and Bourses du Travail.[19] [19] See next Chapter.

The ECONOMIC organization of society, as conceived by Anarchist Communists, does not differ greatly from that which is sought by Socialists.

Their difference from Socialists is in the matter of government: they demand that government shall require the consent of all the governed, and not only of a majority. It is undeniable that the rule of a majority may be almost as hostile to freedom as the rule of a minority: the divine right of majorities is a dogma as little possessed of absolute truth as any other. A strong democratic State may easily be led into oppression of its best citizens, namely, those whose independence of mind would make them a force for progress. Experience of democratic parliamentary government has shown that it falls very far short of what was expected of it by early Socialists, and the Anarchist revolt against it is not surprising.

But in the form of pure Anarchism, this revolt has remained weak and sporadic. It is Syndicalism, and the movements to which Syndicalism has given rise, that have popularized the revolt against parliamentary government and purely political means of emancipating the wage earner. But this movement must be dealt with in a separate chapter.

CHAPTER III   THE SYNDICALIST REVOLT
SYNDICALISM arose in France as a revolt against political Socialism, and in order to understand it we must trace in brief outline the positions attained by Socialist parties in the various countries.

After a severe setback, caused by the Franco Prussian war, Socialism gradually revived, and in all the countries of Western Europe Socialist parties have increased their numerical strength almost continuously during the last forty years; but, as is invariably the case with a growing sect, the intensity of faith has diminished as the number of believers has increased.

In Germany the Socialist party became the strongest faction of the Reichstag, and, in spite of differences of opinion among its members, it preserved its formal unity with that instinct for military discipline which characterizes the German nation.

In the Reichstag election of 1912 it polled a third of the total number of votes cast, and returned 110 members out of a total of 397. After the death of Bebel, the Revisionists, who received their first impulse from Bernstein, overcame the more strict Marxians, and the party became in effect merely one of advanced Radicalism. It is too soon to guess what will be the effect of the split between Majority and Minority Socialists which has occurred during the war. There is in Germany hardly a trace of Syndicalism; its characteristic doctrine, the preference of industrial to political action, has found scarcely any support.

In England Marx has never had many followers.

Socialism there has been inspired in the main by the Fabians (founded in 1883), who threw over the advocacy of revolution, the Marxian doctrine of value, and the class-war. What remained was State Socialism and a doctrine of "permeation." Civil servants were to be permeated with the realization that Socialism would enormously increase their power. Trade Unions were to be permeated with the belief that the day for purely industrial action was past, and that they must look to government (inspired secretly by sympathetic civil servants) to bring about, bit by bit, such parts of the Socialist program as were not likely to rouse much hostility in the rich.

The Independent Labor Party (formed in 1893) was largely inspired at first by the ideas of the Fabians, though retaining to the present day, and especially since the outbreak of the war, much more of the original Socialist ardor. It aimed always at co-operation with the industrial organizations of wage-earners, and, chiefly through its efforts, the Labor Party[20] was formed in 1900 out of a combination of the Trade Unions and the political Socialists. To this party, since 1909, all the important Unions have belonged, but in spite of the fact that its strength is derived from Trade Unions, it has stood always for political rather than industrial action. Its Socialism has been of a theoretical and academic order, and in practice, until the outbreak of war, the Labor members in Parliament (of whom 30 were elected in 1906 and 42 in December, 1910) might be reckoned almost as a part of the Liberal Party.

[20] Of which the Independent Labor Party is only a section.

France, unlike England and Germany, was not content merely to repeat the old shibboleths with continually diminishing conviction. In France[21] a new movement, originally known as Revolutionary Syndicalism -- and afterward simply as Syndicalism- kept alive the vigor of the original impulse, and remained true to the spirit of the older Socialists, while departing from the letter. Syndicalism, unlike Socialism and Anarchism, began from an existing organization and developed the ideas appropriate to it, whereas Socialism and Anarchism began with the ideas and only afterward developed the organizations which were their vehicle. In order to understand Syndicalism, we have first to describe Trade Union organization in France, and its political environment. The ideas of Syndicalism will then appear as the natural outcome of the political and economic situation. Hardly any of these ideas are new; almost all are derived from the Bakunist section of the old International.[21] The old International had considerable success in France before the Franco Prussian War; indeed, in 1869, it is estimated to have had a French membership of a quarter of a million.

What is practically the Syndicalist program was advocated by a French delegate to the Congress of the International at Bale in that same year.[22] [20] And also in Italy. A good, short account of the Italian movement is given by A. Lanzillo, "Le Mouvement Ouvrier en Italie," Bibliotheque du Mouvement Proletarien. See also Paul Louis, "Le Syndicalisme Europeen," chap. vi. On the other hand Cole ("World of Labour," chap. vi) considers the strength of genuine Syndicalism in Italy to be small.

[21] This is often recognized by Syndicalists themselves. See, e.g., an article on "The Old International" in the Syndicalist of February, 1913, which, after giving an account of the struggle between Marx and Bakunin from the standpoint of a sympathizer with the latter, says: "Bakounin's ideas are now more alive than ever." [22] See pp. 42.43, and 160 of "Syndicalism in France," Louis Levine, Ph.D. (Columbia University Studies in Political Science, vol. xlvi, No. 3.) This is a very objective and reliable account of the origin and progress of French Syndicalism. An admirable short discussion of its ideas and its present position will be found in Cole's "World of Labour" (G. Bell & Sons), especially chapters iii, iv, and xi.

The war of 1870 put an end for the time being to the Socialist Movement in France. Its revival was begun by Jules Guesde in 1877. Unlike the German Socialists, the French have been split into many different factions. In the early eighties there was a split between the Parliamentary Socialists and the Communist Anarchists. The latter thought that the first act of the Social Revolution should be the destruction of the State, and would therefore have nothing to do with Parliamentary politics. The Anarchists, from 1883 onward, had success in Paris and the South. The Socialists contended that the State will disappear after the Socialist society has been firmly established. In 1882 the Socialists split between the followers of Guesde, who claimed to represent the revolutionary and scientific Socialism of Marx, and the followers of Paul Brousse, who were more opportunist and were also called possibilists and cared little for the theories of Marx. In 1890 there was a secession from the Broussists, who followed Allemane and absorbed the more revolutionary elements of the party and became leading spirits in some of the strongest syndicates. Another group was the Independent Socialists, among whom were Jaures, Millerand and Viviani.[23] [23] See Levine, op. cit., chap. ii.

The disputes between the various sections of Socialists caused difficulties in the Trade Unions and helped to bring about the resolution to keep politics out of the Unions. From this to Syndicalism was an easy step.

Since the year 1905, as the result of a union between the Parti Socialiste de France (Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Revolutionnaire Francais led by Guesde) and the Parti Socialiste Francais (Jaures), there have been only two groups of Socialists, the United Socialist Party and the Independents, who are intellectuals or not willing to be tied to a party.

At the General Election of 1914 the former secured 102 members and the latter 30, out of a total of 590.

Tendencies toward a rapprochement between the various groups were seriously interfered with by an event which had considerable importance for the whole development of advanced political ideas in France, namely, the acceptance of office in the Waldeck Rousseau Ministry by the Socialist Millerand in 1899. Millerand, as was to be expected, soon ceased to be a Socialist, and the opponents of political action pointed to his development as showing the vanity of political triumphs. Very many French politicians who have risen to power have begun their political career as Socialists, and have ended it not infrequently by employing the army to oppress strikers. Millerand's action was the most notable and dramatic among a number of others of a similar kind. Their cumulative effect has been to produce a certain cynicism in regard to politics among the more class-conscious of French wage-earners, and this state of mind greatly assisted the spread of Syndicalism.

Syndicalism stands essentially for the point of view of the producer as opposed to that of the consumer; it is concerned with reforming actual work, and the organization of industry, not MERELY with securing greater rewards for work. From this point of view its vigor and its distinctive character are derived. It aims at substituting industrial for political action, and at using Trade Union organization for purposes for which orthodox Socialism would look to Parliament. "Syndicalism" was originally only the French name for Trade Unionism, but the Trade Unionists of France became divided into two sections, the Reformist and the Revolutionary, of whom the latter only professed the ideas which we now associate with the term "Syndicalism." It is quite impossible to guess how far either the organization or the ideas of the Syndicalists will remain intact at the end of the war, and everything that we shall say is to be taken as applying only to the years before the war. It may be that French Syndicalism as a distinctive movement will be dead, but even in that case it will not have lost its importance, since it has given a new impulse and direction to the more vigorous part of the labor movement in all civilized countries, with the possible exception of Germany.

The organization upon which Syndicalism depended was the Confederation Generale du Travail, commonly known as the C. G. T., which was founded in 1895, but only achieved its final form in 1902. It has never been numerically very powerful, but has derived its influence from the fact that in moments of crisis many who were not members were willing to follow its guidance. Its membership in the year before the war is estimated by Mr. Cole at somewhat more than half a million. Trade Unions (Syndicats) were legalized by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1884, and the C. G. T., on its inauguration in 1895, was formed by the Federation of 700 Syndicats. Alongside of this organization there existed another, the Federation des Bourses du Travail, formed in 1893.

A Bourse du Travail is a local organization, not of any one trade, but of local labor in general, intended to serve as a Labor Exchange and to perform such functions for labor as Chambers of Commerce perform for the employer.[24] A Syndicat is in general a local organization of a single industry, and is thus a smaller unit than the Bourse du Travail.[25] Under the able leadership of Pelloutier, the Federation des Bourses prospered more than the C. G. T., and at last, in 1902, coalesced with it. The result was an organization in which the local Syndicat was federated twice over, once with the other Syndicat in its locality, forming together the local Bourse du Travail, and again with the Syndicats in the same industry in other places. "It was the purpose of the new organization to secure twice over the membership of every syndicat, to get it to join both its local Bourse du Travail and the Federation of its industry.

The Statutes of the C. G. T. (I. 3) put this point plainly: `No Syndicat will be able to form a part of the C. G. T. if it is not federated nationally and an adherent of a Bourse du Travail or a local or departmental Union of Syndicats grouping different associations.' Thus, M. Lagardelle explains, the two sections will correct each other's point of view: national federation of industries will prevent parochialism (localisme), and local organization will check the corporate or `Trade Union' spirit. The workers will learn at once the solidarity of all workers in a locality and that of all workers in a trade, and, in learning this, they will learn at the same time the complete solidarity of the whole working-class."[26] [24] Cole, ib., p. 65.

[25] "Syndicat in France still means a local union -- there are at the present day only four national syndicats" (ib., p. 66).

[26] Cole, ib. p. 69.

This organization was largely the work of Pellouties, who was Secretary of the Federation des Bourses from 1894 until his death in 1901. He was an Anarchist Communist and impressed his ideas upon the Federation and thence posthumously on the C. G. T.

after its combination with the Federation des Bourses. He even carried his principles into the government of the Federation; the Committee had no chairman and votes very rarely took place. He stated that "the task of the revolution is to free mankind, not only from all authority, but also from every institution which has not for its essential purpose the development of production." The C. G. T. allows much autonomy to each unit in the organization. Each Syndicat counts for one, whether it be large or small. There are not the friendly society activities which form so large a part of the work of English Unions. It gives no orders, but is purely advisory. It does not allow politics to be introduced into the Unions. This decision was originally based upon the fact that the divisions among Socialists disrupted the Unions, but it is now reinforced in the minds of an important section by the general Anarchist dislike of politics. The C. G. T. is essentially a fighting organization; in strikes, it is the nucleus to which the other workers rally.

There is a Reformist section in the C. G. T., but it is practically always in a minority, and the C. G. T. is, to all intents and purposes, the organ of revolutionary Syndicalism, which is simply the creed of its leaders.

The essential doctrine of Syndicalism is the class war, to be conducted by industrial rather than political methods. The chief industrial methods advocated are the strike, the boycott, the label and sabotage.

The boycott, in various forms, and the label, showing that the work has been done under trade union conditions, have played a considerable part in American labor struggles.

Sabotage is the practice of doing bad work, or spoiling machinery or work which has already been done, as a method of dealing with employers in a dispute when a strike appears for some reason undesirable or impossible. It has many forms, some clearly innocent, some open to grave objections. One form of sabotage which has been adopted by shop assistants is to tell customers the truth about the articles they are buying; this form, however it may damage the shopkeeper's business, is not easy to object to on moral grounds. A form which has been adopted on railways, particularly in Italian strikes, is that of obeying all rules literally and exactly, in such a way as to make the running of trains practically impossible. Another form is to do all the work with minute care, so that in the end it is better done, but the output is small. From these innocent forms there is a continual progression, until we come to such acts as all ordinary morality would consider criminal; for example, causing railway accidents.

Advocates of sabotage justify it as part of war, but in its more violent forms (in which it is seldom defended) it is cruel and probably inexpedient, while even in its milder forms it must tend to encourage slovenly habits of work, which might easily persist under the new regime that the Syndicalists wish to introduce. At the same time, when capitalists express a moral horror of this method, it is worth while to observe that they themselves are the first to practice it when the occasion seems to them appropriate.

If report speaks truly, an example of this on a very large scale has been seen during the Russian Revolution.

By far the most important of the Syndicalist methods is the strike. Ordinary strikes, for specific objects, are regarded as rehearsals, as a means of perfecting organization and promoting enthusiasm, but even when they are victorious so far as concerns the specific point in dispute, they are not regarded by Syndicalists as affording any ground for industrial peace. Syndicalists aim at using the strike, not to secure such improvements of detail as employers may grant, but to destroy the whole system of employer and employed and win the complete emancipation of the worker. For this purpose what is wanted is the General Strike, the complete cessation of work by a sufficient proportion of the wage-earners to secure the paralysis of capitalism. Sorel, who represents Syndicalism too much in the minds of the reading public, suggests that the General Strike is to be regarded as a myth, like the Second Coming in Christian doctrine. But this view by no means suits the active Syndicalists. If they were brought to believe that the General Strike is a mere myth, their energy would flag, and their whole outlook would become disillusioned. It is the actual, vivid belief in its possibility which inspires them. They are much criticised for this belief by the political Socialists who consider that the battle is to be won by obtaining a Parliamentary majority. But Syndicalists have too little faith in the honesty of politicians to place any reliance on such a method or to believe in the value of any revolution which leaves the power of the State intact.

Syndicalist aims are somewhat less definite than Syndicalist methods. The intellectuals who endeavor to interpret them -- not always very faithfully- represent them as a party of movement and change, following a Bergsonian elan vital, without needing any very clear prevision of the goal to which it is to take them. Nevertheless, the negative part, at any rate, of their objects is sufficiently clear.

They wish to destroy the State, which they regard as a capitalist institution, designed essentially to terrorize the workers. They refuse to believe that it would be any better under State Socialism.

They desire to see each industry self-governing, but as to the means of adjusting the relations between different industries, they are not very clear. They are anti-militarist because they are anti-State, and because French troops have often been employed against them in strikes; also because they are internationalists, who believe that the sole interest of the working man everywhere is to free himself from the tyranny of the capitalist. Their outlook on life is the very reverse of pacifist, but they oppose wars between States on the ground that these are not fought for objects that in any way concern the workers. Their anti-militarism, more than anything else, brought them into conflict with the authorities in the years preceding the war. But, as was to be expected, it did not survive the actual invasion of France.

The doctrines of Syndicalism may be illustrated by an article introducing it to English readers in the first number of "The Syndicalist Railwayman," September, 1911, from which the following is quoted:- "All Syndicalism, Collectivism, Anarchism aims at abolishing the present economic status and existing private ownership of most things; but while Collectivism would substitute ownership by everybody, and Anarchism ownership by nobody, Syndicalism aims at ownership by Organized Labor. It is thus a purely Trade Union reading of the economic doctrine and the class war preached by Socialism. It vehemently repudiates Parliamentary action on which Collectivism relies; and it is, in this respect, much more closely allied to Anarchism, from which, indeed, it differs in practice only in being more limited in range of action." (Times, Aug. 25, 1911).

In truth, so thin is the partition between Syndicalism and Anarchism that the newer and less familiar "ism" has been shrewdly defined as "Organized Anarchy." It has been created by the Trade Unions of France; but it is obviously an international plant, whose roots have already found the soil of Britain most congenial to its growth and fructification.

Collectivist or Marxian Socialism would have us believe that it is distinctly a LABOR Movement; but it is not so. Neither is Anarchism. The one is substantially bourgeois; the other aristocratic, plus an abundant output of book-learning, in either case. Syndicalism, on the contrary, is indubitably laborist in origin and aim, owing next to nothing to the "Classes," and, indeed,, resolute to uproot them. The Times (Oct. 13, 1910), which almost single-handed in the British Press has kept creditably abreast of Continental Syndicalism, thus clearly set forth the significance of the General Strike: "To understand what it means, we must remember that there is in France a powerful Labor Organization which has for its open and avowed object a Revolution, in which not only the present order of Society, but the State itself, is to be swept away. This movement is called Syndicalism. It is not Socialism, but, on the contrary, radically opposed to Socialism, because the Syndicalists hold that the State is the great enemy and that the Socialists' ideal of State or Collectivist Ownership would make the lot of the Workers much worse than it is now under private employers. The means by which they hope to attain their end is the General Strike, an idea which was invented by a French workman about twenty years ago,[27] and was adopted by the French Labor Congress in 1894, after a furious battle with the Socialists, in which the latter were worsted. Since then the General Strike has been the avowed policy of the Syndicalists, whose organization is the Confederation Generale du Travail." [27] In fact the General Strike was invented by a Londoner William Benbow, an Owenite, in 1831.

Or, to put it otherwise, the intelligent French worker has awakened, as he believes, to the fact that Society (Societas) and the State (Civitas) connote two separable spheres of human activity, between which there is no connection, necessary or desirable. Without the one, man, being a gregarious animal, cannot subsist: while without the other he would simply be in clover. The "statesman" whom office does not render positively nefarious is at best an expensive superfluity.

Syndicalists have had many violent encounters with the forces of government. In 1907 and 1908, protesting against bloodshed which had occurred in the suppression of strikes, the Committee of the C.

G. T. issued manifestoes speaking of the Government as "a Government of assassins" and alluding to the Prime Minister as "Clemenceau the murderer." Similar events in the strike at Villeneuve St. Georges in 1908 led to the arrest of all the leading members of the Committee. In the railway strike of October, 1910, Monsieur Briand arrested the Strike Committee, mobilized the railway men and sent soldiers to replace strikers. As a result of these vigorous measures the strike was completely defeated, and after this the chief energy of the C. G. T. was directed against militarism and nationalism.

The attitude of Anarchism to the Syndicalist movement is sympathetic, with the reservation that such methods as the General Strike are not to be regarded as substitutes for the violent revolution which most Anarchists consider necessary. Their attitude in this matter was defined at the International Anarchist Congress held in Amsterdam in August, 1907. This Congress recommended "comrades of all countries to actively participate in autonomous movements of the working class, and to develop in Syndicalist organizations the ideas of revolt, individual initiative and solidarity, which are the essence of Anarchism." Comrades were to "propagate and support only those forms and manifestations of direct action which carry, in themselves, a revolutionary character and lead to the transformation of society." It was resolved that "the Anarchists think that the destruction of the capitalist and authoritary society can only be realized by armed insurrection and violent expropriation, and that the use of the more or less General Strike and the Syndicalist movement must not make us forget the more direct means of struggle against the military force of government." Syndicalists might retort that when the movement is strong enough to win by armed insurrection it will be abundantly strong enough to win by the General Strike. In Labor movements generally, success through violence can hardly be expected except in circumstances where success without violence is attainable. This argument alone, even if there were no other, would be a very powerful reason against the methods advocated by the Anarchist Congress.

Syndicalism stands for what is known as industrial unionism as opposed to craft unionism. In this respect, as also in the preference of industrial to political methods, it is part of a movement which has spread far beyond France. The distinction between industrial and craft unionism is much dwelt on by Mr. Cole. Craft unionism "unites in a single association those workers who are engaged on a single industrial process, or on processes so nearly akin that any one can do another's work." But "organization may follow the lines, not of the work done, but of the actual structure of industry. All workers working at producing a particular kind of commodity may be organized in a single Union. . . .

The basis of organization would be neither the craft to which a man belonged nor the employer under whom he worked, but the service on which he was engaged. This is Industrial Unionism properly so called.[28] [28] "World of Labour," pp. 212, 213.

Industrial unionism is a product of America, and from America it has to some extent spread to Great Britain. It is the natural form of fighting organization when the union is regarded as the means of carrying on the class war with a view, not to obtaining this or that minor amelioration, but to a radical revolution in the economic system. This is the point of view adopted by the "Industrial Workers of the World," commonly known as the I. W. W.

This organization more or less corresponds in America to what the C. G. T. was in France before the war. The differences between the two are those due to the different economic circumstances of the two countries, but their spirit is closely analogous. The I. W. W. is not united as to the ultimate form which it wishes society to take. There are Socialists, Anarchists and Syndicalists among its members. But it is clear on the immediate practical issue, that the class war is the fundamental reality in the present relations of labor and capital, and that it is by industrial action, especially by the strike, that emancipation must be sought. The I. W. W., like the C. G. T., is not nearly so strong numerically as it is supposed to be by those who fear it. Its influence is based, not upon its numbers, but upon its power of enlisting the sympathies of the workers in moments of crisis.

The labor movement in America has been characterized on both sides by very great violence. Indeed, the Secretary of the C. G. T., Monsieur Jouhaux, recognizes that the C. G. T. is mild in comparison with the I. W. W. "The I. W. W.," he says, "preach a policy of militant action, very necessary in parts of America, which would not do in France."[29] A very interesting account of it, from the point of view of an author who is neither wholly on the side of labor nor wholly on the side of the capitalist, but disinterestedly anxious to find some solution of the social question short of violence and revolution, is the work of Mr. John Graham Brooks, called "American Syndicalism: the I. W. W." (Macmillan, 1913).

American labor conditions are very different from those of Europe. In the first place, the power of the trusts is enormous; the concentration of capital has in this respect proceeded more nearly on Marxian lines in America than anywhere else. In the second place, the great influx of foreign labor makes the whole problem quite different from any that arises in Europe. The older skilled workers, largely American born, have long been organized in the American Federation of Labor under Mr. Gompers. These represent an aristocracy of labor. They tend to work with the employers against the great mass of unskilled immigrants, and they cannot be regarded as forming part of anything that could be truly called a labor movement. "There are," says Mr. Cole, "now in America two working classes, with different standards of life, and both are at present almost impotent in the face of the employers. Nor is it possible for these two classes to unite or to put forward any demands. . . . The American Federation of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World represent two different principles of combination; but they also represent two different classes of labor."[30] The I. W. W. stands for industrial unionism, whereas the American Federation of Labor stands for craft unionism. The I. W. W. were formed in 1905 by a union of organizations, chief among which was the Western Federation of Miners, which dated from 1892. They suffered a split by the loss of the followers of Deleon, who was the leader of the "Socialist Labor Party" and advocated a "Don't vote" policy, while reprobating violent methods. The headquarters of the party which he formed are at Detroit, and those of the main body are at Chicago. The I. W. W., though it has a less definite philosophy than French Syndicalism, is quite equally determined to destroy the capitalist system.

As its secretary has said: "There is but one bargain the I. W. W. will make with the employing class - complete surrender of all control of industry to the organized workers."[31] Mr. Haywood, of the Western Federation of Miners, is an out-and-out follower of Marx so far as concerns the class war and the doctrine of surplus value. But, like all who are in this movement, he attaches more importance to industrial as against political action than do the European followers of Marx. This is no doubt partly explicable by the special circumstances of America, where the recent immigrants are apt to be voteless.

The fourth convention of the I. W. W. revised a preamble giving the general principles underlying its action. "The working class and the employing class," they say, "have nothing in common. There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of the working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all the good things of life. Between these two classes, a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system. . . . Instead of the conservative motto, `A fair day's wages for a fair day's work,' we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, `Abolition of the wage system.' "[32] [29] Quoted in Cole, ib. p. 128.

[30] Ib., p. 135.

[31] Brooks, op. cit., p. 79.

[32] Brooks, op. cit., pp. 86.87.

Numerous strikes have been conducted or encouraged by the I. W. W. and the Western Federation of Miners. These strikes illustrate the class-war in a more bitter and extreme form than is to be found in any other part of the world. Both sides are always ready to resort to violence. The employers have armies of their own and are able to call upon the Militia and even, in a crisis, upon the United States Army. What French Syndicalists say about the State as a capitalist institution is peculiarly true in America. In consequence of the scandals thus arising, the Federal Government appointed a Commission on Industrial Relations, whose Report, issued in 1915, reveals a state of affairs such as it would be difficult to imagine in Great Britain. The report states that "the greatest disorders and most of the outbreaks of violence in connection with industrial disputes arise from the violation of what are considered to be fundamental rights, and from the perversion or subversion of governmental institutions" (p. 146). It mentions, among such perversions, the subservience of the judiciary to the military authorities,[33] the fact that during a labor dispute the life and liberty of every man within the State would seem to be at the mercy of the Governor (p. 72), and the use of State troops in policing strikes (p. 298). At Ludlow (Colorado) in 1914 (April 20) a battle of the militia and the miners took place, in which, as the result of the fire of the militia, a number of women and children were burned to death.[34] Many other instances of pitched battles could be given, but enough has been said to show the peculiar character of labor disputes in the United States. It may, I fear, be presumed that this character will remain so long as a very large proportion of labor consists of recent immigrants.

When these difficulties pass away, as they must sooner or later, labor will more and more find its place in the community, and will tend to feel and inspire less of the bitter hostility which renders the more extreme forms of class war possible. When that time comes, the labor movement in America will probably begin to take on forms similar to those of Europe.

[33] "Although uniformly held that the writ of habeas corpus can only be suspended by the legislature, in these labor disturbances the executive has in fact suspended or disregarded the writ. . . . In cases arising from labor agitations, the judiciary has uniformly upheld the power exercised by the military, and in no case has there been any protest against the use of such power or any attempt to curtail it, except in Montana, where the conviction of a civilian by military commission was annulled" ("Final Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations" (1915) appointed by the United States Congress," p. 58).

[34] Literary Digest, May 2 and May 16, 1914.

Meanwhile, though the forms are different, the aims are very similar, and industrial unionism, spreading from America, has had a considerable influence in Great Britain -- an influence naturally reinforced by that of French Syndicalism. It is clear, I think, that the adoption of industrial rather than craft unionism is absolutely necessary if Trade Unionism is to succeed in playing that part in altering the economic structure of society which its advocates claim for it rather than for the political parties. Industrial unionism organizes men, as craft unionism does not, in accordance with the enemy whom they have to fight. English unionism is still very far removed from the industrial form, though certain industries, especially the railway men, have gone very far in this direction, and it is notable that the railway men are peculiarly sympathetic to Syndicalism and industrial unionism.

Pure Syndicalism, however, is not very likely to achieve wide popularity in Great Britain. Its spirit is too revolutionary and anarchistic for our temperament.

It is in the modified form of Guild Socialism that the ideas derived from the C. G. T. and the I. W.

W. are tending to bear fruit.[35] This movement is as yet in its infancy and has no great hold upon the rank and file, but it is being ably advocated by a group of young men, and is rapidly gaining ground among those who will form Labor opinion in years to come.

The power of the State has been so much increased during the war that those who naturally dislike things as they are, find it more and more difficult to believe that State omnipotence can be the road to the millennium. Guild Socialists aim at autonomy in industry, with consequent curtailment, but not abolition, of the power of the State. The system which they advocate is, I believe, the best hitherto proposed, and the one most likely to secure liberty without the constant appeals to violence which are to be feared under a purely Anarchist regime.

[35] The ideas of Guild Socialism were first set forth in "National Guilds," edited by A. R. Orage (Bell & Sons, 1914), and in Cole's "World of Labour" (Bell & Sons), first published in 1913. Cole's "Self-Government in Industry" (Bell & Sons, 1917) and Rickett & Bechhofer's "The Meaning of National Guilds" (Palmer & Hayward, 1918) should also be read, as well as various pamphlets published by the National Guilds League. The attitude of the Syndicalists to Guild Socialism is far from sympathetic. An article in "The Syndicalist" for February, 1914, speaks of it in the following terms: a Middle-class of the middle-class, with all the shortcomings (we had almost said `stupidities') of the middle classes writ large across it, `Guild Socialism' stands forth as the latest lucubration of the middle-class mind. It is a `cool steal' of the leading ideas of Syndicalism and a deliberate perversion of them. . . . We do protest against the `State' idea . . . in Guild Socialism. Middle-class people, even when they become Socialists, cannot get rid of the idea that the working-class is their `inferior'; that the workers need to be `educated,' drilled, disciplined, and generally nursed for a very long time before they will be able to walk by themselves. The very reverse is actually the truth. . . . It is just the plain truth when we say that the ordinary wage-worker, of average intelligence, is better capable of taking care of himself than the half-educated middle-class man who wants to advise him. He knows how to make the wheels of the world go round." The first pamphlet of the "National Guilds League" sets forth their main principles. In industry each factory is to be free to control its own methods of production by means of elected managers.

The different factories in a given industry are to be federated into a National Guild which will deal with marketing and the general interests of the industry as a whole. "The State would own the means of production as trustee for the community; the Guilds would manage them, also as trustees for the community, and would pay to the State a single tax or rent. Any Guild that chose to set its own interests above those of the community would be violating its trust, and would have to bow to the judgment of a tribunal equally representing the whole body of producers and the whole body of consumers. This Joint Committee would be the ultimate sovereign body, the ultimate appeal court of industry. It would fix not only Guild taxation, but also standard prices, and both taxation and prices would be periodically readjusted by it." Each Guild will be entirely free to apportion what it receives among its members as it chooses, its members being all those who work in the industry which it covers. "The distribution of this collective Guild income among the members seems to be a matter for each Guild to decide for itself. Whether the Guilds would, sooner or later, adopt the principle of equal payment for every member, is open to discussion." Guild Socialism accepts from Syndicalism the view that liberty is not to be secured by making the State the employer: "The State and the Municipality as employers have turned out not to differ essentially from the private capitalist." Guild Socialists regard the State as consisting of the community in their capacity as consumers, while the Guilds will represent them in their capacity as producers; thus Parliament and the Guild Congress will be two co-equal powers representing consumers and producers respectively. Above both will be the joint Committee of Parliament and the Guild Congress for deciding matters involving the interests of consumers and producers alike. The view of the Guild Socialists is that State Socialism takes account of men only as consumers, while Syndicalism takes account of them only as producers. "The problem," say the Guild Socialists, "is to reconcile the two points of view. That is what advocates of National Guilds set out to do. The Syndicalist has claimed everything for the industrial organizations of producers, the Collectivist everything for the territorial or political organizations of consumers. Both are open to the same criticism; you cannot reconcile two points of view merely by denying one of them."[36] But although Guild Socialism represents an attempt at readjustment between two equally legitimate points of view, its impulse and force are derived from what it has taken over from Syndicalism. Like Syndicalism; it desires not primarily to make work better paid, but to secure this result along with others by making it in itself more interesting and more democratic in organization.

[36] The above quotations are all from the first pamphlet of the National Guilds League, "National Guilds, an Appeal to Trade Unionists." Capitalism has made of work a purely commercial activity, a soulless and a joyless thing. But substitute the national service of the Guilds for the profiteering of the few; substitute responsible labor for a saleable commodity; substitute self-government and decentralization for the bureaucracy and demoralizing hugeness of the modern State and the modern joint stock company; and then it may be just once more to speak of a "joy in labor," and once more to hope that men may be proud of quality and not only of quantity in their work. There is a cant of the Middle Ages, and a cant of "joy in labor," but it were better, perhaps, to risk that cant than to reconcile ourselves forever to the philosophy of Capitalism and of Collectivism, which declares that work is a necessary evil never to be made pleasant, and that the workers' only hope is a leisure which shall be longer, richer, and well adorned with municipal amenities.[37] [37] "The Guild Idea," No. 2 of the Pamphlets of the National Guilds League, p. 17.

Whatever may be thought of the practicability of Syndicalism, there is no doubt that the ideas which it has put into the world have done a great deal to revive the labor movement and to recall it to certain things of fundamental importance which it had been in danger of forgetting. Syndicalists consider man as producer rather than consumer. They are more concerned to procure freedom in work than to increase material well-being. They have revived the quest for liberty, which was growing somewhat dimmed under the regime of Parliamentary Socialism, and they have reminded men that what our modern society needs is not a little tinkering here and there, nor the kind of minor readjustments to which the existing holders of power may readily consent, but a fundamental reconstruction, a sweeping away of all the sources of oppression, a liberation of men's constructive energies, and a wholly new way of conceiving and regulating production and economic relations. This merit is so great that, in view of it, all minor defects become insignificant, and this merit Syndicalism will continue to possess even if, as a definite movement, it should be found to have passed away with the war.

PART II   PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE

CHAPTER IV   WORK AND PAY
THE man who seeks to create a better order of society has two resistances to contend with: one that of Nature, the other that of his fellow-men. Broadly speaking, it is science that deals with the resistance of Nature, while politics and social organization are the methods of overcoming the resistance of men.

The ultimate fact in economics is that Nature only yields commodities as the result of labor. The necessity of SOME labor for the satisfaction of our wants is not imposed by political systems or by the exploitation of the working classes; it is due to physical laws, which the reformer, like everyone else, must admit and study. Before any optimistic economic project can be accepted as feasible, we must examine whether the physical conditions of production impose an unalterable veto, or whether they are capable of being sufficiently modified by science and organization.

Two connected doctrines must be considered in examining this question: First, Malthus' doctrine of population; and second, the vaguer, but very prevalent, view that any surplus above the bare necessaries of life can only be produced if most men work long hours at monotonous or painful tasks, leaving little leisure for a civilized existence or rational enjoyment. I do not believe that either of these obstacles to optimism will survive a close scrutiny. The possibility of technical improvement in the methods of production is, I believe, so great that, at any rate for centuries to come, there will be no inevitable barrier to progress in the general well-being by the simultaneous increase of commodities and diminution of hours of labor.

This subject has been specially studied by Kropotkin, who, whatever may be thought of his general theories of politics, is remarkably instructive, concrete and convincing in all that he says about the possibilities of agriculture. Socialists and Anarchists in the main are products of industrial life, and few among them have any practical knowledge on the subject of food production. But Kropotkin is an exception. His two books, "The Conquest of Bread" and "Fields, Factories and Workshops," are very full of detailed information, and, even making great allowances for an optimistic bias, I do not think it can be denied that they demonstrate possibilities in which few of us would otherwise have believed.

Malthus contended, in effect, that population always tends to increase up to the limit of subsistence, that the production of food becomes more expensive as its amount is increased, and that therefore, apart from short exceptional periods when new discoveries produce temporary alleviations, the bulk of mankind must always be at the lowest level consistent with survival and reproduction. As applied to the civilized races of the world, this doctrine is becoming untrue through the rapid decline in the birth-rate; but, apart from this decline, there are many other reasons why the doctrine cannot be accepted, at any rate as regards the near future. The century which elapsed after Malthus wrote, saw a very great increase in the standard of comfort throughout the wage-earning classes, and, owing to the enormous increase in the productivity of labor, a far greater rise in the standard of comfort could have been effected if a more just system of distribution had been introduced. In former times, when one man's labor produced not very much more than was needed for one man's subsistence, it was impossible either greatly to reduce the normal hours of labor, or greatly to increase the proportion of the population who enjoyed more than the bare necessaries of life.

But this state of affairs has been overcome by modern methods of production. At the present moment, not only do many people enjoy a comfortable income derived from rent or interest, but about half the population of most of the civilized countries in the world is engaged, not in the production of commodities, but in fighting or in manufacturing munitions of war. In a time of peace the whole of this half might be kept in idleness without making the other half poorer than they would have been if the war had continued, and if, instead of being idle, they were productively employed, the whole of what they would produce would be a divisible surplus over and above present wages. The present productivity of labor in Great Britain would suffice to produce an income of about 1 pound per day for each family, even without any of those improvements in methods which are obviously immediately possible.

But, it will be said, as population increases, the price of food must ultimately increase also as the sources of supply in Canada, the Argentine, Australia and elsewhere are more and more used up.

There must come a time, so pessimists will urge, when food becomes so dear that the ordinary wage-earner will have little surplus for expenditure upon other things. It may be admitted that this would be true in some very distant future if the population were to continue to increase without limit. If the whole surface of the world were as densely populated as London is now, it would, no doubt, require almost the whole labor of the population to produce the necessary food from the few spaces remaining for agriculture. But there is no reason to suppose that the population will continue to increase indefinitely, and in any case the prospect is so remote that it may be ignored in all practical considerations.

Returning from these dim speculations to the facts set forth by Kropotkin, we find it proved in his writings that, by methods of intensive cultivation, which are already in actual operation, the amount of food produced on a given area can be increased far beyond anything that most uninformed persons suppose possible. Speaking of the market-gardeners in Great Britain, in the neighborhood of Paris, and in other places, he says:- They have created a totally new agriculture. They smile when we boast about the rotation system having permitted us to take from the field one crop every year, or four crops each three years, because their ambition is to have six and nine crops from the very same plot of land during the twelve months. They do not understand our talk about good and bad soils, because they make the soil themselves, and make it in such quantities as to be compelled yearly to sell some of it; otherwise it would raise up the level of their gardens by half an inch every year. They aim at cropping, not five or six tons of grass on the acre, as we do, but from 50 to 100 tons of various vegetables on the same space; not 5 pounds worth of hay, but 100 pounds worth of vegetables, of the plainest description, cabbage and carrots.[38] [38] Kropotkin, "Fields, Factories and Workshops," p. 74.

As regards cattle, he mentions that Mr. Champion at Whitby grows on each acre the food of two or three head of cattle, whereas under ordinary high farming it takes two or three acres to keep each head of cattle in Great Britain. Even more astonishing are the achievements of the Culture Maraicheres round Paris. It is impossible to summarize these achievements, but we may note the general conclusion:- There are now practical Maraichers who venture to maintain that if all the food, animal and vegetable, necessary for the 3,500,000 inhabitants of the Departments of Seine and Seine-et-Oise had to be grown on their own territory (3250 square miles), it could be grown without resorting to any other methods of culture than those already in use -- methods already tested on a large scale and proved successful.[39] [39] Ib. p. 81.

It must be remembered that these two departments include the whole population of Paris.

Kropotkin proceeds to point out methods by which the same result could be achieved without long hours of labor. Indeed, he contends that the great bulk of agricultural work could be carried on by people whose main occupations are sedentary, and with only such a number of hours as would serve to keep them in health and produce a pleasant diversification.

He protests against the theory of excessive division of labor. What he wants is INTEGRATION, "a society where each individual is a producer of both manual and intellectual work; where each able bodied human being is a worker, and where each worker works both in the field and in the industrial workshop."[40] [40] Kropotkin, "Field, Factories, and Workshops," p. 6.

These views as to production have no essential connection with Kropotkin's advocacy of Anarchism.

They would be equally possible under State Socialism, and under certain circumstances they might even be carried out in a capitalistic regime.

They are important for our present purpose, not from any argument which they afford in favor of one economic system as against another, but from the fact that they remove the veto upon our hopes which might otherwise result from a doubt as to the productive capacity of labor. I have dwelt upon agriculture rather than industry, since it is in regard to agriculture that the difficulties are chiefly supposed to arise. Broadly speaking, industrial production tends to be cheaper when it is carried on on a large scale, and therefore there is no reason in industry why an increase in the demand should lead to an increased cost of supply.

Passing now from the purely technical and material side of the problem of production, we come to the human factor, the motives leading men to work, the possibilities of efficient organization of production, and the connection of production with distribution. Defenders of the existing system maintain that efficient work would be impossible without the economic stimulus, and that if the wage system were abolished men would cease to do enough work to keep the community in tolerable comfort.

Through the alleged necessity of the economic motive, the problems of production and distribution become intertwined. The desire for a more just distribution of the world's goods is the main inspiration of most Socialism and Anarchism. We must, therefore, consider whether the system of distribution which they propose would be likely to lead to a diminished production.

There is a fundamental difference between Socialism and Anarchism as regards the question of distribution.

Socialism, at any rate in most of its forms, would retain payment for work done or for willingness to work, and, except in the case of persons incapacitated by age or infirmity, would make willingness to work a condition of subsistence, or at any rate of subsistence above a certain very low minimum. Anarchism, on the other hand, aims at granting to everyone, without any conditions whatever, just as much of all ordinary commodities as he or she may care to consume, while the rarer commodities, of which the supply cannot easily be indefinitely increased, would be rationed and divided equally among the population. Thus Anarchism would not impose any OBLIGATIONS of work, though Anarchists believe that the necessary work could be made sufficiently agreeable for the vast majority of the population to undertake it voluntarily. Socialists, on the other hand, would exact work. Some of them would make the incomes of all workers equal, while others would retain higher pay for the work which is considered more valuable. All these different systems are compatible with the common ownership of land and capital, though they differ greatly as regards the kind of society which they would produce.

Socialism with inequality of income would not differ greatly as regards the economic stimulus to work from the society in which we live. Such differences as it would entail would undoubtedly be to the good from our present point of view. Under the existing system many people enjoy idleness and affluence through the mere accident of inheriting land or capital. Many others, through their activities in industry or finance, enjoy an income which is certainly very far in excess of anything to which their social utility entitles them. On the other hand, it often happens that inventors and discoverers, whose work has the very greatest social utility, are robbed of their reward either by capitalists or by the failure of the public to appreciate their work until too late. The better paid work is only open to those who have been able to afford an expensive training, and these men are selected in the main not by merit but by luck. The wage earner is not paid for his willingness to work, but only for his utility to the employer.

Consequently, he may be plunged into destitution by causes over which he has no control. Such destitution is a constant fear, and when it occurs it produces undeserved suffering, and often deterioration in the social value of the sufferer. These are a few among the evils of our existing system from the standpoint of production. All these evils we might expect to see remedied under any system of Socialism.

There are two questions which need to be considered when we are discussing how far work requires the economic motive. The first question is: Must society give higher pay for the more skilled or socially more valuable work, if such work is to be done in sufficient quantities? The second question is: Could work be made so attractive that enough of it would be done even if idlers received just as much of the produce of work? The first of these questions concerns the division between two schools of Socialists: the more moderate Socialists sometimes concede that even under Socialism it would be well to retain unequal pay for different kinds of work, while the more thoroughgoing Socialists advocate equal incomes for all workers. The second question, on the other hand, forms a division between Socialists and Anarchists; the latter would not deprive a man of commodities if he did not work, while the former in general would.

Our second question is so much more fundamental than our first that it must be discussed at once, and in the course of this discussion what needs to be said on our first question will find its place naturally.

Wages or Free Sharing? -- "Abolition of the wages system" is one of the watchwords common to Anarchists and advanced Socialists. But in its most natural sense it is a watchword to which only the Anarchists have a right. In the Anarchist conception of society all the commoner commodities will be available to everyone without stint, in the kind of way in which water is available at present.[41] Advocates of this system point out that it applies already to many things which formerly had to be paid for, e.g., roads and bridges. They point out that it might very easily be extended to trams and local trains. They proceed to argue -- as Kropotkin does by means of his proofs that the soil might be made indefinitely more productive -- that all the commoner kinds of food could be given away to all who demanded them, since it would be easy to produce them in quantities adequate to any possible demand. If this system were extended to all the necessaries of life, everyone's bare livelihood would be secured, quite regardless of the way in which he might choose to spend his time. As for commodities which cannot be produced in indefinite quantities, such as luxuries and delicacies, they also, according to the Anarchists, are to be distributed without payment, but on a system of rations, the amount available being divided equally among the population. No doubt, though this is not said, something like a price will have to be put upon these luxuries, so that a man may be free to choose how he will take his share: one man will prefer good wine, another the finest Havana cigars, another pictures or beautiful furniture. Presumably, every man will be allowed to take such luxuries as are his due in whatever form he prefers, the relative prices being fixed so as to equalize the demand. In such a world as this, the economic stimulus to production will have wholly disappeared, and if work is to continue it must be from other motives.[42] [41] "Notwithstanding the egotistic turn given to the public mind by the merchant-production of our century, the Communist tendency is continually reasserting itself and trying to make its way into public life. The penny bridge disappears before the public bridge; and the turnpike road before the free road. The same spirit pervades thousands of other institutions.

Museums, free libraries, and free public schools; parks and pleasure grounds; paved and lighted streets, free for everybody's use; water supplied to private dwellings, with a growing tendency towards disregarding the exact amount of it used by the individual, tramways and railways which have already begun to introduce the season ticket or the uniform tax, and will surely go much further on this line when they are no longer private property: all these are tokens showing in what direction further progress is to be expected." -- Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism." [42] An able discussion of this question, at of various others, from the standpoint of reasoned and temperate opposition to Anarchism, will be found in Alfred Naquet's "L'Anarchie et le Collectivisme," Paris, 1904.

Is such a system possible? First, is it technically possible to provide the necessaries of life in such large quantities as would be needed if every man and woman could take as much of them from the public stores as he or she might desire? The idea of purchase and payment is so familiar that the proposal to do away with it must be thought at first fantastic. Yet I do not believe it is nearly so fantastic as it seems. Even if we could all have bread for nothing, we should not want more than a quite limited amount. As things are, the cost of bread to the rich is so small a proportion of their income as to afford practically no check upon their consumption; yet the amount of bread that they consume could easily be supplied to the whole population by improved methods of agriculture (I am not speaking of war-time). The amount of food that people desire has natural limits, and the waste that would be incurred would probably not be very great. As the Anarchists point out, people at present enjoy an unlimited water supply but very few leave the taps running when they are not using them. And one may assume that public opinion would be opposed to excessive waste. We may lay it down, I think, that the principle of unlimited supply could be adopted in regard to all commodities for which the demand has limits that fall short of what can be easily produced. And this would be the case, if production were efficiently organized, with the necessaries of life, including not only commodities, but also such things as education. Even if all education were free up to the highest, young people, unless they were radically transformed by the Anarchist regime, would not want more than a certain amount of it.

And the same applies to plain foods, plain clothes, and the rest of the things that supply our elementary needs.

I think we may conclude that there is no technical impossibility in the Anarchist plan of free sharing.

But would the necessary work be done if the individual were assured of the general standard of comfort even though he did no work? Most people will answer this question unhesitatingly in the negative. Those employers in particular who are in the habit of denouncing their employes as a set of lazy, drunken louts, will feel quite certain that no work could be got out of them except under threat of dismissal and consequent starvation.

But is this as certain as people are inclined to sup pose at first sight? If work were to remain what most work is now, no doubt it would be very hard to induce people to undertake it except from fear of destitution. But there is no reason why work should remain the dreary drudgery in horrible conditions that most of it is now.[43] If men had to be tempted to work instead of driven to it, the obvious interest of the community would be to make work pleasant. So long as work is not made on the whole pleasant, it cannot be said that anything like a good state of society has been reached. Is the painfulness of work unavoidable? [43] "Overwork is repulsive to human nature -- not work. Overwork for supplying the few with luxury -- not work for the well being of all. Work, labor, is a physiological necessity, a necessity of spending accumulated bodily energy, a necessity which is health and life itself. If so many branches of useful work are so reluctantly done now, it is merely because they mean overwork, or they are improperly organized. But we know -- old Franklin knew it -- that four hours of useful work every day would be more than sufficient for supplying everybody with the comfort of a moderately well-to-do middle-class house, if we all gave ourselves to productive work, and if we did not waste our productive powers as we do waste them now. As to the childish question, repeated for fifty years: `Who would do disagreeable work?' frankly I regret that none of our savants has ever been brought to do it, be it for only one day in his life. If there is still work which is really disagreeable in itself, it is only because our scientific men have never cared to consider the means of rendering it less so: they have always known that there were plenty of starving men who would do it for a few pence a day." Kropotkin, "`Anarchist Communism." At present, the better paid work, that of the business and professional classes, is for the most part enjoyable. I do not mean that every separate moment is agreeable, but that the life of a man who has work of this sort is on the whole happier than that of a man who enjoys an equal income without doing any work. A certain amount of effort, and something in the nature of a continuous career, are necessary to vigorous men if they are to preserve their mental health and their zest for life. A considerable amount of work is done without pay. People who take a rosy view of human nature might have supposed that the duties of a magistrate would be among disagreeable trades, like cleaning sewers; but a cynic might contend that the pleasures of vindictiveness and moral superiority are so great that there is no difficulty in finding well-to-do elderly gentlemen who are willing, without pay, to send helpless wretches to the torture of prison. And apart from enjoyment of the work itself, desire for the good opinion of neighbors and for the feeling of effectiveness is quite sufficient to keep many men active.

But, it will be said, the sort of work that a man would voluntarily choose must always be exceptional: the great bulk of necessary work can never be anything but painful. Who would choose, if an easy life were otherwise open to him, to be a coal-miner, or a stoker on an Atlantic liner? I think it must be conceded that much necessary work must always remain disagreeable or at least painfully monotonous, and that special privileges will have to be accorded to those who undertake it, if the Anarchist system is ever to be made workable. It is true that the introduction of such special privileges would somewhat mar the rounded logic of Anarchism, but it need not, I think, make any really vital breach in its system.

Much of the work that needs doing could be rendered agreeable, if thought and care were given to this object. Even now it is often only long hours that make work irksome. If the normal hours of work were reduced to, say, four, as they could be by better organization and more scientific methods, a very great deal of work which is now felt as a burden would quite cease to be so. If, as Kropotkin suggests, agricultural work, instead of being the lifelong drudgery of an ignorant laborer living very near the verge of abject poverty, were the occasional occupation of men and women normally employed in industry or brain-work; if, instead of being conducted by ancient traditional methods, without any possibility of intelligent participation by the wage earner, it were alive with the search for new methods and new inventions, filled with the spirit of freedom, and inviting the mental as well as the physical co-operation of those who do the work, it might become a joy instead of a weariness, and a source of health and life to those engaged in it.

What is true of agriculture is said by Anarchists to be equally true of industry. They maintain that if the great economic organizations which are now managed by capitalists, without consideration for the lives of the wage-earners beyond what Trade Unions are able to exact, were turned gradually into self-governing communities, in which the producers could decide all questions of methods, conditions, hours of work, and so forth, there would be an almost boundless change for the better: grime and noise might be nearly eliminated, the hideousness of industrial regions might be turned into beauty, the interest in the scientific aspects of production might become diffused among all producers with any native intelligence, and something of the artist's joy in creation might inspire the whole of the work. All this, which is at present utterly remote from the reality, might be produced by economic self-government.

We may concede that by such means a very large proportion of the necessary work of the world could ultimately be made sufficiently agreeable to be preferred before idleness even by men whose bare livelihood would be assured whether they worked or not.

As to the residue let us admit that special rewards, whether in goods or honors or privileges, would have to be given to those who undertook it. But this need not cause any fundamental objection.

There would, of course, be a certain proportion of the population who would prefer idleness. Provided the proportion were small, this need not matter.

And among those who would be classed as idlers might be included artists, writers of books, men devoted to abstract intellectual pursuits -- in short, all those whom society despises while they are alive and honors when they are dead. To such men, the possibility of pursuing their own work regardless of any public recognition of its utility would be invaluable. Whoever will observe how many of our poets have been men of private means will realize how much poetic capacity must have remained undeveloped through poverty; for it would be absurd to suppose that the rich are better endowed by nature with the capacity for poetry. Freedom for such men, few as they are, must be set against the waste of the mere idlers.

So far, we have set forth the arguments in favor of the Anarchist plan. They are, to my mind, sufficient to make it seem possible that the plan might succeed, but not sufficient to make it so probable that it would be wise to try it.

The question of the feasibility of the Anarchist proposals in regard to distribution is, like so many other questions, a quantitative one. The Anarchist proposals consist of two parts: (1) That all the common commodities should be supplied ad lib. to all applicants; (2) That no obligation to work, or economic reward for work, should be imposed on anyone.

These two proposals are not necessarily inseparable, nor does either entail the whole system of Anarchism, though without them Anarchism would hardly be possible. As regards the first of these proposals, it can be carried out even now with regard to some commodities, and it could be carried out in no very distant future with regard to many more. It is a flexible plan, since this or that article of consumption could be placed on the free list or taken of as circumstances might dictate. Its advantages are many and various, and the practice of the world tends to develop in this direction. I think we may conclude that this part of the Anarchists' system might well be adopted bit by bit, reaching gradually the full extension that they desire.

But as regards the second proposal, that there should be no obligation to work, and no economic reward for work, the matter is much more doubtful.

Anarchists always assume that if their schemes were put into operation practically everyone would work; but although there is very much more to be said for this view than most people would concede at first sight, yet it is questionable whether there is enough to be said to make it true for practical purposes.

Perhaps, in a community where industry had become habitual through economic pressure, public opinion might be sufficiently powerful to compel most men to work;[44] but it is always doubtful how far such a state of things would be permanent. If public opinion is to be really effective, it will be necessary to have some method of dividing the community into small groups, and to allow each group to consume only the equivalent of what it produces. This will make the economic motive operative upon the group, which, since we are supposing it small, will feel that its collective share is appreciably diminished by each idle individual. Such a system might be feasible, but it would be contrary to the whole spirit of Anarchism and would destroy the main lines of its economic system.

[44] "As to the so-often repeated objection that nobody would labor if he were not compelled to do so by sheer necessity, we heard enough of it before the emancipation of slaves in America, as well as before the emancipation of serfs in Russia; and we have had the opportunity of appreciating it at its just value.

So we shall not try to convince those who can be convinced only by accomplished facts. As to those who reason, they ought to know that, if it really was so with some parts of humanity at its lowest stages -- and yet, what do we know about it? -- or if it is so with some small communities, or separate individuals, brought to sheer despair by ill-success in their struggle against unfavorable conditions, it is not so with the bulk of the civilized nations. With us, work is a habit, and idleness an artificial growth." Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," p. 30.

The attitude of orthodox Socialism on this question is quite different from that of Anarchism.[45] Among the more immediate measures advocated in the "Communist Manifesto" is "equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture." The Socialist theory is that, in general, work alone gives the right to the enjoyment of the produce of work. To this theory there will, of course, be exceptions: the old and the very young, the infirm and those whose work is temporarily not required through no fault of their own.

But the fundamental conception of Socialism, in regard to our present question, is that all who can should be compelled to work, either by the threat of starvation or by the operation of the criminal law. And, of course, the only kind of work recognized will be such as commends itself to the authorities.

Writing books against Socialism, or against any theory embodied in the government of the day, would certainly not be recognized as work. No more would the painting of pictures in a different style from that of the Royal Academy, or producing plays unpleasing to the censor. Any new line of thought would be banned, unless by influence or corruption the thinker could crawl into the good graces of the pundits. These results are not foreseen by Socialists, because they imagine that the Socialist State will be governed by men like those who now advocate it. This is, of course, a delusion. The rulers of the State then will bear as little resemblance to the present Socialists as the dignitaries of the Church after the time of Constantine bore to the Apostles. The men who advocate an unpopular reform are exceptional in disinterestedness and zeal for the public good; but those who hold power after the reform has been carried out are likely to belong, in the main, to the ambitious executive type which has in all ages possessed itself of the government of nations. And this type has never shown itself tolerant of opposition or friendly to freedom.

[45] "While holding this synthetic view on production, the Anarchists cannot consider, like the Collectivists, that a remuneration which would be proportionate to the hours of labor spent by each person in the production of riches may be an ideal, or even an approach to an ideal, society." Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," p. 20.

It would seem, then, that if the Anarchist plan has its dangers, the Socialist plan has at least equal dangers. It is true that the evils we have been foreseeing under Socialism exist at present, but the purpose of Socialists is to cure the evils of the world as it is; they cannot be content with the argument that they would make things no worse.

Anarchism has the advantage as regards liberty, Socialism as regards the inducements to work. Can we not find a method of combining these two advantages? It seems to me that we can.

We saw that, provided most people work in moderation, and their work is rendered as productive as science and organization can make it, there is no good reason why the necessaries of life should not be supplied freely to all. Our only serious doubt was as to whether, in an Anarchist regime, the motives for work would be sufficiently powerful to prevent a dangerously large amount of idleness. But it would be easy to decree that, though necessaries should be free to all, whatever went beyond necessaries should only be given to those who were willing to work -- not, as is usual at present, only to those in work at any moment, but also to all those who, when they happened not to be working, were idle through no fault of their own. We find at present that a man who has a small income from investments, just sufficient to keep him from actual want, almost always prefers to find some paid work in order to be able to afford luxuries. So it would be, presumably, in such a community as we are imagining. At the same time, the man who felt a vocation for some unrecognized work of art or science or thought would be free to follow his desire, provided he were willing to "scorn delights and live laborious days." And the comparatively small number of men with an invincible horror of work -- the sort of men who now become tramps- might lead a harmless existence, without any grave danger of their becoming sufficiently numerous to be a serious burden upon the more industrious. In this ways the claims of freedom could be combined with the need of some economic stimulus to work. Such a system, it seems to me, would have a far greater chance of success than either pure Anarchism or pure orthodox Socialism.

Stated in more familiar terms, the plan we are advocating amounts essentially to this: that a certain small income, sufficient for necessaries, should be secured to all, whether they work or not, and that a larger income, as much larger as might be warranted by the total amount of commodities produced, should be given to those who are willing to engage in some work which the community recognizes as useful. On this basis we may build further. I do not think it is always necessary to pay more highly work which is more skilled or regarded as socially more useful, since such work is more interesting and more respected than ordinary work, and will therefore often be preferred by those who are able to do it. But we might, for instance, give an intermediate income to those who are only willing to work half the usual number of hours, and an income above that of most workers to those who choose a specially disagreeable trade. Such a system is perfectly compatible with Socialism, though perhaps hardly with Anarchism.

Of its advantages we shall have more to say at a later stage. For the present I am content to urge that it combines freedom with justice, and avoids those dangers to the community which we have found to lurk both in the proposals of the Anarchists and in those of orthodox Socialists.

CHAPTER V   GOVERNMENT AND LAW
GOVERNMENT and Law, in their very essence, consist of restrictions on freedom, and freedom is the greatest of political goods.[46] A hasty reasoner might conclude without further ado that Law and government are evils which must be abolished if freedom is our goal. But this consequence, true or false, cannot be proved so simply. In this chapter we shall examine the arguments of Anarchists against law and the State. We shall proceed on the assumption that freedom is the supreme aim of a good social system; but on this very basis we shall find the Anarchist contentions very questionable.

[46] I do not say freedom is the greatest of ALL goods: the best things come from within -- they are such things as creative art, and love, and thought. Such things can be helped or hindered by political conditions, but not actually produced by them; and freedom is, both in itself and in its relation to these other goods the best thing that political and economic conditions can secure.

Respect for the liberty of others is not a natural impulse with most men: envy and love of power lead ordinary human nature to find pleasure in interferences with the lives of others. If all men's actions were wholly unchecked by external authority, we should not obtain a world in which all men would be free. The strong would oppress the weak, or the majority would oppress the minority, or the lovers of violence would oppress the more peaceable people.

I fear it cannot be said that these bad impulses are WHOLLY due to a bad social system, though it must be conceded that the present competitive organization of society does a great deal to foster the worst elements in human nature. The love of power is an impulse which, though innate in very ambitious men, is chiefly promoted as a rule by the actual experience of power. In a world where none could acquire much power, the desire to tyrannize would be much less strong than it is at present. Nevertheless, I cannot think that it would be wholly absent, and those in whom it would exist would often be men of unusual energy and executive capacity. Such men, if they are not restrained by the organized will of the community, may either succeed in establishing a despotism, or, at any rate, make such a vigorous attempt as can only be defeated through a period of prolonged disturbance. And apart from the love or political power, there is the love of power over individuals. If threats and terrorism were not prevented by law, it can hardly be doubted that cruelty would be rife in the relations of men and women, and of parents and children. It is true that the habits of a community can make such cruelty rare, but these habits, I fear, are only to be produced through the prolonged reign of law. Experience of backwoods communities, mining camps and other such places seems to show that under new conditions men easily revert to a more barbarous attitude and practice.

It would seem, therefore, that, while human nature remains as it is, there will be more liberty for all in a community where some acts of tyranny by individuals are forbidden, than in a community where the law leaves each individual free to follow his every impulse.

But, although the necessity of some form of government and law must for the present be conceded, it is important to remember that all law and government is in itself in some degree an evil, only justifiable when it prevents other and greater evils. Every use of the power of the State needs, therefore, to be very closely scrutinized, and every possibility of diminishing its power is to be welcomed provided it does not lead to a reign of private tyranny.

The power of the State is partly legal, partly economic: acts of a kind which the State dislikes can be punished by the criminal law, and individuals who incur the displeasure of the State may find it hard to earn a livelihood.

The views of Marx on the State are not very clear. On the one hand he seems willing,, like the modern State Socialists, to allow great power to the State, but on the other hand he suggests that when the Socialist revolution has been consummated, the State, as we know it, will disappear. Among the measures which are advocated in the Communist Manifesto as immediately desirable, there are several which would very greatly increase the power of the existing State. For example, "Centralization of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly;" and again, "Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State." But the Manifesto goes on to say: When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character.

Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which; the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.[47] [47] Communist Manifesto, p. 22.

This attitude Marx preserved in essentials throughout his life. Accordingly, it is not to be wondered at that his followers, so far as regards their immediate aims, have in the main become out-and-out State Socialists. On the other hand, the Syndicalists, who accept from Marx the doctrine of the class war, which they regard as what is really vital in his teaching, reject the State with abhorrence and wish to abolish it wholly, in which respect they are at one with the Anarchists. The Guild Socialists, though some persons in this country regard them as extremists, really represent the English love of compromise.

The Syndicalist arguments as to the dangers inherent in the power of the State have made them dissatisfied with the old State Socialism, but they are unable to accept the Anarchist view that society can dispense altogether with a central authority.

Accordingly they propose that there should be two co-equal instruments of Government in a community, the one geographical, representing the consumers, and essentially the continuation of the democratic State; the other representing the producers, organized, not geographically, but in guilds, after the manner of industrial unionism. These two authorities will deal with different classes of questions.

Guild Socialists do not regard the industrial authority as forming part of the State, for they contend that it is the essence of the State to be geographical; but the industrial authority will resemble the present State in the fact that it will have coercive powers, and that its decrees will be enforced, when necessary.

It is to be suspected that Syndicalists also, much as they object to the existing State, would not object to coercion of individuals in an industry by the Trade Union in that industry. Government within the Trade Union would probably be quite as strict as State government is now. In saying this we are assuming that the theoretical Anarchism of Syndicalist leaders would not survive accession to power, but I am afraid experience shows that this is not a very hazardous assumption.

Among all these different views, the one which raises the deepest issue is the Anarchist contention that all coercion by the community is unnecessary.

Like most of the things that Anarchists say, there is much more to be urged in support of this view than most people would suppose at first sight. Kropotkin, who is its ablest exponent, points out how much has been achieved already by the method of free agreement. He does not wish to abolish government in the sense of collective decisions: what he does wish to abolish is the system by which a decision is en forced upon those who oppose it.[48] The whole system of representative government and majority rule is to him a bad thing.[49] He points to such instances as the agreements among the different railway systems of the Continent for the running of through expresses and for co-operation generally. He points out that in such cases the different companies or authorities concerned each appoint a delegate, and that the delegates suggest a basis of agreement, which has to be subsequently ratified by each of the bodies appointing them. The assembly of delegates has no coercive power whatever, and a majority can do nothing against a recalcitrant minority. Yet this has not prevented the conclusion of very elaborate systems of agreements. By such methods, so Anarchists contend, the USEFUL functions of government can be carried out without any coercion. They maintain that the usefulness of agreement is so patent as to make co-operation certain if once the predatory motives associated with the present system of private property were removed.

[48] "On the other hand, the STATE has also been confused with GOVERNMENT. As there can be no State without government, it has been sometimes said that it is the absence of government, and not the abolition of the State, that should be the aim.

"It seems to me, however, that State and government represent two ideas of a different kind. The State idea implies quite another idea to that of government. It not only includes the existence of a power placed above society, but also a territorial concentration and a concentration of many functions of the life of society in the hands of a few or even of all. It implies new relations among the members of society.

"This characteristic distinction, which perhaps escapes notice at first sight, appears clearly when the origin of the State is studied." Kropotkin, "The State." p. 4.

[49] Representative government has accomplished its historical mission; it has given a mortal blow to Court-rule; and by its debates it has awakened public interest in public questions.

But, to see in it the government of the future Socialist society, is to commit a gross error. Each economical phase of life implies its own political phase; and it is impossible to touch the very basis of the present economical life -- private property- without a corresponding change in the very basis of the political organization. Life already shows in which direction the change will be made. Not in increasing the powers of the State, but in resorting to free organization and free federation in all those branches which are now considered as attributes of the State." Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," pp. 28.29.

Attractive as this view is, I cannot resist the conclusion that it results from impatience and represents the attempt to find a short-cut toward the ideal which all humane people desire.

Let us begin with the question of private crime.[50] Anarchists maintain that the criminal is manufactured by bad social conditions and would disappear in such a world as they aim at creating.[51] No doubt there is a great measure of truth in this view. There would be little motive to robbery, for example, in an Anarchist world, unless it were organized on a large scale by a body of men bent on upsetting the Anarchist regime. It may also be conceded that impulses toward criminal violence could be very largely eliminated by a better education. But all such contentions, it seems to me, have their limitations. To take an extreme case, we cannot suppose that there would be no lunatics in an Anarchist community, and some of these lunatics would, no doubt, be homicidal.

Probably no one would argue that they ought to be left at liberty. But there are no sharp lines in nature; from the homicidal lunatic to the sane man of violent passions there is a continuous gradation.

Even in the most perfect community there will be men and women, otherwise sane, who will feel an impulse to commit murder from jealousy. These are now usually restrained by the fear of punishment, but if this fear were removed, such murders would probably become much more common, as may be seen from the present behavior of certain soldiers on leave. Moreover, certain kinds of conduct arouse public hostility, and would almost inevitably lead to lynching, if no other recognized method of punishment existed. There is in most men a certain natural vindictiveness, not always directed against the worst members of the community. For example, Spinoza was very nearly murdered by the mob because he was suspected of undue friendliness to France at a time when Holland was at war with that country. Apart from such cases, there would be the very real danger of an organized attempt to destroy Anarchism and revive ancient oppressions. Is it to be supposed, for example, that Napoleon, if he had been born into such a community as Kropotkin advocates, would have acquiesced tamely in a world where his genius could find no scope? I cannot see what should prevent a combination of ambitious men forming themselves into a private army, manufacturing their own munitions, and at last enslaving the defenseless citizens, who had relied upon the inherent attractiveness of liberty. It would not be consistent with the principles of Anarchism for the community to interfere with the drilling of a private army, no matter what its objects might be (though, of course, an opposing private army might be formed by men with different views). Indeed, Kropotkin instances the old volunteers in Great Britain as an example of a movement on Anarchist lines.[52] Even if a predatory army were not formed from within, it might easily come from a neighboring nation, or from races on the borderland of civilization. So long as the love of power exists, I do not see how it can be prevented from finding an outlet in oppression except by means of the organized force of the community.

[50] On this subject there is an excellent discussion in the before-mentioned work of Monsieur Naquet.

[51] "As to the third -- the chief -- objection, which maintains the necessity of a government for punishing those who break the law of society, there is so much to say about it that it hardly can be touched incidentally. The more we study the question, the more we are brought to the conclusion that society itself is responsible for the anti-social deeds perpetrated in its midst, and that no punishment, no prisons, and no hangmen can diminish the numbers of such deeds; nothing short of a reorganization of society itself. Three-quarters of all the acts which are brought every year before our courts have their origin, either directly or indirectly, in the present disorganized state of society with regard to the production and distribution of wealth -- not in the perversity of human nature. As to the relatively few anti-social deeds which result from anti-social inclinations of separate individuals, it is not by prisons, nor even by resorting to the hangmen, that we can diminish their numbers. By our prisons, we merely multiply them and render them worse. By our detectives, our `price of blood,' our executions, and our jails, we spread in society such a terrible flow of basest passions and habits, that he who should realize the effects of these institutions to their full extent, would be frightened by what society is doing under the pretext of maintaining morality. We must search for other remedies, and the remedies have been indicated long since." Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," pp. 31.32.

[52] "Anarchist Communism," p. 27.

The conclusion, which appears to be forced upon us, is that the Anarchist ideal of a community in which no acts are forbidden by law is not, at any rate for the present, compatible with the stability of such a world as the Anarchists desire. In order to obtain and preserve a world resembling as closely as possible that at which they aim, it will still be necessary that some acts should be forbidden by law. We may put the chief of these under three heads: 1. Theft.

2. Crimes of violence.

3. The creation of organizations intended to subvert the Anarchist regime by force.

We will briefly recapitulate what has been said already as to the necessity of these prohibitions.

1. Theft. -- It is true that in an Anarchist world there will be no destitution, and therefore no thefts motivated by starvation. But such thefts are at present by no means the most considerable or the most harmful. The system of rationing, which is to be applied to luxuries, will leave many men with fewer luxuries than they might desire. It will give opportunities for peculation by those who are in control of the public stores, and it will leave the possibility of appropriating such valuable objects of art as would naturally be preserved in public museums. It may be contended that such forms of theft would be prevented by public opinion. But public opinion is not greatly operative upon an individual unless it is the opinion of his own group. A group of men combined for purposes of theft might readily defy the public opinion of the majority unless that public opinion made itself effective by the use of force against them.

Probably, in fact, such force would be applied through popular indignation, but in that case we should revive the evils of the criminal law with the added evils of uncertainty, haste and passion, which are inseparable from the practice of lynching. If, as we have suggested, it were found necessary to provide an economic stimulus to work by allowing fewer luxuries to idlers, this would afford a new motive for theft on their part and a new necessity for some form of criminal law.

2. Crimes of Violence. -- Cruelty to children, crimes of jealousy, rape, and so forth, are almost certain to occur in any society to some extent. The prevention of such acts is essential to the existence of freedom for the weak. If nothing were done to hinder them, it is to be feared that the customs of a society would gradually become rougher, and that acts which are now rare would cease to be so. If Anarchists are right in maintaining that the existence of such an economic system as they desire would prevent the commission of crimes of this kind, the laws forbidding them would no longer come into operation, and would do no harm to liberty. If, on the other hand, the impulse to such actions persisted, it would be necessary that steps should be taken to restrain men from indulging it.

3. The third class of difficulties is much the most serious and involves much the most drastic interference with liberty. I do not see how a private army could be tolerated within an Anarchist community, and I do not see how it could be prevented except by a general prohibition of carrying arms. If there were no such prohibition, rival parties would organize rival forces, and civil war would result. Yet, if there is such a prohibition, it cannot well be carried out without a very considerable interference with individual liberty. No doubt, after a time, the idea of using violence to achieve a political object might die down, as the practice of duelling has done. But such changes of habit and outlook are facilitated by legal prohibition, and would hardly come about without it. I shall not speak yet of the international aspect of this same problem, for I propose to deal with that in the next chapter, but it is clear that the same considerations apply with even greater force to the relations between nations.

If we admit, however reluctantly, that a criminal law is necessary and that the force of the community must be brought to bear to prevent certain kinds of actions, a further question arises: How is crime to be treated? What is the greatest measure of humanity and respect for freedom that is compatible with the recognition of such a thing as crime? The first thing to recognize is that the whole conception of guilt or sin should be utterly swept away. At present, the criminal is visited with the displeasure of the community: the sole method applied to prevent the occurrence of crime is the infliction of pain upon the criminal. Everything possible is done to break his spirit and destroy his self-respect. Even those pleasures which would be most likely to have a civilizing effect are forbidden to him, merely on the ground that they are pleasures, while much of the suffering inflicted is of a kind which can only brutalize and degrade still further. I am not speaking, of course, of those few penal institutions which have made a serious study of reforming the criminal. Such institutions, especially in America, have been proved capable of achieving the most remarkable results, but they remain everywhere exceptional. The broad rule is still that the criminal is made to feel the displeasure of society. He must emerge from such a treatment either defiant and hostile, or submissive and cringing, with a broken spirit and a loss of self-respect.

Neither of these results is anything but evil. Nor can any good result be achieved by a method of treatment which embodies reprobation.

When a man is suffering from an infectious disease he is a danger to the community, and it is necessary to restrict his liberty of movement. But no one associates any idea of guilt with such a situation.

On the contrary, he is an object of commiseration to his friends. Such steps as science recommends are taken to cure him of his disease, and he submits as a rule without reluctance to the curtailment of liberty involved meanwhile. The same method in spirit ought to be shown in the treatment of what is called "crime." It is supposed, of course, that the criminal is actuated by calculations of self-interest, and that the fear of punishment, by supplying a contrary motive of self-interest affords the best deterrent, The dog, to gain some private end, Went mad and bit the man.

This is the popular view of crime; yet no dog goes mad from choice, and probably the same is true of the great majority of criminals, certainly in the case of crimes of passion. Even in cases where self-interest is the motive, the important thing is to prevent the crime, not to make the criminal suffer. Any suffering which may be entailed by the process of prevention ought to be regarded as regrettable, like the pain involved in a surgical operation. The man who commits a crime from an impulse to violence ought to be subjected to a scientific psychological treatment, designed to elicit more beneficial impulses. The man who commits a crime from calculations of self-interest ought to be made to feel that self-interest itself, when it is fully understood, can be better served by a life which is useful to the community than by one which is harmful. For this purpose it is chiefly necessary to widen his outlook and increase the scope of his desires. At present, when a man suffers from insufficient love for his fellow-creatures, the method of curing him which is commonly adopted seems scarcely designed to succeed, being, indeed, in essentials, the same as his attitude toward them. The object of the prison administration is to save trouble, not to study the individual case. He is kept in captivity in a cell from which all sight of the earth is shut out: he is subjected to harshness by warders, who have too often become brutalized by their occupation.[53] He is solemnly denounced as an enemy to society. He is compelled to perform mechanical tasks, chosen for their wearisomeness. He is given no education and no incentive to self-improvement. Is it to be wondered at if, at the end of such a course of treatment, his feelings toward the community are no more friendly than they were at the beginning? [53] This was written before the author had any personal experience of the prison system. He personally met with nothing but kindness at the hands of the prison officials.

Severity of punishment arose through vindictiveness and fear in an age when many criminals escaped justice altogether, and it was hoped that savage sentences would outweigh the chance of escape in the mind of the criminal. At present a very large part of the criminal law is concerned in safeguarding the rights of property, that is to say -- as things are now -- the unjust privileges of the rich. Those whose principles lead them into conflict with government, like Anarchists, bring a most formidable indictment against the law and the authorities for the unjust manner in which they support the status quo. Many of the actions by which men have become rich are far more harmful to the community than the obscure crimes of poor men, yet they go unpunished because they do not interfere with the existing order. If the power of the community is to be brought to bear to prevent certain classes of actions through the agency of the criminal law, it is as necessary that these actions should really be those which are harmful to the community, as it is that the treatment of "criminals" should be freed from the conception of guilt and inspired by the same spirit as is shown in the treatment of disease. But, if these two conditions were fulfilled, I cannot help thinking that a society which preserved the existence of law would be preferable to one conducted on the unadulterated principles of Anarchism.

So far we have been considering the power which the State derives from the criminal law. We have every reason to think that this power cannot be entirely abolished, though it can be exercised in a wholly different spirit, without the vindictiveness and the moral reprobation which now form its essence.

We come next to the consideration of the economic power of the State and the influence which it can exert through its bureaucracy. State Socialists argue as if there would be no danger to liberty in a State not based upon capitalism. This seems to me an entire delusion. Given an official caste, however selected, there are bound to be a set of men whose whole instincts will drive them toward tyranny. Together with the natural love of power, they will have a rooted conviction (visible now in the higher ranks of the Civil Service) that they alone know enough to be able to judge what is for the good of the community. Like all men who administer a system, they will come to feel the system itself sacrosanct. The only changes they will desire will be changes in the direction of further regulations as to how the people are to enjoy the good things kindly granted to them by their benevolent despots. Whoever thinks this picture overdrawn must have failed to study the influence and methods of Civil Servants at present. On every matter that arises, they know far more than the general public about all the DEFINITE facts involved; the one thing they do not know is "where the shoe pinches." But those who know this are probably not skilled in stating their case, not able to say off-hand exactly how many shoes are pinching how many feet, or what is the precise remedy required. The answer prepared for Ministers by the Civil Service is accepted by the "respectable" public as impartial, and is regarded as disposing of the case of malcontents except on a first-class political question on which elections may be won or lost. That at least is the way in which things are managed in England. And there is every reason to fear that under State Socialism the power of officials would be vastly greater than it is at present.

Those who accept the orthodox doctrine of democracy contend that, if ever the power of capital were removed, representative institutions would suffice to undo the evils threatened by bureaucracy. Against this view, Anarchists and Syndicalists have directed a merciless criticism. French Syndicalists especially, living, as they do, in a highly democratized country, have had bitter experience of the way in which the power of the State can be employed against a progressive minority. This experience has led them to abandon altogether the belief in the divine right of majorities. The Constitution that they would desire would be one which allowed scope for vigorous minorities, conscious of their aims and prepared to work for them. It is undeniable that, to all who care for progress, actual experience of democratic representative Government is very disillusioning. Admitting- as I think we must -- that it is preferable to any PREVIOUS form of Government, we must yet acknowledge that much of the criticism directed against it by Anarchists and Syndicalists is thoroughly justified.

Such criticism would have had more influence if any clear idea of an alternative to parliamentary democracy had been generally apprehended. But it must be confessed that Syndicalists have not presented their case in a way which is likely to attract the average citizen. Much of what they say amounts to this: that a minority, consisting of skilled workers in vital industries, can, by a strike, make the economic life of the whole community impossible, and can in this way force their will upon the nation. The action aimed at is compared to the seizure of a power station, by which a whole vast system can be paralyzed.

Such a doctrine is an appeal to force, and is naturally met by an appeal to force on the other side. It is useless for the Syndicalists to protest that they only desire power in order to promote liberty: the world which they are seeking to establish does not, as yet, appeal to the effective will of the community, and cannot be stably inaugurated until it does do so.

Persuasion is a slow process, and may sometimes be accelerated by violent methods; to this extent such methods may be justified. But the ultimate goal of any reformer who aims at liberty can only be reached through persuasion. The attempt to thrust liberty by force upon those who do not desire what we consider liberty must always prove a failure; and Syndicalists, like other reformers, must ultimately rely upon persuasion for success.

But it would be a mistake to confuse aims with methods: however little we may agree with the proposal to force the millennium on a reluctant community by starvation, we may yet agree that much of what the Syndicalists desire to achieve is desirable.

Let us dismiss from our minds such criticisms of parliamentary government as are bound up with the present system of private property, and consider only those which would remain true in a collectivist community. Certain defects seem inherent in the very nature of representative institutions. There is a sense of self-importance, inseparable from success in a contest for popular favor. There is an all-but unavoidable habit of hypocrisy, since experience shows that the democracy does not detect insincerity in an orator, and will, on the other hand, be shocked by things which even the most sincere men may think necessary. Hence arises a tone of cynicism among elected representatives, and a feeling that no man can retain his position in politics without deceit.

This is as much the fault of the democracy as of the representatives, but it seems unavoidable so long as the main thing that all bodies of men demand of their champions is flattery. However the blame may be apportioned, the evil must be recognized as one which is bound to occur in the existing forms of democracy.

Another evil, which is especially noticeable in large States, is the remoteness of the seat of government from many of the constituencies -- a remoteness which is psychological even more than geographical. The legislators live in comfort, protected by thick walls and innumerable policemen from the voice of the mob; as time goes on they remember only dimly the passions and promises of their electoral campaign; they come to feel it an essential part of statesmanship to consider what are called the interests of the community as a whole, rather than those of some discontented group; but the interests of the community as a whole are sufficiently vague to be easily seen to coincide with self-interest. All these causes lead Parliaments to betray the people, consciously or unconsciously; and it is no wonder if they have produced a certain aloofness from democratic theory in the more vigorous champions of labor.

Majority rule, as it exists in large States, is subject to the fatal defect that, in a very great number of questions, only a fraction of the nation have any direct interest or knowledge, yet the others have an equal voice in their settlement. When people have no direct interest in a question they are very apt to be influenced by irrelevant considerations; this is shown in the extraordinary reluctance to grant autonomy to subordinate nations or groups. For this reason, it is very dangerous to allow the nation as a whole to decide on matters which concern only a small section, whether that section be geographical or industrial or defined in any other way. The best cure for this evil, so far as can be seen at present, lies in allowing self-government to every important group within a nation in all matters that affect that group much more than they affect the rest of the community. The government of a group, chosen by the group, will be far more in touch with its constituents, far more conscious of their interests, than a remote Parliament nominally representing the whole country. The most original idea in Syndicalism- adopted and developed by the Guild Socialists -- is the idea of making industries self-governing units so far as their internal affairs are concerned. By this method, extended also to such other groups as have clearly separable interests, the evils which have shown themselves in representative democracy can, I believe, be largely overcome.

Guild Socialists, as we have seen, have another suggestion, growing naturally out of the autonomy of industrial guilds, by which they hope to limit the power of the State and help to preserve individual liberty. They propose that, in addition to Parliament, elected (as at present) on a territorial basis and representing the community as consumers, there shall also be a "Guild Congress," a glorified successor of the present Trade Union Congress, which shall consist of representatives chosen by the Guilds, and shall represent the community as producers.

This method of diminishing the excessive power of the State has been attractively set forth by Mr.

G. D. H. Cole in his "Self-Government in Industry."[54] "Where now," he says, "the State passes a Factory Act, or a Coal Mines Regulation Act, the Guild Congress of the future will pass such Acts, and its power of enforcing them will be the same as that of the State" (p. 98). His ultimate ground for advocating this system is that, in his opinion, it will tend to preserve individual liberty: "The fundamental reason for the preservation, in a democratic Society, of both the industrial and the political forms of Social organization is, it seems to me, that only by dividing the vast power now wielded by industrial capitalism can the individual hope to be free" (p. 91).

[54] Bell, 1917.

Will the system suggested by Mr. Cole have this result? I think it is clear that it would, in this respect, be an improvement on the existing system.

Representative government cannot but be improved by any method which brings the representatives into closer touch with the interests concerned in their legislation; and this advantage probably would be secured by handing over questions of production to the Guild Congress. But if, in spite of the safeguards proposed by the Guild Socialists, the Guild Congress became all-powerful in such questions, if resistance to its will by a Guild which felt ill-used became practically hopeless, I fear that the evils now connected with the omnipotence of the State would soon reappear.

Trade Union officials, as soon as they become part of the governing forces in the country, tend to become autocratic and conservative; they lose touch with their constituents and gravitate, by a psychological sympathy, into co-operation with the powers that be. Their formal installation in authority through the Guilds Congress would accelerate this process. They would soon tend to combine, in effect if not obviously, with those who wield authority in Parliament. Apart from occasional conflicts, comparable to the rivalry of opposing financiers which now sometimes disturbs the harmony of the capitalist world, there would, at most times, be agreement between the dominant personalities in the two Houses. And such harmony would filch away from the individual the liberty which he had hoped to secure by the quarrels of his masters.

There is no method, if we are not mistaken, by which a body representing the whole community, whether as producers or consumers or both, can alone be a sufficient guardian of individual liberty.

The only way of preserving sufficient liberty (and even this will be inadequate in the case of very small minorities) is the organization of citizens with special interests into groups, determined to preserve autonomy as regards their internal affairs, willing to resist interference by a strike if necessary, and sufficiently powerful (either in themselves or through their power of appealing to public sympathy) to be able to resist the organized forces of government successfully when their cause is such as many men think just. If this method is to be successful we must have not only suitable organizations but also a diffused respect for liberty, and an absence of submissiveness to government both in theory and practice.

Some risk of disorder there must be in such a society, but this risk is as nothing compared to the danger of stagnation which is inseparable from an all-powerful central authority.

We may now sum up our discussion of the powers of Government.

The State, in spite of what Anarchists urge, seems a necessary institution for certain purposes. Peace and war, tariffs, regulation of sanitary conditions and of the sale of noxious drugs, the preservation of a just system of distribution: these, among others, are functions which could hardly be performed in a community in which there was no central government.

Take, for example, the liquor traffic, or the opium traffic in China. If alcohol could be obtained at cost price without taxation, still more if it could be obtained for nothing, as Anarchists presumably desire, can we believe that there would not be a great and disastrous increase of drunkenness? China was brought to the verge of ruin by opium, and every patriotic Chinaman desired to see the traffic in opium restricted. In such matters freedom is not a panacea, and some degree of legal restriction seems imperative for the national health.

But granting that the State, in some form, must continue, we must also grant, I think, that its powers ought to be very strictly limited to what is absolutely necessary. There is no way of limiting its powers except by means of groups which are jealous of their privileges and determined to preserve their autonomy, even if this should involve resistance to laws decreed by the State, when these laws interfere in the internal affairs of a group in ways not warranted by the public interest. The glorification of the State, and the doctrine that it is every citizen's duty to serve the State, are radically against progress and against liberty. The State, though at present a source of much evil, is also a means to certain good things, and will be needed so long as violent and destructive impulses remain common. But it is MERELY a means, and a means which needs to be very carefully and sparingly used if it is not to do more harm than good.

It is not the State, but the community, the worldwide community of all human beings present and future, that we ought to serve. And a good community does not spring from the glory of the State, but from the unfettered development of individuals: from happiness in daily life, from congenial work giving opportunity for whatever constructiveness each man or woman may possess, from free personal relations embodying love and taking away the roots of envy in thwarted capacity from affection, and above all from the joy of life and its expression in the spontaneous creations of art and science. It is these things that make an age or a nation worthy of existence, and these things are not to be secured by bowing down before the State. It is the individual in whom all that is good must be realized, and the free growth of the individual must be the supreme end of a political system which is to re-fashion the world.

CHAPTER VI   INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THE main objects which should be served by international relations may be taken to be two: First, the avoidance of wars, and, second, the prevention of the oppression of weak nations by strong ones. These two objects do not by any means necessarily lead in the same direction, since one of the easiest ways of securing the world's peace would be by a combination of the most powerful States for the exploitation and oppression of the remainder. This method, however, is not one which the lover of liberty can favor. We must keep account of both aims and not be content with either alone.

One of the commonplaces of both Socialism and Anarchism is that all modern wars are due to capitalism, and would cease if capitalism were abolished.

This view, to my mind, is only a half-truth; the half that is true is important, but the half that is untrue is perhaps equally important when a fundamental reconstruction of society is being considered.

Socialist and Anarchist critics of existing society point, with perfect truth, to certain capitalistic factors which promote war. The first of these is the desire of finance to find new fields of investment in undeveloped countries. Mr. J. A. Hobson, an author who is by no means extreme in his views, has well stated this point in his book on "The Evolution of Modern Capitalism."[55] He says: [55] Walter Scott Publishing Company, 1906, p. 262.

The economic tap-root, the chief directing motive of all the modern imperialistic expansion, is the pressure of capitalist industries for markets, primarily markets for investment, secondarily markets for surplus products of home industry. Where the concentration of capital has gone furthest, and where a rigorous protective system prevails, this pressure is necessarily strongest. Not merely do the trusts and other manufacturing trades that restrict their output for the home market more urgently require foreign markets, but they are also more anxious to secure protected markets, and this can only be achieved by extending the area of political rule. This is the essential significance of the recent change in American foreign policy as illustrated by the Spanish War, the Philippine annexation, the Panama policy, and the new application of the Monroe doctrine to the South American States.

South America is needed as a preferential market for investment of trust "profits" and surplus trust products: if in time these states can be brought within a Zollverein under the suzerainty of the United States, the financial area of operations receives a notable accession. China as a field of railway enterprise and general industrial development already begins to loom large in the eyes of foresighted American business men; the growing trade in American cotton and other goods in that country will be a subordinate consideration to the expansion of the area for American investments. Diplomatic pressure, armed force, and, where desirable, seizure of territory for political control, will be engineered by the financial magnates who control the political destiny of America. The strong and expensive American navy now beginning to be built incidentally serves the purpose of affording profitable contracts to the shipbuilding and metal industries: its real meaning and use is to forward the aggressive political policy imposed upon the nation by the economic needs of the financial capitalists.

It should be clearly understood that this constant pressure to extend the area of markets is not a necessary implication of all forms of organized industry. If competition was displaced by combinations of a genuinely cooperative character in which the whole gain of improved economies passed, either to the workers in wages, or to large bodies of investors in dividends, the expansion of demand in the home markets would be so great as to give full employment to the productive powers of concentrated capital, and there would be no self-accumulating masses of profit expressing themselves in new credit and demanding external employment. It is the "monopoly" profits of trusts and combines, taken either in construction, financial operation, or industrial working, that form a gathering fund of self-accumulating credit whose possession by the financial class implies a contracted demand for commodities and a correspondingly restricted employment for capital in American industries.

Within certain limits relief can be found by stimulation of the export trade under cover of a high protective tariff which forbids all interference with monopoly of the home markets. But it is extremely difficult for trusts adapted to the requirements of a profitable tied market at home to adjust their methods of free competition in the world markets upon a profitable basis of steady trading. Moreover, such a mode of expansion is only appropriate to certain manufacturing trusts: the owners of railroad, financial and other trusts must look always more to foreign investments for their surplus profits. This ever-growing need for fresh fields of investment for their profits is the great crux of the financial system, and threatens to dominate the future economics and the politics of the great Republic.

The financial economy of American capitalism exhibits in more dramatic shape a tendency common to the finance of all developed industrial nations. The large, easy flow of capital from Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, etc., into South African or Australian mines, into Egyptian bonds, or the precarious securities of South American republics, attests the same general pressure which increases with every development of financial machinery and the more profitable control of that machinery by the class of professional financiers. The kind of way in which such conditions tend toward war might have been illustrated, if Mr. Hobson had been writing at a later date, by various more recent cases. A higher rate of interest is obtainable on enterprises in an undeveloped country than in a developed one, provided the risks connected with an unsettled government can be minimized. To minimize these risks the financiers call in the assistance of the military and naval forces of the country which they are momentarily asserting to be theirs. In order to have the support of public opinion in this demand they have recourse to the power of the Press.

The Press is the second great factor to which critics of capitalism point when they wish to prove that capitalism is the source of modern war. Since the running of a big newspaper requires a large capital, the proprietors of important organs necessarily belong to the capitalist class, and it will be a rare and exceptional event if they do not sympathize with their own class in opinion and outlook. They are able to decide what news the great mass of newspaper readers shall be allowed to have. They can actually falsify the news, or, without going so far as that, they can carefully select it, giving such items as will stimulate the passions which they desire to stimulate, and suppressing such items as would provide the antidote. In this way the picture of the world in the mind of the average newspaper reader is made to be not a true picture, but in the main that which suits the interests of capitalists. This is true in many directions, but above all in what concerns the relations between nations. The mass of the population of a country can be led to love or hate any other country at the will of the newspaper proprietors, which is often, directly or indirectly, influenced by the will of the great financiers. So long as enmity between England and Russia was desired, our newspapers were full of the cruel treatment meted out to Russian political prisoners, the oppression of Finland and Russian Poland, and other such topics.

As soon as our foreign policy changed, these items disappeared from the more important newspapers, and we heard instead of the misdeeds of Germany.

Most men are not sufficiently critical to be on their guard against such influences, and until they are, the power of the Press will remain.

Besides these two influences of capitalism in promoting war, there is another, much less emphasized by the critics of capitalism, but by no means less important: I mean the pugnacity which tends to be developed in men who have the habit of command.

So long as capitalist society persists, an undue measure of power will be in the hands of those who have acquired wealth and influence through a great position in industry or finance. Such men are in the habit, in private life, of finding their will seldom questioned; they are surrounded by obsequious satellites and are not infrequently engaged in conflicts with Trade Unions. Among their friends and acquaintances are included those who hold high positions in government or administration, and these men equally are liable to become autocratic through the habit of giving orders. It used to be customary to speak of the "governing classes," but nominal democracy has caused this phrase to go out of fashion.

Nevertheless, it still retains much truth; there are still in any capitalist community those who command and those who as a rule obey. The outlook of these two classes is very different, though in a modern society there is a continuous gradation from the extreme of the one to the extreme of the other. The man who is accustomed to find submission to his will becomes indignant on the occasions when he finds opposition. Instinctively he is convinced that opposition is wicked and must be crushed. He is therefore much more willing than the average citizen to resort to war against his rivals. Accordingly we find, though, of course, with very notable exceptions, that in the main those who have most power are most warlike, and those who have least power are least disposed to hatred of foreign nations. This is one of the evils inseparable from the concentration of power. It will only be cured by the abolition of capitalism if the new system is one which allows very much less power to single individuals. It will not be cured by a system which substitutes the power of Ministers or officials for the power of capitalists This is one reason, additional to those mentioned in the preceding chapter, for desiring to see a diminution in the authority of the State.

Not only does the concentration of power tend to cause wars, but, equally, wars and the fear of them bring about the necessity for the concentration of power. So long as the community is exposed to sudden dangers, the possibility of quick decision is absolutely necessary to self-preservation. The cumbrous machinery of deliberative decisions by the people is impossible in a crisis, and therefore so long as crises are likely to occur, it is impossible to abolish the almost autocratic power of governments. In this case, as in most others, each of two correlative evils tends to perpetuate the other. The existence of men with the habit of power increases the risk of war, and the risk of war makes it impossible to establish a system where no man possesses great power.

So far we have been considering what is true in the contention that capitalism causes modern wars.

It is time now to look at the other side, and to ask ourselves whether the abolition of capitalism would, by itself, be sufficient to prevent war.

I do not myself believe that this is the case. The outlook of both Socialists and Anarchists seems to me, in this respect as in some others, to be unduly divorced from the fundamental instincts of human nature. There were wars before there was capitalism, and fighting is habitual among animals. The power of the Press in promoting war is entirely due to the fact that it is able to appeal to certain instincts. Man is naturally competitive, acquisitive, and, in a greater or less degree, pugnacious. When the Press tells him that so-and-so is his enemy, a whole set of instincts in him responds to the suggestion. It is natural to most men to suppose that they have enemies and to find a certain fulfillment of their nature when they embark upon a contest. What a man believes upon grossly insufficient evidence is an index to his desires -- desires of which he himself is often unconscious. If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance with his instincts, he will accept it even on the slenderest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way, and much of what is currently believed in international affairs is no better than myth. Although capitalism affords in modern society the channel by which the instinct of pugnacity finds its outlet, there is reason to fear that, if this channel were closed, some other would be found, unless education and environment were so changed as enormously to diminish the strength of the competitive instinct. If an economic reorganization can effect this it may pro vide a real safeguard against war, but if not, it is to be feared that the hopes of universal peace will prove delusive.

The abolition of capitalism might, and very likely would, greatly diminish the incentives to war which are derived from the Press and from the desire of finance to find new fields for investment in undeveloped countries, but those which are derived from the instinct of command and the impatience of opposition might remain, though perhaps in a less virulent form than at present. A democracy which has power is almost always more bellicose than one which is excluded from its due share in the government. The internationalism of Marx is based upon the assumption that the proletariat everywhere are oppressed by the ruling classes. The last words of the Communist Manifesto embody this idea- Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite! So long as the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains, it is not likely that their enmity will be directed against other proletarians. If the world had developed as Marx expected, the kind of internationalism which he foresaw might have inspired a universal social revolution. Russia, which developed more nearly than any other country upon the lines of his system, has had a revolution of the kind which he expected. If the development in other countries had been similar, it is highly probable that this revolution would have spread throughout the civilized world. The proletariat of all countries might have united against the capitalists as their common enemy, and in the bond of an identical hatred they might for the moment have been free from hatred toward each other. Even then, this ground of union would have ceased with their victory, and on the morrow of the social revolution the old national rivalries might have revived. There is no alchemy by which a universal harmony can be produced out of hatred.

Those who have been inspired to action by the doctrine of the class war will have acquired the habit of hatred, and will instinctively seek new enemies when the old ones have been vanquished.

But in actual fact the psychology of the working man in any of the Western democracies is totally unlike that which is assumed in the Communist Manifesto. He does not by any means feel that he has nothing to lose but his chains, nor indeed is this true. The chains which bind Asia and Africa in subjection to Europe are partly riveted by him. He is himself part of a great system of tyranny and exploitation. Universal freedom would remove, not only his own chains, which are comparatively light, but the far heavier chains which he has helped to fasten upon the subject races of the world.

Not only do the working men of a country like England have a share in the benefit accruing from the exploitation of inferior races, but many among them also have their part in the capitalist system. The funds of Trade Unions and Friendly Societies are invested in ordinary undertakings, such as railways; many of the better-paid wage-earners have put their savings into government securities; and almost all who are politically active feel themselves part of the forces that determine public policy, through the power of the Labor Party and the greater unions.

Owing to these causes their outlook on life has become to a considerable extent impregnated with capitalism and as their sense of power has grown, their nationalism has increased. This must continue to be true of any internationalism which is based upon hatred of the capitalist and adherence to the doctrine of the class war. Something more positive and constructive than this is needed if governing democracies are not to inherit the vices of governing classes in the past.

I do not wish to be thought to deny that capitalism does very much to promote wars, or that wars would probably be less frequent and less destructive if private property were abolished. On the contrary, I believe that the abolition of private ownership of land and capital is a necessary step toward any world in which the nations are to live at peace with one another. I am only arguing that this step, necessary as it is, will not alone suffice for this end, but that among the causes of war there are others that go deeper into the roots of human nature than any that orthodox Socialists are wont to acknowledge.

Let us take an instance. In Australia and California there is an intense dislike and fear toward the yellow races. The causes of this are complex; the chief among them are two, labor competition and instinctive race-hatred. It is probable that, if race hatred did not exist, the difficulties of labor competition could be overcome. European immigrants also compete, but they are not excluded. In a sparsely populated country, industrious cheap labor could, with a little care, be so utilized as to enrich the existing inhabitants; it might, for example, be confined to certain kinds of work, by custom if not by law. But race-hatred opens men's minds to the evils of competition and closes them against the advantages of co-operation; it makes them regard with horror the somewhat unfamiliar vices of the aliens, while our own vices are viewed with mild toleration. I cannot but think that, if Australia were completely socialized, there would still remain the same popular objection as at present to any large influx of Chinese or Japanese labor. Yet if Japan also were to become a Socialist State, the Japanese might well continue to feel the pressure of population and the desire for an outlet. In such circumstances, all the passions and interests required to produce a war would exist, in spite of the establishment of Socialism in both countries.

Ants are as completely Socialistic as any community can possibly be, yet they put to death any ant which strays among them by mistake from a neighboring ant-heap. Men do not differ much from ants, as regards their instincts in this respect, where ever there is a great divergence of race, as between white men and yellow men. Of course the instinct of race-hostility can be overcome by suitable circumstances; but in the absence of such circumstances it remains a formidable menace to the world's peace.

If the peace of the world is ever to become secure, I believe there will have to be, along with other changes, a development of the idea which inspires the project of a League of Nations. As time goes on, the destructiveness of war grows greater and its profits grow less: the rational argument against war acquires more and more force as the increasing productivity of labor makes it possible to devote a greater and greater proportion of the population to the work of mutual slaughter. In quiet times, or when a great war has just ended, men's moods are amenable to the rational grounds in favor of peace, and it is possible to inaugurate schemes designed to make wars less frequent. Probably no civilized nation would embark upon an aggressive war if it were fairly certain in advance that the aggressor must be defeated.

This could be achieved if most great nations came to regard the peace of the world as of such importance that they would side against an aggressor even in a quarrel in which they had no direct interest.

It is on this hope that the League of Nations is based.

But the League of Nations, like the abolition of private property, will be by no means sufficient if it is not accompanied or quickly followed by other reforms. It is clear that such reforms, if they are to be effective, must be international; the world must move as a whole in these matters, if it is to move at all. One of the most obvious necessities, if peace is to be secure, is a measure of disarmament. So long as the present vast armies and navies exist, no system can prevent the risk of war. But disarmament, if it is to serve its purpose, must be simultaneous and by mutual agreement among all the Great Powers. And it is not likely to be successful so long as hatred and suspicion rule between nations, for each nation will suspect its neighbor of not carrying out the bargain fairly. A different mental and moral atmosphere from that to which we are accustomed in international affairs will be necessary if agreements between nations are to succeed in averting catastrophes. If once such an atmosphere existed it might be perpetuated and strengthened by wise institutions; but it cannot be CREATED by institutions alone. International co-operation requires mutual good will, and good will, however it has arisen, is only to be PRESERVED by co-operation.

The international future depends upon the possibility of the initial creation of good will between nations.

It is in this sort of matter that revolutions are most useful. If the Russian Revolution had been accompanied by a revolution in Germany, the dramatic suddenness of the change might have shaken Europe, for the moment, out of its habits of thought: the idea of fraternity might have seemed, in the twinkling of an eye, to have entered the world of practical politics; and no idea is so practical as the idea of the brotherhood of man, if only people can be startled into believing in it. If once the idea of fraternity between nations were inaugurated with the faith and vigor belonging to a new revolution, all the difficulties surrounding it would melt away, for all of them are due to suspicion and the tyranny of ancient prejudice. Those who (as is common in the English-speaking world) reject revolution as a method, and praise the gradual piecemeal development which (we are told) constitutes solid progress, overlook the effect of dramatic events in changing the mood and the beliefs of whole populations. A simultaneous revolution in Germany and Russia would no doubt have had such an effect, and would have made the creation of a new world possible here and now.

Dis aliter visum: the millennium is not for our time. The great moment has passed, and for ourselves it is again the distant hope that must inspire us, not the immediate breathless looking for the deliverance.[56] But we have seen what might have been, and we know that great possibilities do arise in times of crisis. In some such sense as this, it may well be true that the Socialist revolution is the road to universal peace, and that when it has been traversed all the other conditions for the cessation of wars will grow of themselves out of the changed mental and moral atmosphere.

[56] This was written in March, 1918, almost the darkest moment of the war.

There is a certain class of difficulties which surrounds the sober idealist in all speculations about the not too distant future. These are the cases where the solution believed by most idealists to be universally applicable is for some reason impossible, and is, at the same time, objected to for base or interested motives by all upholders of existing inequalities. The case of Tropical Africa will illustrate what I mean.

It would be difficult seriously to advocate the immediate introduction of parliamentary government for the natives of this part of the world, even if it were accompanied by women's suffrage and proportional representation. So far as I know, no one supposes the populations of these regions capable of self determination, except Mr. Lloyd George. There can be no doubt that, whatever regime may be introduced in Europe, African negroes will for a long time to come be governed and exploited by Europeans. If the European States became Socialistic, and refused, under a Quixotic impulse, to enrich themselves at the expense of the defenseless inhabitants of Africa, those inhabitants would not thereby gain; on the contrary, they would lose, for they would be handed over to the tender mercies of individual traders, operating with armies of reprobate bravos, and committing every atrocity to which the civilized barbarian is prone. The European governments cannot divest themselves of responsibility in regard to Africa.

They must govern there, and the best that can be hoped is that they should govern with a minimum of cruelty and rapacity. From the point of view of preserving the peace of the world, the problem is to parcel out the advantages which white men derive from their position in Africa in such a way that no nation shall feel a sense of injustice. This problem is comparatively simple, and might no doubt be solved on the lines of the war aims of the Inter-Allied Socialists.

But it is not this problem which I wish to discuss.

What I wish to consider is, how could a Socialist or an Anarchist community govern and administer an African region, full of natural wealth, but inhabited by a quite uncivilized population? Unless great precautions were taken the white community, under the circumstances, would acquire the position and the instincts of a slave-owner. It would tend to keep the negroes down to the bare level of subsistence, while using the produce of their country to increase the comfort and splendor of the Communist community. It would do this with that careful unconsciousness which now characterizes all the worst acts of nations. Administrators would be appointed and would be expected to keep silence as to their methods. Busybodies who reported horrors would be disbelieved, and would be said to be actuated by hatred toward the existing regime and by a perverse love for every country but their own. No doubt, in the first generous enthusiasm accompanying the establishment of the new regime at home, there would be every intention of making the natives happy, but gradually they would be forgotten, and only the tribute coming from their country would be remembered. I do not say that all these evils are unavoidable; I say only that they will not be avoided unless they are foreseen and a deliberate conscious effort is made to prevent their realization. If the white communities should ever reach the point of wishing to carry out as far as possible the principles underlying the revolt against capitalism, they will have to find a way of establishing an absolute disinterestedness in their dealings with subject races. It will be necessary to avoid the faintest suggestion of capitalistic profit in the government of Africa, and to spend in the countries themselves whatever they would be able to spend if they were self-governing.

Moreover, it must always be remembered that backwardness in civilization is not necessarily incurable, and that with time even the populations of Central Africa may become capable of democratic self-government, provided Europeans bend their energies to this purpose.

The problem of Africa is, of course, a part of the wider problems of Imperialism, but it is that part in which the application of Socialist principles is most difficult. In regard to Asia, and more particularly in regard to India and Persia, the application of principles is clear in theory though difficult in political practice. The obstacles to self-government which exist in Africa do not exist in the same measure in Asia. What stands in the way of freedom of Asiatic populations is not their lack of intelligence, but only their lack of military prowess, which makes them an easy prey to our lust for dominion. This lust would probably be in temporary abeyance on the morrow of a Socialist revolution, and at such a moment a new departure in Asiatic policy might be taken with permanently beneficial results. I do not mean, of course, that we should force upon India that form of democratic government which we have developed for our own needs. I mean rather that we should leave India to choose its own form of government, its own manner of education and its own type of civilization.

India has an ancient tradition, very different from that of Western Europe, a tradition highly valued by educated Hindoos, but not loved by our schools and colleges. The Hindoo Nationalist feels that his country has a type of culture containing elements of value that are absent, or much less marked, in the West; he wishes to be free to preserve this, and desires political freedom for such reasons rather than for those that would most naturally appeal to an Englishman in the same subject position. The belief of the European in his own Kultur tends to be fanatical and ruthless, and for this reason, as much as for any other, the independence of extra-European civilization is of real importance to the world, for it is not by a dead uniformity that the world as a whole is most enriched.

I have set forth strongly all the major difficulties in the way of the preservation of the world's peace, not because I believe these difficulties to be insuperable, but, on the contrary, because I believe that they can be overcome if they are recognized. A correct diagnosis is necessarily the first step toward a cure.

The existing evils in international relations spring, at bottom, from psychological causes, from motives forming part of human nature as it is at present.

Among these the chief are competitiveness, love of power, and envy, using envy in that broad sense in which it includes the instinctive dislike of any gain to others not accompanied by an at least equal gain to ourselves. The evils arising from these three causes can be removed by a better education and a better economic and political system.

Competitiveness is by no means wholly an evil.

When it takes the form of emulation in the service of the public, or in discovery or the production of works of art, it may become a very useful stimulus, urging men to profitable effort beyond what they would otherwise make. It is only harmful when it aims at the acquisition of goods which are limited in amount, so that what one man possesses he holds at the expense of another. When competitiveness takes this form it is necessarily attended by fear, and out of fear cruelty is almost inevitably developed. But a social system providing for a more just distribution of material goods might close to the instinct of competitiveness those channels in which it is harmful, and cause it to flow instead in channels in which it would become a benefit to mankind. This is one great reason why the communal ownership of land and capital would be likely to have a beneficial effect upon human nature, for human nature, as it exists in adult men and women, is by no means a fixed datum, but a product of circumstances, education and opportunity operating upon a highly malleable native disposition.

What is true of competitiveness is equally true of love of power. Power, in the form in which it is now usually sought, is power of command, power of imposing one's will upon others by force, open or concealed. This form of power consists, in essence, in thwarting others, for it is only displayed when others are compelled to do what they do not wish to do.

Such power, we hope, the social system which is to supersede capitalist will reduce to a minimum by the methods which we outlined in the preceding chapter.

These methods can be applied in international no less than in national affairs. In international affairs the same formula of federalism will apply: self determination for every group in regard to matters which concern it much more vitally than they concern others, and government by a neutral authority embracing rival groups in all matters in which conflicting interests of groups come into play; lout always with the fixed principle that the functions of government are to be reduced to the bare minimum compatible with justice and the prevention of private violence. In such a world the present harmful outlets for the love of power would be closed. But the power which consists in persuasion, in teaching, in leading men to a new wisdom or the realization of new possibilities of happiness -- this kind of power, which may be wholly beneficial, would remain untouched, and many vigorous men, who in the actual world devote their energies to domination, would in such a world find their energies directed to the creation of new goods rather than the perpetuation of ancient evils.

Envy, the third of the psychological causes to which we attributed what is bad in the actual world, depends in most natures upon that kind of fundamental discontent which springs from a lack of free development, from thwarted instinct, and from the impossibility of realizing an imagined happiness. Envy cannot be cured by preaching; preaching, at the best, will only alter its manifestations and lead it to adopt more subtle forms of concealment.

Except in those rare natures in which generosity dominates in spite of circumstances, the only cure for envy is freedom and the joy of life.

From populations largely deprived of the simple instinctive pleasures of leisure and love, sunshine and green fields, generosity of outlook and kindliness of dispositions are hardly to be expected. In such populations these qualities are not likely to be found, even among the fortunate few, for these few are aware, however dimly, that they are profiting by an injustice, and that they can only continue to enjoy their good fortune by deliberately ignoring those with whom it is not shared. If generosity and kindliness are to be common, there must be more care than there is at present for the elementary wants of human nature, and more realization that the diffusion of happiness among all who are not the victims of some peculiar misfortune is both possible and imperative.

A world full of happiness would not wish to plunge into war, and would not be filled with that grudging hostility which our cramped and narrow existence forces upon average human nature. A world full of happiness is not beyond human power to create; the obstacles imposed by inanimate nature are not insuperable. The real obstacles lie in the heart of man, and the cure for these is a firm hope, informed and fortified by thought.

CHAPTER VII   SCIENCE AND ART UNDER SOCIALISM
SOCIALISM has been advocated by most of its champions chiefly as a means of increasing the welfare of the wage earning classes, and more particularly their material welfare. It has seemed accordingly, to some men whose aims are not material, as if it has nothing to offer toward the general advancement of civilization in the way of art and thought. Some of its advocates, moreover -- and among these Marx must be included -- have written, no doubt not deliberately, as if with the Socialist revolution the millennium would have arrived, and there would be no need of further progress for the human race. I do not know whether our age is more restless than that which preceded it, or whether it has merely become more impregnated with the idea of evolution, but, for whatever reason, we have grown incapable of believing in a state of static perfection, and we demand, of any social system, which is to have our approval, that it shall contain within itself a stimulus and opportunity for progress toward something still better. The doubts thus raised by Socialist writers make it necessary to inquire whether Socialism would in fact be hostile to art and science, and whether it would be likely to produce a stereotyped society in which progress would become difficult and slow.

It is not enough that men and women should be made comfortable in a material sense. Many members of the well-to-do classes at present, in spite of opportunity, contribute nothing of value to the life of the world, and do not even succeed in securing for themselves any personal happiness worthy to be so called. The multiplication of such individuals would be an achievement of the very minutest value; and if Socialism were merely to bestow upon all the kind of life and outlook which is now enjoyed by the more apathetic among the well-to-do, it would offer little that could inspire enthusiasm in any generous spirit.

"The true role of collective existence," says M.

Naquet,[57]" . . . is to learn, to discover, to know.

Eating, drinking, sleeping, living, in a word, is a mere accessory. In this respect, we are not distinguished from the brute. Knowledge is the goal.

If I were condemned to choose between a humanity materially happy, glutted after the manner of a flock of sheep in a field, and a humanity existing in misery, but from which emanated, here and there, some eternal truth, it is on the latter that my choice would fall." [57] "L'Anarchie et le Collectivisme," p. 114.

This statement puts the alternative in a very extreme form in which it is somewhat unreal. It may be said in reply that for those who have had the leisure and the opportunity to enjoy "eternal truths" it is easy to exalt their importance at the expense of sufferings which fall on others. This is true; but, if it is taken as disposing of the question, it leaves out of account the importance of thought for progress. Viewing the life of mankind as a whole, in the future as well as in the present, there can be no question that a society in which some men pursue knowledge while others endure great poverty offers more hope of ultimate good than a society in which all are sunk in slothful comfort. It is true that poverty is a great evil, but it is not true that material prosperity is in itself a great good. If it is to have any real value to society, it must be made a means to the advancement of those higher goods that belong to the life of the mind. But the life of the mind does not consist of thought and knowledge alone, nor can it be completely healthy unless it has some instinctive contact, however deeply buried, with the general life of the community. Divorced from the social instinct, thought, like art, tends to become finicky and precious. It is the position of such art and thought as is imbued with the instinctive sense of service to mankind that we wish to consider, for it is this alone that makes up the life of the mind in the sense in which it is a vital part of the life of the community. Will the life of the mind in this sense be helped or hindered by Socialism? And will there still be a sufficient spur to progress to prevent a condition of Byzantine immobility? In considering this question we are, in a certain sense, passing outside the atmosphere of democracy.

The general good of the community is realized only in individuals, but it is realized much more fully in some individuals than in others. Some men have a comprehensive and penetrating intellect, enabling them to appreciate and remember what has been thought and known by their predecessors, and to discover new regions in which they enjoy all the high delights of the mental explorer. Others have the power of creating beauty, giving bodily form to impalpable visions out of which joy comes to many.

Such men are more fortunate than the mass, and also more important for the collective life. A larger share of the general sum of good is concentrated in them than in the ordinary man and woman; but also their contribution to the general good is greater. They stand out among men and cannot be wholly fitted into the framework of democratic equality. A social system which would render them unproductive would stand condemned, whatever other merits it might have.

The first thing to realize -- though it is difficult in a commercial age -- is that what is best in creative mental activity cannot be produced by any system of monetary rewards. Opportunity and the stimulus of an invigorating spiritual atmosphere are important, but, if they are presented, no financial inducements will be required, while if they are absent, material compensations will be of no avail. Recognition, even if it takes the form of money, can bring a certain pleasure in old age to the man of science who has battled all his life against academic prejudice, or to the artist who has endured years of ridicule for not painting in the manner of his predecessors; but it is not by the remote hope of such pleasures that their work has been inspired. All the most important work springs from an uncalculating impulse, and is best promoted, not by rewards after the event, but by circumstances which keep the impulse alive and afford scope for the activities which it inspires. In the creation of such circumstances our present system is much at fault. Will Socialism be better? I do not think this question can be answered without specifying the kind of Socialism that is intended: some forms of Socialism would, I believe, be even more destructive in this respect than the present capitalist regime, while others would be immeasurably better. Three things which a social system can provide or withhold are helpful to mental creation: first, technical training; second, liberty to follow the creative impulse; third, at least the possibility of ultimate appreciation by some public, whether large or small. We may leave out of our discussion both individual genius and those intangible conditions which make some ages great and others sterile in art and science -- not because these are unimportant, but because they are too little understood to be taken account of in economic or political organization.

The three conditions we have mentioned seem to cover most of what can be SEEN to be useful or harmful from our present point of view, and it is therefore to them that we shall confine ourselves.

1. Technical Training. -- Technical training at present, whether in science or art, requires one or other of two conditions. Either a boy must be the son of well-to-do parents who can afford to keep him while he acquires his education, or he must show so much ability at an early age as to enable him to subsist on scholarships until he is ready to earn his living. The former condition is, of course, a mere matter of luck, and could not be preserved in its present form under any kind of Socialism or Communism.

This loss is emphasized by defenders of the present system, and no doubt it would be, to same extent, a real loss. But the well-to-do are a small proportion of the population, and presumably on the average no more talented by nature than their less fortunate contemporaries. If the advantages which are enjoyed now by those few among them who are capable of good work in science or art could be extended, even in a slightly attenuated form, to all who are similarly gifted, the result would almost infallibly be a gain, and much ability which is now wasted would be rendered fruitful. But how is this to be effected? The system of scholarships obtained by competition, though better than nothing, is objectionable from many points of view. It introduces the competitive spirit into the work of the very young; it makes them regard knowledge from the standpoint of what is useful in examinations rather than in the light of its intrinsic interest or importance; it places a premium upon that sort of ability which is displayed precociously in glib answers to set questions rather than upon the kind that broods on difficulties and remains for a time rather dumb. What is perhaps worse than any of these defects is the tendency to cause overwork in youth, leading to lack of vigor and interest when manhood has been reached. It can hardly be doubted that by this cause, at present, many fine minds have their edge blunted and their keenness destroyed.

State Socialism might easily universalize the system of scholarships obtained by competitive examination, and if it did so it is to he feared that it would be very harmful. State Socialists at present tend to be enamored of the systems which is exactly of the kind that every bureaucrat loves: orderly, neat, giving a stimulus to industrious habits, and involving no waste of a sort that could be tabulated in statistics or accounts of public expenditure.

Such men will argue that free higher education is expensive to the community, and only useful in the case of those who have exceptional abilities; it ought, therefore, they will say, not to be given to all, but only to those who will become more useful members of society through receiving it. Such arguments make a great appeal to what are called "practical" men, and the answers to them are of a sort which it is difficult to render widely convincing. Revolt against the evils of competition is, however, part of the very essence of the Socialist's protest against the existing order, and on this ground, if on no other, those who favor Socialism may be summoned to look for some better solution.

Much the simplest solution, and the only really effective one, is to make every kind of education free up to the age of twenty-one for all boys and girls who desire it. The majority will be tired of education before that age, and will prefer to begin other work sooner; this will lead to a natural selection of those with strong interests in some pursuit requiring a long training. Among those selected in this way by their own inclinations, probably almost all who have marked abilities of the kind in question will be included. It is true that there will also be many who have very little ability; the desire to become a painter, for example, is by no means confined to those who can paint. But this degree of waste could well be borne by the community; it would be immeasurably less than that now entailed by the support of the idle rich. Any system which aims at avoiding this kind of waste must entail the far more serious waste of rejecting or spoiling some of the best ability in each generation. The system of free education up to any grade for all who desire it is the only system which is consistent with the principles of liberty, and the only one which gives a reasonable hope of affording full scope for talent. This system is equally compatible with all forms of Socialism and Anarchism. Theoretically, it is compatible with capitalism, but practically it is so opposite in spirit that it would hardly be feasible without a complete economic reconstruction. The fact that Socialism would facilitate it must be reckoned a very powerful argument in favor of change, for the waste of talent at present in the poorer classes of society must be stupendous.

2. Liberty to follow the creative impulse.- When a man's training has been completed, if he is possessed of really great abilities, he will do his best work if he is completely free to follow his bent, creating what seems good to him, regardless of the judgment of "experts." At present this is only possible for two classes of people: those who have private means, and those who can earn a living by an occupation that does not absorb their whole energies. Under Socialism, there will be no one with private means, and if there is to be no loss as regards art and science, the opportunity which now comes by accident to a few will have to be provided deliberately for a much larger number. The men who have used private means as an opportunity for creative work have been few but important: one might mention Milton, Shelley, Keats and Darwin as examples. Probably none of these would have produced as good work if they had had to earn their livelihood. If Darwin had been a university teacher, he would of course have been dismissed from his post by the influence of the clerics on account of his scandalous theories.

Nevertheless, the bulk of the creative work of the world is done at present by men who subsist by some other occupation. Science, and research generally, are usually done in their spare time by men who live by teaching. There is no great objection to this in the case of science, provided the number of hours devoted to teaching is not excessive. It is partly because science and teaching are so easily combined that science is vigorous in the present age.

In music, a composer who is also a performer enjoys similar advantages, but one who is not a performer must starve, unless he is rich or willing to pander to the public taste. In the fine arts, as a rule, it is not easy in the modern world either to make a living by really good work or to find a subsidiary profession which leaves enough leisure for creation. This is presumably one reason, though by no means the only one, why art is less flourishing than science.

The bureaucratic State Socialist will have a simple solution for these difficulties. He will appoint a body consisting of the most eminent celebrities in an art or a science, whose business it shall be to judge the work of young men, and to issue licenses to those whose productions find favor in their eyes. A licensed artist shall be considered to have performed his duty to the community by producing works of art. But of course he will have to prove his industry by never failing to produce in reasonable quantities, and his continued ability by never failing to please his eminent judges -- until, in the fulness of time, he becomes a judge himself. In this way, the authorities will insure that the artist shall be competent, regular, and obedient to the best traditions of his art. Those who fail to fulfil these conditions will be compelled by the withdrawal of their license to seek some less dubious mode of earning their living. Such will be the ideal of the State Socialist.

In such a world all that makes life tolerable to the lover of beauty would perish. Art springs from a wild and anarchic side of human nature; between the artist and the bureaucrat there must always be a profound mutual antagonism, an age-long battle in which the artist, always outwardly worsted, wins in the end through the gratitude of mankind for the joy that he puts into their lives. If the wild side of human nature is to be permanently subjected to the orderly rules of the benevolent, uncomprehending bureaucrat, the joy of life will perish out of the earth, and the very impulse to live will gradually wither and die. Better a thousandfold the present world with all its horrors than such a dead mummy of a world. Better Anarchism, with all its risks, than a State Socialism that subjects to rule what must be spontaneous and free if it is to have any value. It is this nightmare that makes artists, and lovers of beauty generally, so often suspicious of Socialism. But there is nothing in the essence of Socialism to make art impossible: only certain forms of Socialism would entail this danger. William Morris was a Socialist, and was a Socialist very largely because he was an artist. And in this he was not irrational.

It is impossible for art, or any of the higher creative activities, to flourish under any system which requires that the artist shall prove his competence to some body of authorities before he is allowed to follow his impulse. Any really great artist is almost sure to be thought incompetent by those among his seniors who would be generally regarded as best qualified to form an opinion. And the mere fact of having to produce work which will please older men is hostile to a free spirit and to bold innovation.

Apart from this difficulty, selection by older men would lead to jealousy and intrigue and back-biting, producing a poisonous atmosphere of underground competition. The only effect of such a plan would be to eliminate the few who now slip through owing to some fortunate accident. It is not by any system, but by freedom alone, that art can flourish.

There are two ways by which the artist could secure freedom under Socialism of the right kind.

He might undertake regular work outside his art, doing only a few hours' work a day and receiving proportionately less pay than those who do a full day's work. He ought, in that case, to be at liberty to sell his pictures if he could find purchasers. Such a system would have many advantages. It would leave absolutely every man free to become an artist, provided he were willing to suffer a certain economic loss. This would not deter those in whom the impulse was strong and genuine, but would tend to exclude the dilettante. Many young artists at present endure voluntarily much greater poverty than need be entailed by only doing half the usual day's work in a well-organized Socialist community; and some degree of hardship is not objectionable, as a test of the strength of the creative impulse, and as an offset to the peculiar joys of the creative life.

The other possibility[58] would be that the necessaries of life should be free, as Anarchists desire, to all equally, regardless of whether they work or not.

Under this plan, every man could live without work: there would be what might be called a "vagabond's wage," sufficient for existence but not for luxury.

The artist who preferred to have his whole time for art and enjoyment might live on the "vagabond's wage" -- traveling on foot when the humor seized him to see foreign countries, enjoying the air and the sun, as free as the birds, and perhaps scarcely less happy. Such men would bring color and diversity into the life of the community; their outlook would be different from that of steady, stay-at-home workers, and would keep alive a much-needed element of light heartedness which our sober, serious civilization tends to kill. If they became very numerous, they might be too great an economic burden on the workers; but I doubt if there are many with enough capacity for simple enjoyments to choose poverty and freedom in preference to the comparatively light and pleasant work which will be usual in those days.

[58] Which we discussed in Chapter IV.

By either of these methods, freedom can be preserved for the artist in a socialistic commonwealth- far more complete freedom, and far more widespread, than any that now exists except for the possessors of capital.

But there still remain some not altogether easy problems. Take, for example, the publishing of books.

There will not, under Socialism, be private publishers as at present: under State Socialism, presumably the State will be the sole publisher, while under Syndicalism or Guild Socialism the Federation du Livre will have the whole of the trade in its hands. Under these circumstances, who is to decide what MSS. are to be printed? It is clear that opportunities exist for an Index more rigorous than that of the Inquisition.

If the State were the sole publisher, it would doubtless refuse books opposed to State Socialism.

If the Federation du Livre were the ultimate arbiter, what publicity could be obtained for works criticising it? And apart from such political difficulties we should have, as regards literature, that very censorship by eminent officials which we agreed to regard as disastrous when we were considering the fine arts in general. The difficulty is serious, and a way of meeting it must be found if literature is to remain free.

Kropotkin, who believes that manual and intellectual work should be combined, holds that authors themselves should be compositors, bookbinders, etc.

He even seems to suggest that the whole of the manual work involved in producing books should be done by authors. It may be doubted whether there are enough authors in the world for this to be possible, and in any case I cannot but think that it would be a waste of time for them to leave the work they understand in order to do badly work which others could do far better and more quickly. That, however, does not touch our present point, which is the question how the MSS. to be printed will be selected.

In Kropotkin's plan there will presumably be an Author's Guild, with a Committee of Management, if Anarchism allows such things. This Committee of Management will decide which of the books submitted to it are worthy to be printed. Among these will be included those by the Committee and their friends, but not those by their enemies. Authors of rejected MSS. will hardly have the patience to spend their time setting up the works of successful rivals, and there will have to be an elaborate system of log-rolling if any books are to be printed at all.

It hardly looks as if this plan would conduce to harmony among literary men, or would lead to the publication of any book of an unconventional tendency.

Kropotkin's own books, for example, would hardly have found favor.

The only way of meeting these difficulties, whether under State Socialism or Guild Socialism or Anarchism, seems to be by making it possible for an author to pay for the publication of his book if it is not such as the State or the Guild is willing to print at its own expense. I am aware that this method is contrary to the spirit of Socialism, but I do not see what other way there is of securing freedom. The payment might be made by undertaking to engage for an assigned period in some work of recognized utility and to hand over such proportion of the earnings as might be necessary. The work undertaken might of course be, as Kropotkin suggests, the manual part of the production of books, but I see no special reason why it should be. It would have to be an absolute rule that no book should be refused, no matter what the nature of its contents might be, if payment for publication were offered at the standard rate. An author who had admirers would be able to secure their help in payment. An unknown author might, it is true, have to suffer a considerable loss of comfort in order to make his payment, but that would give an automatic means of eliminating those whose writing was not the result of any very profound impulse and would be by no means wholly an evil.

Probably some similar method would be desirable as regards the publishing and performing of new music.

What we have been suggesting will, no doubt, be objected to by orthodox Socialists, since they will find something repugnant to their principles in the whole idea of a private person paying to have certain work done. But it is a mistake to be the slave of a system, and every system, if it is applied rigidly, will entail evils which could only be avoided by some concession to the exigencies of special cases. On the whole, a wise form of Socialism might afford infinitely better opportunities for the artist and the man of science than are possible in a capitalist community, but only if the form of Socialism adopted is one which is fitted for this end by means of provisions such as we have been suggesting.

3. Possibility of Appreciation. -- This condition is one which is not necessary to all who do creative work, but in the sense in which I mean it the great majority find it very nearly indispensable. I do not mean widespread public recognition, nor that ignorant, half-sincere respect which is commonly accorded to artists who have achieved success. Neither of these serves much purpose. What I mean is rather understanding, and a spontaneous feeling that things of beauty are important. In a thoroughly commercialized society, an artist is respected if he makes money, and because he makes money, but there is no genuine respect for the works of art by which his money has been made. A millionaire whose fortune has been made in button-hooks or chewing-gum is regarded with awe, but none of this feeling is bestowed on the articles from which his wealth is derived. In a society which measures all things by money the same tends to be true of the artist. If he has become rich he is respected, though of course less than the millionaire, but his pictures or books or music are regarded as the chewing-gum or the button hooks are regarded, merely as a means to money.

In such an atmosphere it is very difficult for the artist to preserve his creative impulse pure: either he is contaminated by his surroundings, or he becomes embittered through lack of appreciation for the object of his endeavor.

It is not appreciation of the artist that is necessary so much as appreciation of the art. It is difficult for an artist to live in an environment in which everything is judged by its utility, rather than by its intrinsic quality. The whole side of life of which art is the flower requires something which may be called disinterestedness, a capacity for direct enjoyment without thought of tomorrow's problems and difficulties. When people are amused by a joke they do not need to be persuaded that it will serve some important purpose. The same kind of direct pleasure is involved in any genuine appreciation of art.

The struggle for life, the serious work of a trade or profession, is apt to make people too solemn for jokes and too pre-occupied for art. The easing of the struggle, the diminution in the hours of work, and the lightening of the burden of existence, which would result from a better economic system, could hardly fail to increase the joy of life and the vital energy, available for sheer delight in the world. And if this were achieved there would inevitably be more spontaneous pleasure in beautiful things, and more enjoyment of the work of artists. But none of these good results are to be expected from the mere removal of poverty: they all require also a diffused sense of freedom, and the absence of that feeling of oppression by a vast machine which now weighs down the individual spirit. I do not think State Socialism can give this sense of freedom, but some other forms of Socialism, which have absorbed what is true in Anarchist teaching, can give it to a degree of which capitalism is wholly incapable.

A general sense of progress and achievement is an immense stimulus to all forms of creative work.

For this reason, a great deal will depend, not only in material ways, upon the question whether methods of production in industry and agriculture become stereotyped or continue to change rapidly as they have done during the last hundred years. Improved methods of production will be much more obviously than now to the interest of the community at large, when what every man receives is his due share of the total produce of labor. But there will probably not be any individuals with the same direct and intense interest in technical improvements as now belongs to the capitalist in manufacture. If the natural conservatism of the workers is not to prove stronger than their interest in increasing production, it will be necessary that, when better methods are introduced by the workers in any industry, part at least of the benefit should be allowed for a time to be retained by them. If this is done, it may be presumed that each Guild will be continually seeking for new processes or inventions, and will value those technical parts of scientific research which are useful for this purpose. With every improvement, the question will arise whether it is to be used to give more leisure or to increase the dividend of commodities. Where there is so much more leisure than there is now, there will be many more people with a knowledge of science or an understanding of art. The artist or scientific investigator will be far less cut off than he is at present from the average citizen, and this will almost inevitably be a stimulus to his creative energy.

I think we may fairly conclude that, from the point of view of all three requisites for art and science, namely, training, freedom and appreciation, State Socialism would largely fail to remove existing evils and would introduce new evils of its own; but Guild Socialism, or even Syndicalism, if it adopted a liberal policy toward those who preferred to work less than the usual number of hours at recognized occupations, might be immeasurably preferable to anything that is possible under the rule of capitalism.

There are dangers, but they will all vanish if the importance of liberty is adequately acknowledged.

In this as in nearly everything else, the road to all that is best is the road of freedom.

CHAPTER VIII   THE WORLD AS IT COULD BE MADE
IN the daily lives of most men and women, fear plays a greater part than hope: they are more filled with the thought of the possessions that others may take from them, than of the joy that they might create in their own lives and in the lives with which they come in contact.

It is not so that life should be lived.

Those whose lives are fruitful to themselves, to their friends, or to the world are inspired by hope and sustained by joy: they see in imagination the things that might be and the way in which they are to be brought into existence. In their private relations they are not pre-occupied with anxiety lest they should lose such affection and respect as they receive: they are engaged in giving affection and respect freely, and the reward comes of itself without their seeking. In their work they are not haunted by jealousy of competitors, but concerned with the actual matter that has to be done.

In politics, they do not spend time and passion defending unjust privileges of their class or nation, but they aim at making the world as a whole happier, less cruel, less full of conflict between rival creeds, and more full of human beings whose growth has not been dwarfed and stunted by oppression.

A life lived in this spirit -- the spirit that aims at creating rather than possessing -- has a certain fundamental happiness, of which it cannot be wholly robbed by adverse circumstances. This is the way of life recommended in the Gospels, and by all the great teachers of the world. Those who have found it are freed from the tyranny of fear, since what they value most in their lives is not at the mercy of outside power. If all men could summon up the courage and the vision to live in this way in spite of obstacles and discouragement, there would be no need for the regeneration of the world to begin by political and economic reform: all that is needed in the way of reform would come automatically, without resistance, owing to the moral regeneration of individuals. But the teaching of Christ has been nominally accepted by the world for many centuries, and yet those who follow it are still persecuted as they were before the time of Constantine. Experience has proved that few are able to see through the apparent evils of an outcast's life to the inner joy that comes of faith and creative hope. If the domination of fear is to be overcome, it is not enough, as regards the mass of men, to preach courage and indifference to misfortune: it is necessary to remove the causes of fear, to make a good life no longer an unsuccessful one in a worldly sense, and to diminish the harm that can be inflicted upon those who are not wary in self defense.

When we consider the evils in the lives we know of, we find that they may be roughly divided into three classes. There are, first, those due to physical nature: among these are death, pain and the difficulty of making the soil yield a subsistence.

These we will call "physical evils." Second, we may put those that spring from defects in the character or aptitudes of the sufferer: among these are ignorance, lack of will, and violent passions. These we will call "evils of character." Third come those that depend upon the power of one individual or group over another: these comprise not only obvious tyranny, but all interference with free development, whether by force or by excessive mental influence such as may occur in education. These we will call "evils of power." A social system may be judged by its bearing upon these three kinds of evils.

The distinction between the three kinds cannot be sharply drawn. Purely physical evil is a limit, which we can never be sure of having reached: we cannot abolish death, but we can often postpone it by science, and it may ultimately become possible to secure that the great majority shall live till old age; we cannot wholly prevent pain, but we can diminish it indefinitely by securing a healthy life for all; we cannot make the earth yield its fruits in any abundance without labor, but we can diminish the amount of the labor and improve its conditions until it ceases to be an evil. Evils of character are often the result of physical evil in the shape of illness, and still more often the result of evils of power, since tyranny degrades both those who exercise it and (as a rule) those who suffer it. Evils of power are intensified by evils of character in those who have power, and by fear of the physical evil which is apt to be the lot of those who have no power. For all these reasons, the three sorts of evil are intertwined. Nevertheless, speaking broadly, we may distinguish among our misfortunes those which have their proximate cause in the material world, those which are mainly due to defects in ourselves, and those which spring from our being subject to the control of others.

The main methods of combating these evils are: for physical evils, science; for evils of character, education (in the widest sense) and a free outlet for all impulses that do not involve domination; for evils of power, the reform of the political and economic organization of society in such a way as to reduce to the lowest possible point the interference of one man with the life of another. We will begin with the third of these kinds of evil, because it is evils of power specially that Socialism and Anarchism have sought to remedy. Their protest against Inequalities of wealth has rested mainly upon their sense of the evils arising from the power conferred by wealth. This point has been well stated by Mr. G. D. H. Cole:- What, I want to ask, is the fundamental evil in our modern Society which we should set out to abolish? There are two possible answers to that question, and I am sure that very many well-meaning people would make the wrong one. They would answer POVERTY, when they ought to answer SLAVERY. Face to face every day with the shameful contrasts of riches and destitution, high dividends and low wages, and painfully conscious of the futility of trying to adjust the balance by means of charity, private or public, they would answer unhesitatingly that they stand for the ABOLITION OF POVERTY.

Well and good! On that issue every Socialist is with them. But their answer to my question is none the less wrong.

Poverty is the symptom: slavery the disease. The extremes of riches and destitution follow inevitably upon the extremes of license and bondage. The many are not enslaved because they are poor, they are poor because they are enslaved. Yet Socialists have all too often fixed their eyes upon the material misery of the poor without realizing that it rests upon the spiritual degradation of the slave.[59] [59] "Self-Government in Industry," G. Bell & Sons, 1917, pp.

110.111.

I do not think any reasonable person can doubt that the evils of power in the present system are vastly greater than is necessary, nor that they might be immeasurably diminished by a suitable form of Socialism. A few fortunate people, it is true, are now enabled to live freely on rent or interest, and they could hardly have more liberty under another system. But the great bulk, not only of the very poor, but, of all sections of wage-earners and even of the professional classes, are the slaves of the need for getting money. Almost all are compelled to work so hard that they have little leisure for enjoyment or for pursuits outside their regular occupation.

Those who are able to retire in later middle age are bored, because they have not learned how to fill their time when they are at liberty, and such interests as they once had apart from work have dried up.

Yet these are the exceptionally fortunate: the majority have to work hard till old age, with the fear of destitution always before them, the richer ones dreading that they will be unable to give their children the education or the medical care that they consider desirable, the poorer ones often not far removed from starvation. And almost all who work have no voice in the direction of their work; throughout the hours of labor they are mere machines carrying out the will of a master. Work is usually done under disagreeable conditions, involving pain and physical hardship.

The only motive to work is wages: the very idea that work might be a joy, like the work of the artist, is usually scouted as utterly Utopian.

But by far the greater part of these evils are wholly unnecessary. If the civilized portion of mankind could be induced to desire their own happiness more than another's pain, if they could be induced to work constructively for improvements which they would share with all the world rather than destructively to prevent other classes or nations from stealing a march on them, the whole system by which the world's work is done might be reformed root and branch within a generation.

From the point of view of liberty, what system would be the best? In what direction should we wish the forces of progress to move? From this point of view, neglecting for the moment all other considerations, I have no doubt that the best system would be one not far removed from that advocated by Kropotkin, but rendered more practicable by the adoption of the main principles of Guild Socialism. Since every point can be disputed, I will set down without argument the kind of organization of work that would seem best.

Education should be compulsory up to the age of 16, or perhaps longer; after that, it should be continued or not at the option of the pupil, but remain free (for those who desire it) up to at least the age of 21. When education is finished no one should be COMPELLED to work, and those who choose not to work should receive a bare livelihood, and be left completely free; but probably it would be desirable that there should be a strong public opinion in favor of work, so that only comparatively few should choose idleness.

One great advantage of making idleness economically possible is that it would afford a powerful motive for making work not disagreeable; and no community where most work is disagreeable can be said to have found a solution of economic problems.

I think it is reasonable to assume that few would choose idleness, in view of the fact that even now at least nine out of ten of those who have (say) 100 pounds a year from investments prefer to increase their income by paid work.

Coming now to that great majority who will not choose idleness, I think we may assume that, with the help of science, and by the elimination of the vast amount of unproductive work involved in internal and international competition, the whole community could be kept in comfort by means of four hours' work a day. It is already being urged by experienced employers that their employes can actually produce as much in a six-hour day as they can when they work eight hours. In a world where there is a much higher level of technical instruction than there is now the same tendency will be accentuated. People will be taught not only, as at present, one trade, or one small portion of a trade, but several trades, so that they can vary their occupation according to the seasons and the fluctuations of demand. Every industry will be self-governing as regards all its internal affairs, and even separate factories will decide for themselves all questions that only concern those who work in them. There will not be capitalist management, as at present, but management by elected representatives, as in politics. Relations between different groups of producers will be settled by the Guild Congress, matters concerning the community as the inhabitants of a certain area will continue to be decided by Parliament, while all disputes between Parliament and the Guild Congress will be decided by a body composed of representatives of both in equal numbers.

Payment will not be made, as at present, only for work actually required and performed, but for willingness to work. This system is already adopted in much of the better paid work: a man occupies a certain position, and retains it even at times when there happens to be very little to do. The dread of unemployment and loss of livelihood will no longer haunt men like a nightmare. Whether all who are willing to work will be paid equally, or whether exceptional skill will still command exceptional pay, is a matter which may be left to each guild to decide for itself.

An opera-singer who received no more pay than a scene-shifter might choose to be a scene-shifter until the system was changed: if so, higher pay would probably be found necessary. But if it were freely voted by the Guild, it could hardly constitute a grievance.

Whatever might be done toward making work agreeable, it is to be presumed that some trades would always remain unpleasant. Men could be attracted into these by higher pay or shorter hours, instead of being driven into them by destitution. The community would then have a strong economic motive for finding ways of diminishing the disagreeableness of these exceptional trades.

There would still have to be money, or something analogous to it, in any community such as we are imagining. The Anarchist plan of a free distribution of the total produce of work in equal shares does not get rid of the need for some standard of exchange value, since one man will choose to take his share in one form and another in another. When the day comes for distributing luxuries, old ladies will not want their quota of cigars, nor young men their just proportion of lap-dog; this will make it necessary to know how many cigars are the equivalent of one lap-dog. Much the simplest way is to pay an income, as at present, and allow relative values to be adjusted according to demand. But if actual coin were paid, a man might hoard it and in time become a capitalist. To prevent this, it would be best to pay notes available only during a certain period, say one year from the date of issue. This would enable a man to save up for his annual holiday, but not to save indefinitely.

There is a very great deal to be said for the Anarchist plan of allowing necessaries, and all commodities that can easily be produced in quantities adequate to any possible demand, to be given away freely to all who ask for them, in any amounts they may require. The question whether this plan should be adopted is, to my mind, a purely technical one: would it be, in fact, possible to adopt it without much waste and consequent diversion of labor to the production of necessaries when it might be more usefully employed otherwise? I have not the means of answering this question, but I think it exceedingly probable that, sooner or later, with the continued improvement in the methods of production, this Anarchist plan will become feasible; and when it does, it certainly ought to be adopted.

Women in domestic work, whether married or unmarried, will receive pay as they would if they were in industry. This will secure the complete economic independence of wives, which is difficult to achieve in any other way, since mothers of young children ought not to be expected to work outside the home.

The expense of children will not fall, as at present, on the parents. They will receive, like adults, their share of necessaries, and their education will be free.[60] There is no longer to be the present competition for scholarships among the abler children: they will not be imbued with the competitive spirit from infancy, or forced to use their brains to an unnatural degree with consequent listlessness and lack of health in later life. Education will be far more diversified than at present; greater care will be taken to adapt it to the needs of different types of young people. There will be more attempt to encourage initiative young pupils, and less desire to fill their minds with a set of beliefs and mental habits regarded as desirable by the State, chiefly because they help to preserve the status quo. For the great majority of children it will probably be found desirable to have much more outdoor education in the country.

And for older boys and girls whose interests are not intellectual or artistic, technical education, undertaken in a liberal spirit, is far more useful in promoting mental activity than book-learning which they regard (however falsely) as wholly useless except for purposes of examination. The really useful education is that which follows the direction of the child's own instinctive interests, supplying knowledge for which it is seeking, not dry, detailed information wholly out of relation to its spontaneous desires.

[60] Some may fear that the result would be an undue increase of population, but such fears I believe to be groundless. See above, (Chapter IV, on "Work and Pay." Also, Chapter vi of "Principles of Social Reconstruction" (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.).

Government and law will still exist in our community, but both will be reduced to a minimum.

There will still be acts which will be forbidden -- for example, murder. But very nearly the whole of that part of the criminal law which deals with property will have become obsolete, and many of the motives which now produce murders will be no longer operative.

Those who nevertheless still do commit crimes will not be blamed or regarded as wicked; they will be regarded as unfortunate, and kept in some kind of mental hospital until it is thought that they are no longer a danger. By education and freedom and the abolition of private capital the number of crimes can be made exceedingly small. By the method of individual curative treatment it will generally be possible to secure that a man's first offense shall also be his last, except in the case of lunatics and the feeble-minded, for whom of course a more prolonged but not less kindly detention may be necessary.

Government may be regarded as consisting of two parts: the one, the decisions of the community or its recognized organs; the other, the enforcing of those decisions upon all who resist them. The first part is not objected to by Anarchists. The second part, in an ordinary civilized State, may remain entirely in the background: those who have resisted a new law while it was being debated will, as a rule, submit to it when it is passed, because resistance is generally useless in a settled and orderly community.

But the possibility of governmental force remains, and indeed is the very reason for the submission which makes force unnecessary. If, as Anarchists desire, there were no use of force by government, the majority could still band themselves together and use force against the minority. The only difference would be that their army or their police force would be ad hoc, instead of being permanent and professional.

The result of this would be that everyone would have to learn how to fight, for fear a well drilled minority should seize power and establish an old-fashioned oligarchic State. Thus the aim of the Anarchists seems hardly likely to be achieved by the methods which they advocate.

The reign of violence in human affairs, whether within a country or in its external relations, can only be prevented, if we have not been mistaken, by an authority able to declare all use of force except by itself illegal, and strong enough to be obviously capable of making all other use of force futile, except when it could secure the support of public opinion as a defense of freedom or a resistance to injustice.

Such an authority exists within a country: it is the State. But in international affairs it remains to be created. The difficulties are stupendous, but they must be overcome if the world is to be saved from periodical wars, each more destructive than any of its predecessors.

Whether, after this war, a League of Nations will be formed, and will be capable of performing this task, it is as yet impossible to foretell. However that may be, some method of preventing wars will have to be established before our Utopia becomes possible.

When once men BELIEVE that the world is safe from war, the whole difficulty will be solved: there will then no longer be any serious resistance to the disbanding of national armies and navies, and the substitution for them of a small international force for protection against uncivilized races. And when that stage has been reached, peace will be virtually secure.

The practice of government by majorities, which Anarchists criticise, is in fact open to most of the objections which they urge against it. Still more objectionable is the power of the executive in matters vitally affecting the happiness of all, such as peace and war. But neither can be dispensed with suddenly. There are, however, two methods of diminishing the harm done by them: (1) Government by majorities can be made less oppressive by devolution, by placing the decision of questions primarily affecting only a section of the community in the hands of that section, rather than of a Central Chamber. In this way, men are no longer forced to submit to decisions made in a hurry by people mostly ignorant of the matter in hand and not personally interested.

Autonomy for internal affairs should be given, not only to areas, but to all groups, such as industries or Churches, which have important common interests not shared by the rest of the community. (2) The great powers vested in the executive of a modern State are chiefly due to the frequent need of rapid decisions, especially as regards foreign affairs. If the danger of war were practically eliminated, more cumbrous but less autocratic methods would be possible, and the Legislature might recover many of the powers which the executive has usurped. By these two methods, the intensity of the interference with liberty involved in government can be gradually diminished. Some interference, and even some danger of unwarranted and despotic interference, is of the essence of government, and must remain so long as government remains. But until men are less prone to violence than they are now, a certain degree of governmental force seems the lesser of two evils. We may hope, however, that if once the danger of war is at an end, men's violent impulses will gradually grow less, the more so as, in that case, it will be possible to diminish enormously the individual power which now makes rulers autocratic and ready for almost any act of tyranny in order to crush opposition. The development of a world where even governmental force has become unnecessary (except against lunatics) must be gradual. But as a gradual process it is perfectly possible; and when it has been completed we may hope to see the principles of Anarchism embodied in the management of communal affairs.

How will the economic and political system that we have outlined bear on the evils of character? I believe the effect will be quite extraordinarily beneficent.

The process of leading men's thought and imagination away from the use of force will be greatly accelerated by the abolition of the capitalist system, provided it is not succeeded by a form of State Socialism in which officials have enormous power. At present, the capitalist has more control over the lives of others than any man ought to have; his friends have authority in the State; his economic power is the pattern for political power. In a world where all men and women enjoy economic freedom, there will not be the same habit of command, nor, consequently, the same love of despotism; a gentler type of character than that now prevalent will gradually grow up. Men are formed by their circumstances, not born ready made. The bad effect of the present economic system on character, and the immensely better effect to be expected from communal ownership, are among the strongest reasons for advocating the change.

In the world as we have been imagining fit, economic fear and most economic hope will be alike removed out of life. No one will be haunted by the dread of poverty or driven into ruthlessness by the hope of wealth. There will not be the distinction of social classes which now plays such an immense part in life. The unsuccessful professional man will not live in terror lest his children should sink in the scale; the aspiring employe will not be looking forward to the day when he can become a sweater in his turn.

Ambitious young men will have to dream other daydreams than that of business success and wealth wrung out of the ruin of competitors and the degradation of labor. In such a world, most of the nightmares that lurk in the background of men's minds will no longer exist; on the other hand, ambition and the desire to excel will have to take nobler forms than those that are encouraged by a commercial society.

All those activities that really confer benefits upon mankind will be open, not only to the fortunate few, but to all who have sufficient ambition and native aptitude. Science, labor-saving inventions, technical progress of all kinds, may be confidently expected to flourish far more than at present, since they will be the road to honor, and honor will have to replace money among those of the young who desire to achieve success. Whether art will flourish in a Socialistic community depends upon the form of Socialism adopted; if the State, or any public authority, (no matter what), insists upon controlling art, and only licensing those whom it regards as proficient, the result will be disaster. But if there is real freedom, allowing every man who so desires to take up an artist's career at the cost of some sacrifice of comfort, it is likely that the atmosphere of hope, and the absence of economic compulsion, will lead to a much smaller waste of talent than is involved in our present system, and to a much less degree of crushing of impulse in the mills of the struggle for life.

When elementary needs have been satisfied, the serious happiness of most men depends upon two things: their work, and their human relations. In the world that we have been picturing, work will be free, not excessive, full of the interest that belongs to a collective enterprise in which there is rapid progress, with something of the delight of creation even for the humblest unit. And in human relations the gain will be just as great as in work. The only human relations that have value are those that are rooted in mutual freedom, where there is no domination and no slavery, no tie except affection, no economic or conventional necessity to preserve the external show when the inner life is dead. One of the most horrible things about commercialism is the way in which it poisons the relations of men and women. The evils of prostitution are generally recognized, but, great as they are, the effect of economic conditions on marriage seems to me even worse. There is not infrequently, in marriage, a suggestion of purchase, of acquiring a woman on condition of keeping her in a certain standard of material comfort. Often and often, a marriage hardly differs from prostitution except by being harder to escape from. The whole basis of these evils is economic. Economic causes make marriage a matter of bargain and contract, in which affection is quite secondary, and its absence constitutes no recognized reason for liberation. Marriage should be a free, spontaneous meeting of mutual instinct, filled with happiness not unmixed with a feeling akin to awe: it should involve that degree of respect of each for the other that makes even the most trifling interference with liberty an utter impossibility, and a common life enforced by one against the will of the other an unthinkable thing of deep horror. It is not so that marriage is conceived by lawyers who make settlements, or by priests who give the name of "sacrament" to an institution which pretends to find something sanctifiable in the brutal lusts or drunken cruelties of a legal husband. It is not in a spirit of freedom that marriage is conceived by most men and women at present: the law makes it an opportunity for indulgence of the desire to interfere, where each submits to some loss of his or her own liberty, for the pleasure of curtailing the liberty of the other. And the atmosphere of private property makes it more difficult than it otherwise would be for any better ideal to take root.

It is not so that human relations will be conceived when the evil heritage of economic slavery has ceased to mold our instincts. Husbands and wives, parents and children, will be only held together by affection: where that has died, it will be recognized that nothing worth preserving is left. Because affection will be free, men and women will not find in private life an outlet and stimulus to the love of domineering, but all that is creative in their love will have the freer scope.

Reverence for whatever makes the soul in those who are loved will be less rare than it is now: nowadays, many men love their wives in the way in which they love mutton, as something to devour and destroy.

But in the love that goes with reverence there is a joy of quite another order than any to be found by mastery, a joy which satisfies the spirit and not only the instincts; and satisfaction of instinct and spirit at once is necessary to a happy life, or indeed to any existence that is to bring out the best impulses of which a man or woman is capable.

In the world which we should wish to see, there will be more joy of life than in the drab tragedy of modern every-day existence. After early youth, as things are, most men are bowed down by forethought, no longer capable of light-hearted gaiety, but only of a kind of solemn jollification by the clock at the appropriate hours. The advice to "become as little children" would be good for many people in many respects, but it goes with another precept, "take no thought for the morrow," which is hard to obey in a competitive world. There is often in men of science, even when they are quite old, something of the simplicity of a child: their absorption in abstract thought has held them aloof from the world, and respect for their work has led the world to keep them alive in spite of their innocence. Such men have succeeded in living as all men ought to be able to live; but as things are, the economic struggle makes their way of life impossible for the great majority.

What are we to say, lastly, of the effect of our projected world upon physical evil? Will there be less illness than there is at present? Will the produce of a given amount of labor be greater? Or will population press upon the limits of subsistence, as Malthus taught in order to refute Godwin's optimism? I think the answer to all these questions turns, in the end, upon the degree of intellectual vigor to be expected in a community which has done away with the spur of economic competition. Will men in such a world become lazy and apathetic? Will they cease to think? Will those who do think find themselves confronted with an even more impenetrable wall of unreflecting conservatism than that which confronts them at present? These are important questions; for it is ultimately to science that mankind must look for their success in combating physical evils.

If the other conditions that we have postulated can be realized, it seems almost certain that there must be less illness than there is at present. Population will no longer be congested in slums; children will have far more of fresh air and open country; the hours of work will be only such as are wholesome, not excessive and exhausting as they are at present.

As for the progress of science, that depends very largely upon the degree of intellectual liberty existing in the new society. If all science is organized and supervised by the State, it will rapidly become stereotyped and dead. Fundamental advances will not be made, because, until they have been made, they will seem too doubtful to warrant the expenditure of public money upon them. Authority will be in the hands of the old, especially of men who have achieved scientific eminence; such men will be hostile to those among the young who do not flatter them by agreeing with their theories. Under a bureaucratic State Socialism it is to be feared that science would soon cease to be progressive and acquired a medieval respect for authority.

But under a freer system, which would enable all kinds of groups to employ as many men of science as they chose, and would allow the "vagabond's wage" to those who desired to pursue some study so new as to be wholly unrecognized, there is every reason to think that science would flourish as it has never done hitherto.[61] And, if that were the case, I do not believe that any other obstacle would exist to the physical possibility of our system.

[61] See the discussion of this question in the preceding chapter.

The question of the number of hours of work necessary to produce general material comfort is partly technical, partly one of organization. We may assume that there would no longer be unproductive labor spent on armaments, national defense, advertisements, costly luxuries for the very rich, or any of the other futilities incidental to our competitive system. If each industrial guild secured for a term of years the advantages, or part of the advantages, of any new invention or methods which it introduced, it is pretty certain that every encouragement would be given to technical progress. The life of a discoverer or inventor is in itself agreeable: those who adopt it, as things are now, are seldom much actuated by economic motives, but rather by the interest of the work together with the hope of honor; and these motives would operate more widely than they do now, since fewer people would be prevented from obeying them by economic necessities. And there is no doubt that intellect would work more keenly and creatively in a world where instinct was less thwarted, where the joy of life was greater, and where consequently there would be more vitality in men than there is at present.

There remains the population question, which, ever since the time of Malthus, has been the last refuge of those to whom the possibility of a better world is disagreeable. But this question is now a very different one from what it was a hundred years ago. The decline of the birth-rate in all civilized countries, which is pretty certain to continue, whatever economic system is adopted, suggests that, especially when the probable effects of the war are taken into account, the population of Western Europe is not likely to increase very much beyond its present level, and that of America is likely only to increase through immigration. Negroes may continue to increase in the tropics, but are not likely to be a serious menace to the white inhabitants of temperate regions. There remains, of course, the Yellow Peril; but by the time that begins to be serious it is quite likely that the birth-rate will also have begun to decline among the races of Asia If not, there are other means of dealing with this question; and in any case the whole matter is too conjectural to be set up seriously as a bar to our hopes. I conclude that, though no certain forecast is possible, there is not any valid reason for regarding the possible increase of population as a serious obstacle to Socialism.

Our discussion has led us to the belief that the communal ownership of land and capital, which constitutes the characteristic doctrine of Socialism and Anarchist Communism, is a necessary step toward the removal of the evils from which the world suffers at present and the creation of such a society as any humane man must wish to see realized. But, though a necessary step, Socialism alone is by no means sufficient. There are various forms of Socialism: the form in which the State is the employer, and all who work receive wages from it, involves dangers of tyranny and interference with progress which would make it, if possible, even worse than the present regime. On the other hand, Anarchism, which avoids the dangers of State Socialism, has dangers and difficulties of its own, which make it probable that, within any reasonable period of time, it could not last long even if it were established. Nevertheless, it remains an ideal to which we should wish to approach as nearly as possible, and which, in some distant age, we hope may be reached completely. Syndicalism shares many of the defects of Anarchism, and, like it, would prove unstable, since the need of a central government would make itself felt almost at once.

The system we have advocated is a form of Guild Socialism, leaning more, perhaps, towards Anarchism than the official Guildsman would wholly approve. It is in the matters that politicians usually ignore- science and art, human relations, and the joy of life -- that Anarchism is strongest, and it is chiefly for the sake of these things that we included such more or less Anarchist proposals as the "vagabond's wage." It is by its effects outside economics and politics, at least as much as by effects inside them, that a social system should be judged. And if Socialism ever comes, it is only likely to prove beneficent if non economic goods are valued and consciously pursued.

The world that we must seek is a world in which the creative spirit is alive, in which life is an adventure full of joy and hope, based rather upon the impulse to construct than upon the desire to retain what we possess or to seize what is possessed by others. It must be a world in which affection has free play, in which love is purged of the instinct for domination, in which cruelty and envy have been dispelled by happiness and the unfettered development of all the instincts that build up life and fill it with mental delights. Such a world is possible; it waits only for men to wish to create it.

Meantime, the world in which we exist has other aims. But it will pass away, burned up in the fire of its own hot passions; and from its ashes will spring a new and younger world, full of fresh hope, with the light of morning in its eyes.

The final chapter, XXXII THE ARBITERS OF EUROPE, has a passage half-way through showing the extraordinary limitations of Russell's understanding and choice of sources. He talks of Rasputin as the "Saint" who thought himself inspired by 'on high', and was used by the 'Tsarina' to control Tsar Nicholas II by her 'masterful will'. But (it seems) Rasputin had a Jewish 'secretary', Simonovich, who (according to his own memoirs, German translation 1928) advised Rasputin socially and financially, traded in gems and gambling, and tutted as Rasputin like a schoolboy. Just one single tiny example of Jews in the chaos of Germany, Russia, France, China, Japan, the United States, and Britain—and the rest of the world—and the failure of observers at the time to notice them.

INDEX
Academy, Royal, 107
Africa, 149, 165
Agriculture, 90 ff.
Alexander II, 43
Allemane, 60
America, xi, 31, 74 ff., 125, 140, 210
American Federation of Labor, 76
Anarchism, passim-
    defined, 33
    and law, 33, 51, 111 ff., 198 ff.
    and violence, 33, 52.4, 72, 121 ff.
    and distribution, 93 ff.
    and wages, 96 ff.
    anti-German, 46
    attitude to syndicalism, 79
    congress in Amsterdam, 79
Ants, 152
Army, private, 120, 123
Art, 109, 111, 138, 166 ff., 203
    and appreciation, 169, 181.6
    and commercialism, 181
    and freedom, 182
Artists, 103
    under State Socialism, 174
Asia, 149, 158, 210
Australia, 151
Authors, Guild of, 179
Autonomy, 133, 137, 160

Backwoods, 133
Bakunin, x, 3649
    biography, 3747
    writings, 4749
    and Marx, 38 ff., 59 n.
    and Pan-Slavism, 41, 45
    and Dresden insurrection, 41
    imprisonments, 41
    anti-German, 45
    and production, 50
Bebel, 66
Benbow, William, 71 n.
Bergson, 68
Bernstein, 27.29, 56
Bevington, 53
Bismarck, 30
Books under Socialism, 178
Bornstedt, 39
Bourgeoisie, 11
Bourses du Travail, 54, 63
Boycott, 68
Briand, 72
Bright, 21
Brooks, John Graham, 75, 77n.
Brousse, Paul, 60
Bureaucracy, 128, 174
Button-hooks, 182

Cafiero, 48n.
Capital, 6, 10, 18.25
Capitalism, 2, 202
    and war, 139 ff.
California, 181
Censor of plays, 107
Champion, 91
Charlton, Broughton, 19
Chewing-gum, 189
China, 137, 140
Christ, 187
Chuang Tzu, 33
Churches, 201
Civil Service, 128
Class war, xvi, 9 ff., 27, 29, 81, 66, 116 149
Clemenceau, 71
Cobden, 21
Cole, G. D. H., 89n., 63, 64n., 73, 76, 81n., 134, 190
Communism, 10 ff.
    anarchist, 1, 38ff., 60, 96n., 100n., 106n.
Communist Manifesto, 5, 9.18, 114, 148
Competitiveness, 160
Concentration of Capital, Law of, 8, 23.5
Confederation General du Travail, 63.65, 71, 74
Conquest of Bread, The, 80, 87
Constantine, 108, 187
Creativeness, 186.7
Crime, 118 ff.
Cultivation, intensive, 89
Cultures maraicheres, 91

Darwin, 173
Deleon, 76
Democracy, 2, 30, 129 ff., 148, 167
Deutche Jahrbucher, 38
Devolution, 200
Disarmament, 153
Disraeli, 30
Distribution, 99 ff.
Dubois, Felix, 62
Duelling, 123

Education, 169 ff., 189, 193, 196
Edward VI, 22
Empire Knouto-Germanique, 48
Engels, 3, 6, 17, 38
Envy, 160.169
Evils-
    physical, 188, 207.11
    of character, 188, ~2.07
    of power, 188 ff.
Evolution, 164

Fabians, 67
Fear, 186, 203
Feudalism, 10
Fields, Factories and Workshops, 80, 87 ff.
Finance and war, 140
Finland, 144
Fourier, 4n.
Franco-Prussian War, 46, 86, 69
Franklin, 100n.
Freedom, see Liberty

George, Lloyd, 186
German Communist League, 8
German Working Men's Association, 8
Germany, 144
Giles, Lionel, 36n.
God and the State, 48
Godwin, 207
Gompers, 76
Gospels, The, 187
Government, 111 ff., 198 ff.
    representative, 117, 129 ff., 137 ff.
Guesde, Jules, 89.60
Guild Congress, 83, Cal ff.,
Guild Socialism, xi, 80 ff., 133, 192, 211
    and the State, 82.4, 114, 184.5
Guillaume, James, 36n., 37

Haywood, 77
Hegel, 4
Herd instinct, xv
Heubner, 41
History, materialistic interpretation of, 7
Hobson, J. A., 144
Hodgskin, 5n.
Hulme, T. E., 29
Hypocrisy, 132

Idleness, 103 ff.
Independent Labor Party, 87
India, 188
Individual 138
Industrial Relations, American Commission on, 78
Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.), xi, 31, 74
International alliance of socialist democracy, 44
International fraternity, 43
International Working Men's Association, 6, 44 ff., 69
Internationalism, 148, 150

Japan, 161
Jaures, 60
Jouhaux, 75
Joy of Life, 206

Keats, 173
Knowledge, 168
Kropotkin, 36, 46, 80.61, 87 ff., 96n., 100n., 102, 106n., 116 ff., 179, 192
Kultur, 159

Labor, integration of, 99
Labor Party, 57, 150
Lagardelle, 64
Law, 111 ff., 198
Levine, Louis, 69n., 60n.
Liberal Party, 28, 30
Liberty, 111 ff., 192, 201
    and syndicalism, 85
    and anarchism, 108
    and creative impulse, 169, 172.81
    and art, 182.3, 204
    and human relations, 204
Liquor Traffic, 137
Livre, Federation du, 178
Lunatics, 119
Lynching, 122

Magistrates, 101
Majorities, divine right of, 130, 200
Malthus, 86 ff., 207 ff.
Manchesterism, 29
Marriage, 204
Marx, x, 1.31, 36, 60, 77, 148, 164
    biography, 3.7
    doctrines, 7.31, 113
    and Bakunin, 38 ff.
    and International Working
    Men's Association, 44 ff., 89n.
Marxisme, La decomposition du, 29
Mazzini, 43
Millennium by force, 164
Millerand, 60, 61
Milton, 173
Miners, Western Federation of, 76, 78
Money, 196
Monroe Doctrine, 140
Morning Star, 21
Morris, William, 176

Napoleon, 120
Napoleon III, 46
Naquet, Alfred, 98n., 118n, 165
National Guilds, 81n.
National Guilds League, 82
Nationalism, 17, 25, 28, 32
Nations-
    relations of, 139 ff.
    League of, 132, 200
Necessaries, free? 109, 196
Neue Rheinische Zeitung, 41
Nicholas, Tsar, 43

Opera Singers, 196
Opium Traffic, 137
Orage, 81n.
Owen, Robert, 5n.

Pellico, Silvio, 42
Pelloutier, 54, 63
Permeation, 57
Persia, 158
Plato, vii
Poets, 104
Poland, 37, 144
Population, 197n.
Possibilists, 60
Poverty, 190
Power, love of, 111, 144, 160, 161
Press, 143
Production, methods of, 87 ff.
Proletariat, 11 ff.
Proportional Representation, 165
Proudhon, 4n., 38
Pugnacity, 147
Punishment, 123 ff.

Ravachol, 53
Ravenstone, Piercy, 6n.
Reclue, Elisee, 48n.
Revisionism, 27, 66
Revolution-
    French, 7
    Russian, 18, 67, 148, 164
    Social, 6, 17, 70, 113, 148, 164, 164
    of 1848, 3, 6, 40
Ruge, 38

Sabotage, 66
Saint-Simon, 4n.
Sand, George, 38, 41
Sarajevo, 32
Scholarships, 170, 197
Science, 86, 109, 138 166 ff., 189, 207
    men of, 207
Self-interest, 125
Sharing, free, 96 ff., 195
Shelley, 173
Single Tax, 82
Slavery, 190
Socialism, passim-
    defined, 1
    English, 5
    French, 4, 59
    German, 66
    evolutionary, 27
    State, 67, 107, 115, 128, 170, 174, 202, 208
    and distribution, 93 ff.
    and art and science, 164 ff. 203
    Guild, see Guild Socialism
Socialist Labor Party, 76
Socialist Revolutionaries, Alliance of, 43
Socialists, Inter-Allied, 156
Sorel, 29, 67
Spinoza, 120
State, x, xi, 1, 16, 30, 48, 60, 68, 78, 82.4, 107 ff., 138, 146
Strikes, 66, 67, 70, 78 ff., 130
Syndicalism, passim-
    and Marx, 28, 116
    and party, 30
    and liberty, 85
    and political action, 30, 69, 129 ff.
    and anarchism, x, 66, 72,
    in France, 58 ff.
    in Italy, 58n.
    reformist and revolutionary, 62
    and class-war, 65, 116
    and general strike, 67, 69, 130
    and the State, 68, 116
    and Guild Socialism, 81n., 134
Syndicalist Railwayman, 69
Syndicates, 65

Tariffs, 137
Technical Training, 169 ff., 197
Theft, 121
Thompson, William, 5n.
Tolstoy, 32
Trade Unionism, x, 13, 62
    industrial, 31, 74 ff.
    craft, 73
Trusts, 75, 141

Utopias, vii, $, 200

Vagabond's wage, 177, 193, 208, 212
Villeneuves Saint Georges, 71
Violence, crimes of, 121, 122, 199
Violence, Reflections on, 29
Viviani, 60
Volkstimme, 27n.
Volunteers, 121

Wages, 9, 78, 9$ ff., 199
    iron law of, 26
    and art and science, 168 ff.
Wagner, Richard, 41
Waldeck-Rousseau, 61, 63
Walkley, Mary Anne, 90
War-
    avoidance of, 139 ff., 199
    and capitalism, 139 ff.
    and the Press 143 ff.
Women-
    votes for, 155
    economic independence of, 196
Work-
    and wages, 93 ff., 194
    hours of, 102, 193, 209
    can it be made pleasant? 100, 193, 904

Yellow races, 151, 210

[End of 'Roads to Freedom']
Top of Page

Ronald W Clark: The Life of Bertrand Russell Published 1975
- Not a very adequate book: Clark isn't [or rather wasn't - he's dead] very intelligent [e.g. considers ABC of Relativity in due course became outdated, without realising that it stated an imaginative picture; presumably therefore he never read it. He sits on both sides of the fence as to whether e.g. Vietnam war was an invasion or a defense without saying he doesn't know, but instead waffling; similarly he e.g. uses the phrase 'Viet Cong' despite footnote in 'War Crimes in Vietnam' which one presumes therefore he hadn't read, and e.g. quotes an opinion on Russell from The Economist; omitting reviewers on his books, e.g. on 'Power' and 'History of..' and Education books [it might have been interesting to get professional historians' views] and the best bits therefore are usually Russell himself.

Clark has a tiresome way of presenting the fact that somebody replied to Russell, as if this were proof of the reply's correctness - see for example
      1. Notes below on 'the banker' who replied to Russell on alleged desire for capitalist imperialism in China,
      2 Santayana's comments on Russell's 'Problems of Philosophy',
      3 Clark on Kurt Goedel, quoted below,
      4 pp 618-20 on the BBC all written as though that organisation's memos, Director-General etc must be right: 'notwithstanding the regular pin-pricks, the Corporation continued to use Russell'

There's quite a lot on sex; on p 25 he talks of Russell hurting his penis when very young, and goes on to say that 'he shared their [ordinary men and women] physical passion to an abnormal degree.'

A worrying aspect is that many of the letters to strangers which are quoted from were also used in 'Dear Bertrand Russell' which tends to suggest Clark's reading of Russell's correspondence wasn't thorough.

Another tiresome aspect is that Clark has no concern for truth; he instinctively bows to vested interests.
      1. He censors R's criticisms of religion: in 'Why I am Not..', 'Human Society..', and 'Religion and Science', tending to side with T S Eliot's 'curious document' view and being unable e.g. to take the intellectual arguments on board or e.g. the then-newly discovered history of the Templars and material on witchhunting and the Inquisition. 'Science and religion' only receives one single mention, and that's just in a list of Russell's books.
      2. p 801 on the Israelis: '.. the message itself [of 1970] is quintessentially Russell: condemning what he believes to be wrong, equally unperturbed by the protestations of friends [sic] or the wrath of foes, overturning the apple-cart in a good cause without the slightest thought of the consequences.'
      3. 668 'the Secretary of State for Defence, Duncan Sandys, admitted.. 'no means of providing adequate protection..'.. it could hardly be expected that either politicians or the Services would be equally willing [sc. as Russell] to admit that Britain was indefensible. ...'
      4. Nothing on wars [Malaya; Korea; Nigeria] where Russell surprisingly wasn't awake, or was.

Clark is also weak on influences and evidence generally; where did Russell get his information (say) on Russian behaviour in East Germany just after the war? No sources are indicated; it can't occur to Clark that newspapers aren't everything. The huge number of Russell's correspondents seems outside Clark's awareness.

The book is divided into four sections with these odd titles: 'The Reason Why', 'The New Romantic', 'A Long March Downhill', 'The Last Attachment'.
    The Penguin blurb says Clark started writing on atom bombs, then on Tizard, Appleton, J B S Haldane, then Einstein, and I suppose [since presumably he wasn't ridiculed for that] on to Russell. Clark wrote a biography of Lenin (published 1988); another hack non-Jew-aware job.

- About 330,000 words, excluding:
- 820-832 Sources and Bibliography
- 833-932 Notes and references by page. Almost every page has one or more notes, though they aren't numbered. Mostly these give the source of Russell's writing or verbal quotation. Some are third parties on Russell, e.g. Foreign Office, BBC Archives. Some include items not I think referred to anywhere, e.g. I F Stone on Russell's moral influence. Note: The Foreign Office minutes show men of considerable narrow mindedness and stupidity where they're quoted, mostly from First World War: 356-7, and note on 877 to p 344
- 933-979: Index. Quite detailed; has Russell's life events, books, articles, people on him, him on people, indexed separately, which is useful once you've worked it out
    The total book is therefore similar in length to all three volumes of Russell's Autobiography.

    -22: Family tree from Lord John Russell, 3rd son of 6th Duke of Bedford, including John Francis Stanley Russell [Frank; 1865-1931], Rachel, the survivor of twins, who herself died when Russell was about two, to Russell's kids John Conrad b 1921, Katharine Jane b 1923, Conrad Sebastian Robert b 1937. [The dates of births of Russell's four wives are chivalrously omitted].
    - 24: Russell's birth: 'big & fat', 'vigorous and strong'
    - 24-5: John Stuart Mill becomes a 'non-religious godparent'
    - 39: Rollo Russell introduces Bertie to John Tyndall
    - 40: [Hannah Pearsall-Smith, mother of Logan, 'powered by .. dominant sadism and the religious fervour that had driven her into writing The Christian's Secret of a Happy Life .. which sold more than a quarter of a million copies.. Logan.. was to carve himself a small but select literary niche before tottering into euphoric senility.'
    - 97 ff: Cretan liar and other paradoxes at last taken seriously
    - 99-100: Letter to Frege on 'let w be the [following] predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each answer its opposite follows. ...' 'Frege replied by return. .. consternation.. the sole possible foundations of arithmetic, seem to vanish.. Russell.. His entire life's work was on the verge of completion, much of his work had been ignored to the benefit of men infinitely less capable.. he responded with intellectual pleasure clearly submerging any feelings of personal disappointment. It was almost superhuman..'
    - 101,150: Elie Halévy: [Russell met this historian at the Whiteheads; several or Russell's letters are quoted from]
    - 103: 'Between February 1901 and February 1902.. sudden 'conversion', a change of heart.. love of humanity and a horror of force..' [Clark believes Russell probably loved Evelyn Whitehead, with whom he'd been in contact because of Whitehead's oddities like overspending; 106 quotes a letter to Alys on their 'exceedingly frank talk.. on the subject of Alfred' and 109: '..in the Cambridge of 1902 there were rarely second options for the wives of university dons.' Only hints exist about this. At any rate his 'conversion' may have involved a woman whom he loved but who he could never have. And 109: 'after Whitehead's death in 1947 Evelyn destroyed Russell's letters; those to her husband and those to herself'
    - 105: BOER WAR: '.. Alys was jealous of it. She was a foreigner, & in any case couldn't understand feeling so much about anything that didn't touch one personally. .. it was the real cause [of their rupture]. At the beginning of he war I was an imperialist more or less. In the middle of it.. change of heart.. incidentally made me a pro-Boer'/ 106: Letter 7 March 1900 from Sidney Webb on 'Russell and his wife [Alys] keen about the war and eager to get on foot a sane theory of imperialism'./ End: 110: 'the following day the Whiteheads.. celebrated the end of the Boer War'.
    - 108: [Realises he's out of love with Alys. 108 has passage on this [Clark's word] bouleversement cut from his autobiography [because of Edith?] about his nature not 'to remain physically fond of any woman for more than seven or eight years. As I view it now, this was the basis of the matter.. humbug'. 110-112: His cruel stabbing letters to Alys bring her 'near suicide']
    - 109: [Beatrice Webb takes Alys Russell to Switzerland - Monte Generosa, then the Engadine]
    - 106: Mill House, Grantchester; already had links with Chaucer, Byron, Wordsworth/ 110: completes 'Principles of Mathematics' there. He finished it in a hurry - 1912. 'more experience in pain than pleasure' May 1902
    - 111: Image of gold-fish in a bowl 'longing for freedom'
    - 114-5: [Berenson's house I Tatti above Florence; Russell's feelings of philistinism, and of puritanism, East End, people scraping for pence]
    - 116-7: 'Free Man's Worship' of 1903 on 'extinction in the vast death of the solar system.. the debris of a universe in ruins.. But in thought, in aspiration, we are free..'
    - 117: [Indian education; written 1973] 'students of English in Calcutta University would recite the last paragraphs.. with the feeling.. select page from the "Areopagitica", "Unto This Last", or "Sartor Resartus". ..'
    - 119-120: [Reading party with Bob and I think George Trevelyan: Moore writes to say Russell would cause difficulty with him. Wrote the same to Desmond MacCarthy. In 1903.]
    - 148-9, 301: The Coefficients
    - 223 Fyodor in Dostoevsky's Idiot
    - 228-9: [Lausanne c May 1913; what was then the Old Hotel.. a century and a quarter earlier Gibbon had written in a summer-house there the last lines of the last page../ he and Ottoline read Leopardi/ Lac Leman/ Ferney, where they 'peered through the gates at Voltaire's house']
    - 230: FILMS: 'we went out to a cinematograph to see if it bore out Bergson's philosophy, which it did. Darling, I can't tell you how awful it was.' 1912]
    - 246-7: [Santayana's influence on Russell's ideas on ethics changed, Clark says in unclear passages, R's views:] 'Santayana's Winds of Doctrine [1913].. outlined the doctrines that emerged [sic; i.e. Clark says S believed emerged] from Russell's writing:
    ".. that the mind or soul is an entity separate from its thoughts and pre-existent; that its substantial elements may be infinite in number, having position and quality, but no extension, so that each mind or soul might well be one of them; that both the existent and the ideal worlds may be infinite, while the ideal world contains an infinity of things not realised in the actual world; and that this ideal world is knowable by a separate mental consideration, a consideration which is, however, empirical in spirit, since the ideal world of ethics, logic, and mathematics has a special and surprising constitution, which we do not make but must attentively discover."
    It was on the ethical aspect of this doctrine that Santayana directed his criticism with an accuracy which caused Russell to change his views. Up to now.. 'The Elements of ethics', an essay which leaned heavily on Moore's Principia Ethica.. Their essence was that the substance of ethics was as independent of human judgment as the substance of philosophy or mathematics. .. [1910:] "Thus good or bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do; and when two people differ as to whether a thing is good only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right."
    Now came Santayana with his argument that ethics involved the unknowable. ..
    - 250-255: FIRST INFLUENCE OF WITTGENSTEIN, 1913: 'FIve days later all this had changed.. [Lots about W raging and storming, not knowing whether R was speaking the truth or being polite, etc] .. 252: I feel in my bones that he must be right.. an event of first-rate importance in my life.. I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to piece against a breakwater. ..' [From a 1916 letter to Ottoline in his autobiography] /864: [Note says Kenneth Milton Blackwell gives a detailed analysis of the technical arguments involved in W's impact on R's theory of belief]/ 267-9 Wittgenstein goes off, I think to Norway, to try to solve logic; Russell says the work he's done is as good as any ever done
    - 261: JOSEPH CONRAD and Russell's visit to Ashford, Kent, Sept 1913, after Ottoline introduced R to him. [There's a description, in a letter to Ottoline, of what they talked about and did; followed by a letter on their meeting which is also in 'Dear Bertrand Russell']
    - 262: [PHYSICS: Annual meeting of the British Association, 'whose members heard for the first time how Niels Bohr had successfully explained Rutherford's nuclear atom in terms of Planck's Quantum Theory. .. poor J J Thomson.. was squashed.. The nature of matter has been changing about once a year for the last fifteen years.. Scientific world.. tremendously alive.. like the Renaissance mariners. .. A few of the abler science and mathematical students would visit him once a week after dinner and discuss philosophical questions linked with science. The traffic was two-way.. 264: The Relation of Sense-data to Physics 1914, reprinted in Mysticism and Logic'/ 264: Limerick about feel ya, sensibilia]
    - 265: [Note: US idea of genius?] Norbert Weiner and his father, 'a distinguished professor at Harvard' '.. his father and teachers have made him conceited.. he at once reeled off the names of all the great philosophers, tho' he couldn't remember the titles of their books.. I think him more infant than phenomenon. Americans have no standards.'/ Then account of 'tea party' and Wiener's New England puritanism, which 'clashed with his philosophical defence of libertinism [sic].'
    - 288: 'Princeton - full of New Gothic, & ... as like Oxford as monkeys can make it'
    - 289: [Miss Helen Dudley.. 'the more remarkable she seemed', in a letter to Ottoline Morrell]
    - 301: FIRST WORLD WAR: 310: 'In 1914 this attitude [neutrality] had more support than is usually appreciated today. In Russell's case, its roots stretched back to the Co-Efficients and his ineradicable belief that Grey's policy at the Foreign Office had been a recipe for war. .. in 1911, he had been blistering.. on the outcome of the Anglo-Persian Treaty. 'We help in the perpetration of a crime against liberty, justice & civilisation..' .. Charles Sanger wrote.. 'I have always regarded Grey as one of the most wicked and dangerous criminals.. it is awful that a Liberal cabinet should have been parties to engineering a war to destroy Teutonic civilisation in favour of Serbians and the Russian autocracy.' ..
    [Clark says:] .. Russell.. could not believe that the Foreign Office record was anything less than a Machiavellian progress. That men could reach Cabinet rank and still do no more than muddle through .. was.. unbelievable; the alternative was intent, the conspiracy view of history which made it almost inevitable [sic] that half a century later he should regard Macmillan and Kennedy as 'much more wicked than Hitler', and the assassination of President Kennedy as a skilfully devised plot.'
    302: 'the feeling for neutrality remained strong .. last weekend of peace.. London the day war began.. Massingham, editor of Nation/ George Trevelyan/ Charles Buxton/ J A Hobson of the British Neutrality Committee.. 303: Emperors at balconies appealing to God/ 307: Gilbert Murray/ both Whiteheads, and on Belgium and Louvain/ Eddie Marsh as Churchill's private secretary, an obscene insect/ Hobson/ Keeling/ The prize bore of the College spoke to me../ Wells/ Shaw/ Maeterlinck/ Robert Bridges/ 306: Russell more in line with majority opinion 5 Aug 1914 says Clark/ 308-9 Whiteheads: Evelyn 'that ideal of freedom which Germany opposes.. their precious young lives..'/ 310 Wittgenstein
    303: Proofs of Keynes' 'Treatise on Probability'
    312: [U.D.C., Union of Democratic Control. Aims: 1 to secure real parliamentary control over foreign policy and prevent it being forced.. as accomplished fact/ 2 To open negotiations with democratic parties and influences on the Continent when the war ended; and secure un-humiliating term of peace without artificial frontiers.. starting point for .. future wars. Included Charles Trevelyan, E D Morel, Ramsay MacDonald, Norman Angell, Lord Ponsonby, Joseph Rowntree. 'Continued.. until after the second world war.'
    - 312: 'War: the Offspring of Fear' 1914. Pamphlet; 'additions suggested by Trevelyan' on Grey. [Clark thinks phrases about great race-conflicts, Teuton and Slav etc, 'might have come from Germany a generation later.']
    - 314: Lusitania sinking
    . 340: face looking so evil, talking about love idea, from D H Lawrence, quoting 'a woman'/ 289: .. assume the repulsive expression of a lustful satyr [But how can Clark know what Russell's face looked like in presumably private circumstances?]
    - 345: People enjoying WW1
    - 348: 'Moore as an example of the other attitude' [Russell had to be 'up and doing' during the war]
    - 348: 'Aldous Huxley was habitually present while she [Ottoline] undressed' This was at Garsington, source of Crome Yellow. Russell disliked Aldous Huxley, no doubt because of this, but ostensibly partly because of H's caricature of him as Mr Scogan (in I think Crome Yellow - "like a lizard from the [geological period]"/ and quote to the effect that some men should be spared the tedium of having to work for a living), partly because of plagiarism of the last two chapters of The Scientific Outlook [p 566 'The only thing he has added is the Bokanovsky twins... otherwise the parallelism applies in great detail, e.g. the prohibition of Shakespeare and the intoxicant producing no headache'] of Brave New World from the two penultimate chapters of 'The Scientific Outlook'. Comment on Encyclopedia Britannica as the only book which influenced Huxley: Alps, Andes, Apennines; Himalayas, Hippocratic Oath/ And D H Lawrence like Huxley put Russell in a book: In the Blind Man, Bertie Reid 'whose mind was so much quicker than his emotions, which were not so very fine'; In Women in Love, Sir Joshua Malleson [name, says Clark, from R's current mistress] 'with a mental fibre so tough as to be insentient.. an elderly sociologist.. a learned dry Baronet of fifty who was always making witticisms and laughing at them heartily in a harsh horse-laugh'
    - 356-357 ff: Foreign Office people refuse Russell a passport to US [and Trinity expels him].
    - 391: [President Wilson elected 1916, slogan 'he kept us out of war'
    - 393-4: [Whitehead writes to Russell/ fourth volume of Principia/ breaks off collaboration/ plus a letter [which Clark says makes it appear that Whitehead's views on Russell's views must surely have influenced him:] on German deportation of French and Belgians. 'What are you doing to help these people?']
    - 395ff: [FALL OF TSAR AND RUSSIAN REVOLUTION] March 1917 Albert Hall meeting packed. [Note made much later in 2020: Russell wrote 'the audience was largely Russian Jews' and 'the Sinn Fein martyrs were enthusiastically cheered. The Russians have really put a new spirit into the world..] C.O.'s.. republic.. freedom for India all the things one never hears mentioned. .. The Reporters applauded, but did not take notes. .. Kerensky was marshalling his forces.. [Russell went (by train presumably) with Colette, her husband Miles, and Ramsay MacDonald, to Leeds. He seems to have had no idea there were Jews in Leeds] The Leeds meeting to co-ordinate their efforts with the Russians.. "Worker's Control" not liked by Beatrice Webb.. 'organizations aimed at the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils'
    - 398ff: Siegfried Sassoon, VC, and wounded, had received 'Principles of Social Reconstruction' and read foreword. 1917: Introduced to Russell who appears as Thornton Tyrell in Sassoon's 'Memoirs..' in which Russell, reading Kropotkin 'Conquest of Bread', recommended he write two hundred words on World War 1 being prolonged, because no statement of war aims, and what the war was really like. '.. wilful defiance of military authority. .. I believe that this War, upon which I entered as a war of defence and liberation, has now become a war of aggression and conquest.. the purposes should have been so clearly stated as to have made it impossible to change them.. sufferings of the troops.. political errors and insincerities.. protest against the deception which has been practised upon them; .. callous complacence.. posting of the statement.. Sassoon failed to report to the Fusiliers depot.. composed a letter to the Colonel.. Robert Graves arranged him to be certified or else appear before a medical board which he'd refused to do, and 'sent to a place in the country as suffering from nerves.' [Shell-shock appears to have been invented by this time].
    - 404: Clark: 'Falling away of faith, so beautifully analysed in C E Montague's Disenchantment. The British army escaped the mutinies which riddled the French after the Nivelle offensive, and even in 1919 the post-war revolts on demobilization presented no serious problem. Even so, victory came only just in time'
    - 404: Brotherhood Church, Southgate Road, Islington meeting with roughs, criminals, two utterly bestial women etc. [I'd thought this was in Leeds. Anyway, Russell in his Autobiography stresses that this was almost the only violent incident at his speeches etc]
    - 421 'The German Peace Offer' and a blaze of publicity on the sentence about 'the American garrison'. [All suggests to me that Russell may have been a 'useful idiot']
    - 422-431: Bow Street charge about 'a printed publication'/ 424: 'touch of the ludicrous in sentencing Russell for a few unwary phrases after he had stumped the country with impunity while preaching the pacifist cause.'/ Second Division in prison. Amusing stuff about class system in prison, these people who are used to servants, etc. 428: 'I am not near enough in outlook to the average man to have much immediate influence. One has to aim at being, like Shelley, an influence upon the comparatively few in the rising generation, not a power in the present.'/ [Cp segregated sewage system in S Africa.]/ Whiteheads' son Eric killed/ 430 Three visitors per week; R complied lists of 'compatibles'/ Use of French in letters e.g. Boismaison for Mrs Woodhouse's farm 'in ostensible letter from the French Girondin Buzot to Madame Roland.'
    - 431-2: [Russell's work in prison: 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy' 70,000 words.. he would start on the Analysis of Mind [I've noted this with my notes on this book]
    - 434, 472: G D H Cole
    - 445: [1927 reflections on human excellence and 'many elements .. hitherto associated with aristocracy, such as fearlessness, independence of judgment, emancipation from the herd, and leisurely culture.' [I think Alistair Cooke's essay on Russell incorporated selected parts of this]
    - 455: Lewis Carroll and Russell's similar worlds, says Clark; this is in terms of logic and paradoxes; similar view but from appearance viewpoint expressed 265 ff by Norbert Weiner on Russell, Moore, and McTaggart, comparing them to Mad Hatter's Tea Party
    - 471: Lenin
    - 473-4, 520: Jews, Americanized Jews, and USSR/ 'before the end of the Second World War Russell the creation of a Jewish state as essential to post-war peace.'
    - 474: 'In 1920.. disillusion with Bolshevik Russia welled up in the tranquil security of neutral Sweden, where the contrast between Russia and Democracy hit him between the eyes. ..'
    - 481.493: China description 1920; Clark thinks Russell's attitude veered between delight and dislike, or fear of becoming out of touch, and gives extracts from letters to show this
    - 483: Dewey and US imperialists in China [Russell decided he disliked Dewey, after previously liking him. It occurs to me it could, as much as anything, be envy for another power taking over from Britain. The truth is of course that Britain, with the Opium Wars, treatment of the Boxers etc, wasn't noticeably more considerate than the US at the time]
    - 494: Chinese saying
    - 507-8: '.. the idea that the country was considered by the West solely as a field for capitalist exploitation. .. wrote regularly.. In 1924 an article on 'British Imperialism in China' in the new Leader.. reaction from Sidney Waterlow.. He minuted on the offending [sic] article.. 'he has always been a psychological puzzle to me. How is it possible that a man with his scientifically-trained mind should permit himself to write assertively and dogmatically on questions of fact of which he has only the most superficial knowledge? .. mistakes and mis-statements.. The present article.. hardly seems worth detailed comment, & it would be troublesome to disentangle its interwoven strands of fact & fiction.' However, Sir Charles Addis, the [sic] banker, did his best. .. His lengthy rebuttal.. was finally accepted by the Morning Post..' [Clark gives no information on this article, not even its date; later, I tracked it down.]
    - 507: Freedom and Organization [see two notes under that book, title for Americans of One Two Three - Bang and 560 Peter Spence's contributions]
    - 508 ff: Russell and Boxer Indemnity [from which he was sacked] and various people and pressure groups for 'Industry' rather than Education.
    - 511: [Icarus] 'I am compelled to fear that science will be used to promote the power of dominant groups rather than to make men happy.'
    - 513-515: ['Why I Am Not a Christian' reactions; 1927 lecture at Battersea Town Hall. Clark says: 'straightforward recapitulation of the Rationalist argument, neither very deep nor very searching... bitterly anti-religious.. unlike.. reluctant despair of Free Man's Worship, .. thoughtful Hibbert Journal 'The Essence of Religion' or the equally well-argued 'Mysticism and Logic'. Reaction against Ottoline's ameliorating influence was one reason.. virulence does not begin to disappear until three decades later..' (The later statement is nonsense of course)/ 1929 debate with Bishop Gore who said Suffering is sent as a purification from sin. & whose ?book 'Lux Mundi' 'had driven Julian Huxley.. to scientific humanism'/ T S Eliot 1927 review 'curious and pathetic document'/ Times reviewer: '.. the things which worried Russell in the 20 C were.. those which had worried Bishop Colenso in the 19th. [19 C]'
    - 515: [Labour Party candidate for perhaps Chelsea or London University. R H Tawney resigns when H G Wells, 'a cad', is suggested as candidate.]
    - 517: American Imperialism
    - 521: Buys Carn Voel in Cornwall
    - 525: [Dora] 'it struck both Russell and myself that Labour had no real policy for education, only "more education" not "what sort", and concentration on equipment and buildings.. not the least real notion of how to educate for democracy.'/ 597: Debate on 'Education for Democracy' in Washington with Arnold Lunn and others [Clark gives no details]
    - 534: [AS A PERSON: Questionnaire for 'Little Review' survived; stuff about hating himself, liking the sea, liking heraldry because it is absurd etc; there's a similar questionnaire under the title 'the long and the short of it' in his autobiography [vol. II, I'm pretty sure] and a couple more in 'Dear Bertrand Russell']
    - 539: [Would-be satirical poem in reaction to Marriage and Morals by Roy Campbell in 'The Georgiad']
    - 540: [Debate on marriage with J C Powys]
    - 540: [Mormons, Los Angeles, San Diego]
    - 552: 'the effort to treat the girl as his own was beyond his strength, he has admitted. 'I did not at all dislike her & I felt strongly that it would be unjust and bad for her if, so long as we were nominally all one family, I allowed any preference for my children to appear. But the resulting strain of hourly and daily insincerity was intolerable, & made family life a torture.' [After Russell wrote things like: 'neither the right to dispose of property by will nor the right of children to inherit from parents has any basis outside the instincts of possession and family pride.' Maybe it's not hypocrisy after all.]
    - 556: 'Russell's two children were made Wards in Chancery.. Dora's petition for divorce..'/ Meynell on Russell; a great man can have his littlenesses
    - 559-560: 'Freedom and Organisation 1814-1914': '.. subjectivity of each man's cosmos.. Consider say Marx and Disraeli.. My impulse is to give accounts of a number of eminent men.. I see the period as framed between two Emperors, Alexander I and William II, both completely silly.. I should like to include Jefferson, although he is a little early [and when it was printed in two volumes, one started 1776, the other 1814] .. to state the launching of the democratic idea.. Whole middle period is dominated by Bismarck. Other men .. are: Bentham, Malthus, Cobden, Robert Owen, Marx, Mazzini, Napoleon III, Disraeli, Darwin, Pasteur, perhaps Stevenson, Carnegie, Rockefeller, and as the grand finale of so much intellect, the Emperor William II...'
    - 560: [Planned a book on The Cult of Feeling from Rousseau to Hitler. 'The break-up of C 18th rationalism, Wesley, Romantic Movement, medievalism (Scott, Nietzsche, Tractarians, Dizzy = Disraeli); irrationalism in philosophy (Carlyle, Nietzsche, James, Bergson) & its connection with violence in politics. There should be an intellectual development accompanied throughout by appropriate events, from Marie Antoinette's Fetes Champetres to Hitler's pogroms, all of which spring from the cult of the heart as opposed to the head...' Never written; some notes evolved into 'The Revolt Against Reason', 1935, and Power: A New Social Analysis & A History of Western Philosophy.]
    - 561: 'Power': 'I am very keen on it myself.. I think of it as founding a new science, like Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations".'/ a reference to a 1937 series of LSE lectures, 'The Science of Power', out of which the book grew.
    - 561: [How to think book; see above]
    - 561-3: [In 1930 Russell writes to Stanley Unwin about autobiography, says he fully intends to write it before long, makes a start/ says 'it cannot be published until after I am dead.. probably.. some twenty or thirty years'/ 'parts of the manuscript might be considered obscene'
    - 565-6: Joad plagiarised him [see letter to Joad/ / NB: He was also in my opinion plagiarised by Charlie Chaplin, in the speech at the end of the Great Dictator ["We think too much, and feel too little"]/ And in the 80s by hack of 'Megatrends' in one sentence, at least
    - 567-8: [Contacts Abraham Flexner of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, after Russell heard Einstein and others had purely research jobs in some organization. 'The political and economic people are a little afraid of you!' Turned down because Flexner's brother, head of Rockefeller Medical Center in New York was a Quaker, married to a cousin of Alys]
    - 568-9: [Santayana's novel, The Last Puritan, sells many copies. He helps Russell with money]
    - 570.1: Just before Second World War/ Writes the case for US neutrality in a war, after which it could use its economic power
    - 574-5: Which Way To Peace? rushed off in 1939 [Not liked by Gerald Brennan; Clark says it says 1 occupation would be less bad than bombing and gas/ 2 Germany and Russia might partition Poland again]
    - 587: Tablet and Jesuit 'America' in 1940
    - 588: 'Aphrodisiac' pleased him. 'I cannot think of any predecessors except Apuleius and Othello' he remarked to Gilbert Murray.'
    - 610 ff: Second World War coming to an end... notes about that [cp e.g. C P Snow's letters on what might happen]
    - 612: After Second world war: 'garden destroyed.. some of the best churches, the Temple.. just as in Lamb's essay.. my grandmother's house in Dover Street'
    - 618-20: BBC regular broadcaster; starts with BBC internal memo 'whether there would be any objection to his speaking on a strictly academic philosophy-brief to India.'/ Eddington, a Quaker, had spoken earlier/ Brains Trust/ The Future of Civilisation/ J B S Haldane/ etc etc, leading to Copleston etc
    - 628: Also worked for the British Council; connection with lectures in Norway
    - 629: [Upper class and breaking glass, breaking windows]
    - 637-8: [Australia trip on 'outbreak of the Korean War'; Russell now 79. Story about 'two sand-gropers at Alice Springs' walking miles in the hope of meeting him]
    - 639: [McMillan Theatre, New York, and people lined up.. around two blocks.. a reporter.. anybody would think it was JANE Russell they were here to see..']
    - 647: [Guardian, newspaper Oct 1945] 'Russia's immense military strength as revealed by the war..' writes Russell. [2021: In retrospect, just another example of Russell's gullibility, since Jews funneled huge sums to the USSR to be used to buy US arms and factories and goods].
    - 647: Sept 1945 letter to Kingsley Martin about USSR behaviour in Germany 'east of the Elbe (with the exception of a part of Berlin) .. Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia.. expulsion of Germans from the territories annexed in what used to be parts of Germany.. utter barbarity..'
    - 658-661: John Freeman March 1959 BBC interview. Clark makes much of Russell advocating preventive war 'against communism, against Soviet Russia?' and Russell's reply .. 'It's entirely true, and I don't repent of it'
    - 665: [Had to memorise Belloc's Cautionary Tales for his kids]
    - 667: 'It is now known .. P M S Blackett .. also.. Sir Henry Tizard did not wish Britain to build her own nuclear weapons. Churchill.. '.. research.. We should have the art rather than the article.'
    - 679: Writes for COI = Central Office of Information
    - 684: 'The Principia had a chequered career.. then had come Kurt Gödel, the Austrian who had shown that any axiomatic system strong enough to prove the truths of elementary arithmetic could be either consistent or complete, but not both. The Principia, he showed, was the first but not the second. .. certainty.. as much a chimera in mathematics as Heisenberg had shown it to be in physics. ..'
    - 685: [Start of criticisms of 'linguistic philosophy'/ defends his Theory of Descriptions]
    - 686-7: 'My Philosophical Development'. .. a great theme is the 'gradual retreat from Pythagoras'. 'I no longer have the wish to thrust out human elements from regions where they belong; I have no longer the feeling that intellect is superior to sense, and that only Plato's world of ideas gives access to the "real" world. ..'
    - 687: '.. the move from London [to North Wales] .. was largely the result of the break-up of the Richmond household. ..'
    - 695: Kingsley Martin says J B Priestley in fact started CND
    - 706: 'Russell.. put up an idea for what finally became the famous Khrushchev Memoirs.'
    - 711-2: '.. autumn 1959.. 'Pugwash and CND.. limits of their effectiveness'.. Approaching his 90th year, he was determined to use a new method. He did so, and split the movement down the middle. ..'
    - 713: Russell deplores Oswald Mosley's sadism
    - 718: Suffragettes as example of success by civil disobedience [cp Poll Tax?]
    - 722: Leonard Cheshire
    - 786: 'Labour government had stated it would not allow entry by North Vietnamese [sic].. Swiss government banned the Tribunal.. de Gaulle announced that the government opposed the Tribunal being held anywhere in France..'
    - 794: Joke about Zena Dare: 'She seems quite beautiful.. He seems quite intelligent'
    - 794: Bible quote from 1 Kings 7:23 in effect implying pi is three [I presume this is right; it's the only one I could find on the subject]

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image   Review of Bertrand Russell   Katharine Tait: My Father, Bertrand Russell

Revealing book by Russell's daughter; but doesn't reveal attractive things, 18 Oct 2010

Russell's nearest and perhaps dearest didn't write much about him. This book is therefore exceptional. Unfortunately Katharine Tait comes across as an entirely egocentric person. The book is more about her than him. Born 1923, when Russell was about 50; the main impressions of this book (at least, to me) are (1) she was rather stupid, (2) Russell's life seen through her eyes was appallingly chaotic and financially and emotionally on the margin of holding together.

There's quite a lot on her early years, Cornwall, and the experimental school in Telegraph House—the school seems to have made the building unsaleable. She says she teased her brother John so persistently it became habitual. It's clear she learned nothing from her father—she clearly never understood things like Kepler's Laws, and all Russell's books she quotes are popular titles, of which she gives the American versions. Russell disliked religion, but Katharine took the practical female view, e.g. envying some curate his house. (She also married a cleric, and went to Uganda presumably to convert the natives; then returned to somewhere higher paying in the USA). She dreamed about magic, marriage, and secret love.

It's painful to hear that Russell told her lies, which confused her for years: e.g. that the Duke of Wellington had a small tail, that Hungary was originally called Yum Yum, that an elephant was coming down the drive (every April 1st), that Mad King Ludwig was ascertained to be mad because he 'bubbled his soup' (her phrase). Russell called her 'woggywog' and pretended she wasn't Kate, which she says worried her.

Russell said in his book The Conquest of Happiness that women are superior to men, because men judge women by looks rather than character. Patricia Spence seems to have conformed to his sexual stereotype. Aged about ten, Katharine watched Russell write 'Freedom and Organisation 1814-1914, sitting upright at his desk, writing, having planned his book in his head, and discussed it with 'Peter'.

In 1938, Russell moved to the USA—to the University of Chicago, Rockefeller's "best investment". After a couple more moves he wrote 'History of Western Philosophy'; Katharine, 15ish when they moved, was at Harvard (or Yale?) and got married—so there are large gaps in her account after about 1945. When Russell was doing his best to be an activist on nuclear war and Vietnam, she has nothing intelligent to say, despite being over 40 by then.

She was filmed, and shown on BBC TV as part of a two-part programme on Russell. She found it hilarious that poor Russell could never find a woman intelligent enough (unless Edith Finch counts).

Not a wonderful book, but possibly helped her weather the financial problems of divorce and her five children.
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Russell book jacket   Review of Bertrand Russell   Rupert Crawshay-Williams: Russell Remembered

Affectionate account of Russell from 1945, 7 May 2009

Published by Oxford University Press (1970) with a single monochrome photo of Russell as frontispiece. 50 years later, fascinating to see absolutely nothing about Jews: Both Crawshay-Williams and Russell agree on the terminology of 'Communists' and 'Russians' (no mentions of Jews) but also on big events: dropping the atomic bomb, giving nuclear secrets to the Russians, murdering Jews, assassination of Kennedy. A wonderful book for absolute ignorance of Jews and Judaism, and leaves one wondering about Oxford University, its Press and its super-censorship.

The author met Russell first as one of a small party, I think with Clough-Ellis or whatever the architect of Portmeirion was called; and he recalls his feeling of nervousness over possible embarrassments that might take place, or yawning silences, whatever. In fact he says Russell liked gossip and small talk. He records his later surprise that Russell and his wife felt nervous about asking them, in turn, to call. He couldn't believe Russell was so isolated.

After the chapter Russell Encountered, we have 1945-8 (p 33 has Russell's inability to make afternoon tea), then A Need for Reassurance and 1948-53. then four more chapters

Crawshay-Williams says at the time he knew nothing of philosophy; extraordinarily, Russell allowed him to read the MS of Human Knowledge while it was being written. C-W also reviewed volume 1 of Russell's Autobiography! And he puts in philosophical footnotes, clearly feeling that philosophy has rubbed off onto him. (C-W's book 'The Comforts of Unreason' was published in 1947). Some of this book was jotted down after chats (there's a similar constructed-from-jottings book about Whitehead, by Lucien Price) but tape recorders, when they became available, were cumbersome.

Great many famous people in passing: Blackett, Brockway, Cantor, Deutscher, John Dewey, Eddington, Fermi, Anatole France, J B S Haldane, Alger Hiss, Holroyd, Julian Huxley, William James, Storm Jameson, Roy Jenkins, Arthur Koestler, G E Moore, Kant, Kennedy assassination, Keynes, Kingsley, Vachel Lindsay, Marvin Minsky, Frank Lloyd Wright, Malinowsky, Ottoline Morrell, Nasser, A S Neill, David Pears, Michael Postan, Schweitzer, Susan Stebbing, several Stracheys, Julian Trevelyan, Trotter of crowd psychology, Voltaire, Alan Wood.

This was the time of the 'Brains Trust', and 'History of Western Philosophy'; up to Russell's Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal. Linguistic philosophy, atomic weapons, Kennedy's assassination, Khrushchev make appearances.

A typical verbal game is Russell on a twelve-penny weighing problem, (on p 32) which Russell refused to even listen to, as his mind would 'buzz' for a couple of days.

A typical bit of philosophy is: 'Russell is by no means alone in this habit of first assuming that we know certain propositions to be true, and only then enquiring how we know them. This assumption is at the basis of the whole controversy as to whether certain statements can be both synthetic (empirical) and at the same time a priori (i.e. known to be true without experience, as 'Two plus two equals four'..) One of these controversial statements is 'Nothing can be both red and green all over. Yet there seems to be no agreed way of formally demonstrating that it is true in this absolute sense. ..'

If you like Russell, this book gives a good account of the final period of his life, viewed by a sympathetic neighbour. Crawshay-Williams seems to have considered that he was 'Boswellizing' Russell; but of course he met Russell only in 1945. But the fantastic omissions in the world-views of both men are hauntingly horrible.
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Review of Very limited look at numbers, fractions, some algebra   Bertrand Russell: Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy

Disappointing
March 2013
1919 book (one of a series of titles by various authors for a philosophical library) is a rather depressing illustration of Russell's uncreativity. There's an exhaustive treatment of numbers (including irrationals etc) and things like continuity—all part of what was at the time called 'analysis'. This is of historical interest; for example Pythagoras was puzzled by the square root of two being, literally, irrational. After algebra, transcendental numbers appeared. The most recent when Russell wrote was Cantor on the infinite; most of which Russell claimed to have worked out independently.

But any wide view—that is the next possibly mathematical advance? Is there some intellectual continuity from enumeration to such analysis of change as is found in calculus? Is arithmetic a picture of the world, as geometry perhaps is? What is it that makes some things more amenable to 'mathematics' than others? Given some new phenomenon, or for that matter something long accepted, is there some 'mathematical' methodology to try to deal with it? Are fuzzy concepts able to be trapped mathematically; if not, what limits are there?—such questions are not part of Russell's work, certainly not in this book. Russell swallowed completely the supposed evidence for relativity. He contributed nothing to physics, which was supposed to have come to some sort of apex with H-bombs: had he known more, he might have played a part in debunking what now appears to be a massive hoax.
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Review of Bertrand Russell   Human Society in Ethics and Politics (published in 1954)

Collection of Essays on the Theory and Practical Application of Ethics. BUT freighted with Judaic Ethics from Christianity, and Cold War and Other Wrong 'Useful Idiot' Assumptions. Oct 2015
A difficult book to read, and difficult to review. Five stars for importance: anyone who can conclusively demonstrate a valid theory of ethics, and not only that but go on to show how to politically achieve it, will have achieved something stellar and magnificent. I don't know how far Russell thought this book would make him the Newton of ethics, as Bentham did. But of course the book wasn't popular, or convincing. I was tempted to give a higher rating, because there is meat in there accessible with some effort, but perhaps a virtuous book ought to minimise the effort needed to digest its ideas.

The title always struck me as odd, with its strange use of 'in'. There's also his implicit belief that one 'human society' exists; Russell was untroubled by anthropological questions. The title must have been chosen to try to fit the chapters: the first nine were written in 1945-6; twelve others in 1953; and 'Politically Important Desires', which was delivered in Stockholm on receiving his Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950, and therefore I presume written in 1950.
      This period spans the post-Second World War era, following the blanket censorship of the war and more or less up to the announcement of the Soviet 'H-bomb'. ('Soviet' meant Russia, which was renamed the USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after the 1917 Jewish coup. But Russell always referred to it as 'Russia'). Russell probably believed in complete Jewish innocence, complete German and/or Hitler guilt, regrettable Russian violence, the USA as run by Americans, the completeness of technical fixes, absence of genetic reactions to events, and the truth of atomic bombs. He believed Hitler's policy was the same as Bismarck's—incredibly, in a world where Jews in Russia were fed with money and weapons, mostly by Jews in the USA. All these beliefs were known at the time by 'elites' to be wrong, and they now appear wrong to many people, which complicates the interpretation, and also makes Russell look something of a fool.

Russell writes very badly on ethics. I *think* because there was not much in the way of analysis of ethical ideas. Isaiah Berlin liked to invent, or use, Greek-based words to categorise types of philosophical theories; but the same process doesn't seem to have been applied much to ethical ideas, because of course consigning them to categories annoyed religiously-dogmatic types, or was liable to charges of blasphemy, or made Jewish exceptionalism obvious, or otherwise was discouraged. Russell was of course aware of the external view of life on earth, the solar system as a tiny part of the Milky Way, which makes it obvious that there's no such thing as objective ethics. So, much of his ethics section is verbiage which could have been reduced by some classificatory system.
      Russell was heavily doped by his upbringing: George Eliot saying 'There is no God and yet we must be good' was regarded as sophisticated humour. His category of 'superstitious ethics' illustrates a problem: what Jew for example would admit that twirling a chicken over his head is 'superstitious'? Russell also had a tiresome tendency to assume people were fools, without taking into account propaganda; despite his awareness of the power of propaganda. Here's a typical online quotation: 'The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed in view of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widely spread belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible.' Probably everyone who ever lived has believed they need food to survive; that they need water, or they will feel thirst; that they have to sleep now and then; that they dislike extreme cold, and extreme heat; that fire can harm them; that if they're stabbed or hit, they will feel pain or worse. If so, these people would all have been entirely correct.
      And Russell, as he explains in this Autobiography, felt deeply that some acts are evil, and others good, and despite talks with Santayana that feeling remained with him. No doubt it remains with many people; I hope so, I think. In War Crimes in Vietnam he did what he could to express horror and disgust at what he took to be American actions, but he had no idea that there are people with no such reactions. However, he seems to have had little idea of the genetic roots of behaviour.

I think it's fair to say that Russell looks at human groups and says, in effect, well, it's unfair to discriminate in favour of one of these as against the other. Therefore everyone should be nice to everyone else. His interpretation of ethics is, broadly, that anyone who says people ought to get along is ethically a good person. But Russell also as I've noted elsewhere almost invariably uses examples (as does J S Mill) which make other groups—savages, Moslems, cannibals, Germans, Catholics, Americans, businessmen, Amish, Hindus, Fascisti, Japanese—look silly and irrational. In this way he combines a supposedly general ethic with arrogance about his own kind. The most important example at present is probably so-called Jews, who simply deny that any other groups should even be considered human. Russell's argumentation fails in the most important case.

Much of Russell's material on the intersection between ideas and the real world doesn't seem soundly based. For example, on 'free will', Russell's main concern is that if people believe in free will, they may suddenly stop doing their work. I think it's true to say Russell never understood 'free will'. He thinks that man has always sharply distinguished other men, as either friends or enemies, but of course this is untrue—no town or city could exist if it were true, opening the possibility to unnoticed criminals and subversion. Russell has an argument from anthropology which is tiresome, on sending out a questionnaire to 'leaders of religious thought throughout the world'. He doesn't seem perturbed by this empirical intrusion into theory; suppose (for example) they all agree; they might still be wrong. He seems to miss the point of arguments for religious revival, which as far as I can see is the claim that it worked in the past, and so it should work now. Russell stresses (e.g.) Christian states at the time of the late Roman Empire fighting each other, which most modern people would probably not believe to be historically true. Russell also assumes that his newspapers and the BBC give him reliable information: he had absolutely no idea of the extend of Jewish media control.

Russell was followed in the official English-speaking ethics world by P H Nowell-Smith who may or may not have written well, but seems to have been opportunistic and unpleasant. John Rawls (American?) was another; I doubt he had anything to say on world issues. But the whole development of philosophical ethics has been (as far as I know) submerged by the huge torrent of Jewish-paper-money funded material, including in particular the fraud of the 'Holocaust' and 'Jewish' horror that anyone could fight to remove Jewish control over money. An example is Grayling. Russell, although awash with errors, doesn't compare badly with the subsequent deluge of filthy water—he at least tried to take things seriously.

Here's the chapter list:
INTRODUCTION
PART 1: ETHICS [Object: 'to set forth an undogmatic ethic ....'] 1. SOURCES OF ETHICAL BELIEFS AND FEELINGS | 2. MORAL CODES | 3. MORALITY AS MEANS | 4. GOOD AND BAD | 5. PARTIAL AND GENERAL GOODS | 6. MORAL OBLIGATION | 7. SIN | 8. ETHICAL CONTROVERSY | 9. IS THERE ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE? | 10. AUTHORITY IN ETHICS | 11. PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION | 12. SUPERSTITIOUS ETHICS | 13. ETHICAL SANCTIONS
PART 2: THE CONFLICT OF PASSIONS [Object: '.... and to apply this ethic to various current political problems. .. does not attempt to be a complete theory of politics. .. I deal only with those parts that, in addition to being closely related to ethics, are of urgent practical importance...'] 1. FROM ETHICS TO POLITICS | 2. POLITICALLY IMPORTANT DESIRES | 3. FORETHOUGHT AND SKILL | 4. MYTH AND MAGIC | 5. COHESION AND RIVALRY | 6. SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUE AND THE FUTURE | 7. WILL RELIGIOUS FAITH CURE OUR TROUBLES? | 8. CONQUEST? | 9. STEPS TOWARDS A STABLE PEACE | 10. PROLOGUE OR EPILOGUE?


Important note on the 5-page Preface: I see, some years later, that I omitted the Preface. However, it includes an important point which clarifies him and goes a long way to nullifying much of his argumentation. This is what he says:-
“Reason” has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends.

      The etymology of 'reason' (Old French, Middle English, varied usages) makes Russell's assertion seem wrong. I assume he's influenced by such people as Kant ('categorical imperative') and Hume.
      But the 'clear and precise meaning' is strangely deficient. Suppose a man wishes an end to be a model train set. Russell says he's a reasonable man if he works out the 'right' means to his train set—no doubt size, place, design and layout would come into it, plus lighting, electricity and so on. But surely 'reason' should include the choice of ends. Is a man using his reason if he wants to build an indoor swimming-pool filling his entire house, or wants to produce a design for mass murder of anyone who wears jeans, or wants to design a wooden military vehicle to be placed upside-down in his front garden? Very probably the narrow and restricted definition is to evade issues typically of Jewish interest, such as auctioning properties before they have been seized by Jews, or dealing in traffic of women for prostitution, or claiming that non-Jews are non-entities. I don't know, and since Russell is beyond enquiry shall never know.

Russell's Introduction includes this:
‘... Wisdom as regards the action of social groups requires a scientific study of human nature in society, if we are to judge what is possible and what impossible. The first thing is to be clear as to the important motives governing the behaviour of individuals and groups. Of these the most important are those concerned with survival, such as food and shelter and clothing and reproduction. But when these are secure, other motives become immensely strong. Of these, acquisitiveness, rivalry, vanity, and love of power are the most important. Most of the political actions of groups and their leaders can be traced to these four motives, together with what is necessary for survival. ...’
    These are descriptions, from outside, not very helpful towards understanding how biology leads to types of activity. It's fairly easy to see how hunger and thirst affect animals, by way of some mechanism which registers lack of water, lack of sugars or protein, or whatever, though a lot of science is needed. But how is acquisitiveness for example encoded in some presumably Darwinian way? And 'love of power' which seems to be the most abstract? Russell belonged to the world without much in the way of statistical modelling; one feels there may be a way to analyse politics based on impulses, perhaps pairs of opposing impulses, rather like muscles. I haven't found much along these lines, apart from Russell insisting on these four 'most important' motives.

A typical example of Russell doing his best to set out starting-point is his account of Leibitz and 'compossibilities' (presumably not verbatim from Leibnitz). 'Borrowing a term from Leibniz's account of possible worlds, we may call two desires or impulses "compossible" when both can be satisfied, and "conflicting" when the satisfaction of the one is incompatible with that of the other. If two men are both candidates for the Presidency of the United States, one of them must be disappointed. But if two men both wish to become rich, the one by growing cotton and the other by manufacturing cotton cloth, there is no reason why both should not succeed.' This is slightly reminiscent of Jack Sprat. Of course, if people are happy with the equivalent of only eating meat, or fat, we have no problem. In practice, this is not much help.

In Chapter 1, to give the feel of Russell, we have, and I quote at length:
Let us begin with egoism, by which I mean the doctrine that every man does--or should--pursue exclusively his own interest. To make this doctrine precise, we must first define what we mean by a man's "interest''. The most precise definition is that of the doctrine called "psychological hedonism", which asserts that every man not only does, but inevitably must, pursue exclusively his own pleasure. This doctrine was held by all the earlier utilitarians. It followed that, if "virtue" consists in pursuing the general good, the only way to make men virtuous is to produce a harmony between general and private interests, by insuring that the act which will produce the maximum of pleasure for myself is also that which will produce the maximum of pleasure for the community. In the absence of the criminal law I should steal, but fear of prison keeps me honest. If I enjoy being praised and dislike being blamed, the moral sentiments of my neighbours have an effect similar to that of the criminal law. Belief in everlasting rewards and punishments in the next life should, on a rational computation, be an even more efficient safeguard of virtue.

But it is not the case that men desire only their own pleasure. There is a confusion arising from the fact that, whatever you may desire, you will obtain pleasure from achieving your object, but in most cases the desire is the source of the pleasure, whereas psychological hedonism supposes the anticipated pleasure to be the cause of the desire. This applies especially to the simplest desires, such as hunger. The hungry man desires food, whereas the well-fed gourmet desires the pleasure to be derived from food. The desire for food is one which we share with the animals, whereas the desire for the pleasure of good food is a sophisticated product of cookery, memory, and imagination.

Further: the pleasure to be derived from achieving a desired object consists, in general, of two parts, one that of achievement, the other that belonging to the object on its own account. If you chase round the town in search of oranges, and at last obtain some, you have not only the pleasure that the oranges would have given you if you had obtained them without difficulty, but also the pleasure of success. Only the latter is always present when a desire is satisfied; the former may, on occasion, be absent.

The psychological hedonist is thus mistaken in supposing that what we desire is always pleasure, but he is mistaken also in another respect which is, for us, of even more importance.

What a man desires need not be an experience of his own, or a series of experiences, or anything to be realized in his own life. It is not only possible, but usual, to have objects of desire which lie wholly outside our own lives. The most common example of this is parental feeling. A large percentage of mankind, probably a majority, desire that their children shall prosper after they themselves are dead. The same thing is true of wives, and of some women who are not wives; Charles II [etc]

From Chapter 5, Partial and General Goods, we find
'General good' = total satisfaction of desire, no matter by whom enjoyed.
Various systems of morality.. differing views as to class whose good an individual should seek. .. Each embodied in familiar maxims. ... Christ taught.. 'though shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'.. [also Buddhists and Stoics] ... Since the rise of nationalism ... the good of one's nation for that of all mankind.. "for king and country". Russell knew some Russian revolutionaries during the Russo-Japanese war who drank a toast "to the failure of Russian arms" [These very likely Jews, of course]. ... Some.. loyalty to their colour .. Haiti.. Kipling's lesser breeds without the law.. Chinese till 1840, Japanese till 1945. .. the belief that only the good of one race is important...

Russell is dishonest in claiming that nationalists are interested exclusively in one nation or race. Generally, they know perfectly well that they have enough trouble staking their own claim.

Chapter 7, 'Sin'. It took me years to realise that by 'sense of sin' Russell seems to mean ANY feeling that something is wrong, including say murder or incest or war work or lying. He didn't distinguish this properly from 'superstitious ethics' and I was baffled by the way discussion of things he clearly disapproved of seemed to be mixed with irrational feelings of guilt over silly things.
    Russell states 'sin' is always a feeling in opposition to some authority, rather than something endogenous. Examples include: 'Disobedience, if it is to feel sinful, must be disobedience to an authority inwardly respected..' and '... a sense of sin ... may be .. a subconscious association with parental disapproval, or it may be fear of the bad opinion of a man's own herd ...' But he mixes this with 'it was connected with ritual defilement and with breaches of tabu' and 'the sense of sin reached its acme in St Augustine' and with behaving 'against the Will of God'. And he speculates that Columbus may have felt sinful if he didn't risk his voyage, and Thomas More sinful if he hadn't studied Greek.

Russell was very liable to feelings of sinfulness; or at least claimed he was—for example, in his autobiography he says he felt more at ease in a small Christian church than in the ruins of the Parthenon, and claimed the Greeks had had no 'sense of sin'. This seems to me a piece of wrong, hypocritical, or misplaced official self-criticism. It's comparable in my view with 'pathological altruism' as a self-criticism of the West. In neither case does it correspond closely with the real world, though there's a bit of truth in it. In wars and atrocities, there is little sign of either a feeling of sin or an attitude of altruism.

The chapter meanders on feelings of shame and/or guilt, and on 'free will', in very traditional style, and unfortunately is not Darwinian in any sense; it's partly in the Jewish quasi-tradition of Freud. Disappointing; I'd hoped for helpful comparisons with 'pathological altruism' and 'virtue signalling', but no such luck.
Here's part 2, The Conflict of Passions. Turning from Russell's inadequate theorising, we find practical matters, though mostly seen from a pre-First World War viewpoint. This is unfortunate, since the topics themselves—Forethought and Skill, Cohesion and Rivalry, Scientific Technique, Conquest?—needed more insight than provided by British political puppets and lightweight observers.

Chapter 7: Can Religious Faith Cure Our Troubles? And in here we have Russell's summary of the history of the world during much of his adult lifetime. I've put it below; it is extremely interesting as an utterly Jew-naive set of events. It's a newspaper-like view without the slightest grasp of Jewish behind-the-scenes malevolence:
What has happened in the world since 1914 has proceeded with a kind of inevitability that is like that of Greek tragedy. It is an inevitability derived, not from external circumstances, but from the characters of the actors. Let us briefly trace the steps in this development.
    The Germans in 1914 thought themselves strong enough to secure by force an empire comparable to those of Britain, France, and Russia. Britain, France and Russia combined to thwart this ambition. Russia was defeated and, in the Revolution of 1917, abandoned its traditional Imperialistic policy. The West had promised Constantinople to the Russians, but, when the Russians made a separate peace, this promise fell through. Britain and France, with the help of America, defeated the Germans after the Germans had defeated the Russians. The Germans were compelled to accept the humiliating Treaty of Versailles and to profess a belief in their sole war-guilt. They were "wicked" because they had made war. The Russians were "wicked" because they had made a separate peace, and, still more, because they had repudiated their war-debts. All the victorious nations combined to fight Russia, but were defeated, and were somewhat surprised to find that Russia no longer loved them. The Germans meanwhile suffered great distress, which was much aggravated when the folly of the American Republican Government brought about the Great Depression. Suffering produced hysteria, and hysteria produced Hitler. The Western nations, hoping that Hitler would attack Russia, did not oppose him. They had opposed the comparatively blameless Weimar Republic, but in befriending Hitler they proved to all mankind that they were totally destitute of moral standards. Hitler, fortunately, was mad, and, owing to madness, brought about his own downfall. The West had been delighted to accept Russia's help in bringing about this result, and, whereas at the end of the First World War Russia and Germany had been alike weak, Russia at the end of the Second World War was strong. Britain was traditionally hostile to Russia, but from 1907 to 1917 had been forced into a semblance of friendship with that country by fear of Germany. At the end of the Second World War a quite new international pattern developed. Western Europe had ceased to count. Russia and the United States were alone powerful. As has always happened in the past in more or less similar situations, these two Great Powers were mutually hostile. Each saw a chance of world hegemony. Russia inherited the policy of Philip II, Napoleon and the Kaiser. America inherited the policy which England had pursued throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.
    In all this there was nothing new except technique. .. The situation would be exactly what it is if Russia still adhered to the Orthodox Church. What our propaganda would be can be seen by anybody who reads the records of the Crimean War. ..'

It's worth quoting Russell at length on early Christianity:
    It is completely mysterious to me that there are apparently sane people who think that a belief in Christianity might prevent war. Such people seem totally unable to learn anything from history. The Roman State became Christian at the time of Constantine, and was almost continually at war until it ceased to exist. The Christian States which succeeded to it continued to fight each other, though, it must be confessed, they also from time to time fought states which were not Christian. From the time of Constantine to the present day there has been no shred of evidence to show that Christian States are less warlike than others. Indeed, some of the most ferocious wars have been due to disputes between different kinds of Christianity. Nobody can deny that Luther and Loyola were Christians, nobody can deny that their differences were associated with a long period of ferocious wars.
    Russell doesn't name any of the states, presumably regarding knowledge of Rome as something common to most people. More seriously, he has no idea of actual historical processes. He states, in the passive, that the 'Roman State became Christian', when Constantine was selected to bring about that change, which was then enforced by violent persecution. In the same mental flow, he has no idea of the forces behind such people as Luther and Loyola.

Chapter 10, Authority in Ethics, I think deals (in essence) with Jesus in opposition to the world of his time, and influencing people post mortem. Russell identified himself with someone heroically struggling against evil, though people with no belief in the Jewish 'Jesus' character, and no belief in any beneficent results from Christianity, will not follow Russell. Russell believes in, and often uses the phrase, "the interest of the community", as though such a thing is indubitable and present. Here's quite a precise statement: 'Many of the things that are best in the human species are due to the fact that it is not completely gregarious. The individual has his own intrinsic value, and the best individuals make contributions to the general good which are not demanded, and are often even resented by the rest of the herd. ...' The latter part sounds like Barbara Lerner Spectre.

I have a lot more material on this book by Russell; perhaps I'll write it up. But generally, it's clear Russell is a conventional 19th century radical, unaware of the intrusion in the 20th century of Jews or more imitators. And he has no idea of systematic propaganda. His precepts are of little use—should there be punishments for deception, for example?—and always assume conventional principles on what is good and bad—why should human populations which outgrow food be treated 'well'? Practically, in addition to his 19th century ignorance about Jews, he has no idea about the 'Fed' and paper money, the Jewish push for wars, and the phoney 'nuclear weapons' and 'Cold War' and 'Jewish' money frauds. It's terribly sad and terribly worthless.
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Review of Bertrand Russell   PORTRAITS from MEMORY and other essays (published in 1956)

Russell aged about 80: about half his life had been lived before the First World War. Rather agonisingly affectionate memories of friendships and attempts at intellectual venture, totally innocent of the truth about post-1945 world. Added 20 May 2017
Worth reading for its sentimentality, and complete failure to assess the world situation. '... the absolute conviction of stability which made it an unquestioned axiom that no changes were to be expected anywhere in the world, except an ordered and gradual development towards a constitution exactly like that of Britain. Was ever an age so blessedly blind to the future? ...' Russell wrote in his short chapter on Lord John Russell.
      An Autobiographical Epitome looks back, overviews history in a naive way, including his family's part in the 'Revolution of 1688' and has much the same wording as his filmed interview here 1952 A Conversation with Bertrand Russell

'Six Autobiographical Talks' has two 'talks' on philosophy, starting with 'Why I Took to Philosophy'. 'Experiences of a Pacifist in the First World War' shows he had not the slightest comprehension of unified propaganda, made possible by newspapers and their control, nor any idea that significant groups of people want war, nor even that street violence could be a part of politics. 'From Logic to Politics' describes his view of individual psychology and the First World War, 'individual psychology' being what was described in newspapers of the time. 'Beliefs...' and 'Hopes...' are what one might expect; he hopes for a more evenly-divided world, which he considers would necessarily be cheerier and less prone to violence.

His nine 'Portraits from Memory' are: I Cambridge Dons (in the 1890s), II Some of Russell's contemporaries at Cambridge, III George Bernard Shaw, IV Wells, V Conrad, VI George Santayana, VII Whitehead, VIII Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and IX D H Lawrence. Keynes is excluded; so is G E Moore, and Wittgenstein, suggesting Russell ducked the task of describing people he'd considered his superiors. He also ducks the task of describing his family, such as Lord Portal, bomber of German cities, or at least nominal air force commander.

The nine sections give an overview of the late nineteenth century's pinnacle of the British academic world, but, to the prepared mind, delapidates it stone by stone. Security of tenure was 'carried very far';
When I [Russell in 1890] was a freshman, the College was dominated by three elderly dignitaries: the Master, the Vice-Master, and the Senior Fellow. When I returned to the College twenty years later as a lecturer, they were still going strong, and seemed no older. ... The Senior Fellow was the last survivor of the old system by which men got life Fellowships at twenty-two and had no further duties except to draw their dividend. This duty he performed punctiliously, but otherwise he was not known to have done any work whatever since the age of twenty-two.

As the case of the Senior Fellow shows, security of tenure was carried very far. The result was partly good, partly bad. Very good men flourished, and so did some who were not so good. Incompetence, oddity and even insanity were tolerated, but so was real merit. In spite of some lunacy and some laziness, Cambridge was a good place, where independence of mind could exist undeterred.

It occurs to me that a degree was generally regarded as an escape from work for life—consider the case of the hierarchy of the Church of England, and the analogous cases of the navy and army. It seemed natural to advocate conventional education, though by 1945 the weakness was starting to show. I've often enough found that textbooks by schoolmasters of that era were remarkably good, and part of that tradition survives—a biography of Tony Blair was partly written by a public school master, though the quality was in the tradition of non-excellence.

Russell provides anecdotes about anecdotes, but also comments on Fellows in orders and the Thirty-Nine Articles. Russell's information on his contemporaries outlines a very few of them, and many (for example, Sanger) introduced to him on the recommendation of Whitehead, who was about eleven years older—the previous academic generation—with obscure suggestions of appointment corruption: Russell was himself preferred over a rival maths examinee (presumably just as A J Ayer's final exam results were revised up, much later). We have McTaggart, the Hegelian, and the Trevelyans ('Bob ... Like all the family, ... has a minute knowledge of the strategy and tactics in all the great battles of the world'—except presumably the financing.
      To the modern revisionist mind, the striking thing of all these supposedly disparate figures is their complete ignorance, or avoidance, of the Jewish issue: Shaw and Wells, of course; Conrad, the Pole hating Russia; Santayana, the Spaniard at Harvard unaware of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism's mutual base in 'Jewish' writings—the sinking of the Maine was 1898; Whitehead, 'whose knowledge of history used to amaze me'; the Webbs, with minimal information on Sidney Webb (later 'Lord Passfield'). Russell learned to hate D H Lawrence, who knew something was wrong with the world, but of course got nothing useful from Russell or his visits to Cambridge. Russell knew the Universities lived on their investments, but otherwise had no interest in their financial entanglements, except as occasional scandals.

A passage, on H G Wells, shows Jewish penetration before the First World War. Russell met Wells in 1902 at Sidney Webb's discussion society, 'The Co-efficients'. Present were also Sir Edward Grey, H J MacKinder, Commander Bellairs 'a breezy naval officer' (long, rather pointless anecdote), W A S Hewins (director of the new LSE), about four others who 'escaped my memory'. And Amory. I presume Russell meant Amery—Russell's autobiography has a mis-spelt Jew in South Africa—who was later outed as a Jew, with interests in South Africa. The 'Co-efficients' may be listed elsewhere; I'd guess they were military, naval, financial, or propaganda types.

Some of this material reappeared in Russell's Autobiography. Most is affectionate, possibly too much so: Whitehead was anti-'Nazi', and blamed Germans for his son's death near the end of the Great War. Russell considers his Bergson-like philosophy was started by this event. Santayana as described by Russell is essentially a literary critic; his account of Goethe is a tour de force: Russell says nothing about Harvard's hiring policies in those days. Shaw and the Webbs are treated as 'socialists' in the UK sense, though Russell just about recognises that Mrs Webb learned the idea that directors keep shareholders in their place from her war-profiting father—my description, taken from Russell, who wrote of the Crimean war with no sort of insight. Russell never mentions that Webb was a Jew. All world events which Russell viewed politically, from Napoleon onwards, are treated as party political, and where necessary as between nations. Thus, he always refers to the USSR as 'Russia'. His Freedom and Organization 1814-1914 starts with the Congress and Vienna, and completely ignores finance and the Rothschilds.


Russell's discursive essays include How I Write, which includes near-plagiarism of Orwell's 1946 Politics and the English Language. And Russell's Symptoms of Orwell's 1984 is agonisingly ignorant of the forces behind Communism, a judgment reinforced by Why I am not a Communist.
    A Plea for Clear Thinking recommends '... we substitute a single abstract problem in which the letters A and B replace the names of nations or communities about which we have strong feelings..'. Russell, as always, assumes the important groups will be identifiable, and two in number.
    History as an Art is a long essay (as are John Stuart Mill and Mind and Matter). Russell wishes 'to set forth what those who are not historians ought to get from history.' The sweep of the essay—everything from what makes some things interesting—and literary style—and the decline of history in the grand manner—conceals the single most important puzzle of history, thrown sharply into light and shade by queries of secret Jew machinations. Russell does however refer to a number of historians and histories: Meyers, The Dawn of History ('... on four separate occasions drought in Arabia has caused a wave of Semitic conquest'), Trevelyan's Social History and Clio, Milman's History of Christianity. And Augustine, Carlyle, Clarendon, Gibbon (and Tillemont, of the spade work), Hegel, Macaulay, Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, Toynbee, Treitschke, Sarpi, and the Cambridge Ancient History. Russell thought in terms of drama, not accuracy, though fortunately he was modern enough not to take Jewish mythology very seriously.
    The Cult of Common Usage discusses the 'most influential school of philosophy in Britain at the present day...' Russell wrote the foreword to Words and Things (by Ernest Gellner, presumably a Jew) on this topic. Russell seems unable to connect dots with the Dons, Head Master, Senior Fellow, and others of his youth.
    Knowledge and Wisdom is a short article which shows that Russell had no idea about instinctive or genetic impulses, which Jews and blacks have forced onto the attention of the modern world. If only A, presented with a list of his good and bad points by B, and his rival B, presented with a list of his good and bad points by A, would get together sufficiently ... how much better the world would be.
    Man's Peril (BBC radio) and Steps towards Peace (read for him at the World Assembly for Peace, Helsinki) were part of the unpredictable outcome of the Jewish fraud of 'nuclear weapons'. The various Peace movements were widely felt or believed to be Communist; another misunderstanding, since of course they were Jewish. Sigh. Soon after this book was published, Russell started activity against Americans and the Vietnam War. If only he'd known about war criminals such as Kissinger.

After Russell's Portraits, we have a chapter on Lord John Russell,
Russell entirely approved of his grandfather, rather as J S Mill remained under his father's mental thumb. With the aid of the magic light held aloft to illuminate the darkness, the Jew-aware flame, we can now see him as a paid sycophant of Jews. Victoria gave him Pembroke Lodge (presumably plus equipment and servants)—her longevity, as with Elizabeth II, probably assured by the Jewish link. Russell's piece incorporates all the evasive turns of phrase and slang expressions by which Jews kept hidden, in a similar way in which savages are reported to change the names of things they shouldn't mention.
      Russell wrote: ‘He was one month old when the September Massacres terrified Royalists at home and the Battle of Valmy began the twenty-two years' war of the revolution against reaction.’ I recommend Miles Mathis on the 'French Revolution'; Mathis is scathing on Valmy, and his article suggests Russell was primed to repeat the official crypto-jewish story.
      Meanwhile, other Jewish forces were at play: with 1066 and c. 1666, they at least controlled the 'Bank of England', and one has to guess why a supplement was felt needed. Possibly it was simply a population issue. Or a money thing: in the 18th century, there were huge and expensively irrelevant buildings erected around England; very likely these were seen to be excessive, once the fever had passed. Or an aristocratic thing: there was intermarriage and one can sense remotely the disapproval combined with money-grabbing that must have happened. Or a Church of England thing: Roman Catholicism was in symbiosis with Jews, which must have left traces in the C of E.
      But treating the 19th century as a new, separate thrust, Russell appears a major player, as Disraeli and Gladstone were later. I'll go through Russell's short chapter and attempt to decode the phrases into what may have been their meanings at the time.
      The 'French Revolution' but not 1815 has passed before LJR's birth. The 'French Revolution' was code for a Jewish promotion of war, on the divide-and-rule principle. The novelist Walter Scott noticed this and wrote about it, but was successfully edited out. Whether Napoleon was Jewish is a question addressed, possibly for the first time, by Miles Mathis. The 'fall of the monarchy' may have been a fake. The word 'reaction' (to the September massacres) was perhaps a Newtonian introduction. Russell orates about Fox (Tories) vs Pitt (Whigs), but of course there's complete omission of Jews. So those battle lines may be wrong.
      Russell ascribes the 1832 Reform Bill to LJR, 'which started Britain ... to complete democracy.' My guess is that Jews were confident enough of controlling opinion that they felt they could risk democracy. The passing of the Bill was the 'decisive battle between reactionaries and progressives in England.' The was nearly civil war. These days one would think of landowners, poverty-stricken by the Rothschilds after Waterloo, willing to accept bribes for votes. Anyway, 'in later years he was only moderately Liberal.' Translation: he'd done his work for Jews and no longer needed to pretend.
      LJR was an aristocratic reformer ... deriving his zeal from Demosthenes and Tacitus', Liberty vs Tyranny, and 'quite untouched by the hard facts of economics'. (And untouched by the hard facts of the results of the 'Kahal' system.) (C N Parkinson wrote that Greece became a democracy in the 19th century, mocking he whole attitude). Just before his death, LJR was lauded by 'leading nonconformists' (code word to include Jews) as a supporter 'of religious liberty' (code word for supporting Jews to enter and parasitize. Since Jews have their evasive kol nidre vow, they needn't have protested; but I suppose they didn't feel secure enough to break their solemn oaths—except with governments).
and then a chapter on John Stuart Mill, the longest in the book, the next longest being History as an Art. I want to zoom in on Russell on Mill (1806-1873), who he clearly regards as a perfect specimen of early to mid Victorianism.
In his Autobiography Russell wrote that he gave 'John Stuart Mill' as a lecture to the British Academy in January, 1955, and that it was 'acclaimed in a most gratifying manner. The audience rose, thumped, and clapped.' The 'British Academy' is not an impressive organisation. I want to show why that reaction was unsound, and why the audience may have been claqued.
      The chapter is in four sections, an arrangement I may as well retain.
      I
      Note firstly the chance nature of 'Victorianism'. Victoria (1819-1901; Queen 1837) lived many years, but might have died much earlier than she did. This imposes a pseudo-uniformity of the sort which seems important to nostalgic types. Russell insists on two other types of uniform change: one is the attitude that ideas are links in chains, detectable usually after the event. The other is that philosophers and thinkers and 'thinkers' seem to cause change (though Russell never shows how this trick is done.)
      Mill's 'influence in politics and in forming opinion on moral issues was very great' writes Russell, but with no evidence, except, presumably, mentions in the newspapers and magazines of the time. But note that Mill said nothing about India or China. The East India Company was integrated into British life; the Chinese opium trade was indirect, but powerful. Mill's father wrote the history of the East India Co and must have known a lot about it. But he wrote nothing (that I know of) on the sinister side. Russell writes nothing about Mill and money; it's very likely that John Mill was a Jewish hireling, with John Stuart financed in the same way. He looks like a manufactured product, like the 'Dimbleby' family in Britain from about 1945. Russell says absolutely nothing on this issue. Belloc's book The Jews (1920) was published 35 years before Russell's speech, but was entirely ignored. Most of the African and other empire ventures of Britain, nominally, took place after J S Mill's death; but even so he made no projections or predictions.
      Part I nods towards J S Mill's great influence, but the huge majority is on Logic (first edn 1843), which Russell correctly savages, even though this would seem to weaken J S Mill's influence. Russell talks of induction, and of sets which contain things which belong elsewhere, giving paradoxical results. I've criticised Russell on this; language has immense coverage but also technical limits, which make it unreasonable to expect microscopic precision in unusual cases. Russell likes George Boole's Laws of Thought (1854) and mentions Darwin's Origin of Species (1859), both books leaving little impression on J S Mill. Russell attributes this to John Mill's iron grip, reigning supreme over his son's subconscious. And not to J S Mill's lack of intelligence and/or source of funding.
      II
      Part II deals entirely with J S Mill's Principles of Political Economy (1848 - the same year as The Communist Manifesto, Russell points out, without discussing 1848). Russell also points out that in 1849 a 'substantially modified edition' was published, mainly concerning socialism. This seems a remarkably short time to reset and reprint a book of no great sales impact, adding to the puzzle over Mill's backing. Mill, like Russell, seems to have had no idea that 'Marxian socialism' was a Jewish construction, based no doubt on the Kahal system, where Jews aim to own and control everything. J S Mill wrote on St Simon and Fourier, who I think must have been influenced by Roman Catholic oratory, again without understanding of the rigidly censored Jewish symbiosis with Catholicism. And of course with other groups—Islam, Quakers, Mormons, Freemasons... though of course Russell says nothing about them.)
      At this point, Russell notices that in 'our time, [we] take it as part of the meaning of socialism that private capitalists should be replaced by the State' where what he means is that Jews of the Manchester Guardian type want to control things for Jews. Mill was confident that 'the power of governments ... will diminish' where this difference comes to a head, one might say. But I must repeat the Jewish element was completely suppressed by both writers.
      Russell says the 'only nineteenth century writer who foresaw he future with any approach to accuracy was Nietzsche' but this is not true. There were warnings about Jewish power. But not in books and the press: respectable media were Jewish-controlled. As a test, see if you can find references to Jewish power in, for example, The Times.

      Russell refers to Mr Packe, who wrote 'his admirable biography'. If you wish to test the hypothesis that J S Mill was controlled opposition, shepherded by several Jews, you might read this biography with your jadar turned on. My guess is that Packe was substantially Jewish, judging partly by his odd surname. If you detect this background, you may find confirmation in the topics selected, for example the differences between the editions and the extent to which these reflect Jewish interests. You may find no hints as from where Mill, and his East India Co father, got their income. You may find subtle clues on the extent to which Mill's 'media image', as a puritanical solemn correctly-behaved Victorian gentleman, was manufactured.
      Russell quotes Mill's 'famous passage' on communism: ‘... the produce of labour ... apportioned as we now see it ... largest portion to those who have never worked at all, ... remuneration dwindling as the work gros harder and more disagreeable, until the most exhausting bodily labour cannot count ... on being able to earn even the necessities...&rquo; But Russell doesn't notice the parts played by knowledge and planning and non-labouring work, or work which is deceptive and fantastic or entertaining. .
      III
      Russell switches to On Liberty (1859) and. On the Subjection of Women (1869). He says little on the latter—mentioning only Plato, but not legal material of the Belfort Bax type on allowances extended to women in practice. Russell spoke on the subject, but only advocated votes for women, which of course only encourages the power of organise parties. He spoke for suffragists, not the violent funded group, the suffragettes. Russell hasn't a clue as to how pressure groups were funded, presumably generally by Jews.
      On Liberty failed in its nominal purpose, and Russell ponders this, but doesn't consider how freedom for group A may well infringe freedom for group B. He doesn't consider the harm that liberty can do, or balance it with the good it can do. In particular, he doesn't know that freedom for Jews implies non-freedom of 'Goyeem' as they're pronounced; the reason that 'from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth, 'Liberty' was the watchword of the radicals and revolutionaries' was to boost Jews at everyone else's expense. He deplores the Soviet Union, which he always calls 'Russia', but is entirely unaware of the Jews behind it and their international influence (under which the USSR was flooded with weapons, trucks, tanks, planes while this fact was hidden from local populations around the world.) Russell says 'Marx substituted Prussian discipline for freedom', ignoring Jews.
      He has a theory (also in Power) that lack of liberty was a feature of big organizations. If the executive structure at the top has aims not shared by the other 'members', 'the lack of liberty may grow until it is almost total.' Russell has no theory as to how 'members' may largely dislike 'their' organisation, and be made to remain. But Russell hadn't the slightest conception of the intense malice and hatred which Jews have for 'goyim'.

      At the end of this section Russell displays hostility to police, including the F.B.I. 'which has only the level of education to be expected among policemen, [and] considers itself competent to withhold visas from the most learned men in Europe ...' one of his examples being Oppenheimer, now known to be part of the nuclear swindle. Russell says 'In our day, they [police] are it worst enemy in most civilized countries.' He was also thinking of the Stasi, I imagine. It's odd that he didn't say something similar about branches of the military; and shows he had no idea of wartime atrocities. In each case, they are following the (admittedly confusing) orders they receive 'from above', which in the worst cases are anti-goy and malicious, the true reasons for their operations shrouded in secrecy..
      IV
      Russell considers how J S Mill would write today, and accordingly lists issues that he might have dealt with. These do not include any topics which have been fanned into flames since J S Mill's death: no examination of war funding, of human population sizes, of eugenics, and generally of any technical subjects. Which is understandable, but leaves a big hole, like spaces inside badly-made loaves of bread.
      Very characteristic of Russell is his insistence that ‘Almost every great service that individuals have ever done to mankind has exposed them to violent hostility...’ which sounds like the Jewish fantasy of Tikkun Olam. There are many great services—improved food, medical benefits when genuine, attractive surroundings—which did not expose the individuals responsible to violence. This attitude went deeply into Russell, certainly sparked off by his upbringing.
      In particular though I must draw attention to the ways in which 'liberty' is not applied to Jews, who wriggle through the definitions and sources of interferences with liberty. Mill (thinks Russell) would object to a tyrannical moral code: the whole of Judaism stands condemned—or it would, it Mill knew anything about it. Perhaps Mill on observation of 'the Sabbath' might count. Mill said things on homosexuality, and Obscene Publications, but not on Jewish practices such as circumcision and child rape.
      Russell poses the question, 'what should a lover of liberty wish to see done in the schools?' where even the question is framed to avoid including Jews. Russell is hostile to Jesuits and Catholic and Communists, all capitalised, but says nothing about specifically Jewish 'education'.
      Under 'education', Russell considers books: ‘It is not easy to devise any sound principle upon which ... authority could decide what books deserve to be printed. I do not think any improvement is possible upon the present diversity of publishers.’ Saddening.

      Russell left his speech suspended in an anaesthetic cloud of praise for Mill's value and mild merits. But there's little foundation for that; Mill comes across as a possible hired propagandist. Let's take an example: it appears Soros pays for advertising campaigns for attorneys who are know to let criminals go free, unless they oppose Jews. The effects on liberty must be enormous. So, what should be done? There's no answer.
      Russell barely mentions religion in his summary of J S Mill, beyond saying that liberty should include freedom of religion. But why should it? I don't think anyone not African wanted freedom to believe in 'witchcraft'. Russell says Mill paid little attention to Darwin; but Russell doesn't state what Mill thought of the 'Argument from Design', which Darwin (and Wallace, don't forget) destroyed. The source of the insistence on 'God' and its extensive penetration everywhere (think of simple Americans) is yet another legacy from Jews, including Satan as their own cherished myth. I think I noticed the word 'rationalism' somewhere in Russell's essay, with the implicit idea that a fraction's ratio makes sense. But Mill seems to take Russell's unanalyical view of 'God'. The whole point of religious liberty is to allow Jews to get in and impose their own supsersitions. Temporary freedom, as in other manoeuvres.
A wonderful book for students of the aristocratic Victorian outlook, and its persistence. And its failure to face facts about Jews and finance and concealed impulses.

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Review 22 June 2017 by 'Rerevisionist' of Bertrand Russell   MY PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT (published in 1959)

If you're interested in Russell, this book provides a good overview of his philosophical beliefs, twists, and turns. And it should have interest to people musing over fashions, propaganda, careerism, curricula, censorship, and related issues. It has 19 chapters, and an index of names. What I've called chapter 19 is what there was of Alan Wood's Russell's Philosophy, interrupted by Wood's death, highly flattering, written from Wood's notes from Russell's works, and I think later worked up into Bertrand Russell: the Passionate Sceptic. Chapter 18, Some Replies to Criticism, are four long reviews of books and articles, by Mr Urmson, Mr Warnock, Mr Strawson, and Professor Ryle. Russell in some cases objects to having his work—notably the Theory of Types—ignored; but the original pieces weren't I think specifically aimed at Russell. The sceptic will probably view them as careerist pieces, intended to contribute to nothing much except comfort. Note that Gellner's Words and Things (not included) was published in the same year, 1959, and Russell's continued attacks on Oxford philosophy continued.

Roughly, we have Russell when young (Christian commentaries, also included in his Autobiography, about ten years later—much of this book is republished from Russell's works, and will be recognised by some readers). Then Cambridge and Hegel and some others, for example Sedgwick. Moore gets a few sentences. Then Principia Mathematica. Then Wittgenstein, early and later. Then Theory of Knowledge—Russell gives some detail as to why his Human Knowledge was less slap-dash than might have been thought. Then language. And 'retreat from Pythagoras', essentially on the horrors of the world.

It's difficult to decide how much impact Russell had. A J Ayer said (to Ved Mehta) the sine qua non of philosophers is vanity, and the philosophers quoted certainly seem to have their share. Russell gives two examples of others (an unnamed Mathematische Annalen author, and Reichenbach at California) who clearly were unfamiliar with Russell's work, perhaps because the notation had been off-putting. I'll try to review this book untechnically, treating it as an artefact of the past.

A considerable part of the impression left by Russell is his unoriginality. This is often a feature of official philosophy: philosophy courses, and such events as 'Philosophy in Pubs', deal with such things as the 'soul' (feminine gender), induction, dualism, and so on. Russell nibbled and chewed at pre-existing phrases and concepts, but originated very little. His 'First Efforts' are (for example) such things as Free Will, God, Uniformity of Nature, Reason, Primitive Morality—obviously unoriginal. So are his attitudes: consider this extract, which is clearly taken from Christian ideas as these were popularised to him: '... Suppose ... that I had the chance of saving a [drowning] man whom I knew to be a bad man who would be better out of the world, obviously I should consult my own happiness better [than being entirely selfish] by plunging in after him. For, if I lost my life, that would be a very neat way of managing it, and, if I saved him, I should have the pleasure of no end of praise. But if I let him drown, I should have lost an opportunity of death and should have the misery of much blame, but the world would be better for his loss and ... for my life.' Another extract from the same 1888 notebook is: '... Yet this inner voice, this God-given conscience which made Bloody Mary burn the Protestants, this is what we reasonable beings are to follow. ...' Here, Russell is obviously following a passage from his grandfather's library; but I doubt Russell ever stepped back to consider whether Mary had reasons of state, practical religious interests or what not, to support her views. His books show that, all his life, he assumed that supposedly theological wars were based on fanatically-held beliefs, rather than (say) funding for weapons for one or both sides.

Ordinary language is not specially adapted to discuss officially-accepted fashionable philosophy, though Russell never seems to have asked himself why. To quote from my Bertrand Russell: Dupe of Jews ordinary language has not developed in a way to make self-referential statements consistent, and indeed there's no reason why it should, any more than biological evolution would produce sense organs able to examine themselves—in both cases these things have quite enough work to do already. Even this is a generous statement: many black 'cultures' had no written language at all—it is about as new to them now air travel is to whites.

This book has a number of accounts of Russell's becoming aware of good work, for example by Frege. His History of Western Philosophy is a masterpiece of that type; grasping ideas, then explaining them, unnoticed errors and all, suited him. This outlook extended to novelties: there was an assault by Jews, increasing through Russell's lifetime, and the more-or-less abstract ideas parts—Marx, Cantor, Freud, Einstein, Wittgenstein—were regurgitated by Russell in a depressingly uncritical way, which in fact damaged him in his 90s.

For example, Bertrand Russell loved the 'space-time' idea, as did Whitehead; they both shoehorned 'intervals' into their philosophies. And this outlook extended to mathematics: the 20th century had some growth in mathematics, for example in statistical theories, in physics— much of this being fake, though—and in possibilities which came to something, in fuzzy sets, input-output analyses, structures of chemicals, electricity, broadcasting technology. Russell contributed nothing to any of this. His contribution was fine analysis of language and logic, but he seems somewhat naive about language, assuming English to be a perfect enough tool when supplemented by a few symbols. Somewhere he says language is made up of sounds; but looking at hieroglyphics of long-dead language, this seems inadequate. He says somewhere that the principle of induction would seem to show a baby would grow indefinitely. He agonises over the English use of 'or', in effect discussing such things as 'exclusive or'. He thought at one time that the number of things in the universe must be the largest possible integer.

Another pain-inducing aspect to Russell's life is the specific datedness of his work. To some extent this is inevitable. But one wonders what Russell would have done if Newton and calculus hadn't been invented, limits and all, with their associated scope for scepticism. Could Russell have invented calculus? Parallels and the supposed Euclidean problems point the same way. (Russell liked the idea of non-Euclidean geometry, but did nothing to clarify it in any way). He was aware of men's interpretation of animal behaviour: 'It seemed that animals always behave in a manner showing the rightness of the philosophy entertained by the man who observes them.' But he had little interest in differences between and within races.

Bertrand Russell shows a lack of understanding of (for example) Pragmatism in its various guises. He simply had no idea that Jews seem to have an instinctive interest in power, and not in truth. So Russell manufactures anecdotes and stories to illustrate why 'pragmatism' is obviously wrong, and is surprised to have them dismissed as silly. In the same sort of way, he had no comprehension of the NSDAP. I suspect this sympathetic failure explains his lack of interest in philosophies that were not 'Western', despite their presumed interest for the truth-seeker. Another lack of understanding is in careers: just as with vicars (he made fun of The Fairchild Family because a boy was punished by his father for not learning the necessary Latin), and with journalists (though the ones who praised him were spared), Russell seems to have had no appreciation that money and lifetime careers would tempt mimics and parasitical types into the world of philosophy, though it seems obvious enough. Similarly he stated that 'Logic ... considered a branch of philosophy ... [in] Aristotle, has been considered ... a subject only to be treated by those ... proficient in Greek. Mathematics, as a consequence, has only been treated by those who knew no logic. ... to the present century, this divorce [sic] has been disastrous.' But Russell's biggest failing was in politics. He might perhaps have done useful work on politics and states, teasing out interactions within groups of the same name, and between groups; but for his entire life he referred to Russia, the USSR and (no doubt) CIS as "Russia", missing fairly simple but essential understandings.

However, many men's lives are far less interesting than Russell's. Bear this in mind when reading my rather desolated and drained opinions. I don't suppose there are many comparable intellectual autobiographies of philosophers. But I hope Russell will come to be recognised as the last un-Jew-wise philosopher. He's the equivalent of people still unable to understand Wallace/Darwin.
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Review of Bertrand Russell   Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (published in 1959)

Russell on nuclear war
Bertrand Russell, 15 Years After Whatever Happened at Hiroshima Uploaded 24 November 2015 Oct 2015
Russell's '.. aim .. to show possible means of achieving peace in ways which should be equally acceptable to Communist Nations, to NATO nations, and to uncommitted nations..'. Russell in his entire life never looked below the surface of 'nations'; he simply had no idea that subsets may have their own aims. And in all his life he accepted the official lines in general assumptions: he opposed the First World War, but I don't think came up with anything factually based, except in the sense war is horrible for the victims. It's now obvious enough that the printed media of Russell's youth were dominated by Jews: Germany alone had 4,000 Jewish periodicals, and, in a version of conformity experiments, they dominated literary types. Though not typical Germans: Kurt Eisner got nowhere with his attempted Jewish coup in Germany. With Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, I now take the view the entire nuke threat was made up, just another Jewish fabrication. However, it's of interest to Russell's readership to see what he made of this subject.

Here's Russell's contents list:-
Introduction
I If Brinkmanship Continues
II If Nuclear War Comes
III Methods of Settling Disputes in the Nuclear Age
IV Programme of Steps towards Peace
V New Outlook Needed before Negotiations
VI Disarmament
VI Steps towards Conciliation
VIII Territorial Adjustments
IX Approach to an International Authority
X Some Necessary Changes in Outlook [Subdivided into: Fanaticism; nationalism; education]
Appendix I: Unilateral Disarmament [Replies to critics]
Appendix II: Inconsistency?


It's clear enough just from the chapter information that Russell has no opinions on the technology. (In Dear Bertrand Russell he was asked to give expert advice on inspection, and replied he couldn't, and what was needed were detectives and others). Russell seemed also not in touch with high-up, or supposedly high-up, officials: at the time of publication, Israel's atomic weapons development was supposed to have been in operation for ten years.

Here are notes I made from the book; Russell's various approaches to political problems are clear enough, for example the world government idea, which he conceives of as democratic and accountable; and his lessons from history, all assuming either nations or religions as their causes of conflicts.–

I: IF BRINKMANSHIP CONTINUES I F Stone's Weekly of Oct 20, 1958: General Putt before House Committee on Armed Services explains the USAF want missile base on moon. Russell has no way to assess the plausibility of this, or for that matter of I F Stone.

II: IF NUCLEAR WAR COMES Russell mentions Dr Libby, supposed developer of 'clean bombs'. Note that Russell spoke with Edward Teller, I think on a phone link; he disliked Teller, as of course well he might. Russell was not good on 'fall-out': he considered both long-lived and short-lived isotopes dangerous, and had no way to estimate how much fallout there might be.

III: METHODS OF SETTLING DISPUTES IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 'There is no reason except human folly for the perpetuation of a lower standard of life in Asia and Africa than that which now prevails in America.' Russell does not prove this statement, however. He often says in his books 'the techniques are known'—but without knowing, simply put, whether there's enough to go round, and whether people are up to the work.

IV: PROGRAMME OF STEPS TOWARDS PEACE

V: NEW OUTLOOK NEEDED BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS Russell states the situation is '.. definitely new in human history. In the conflicts between Christianity and Islam, it was war that decided which countries should be Christian and which Mohammedan. In the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics.. America, North and South, is Christian because European arms were more effective than those of Red Indians. This long history has become so deeply embedded in the outlook of both statesmen and ordinary men ..' Again, one wonders if this is true. There must have been countless occasions where two sides did not go to war if they were fairly equal, and when unequal.

VI: DISARMAMENT Russell quotes from Inspection for Disarmament, edited by Seymour Melman (1958) who no doubt was another Jew. Russell says it '[has] a valuable account of the devices by which the Germans, after the First World War, concealed the armaments which it created in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles.' I wonder if it had a valuable account of the devices of concealment by Stalin?

VII: STEPS TOWARDS CONCILIATION Russell's initial proposal is a Conciliation Committee. He gives his views as to composition and duties and confidentiality; the latter sounds like cabinet confidentiality.
    Here's his evidence this might work: 'Britain and Russia had hated and feared each other ever since the Crimean War, but, after over fifty years of mutual suspicion, they came to the conclusion that each had less to fear from the other than from Germany and, in the year 1907, they concluded an entente by which an end was put to all the divergencies between their policies. This happened through the common fear of Germany—a fear far less dreadful than the fear of nuclear warfare.' This of course is a tiny, partial, selected claim: they did nothing much to help Russia after 1917.

VIII: TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS
    1 Europe: 'I do not think that the removal of American forces from Western Europe can become practical politics except as a sequel to an enforceable agreement for the abolition of nuclear weapons.' Russell does not know of, and therefore not consider, the idea of invading the USSR to liberate it from Jews. And no doubt this was the reason for the Jewish fakery over atom spies.
    2 Middle East:, '..the hatred of Israel in Arab countries is regrettable but understandable. Not only in Arab countries but throughout Asia, Israel is regarded as a piece of unwarrantable Western imperialism. The fact that the Jews originally came from Asia is forgotten; what is remembered is that, in the course of centuries, the great majority of them have become completely westernized. The west, however, cannot abandon the state of Israel after deliberately creating it and guaranteeing its protection. I think that the only thing that can be done is to fix unalterably the geographical frontiers of Israel and undertake that Russia and the West, jointly, shall prevent any aggression by or against the state of Israel. If there were no uncertainty, and if the Great Powers were united in the matter, Jews and Arabs would in time get used to each other and discover that mutual hatred serves no purpose.' It's obvious to us, now, that Israel had no intention of having its borders fixed.
    3 Far East: '..The conquest of China by the Communists is the severest blow that the West has suffered since Lenin's Government became secure. It cannot be denied that the Chinese Communists have given evidence of militaristic imperialism. Their intervention in the Korean war was as unjustified as it was unfortunate, and their conquest of Tibet was the kind of thing which is severely condemned when done by a western power..'  Russell has no idea of the mechanisms underlying 'communism'.
    'The importance of Formosa to America, like that of Cyprus to Britain, is strategic and bound up with preparedness for a nuclear war.' I'm guessing this statement is taken from the various 'experts' as prodded by Jewish planners and publishers.

IX: APPROACH TO AN INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY About seven pages: Russell thinks many people like war, and will therefore be led, unconsciously, not to face the facts about necessary steps to peace:
'The great majority of those who have considered the conditions for secure peace are persuaded that the most important of these conditions is the creation of an International Authority with power to enforce its decisions. This, however, remains for the moment a purely academic opinion: while the East-West tension retains anything like its present acuteness, neither side would submit to any International Authority unless it could dominate it. The question is, at bottom, one of great simplicity: would you rather have a world in which both friends and foes survive, or a world in which both are extinct? Put in these abstract terms, most people would prefer the survival of their friends to the extinction of their foes. But when it is pointed out to them that this choice, if made in earnest, requires some very distasteful measures, they will refuse to admit the necessity of such measures and will persist in the course leading to universal death. In this chapter, I wish to suggest comparatively painless steps by which an International Authority could gradually come into existence. These steps will only be possible after the measures of conciliation considered in earlier chapters.

And here is a summary of Russell's proposed steps:–
The first thing.. is to confirm the advisory authority of the Conciliation Committee outlined in Chapter VII. ..

The League of Nations and the United Nations were both intended by their creators to be the germ of an International Authority capable of preventing war. Both failed, but the United Nations is perhaps still capable of being so reformed as to fulfil its intended functions. The reforms required are, however, very drastic..
.. one very vital measure.. is the admission to UNO of all States that desire membership. .. the most urgent case is that of Communist China. China is the most populous state in the world and may, within a few decades, become the most powerful. .. China is only the most glaring example of exclusion. There can be no good reason for keeping out any country which is willing to undertake the obligations imposed by the UNO.

There is a difficulty which faces all federal organizations, namely that some members of the federation are more powerful or more populous than others and it therefore does not seem just that all should carry equal weight. This problem faced by the framers of the American Constitution, and, as everybody knows, they adopted a compromise solution: In the Senate, all States are equal, but, in the House of Representatives, their weight is proportional to their population. Some arrangement will be necessary in the Constitution of the reformed United Nations if small States are not to have undue weight. The present arrangement, according to which all States count equally in the Assembly, but, in the Security Council, certain powerful States have a veto, is open to various objections which I shall consider presently. One possible solution - which, I admit, has its own difficulties - would be to divide the world into a number of subordinate Federations, each of which should be a member of the one World-wide Federation. These subordinate Federations should be framed in accordance with two principles: first, they should all be approximately equal in population so that there would be no serious injustice in counting each as one in the federation of Federations which would be the reconstituted UNO; the principle should be that, as far as possible, each Federation should have internal interests outweighing those concerning its external relations. It should be generally understood, though not formally decreed, that, in general, each subordinate Federation should have autonomy in regard to its internal affairs and that only disputes between Federations should come before UNO. In this way, the interference of the International Authority in local affairs could be reduced to a minimum.

The Veto, which was adopted in 1945 when the United Nations was created, was a practical necessity at that time. Both the United States and the USSR were agreed on this point. There is no likelihood that the Veto will be abolished until such time as East and West have become much more conscious of their common interests than they now are. But so long as the Veto exists, UNO lacks an essential characteristic of any Government. It is of the essence of a Government that it can enforce decisions upon recalcitrant members of the State which it represents. What should we think of a national State in which any burglar could veto laws against theft? There was once a national State constituted in this manner. It was the State of Poland. The liberum veto which existed in that country reduced it to impotence and rendered it incapable of resisting partition among its powerful neighbours. Nevertheless, it was this example which was followed when UNO was created. Already at that time the divergent interests of East and West made such a course inevitable. But if there is ever to be an International Authority capable of preventing large-scale war, it will have to be an Authority in which the Veto does not exist, since, otherwise, it will be unable to settle any dispute in which either side is prepared to use the Veto.

There will need to be, as in any Federation, a well-defined Constitution deciding which powers are to be federal. It should be understood that these powers must be only such as are involved in the prevention of war. There must be no interference by the Federal Authority with religion or economic structure or the political system. If some countries prefer parliamentary democracy, and others prefer some form of dictatorship, they must be free to persist in their choice. They must be similarly free if some prefer Communism and others prefer Capitalism. I think they must also be free to impose such limits upon individual liberty as they may consider desirable. I do not think that the Federal Authority ought to impose freedom of the Press or any other freedom upon any subordinate State. I say this in spite of realizing the importance of such freedoms. I say it because only the prevention of war gives outside States a justification for interference.

We have, I am afraid, already travelled a long way into Utopian regions, but there is a last step even more Utopian that must be taken if world peace is to be secure. There must be an International Armed Force sufficiently powerful to be certain of victory over the armed forces of any nation or likely alliance of nations. In the absence of this condition, the decrees of the International Authority may not be enforceable and may easily sink to the level of empty pronouncements like the Kellogg Pact. The International Authority will have to be free to create such armed forces as it thinks necessary and to impose such taxation as they may require. It will also need a legal right to limit the armed forces of national States so as to prevent any serious threat to its authority.

All this, however utopian it may appear, is only a close parallel to what happened in national States as a result of the invention of gunpowder. In the Middle Ages throughout Western Europe powerful barons in their castles could defy the central Government. It was only when artillery became able to destroy castles that the central Government was able to control feudal barons. What gunpowder did in the late Middle Ages, nuclear weapons have to do in our time. I do not mean that they have to be actually employed. ...'

X: SOME NECESSARY CHANGES IN OUTLOOK: FANATICISM, NATIONALISM, EDUCATION 'Issues that seemed to contemporaries as important as the issue of Communism or Capitalism seems to fanatics of the present day have repeatedly arisen in the past, and have been shown by the course of time to be not so tremendous as contemporaries suppose. There is a well-known passage in Gibbon in which he considers what would have happened if the Mohammedans had won the Battle of Tours. [732 AD] To Christians of that day, the issue appeared as momentous as the issue of our own time appeared to Senator McCarthy and to Stalin, but it may well be doubted whether the present-day world would be much different from what it is if the Mohammedans had been the victors and not the vanquished in that famous conflict. ...' This was a fairly popular opinion amongst people who thought themselves enlightened in Russell's time, in my view because of Jewish influence: they hate Christians and would presumably like Muslims to defeat Christians. But unlike Christianity Islam is solidly tribal.

Russell compares a boastful person with a boastful nation; the same comparison occurs in another of his books. There are other similes with instructional purposes in Russell: duelling seems silly; so war seems silly. Rough men fighting in the street is disgusting; war is disgusting. War is like people in a street of houses fighting to destruction.

One of Russell's grand historical generalisations is the comparison of the discovery of fire with the (alleged) discovery of nuclear power. His book is something like the construction of a special purpose fire brigade.
Nationalism 'We have become so accustomed to nationalism that it has come to seem an inherent part of human nature. History, however, does not bear out this view. In antiquity, there was hardly any nationalism except that of the Jews. In the Middle Ages, when ecclesiastics travelled freely throughout the Catholic world, their partisan feelings were centred upon their Church and not upon their nation. ... The nationalism of modern times has grown up, mainly, as a reaction against foreign imperialism. One may put its beginning at the time of Joan of Arc when the French were aroused to collective resistance against English conquest. English nationalism began with the resistance to the Spanish Armada, and found its classic expression, a few years later, in the plays of Shakespeare. German and Russian nationalisms had their origin in resistance to Napoleon; American nationalism, in resistance to the Redcoats. Unfortunately, there is a psychologically natural dynamic.. those who are fighting for freedom, not unnaturally, exaggerate their own merits and the demerits of the foreign oppressor. When they have won freedom, the beliefs formerly appropriate survive and are thought to justify foreign conquest. ..'
Well, maybe. Russell doesn't seem to include tribalisms: Genghis Khan? Turks? Huns? Ancient Greeks, Romans? Russell may have been suggesting nationalism is a stage, probably related to travel and propaganda, which may pass away, but this seems unconvincing; he seems to ignore small kingdoms—Cornwall, Aragon, Mercia, Sicily, Brittany...—though they must have had deep emotional attachments.
Appendices:
I UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. '.. I have been led into a purely academic issue as if it were one of practical politics. Everybody knows that neither the United States nor the USSR will disarm unilaterally. The question whether either would be wise to do so is therefore no more than an exercise in theoretical ethics. ... It is true that I advocate practically.. the abandonment of the H-bomb by Britain and the prevention of the spread of H-bombs..'
II INCONSISTENCY?: Russell defends himself against the charge that he changed his mind; his autobiography shows he felt deeply about this—he suggested the USA should invade the USSR when it had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. If it had been true, it's a very defensible position. But Russell was (or seemed to be) utterly innocent on the Jewish issue. He also mentions the Baruch Proposal; almost certainly this would involve cryptic Jewish strangleholds over as much as possible.

Russell appended a Bibliography, everything dated 1958, including a New Scientist and including: Greville Clark & Louis B Sohn, World Peace through World Law; H W Heckstall-Smith , Atomic Radiation Dangers and What They Mean to You, Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age; Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race, a Programme for World Disarmament; Linus Pauling, No More War!, and 10 Conservative MPs, A World Security Authority?

All these books swamped out any nuclear scepticism, as of course must have been intended. Russell's simple model—small units getting bigger, and terminating in one world-wide unit—must have appealed to the financial oligarchs! It's what they claim to want, with the small difference of deleting democracy. How they must have sniggered at Russell as regards nuclear matters, though.

This link includes a review of Bertrand Russell's America in which I've included comments on Jewish manipulation of Russell, on the Second World War, nuclear issues, and the Vietnam War.
And this is Bertrand Russell, Dupe of Jews with similar, but more general material by several authors.

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1998 Reputations 2 hour TV programme on Bertrand Russell, by ‘BBC and A & E Network co-production’. (There may be another part, but if so I didn't find it. I've added credits to give a faint idea of the vast extent of the censorship by Jews and the co-operation, aware or not, by non-Jews).

Reputations on Bertrand Russell. Consultant: Ray Monk. 1998

Review written at the time by Rae West. Unchanged below except for a few corrected typos and the boldened 'ritual curse'.

Any two hour programme on Russell can't be all bad; small b/w clips from 1960s 'Face to Face' TV programme (rebroadcast a few years ago) and a 1950s interview (in which Russell had shorter hair!) were the main direct exhibits on Russell. The format is chronological, apart from an introductory sequence, never shown before, of Russell emerging from his Chelsea house behind Edith, and being driven off to Trafalgar Square to sit down and be interviewed about his stance (or sitting position) on nuclear weapons. After this, we proceed to his infancy, childhood, Cambridge, and arrive at the 1930s, which, in Russell's case, looks like middle age, despite of course his being 60 or so.

Scene-setting is partly by English views - Grantchester mill, Pembroke Lodge; unfortunately to get a Victorian feel it's necessary to exclude modern stuff. Hence Cambridge is represented only by a shot of the front of Trinity - you'd imagine they could have unearthed a few sepia 1890s pre-motor car Cambridge views to pan across. Pembroke Lodge, which now is enlarged and has turnstiled and tabled tea-shop appurtenances, has to be shown only by edges and corners and views through windows; in fact this is an accurate metaphor for their treatment of poor Bertie, who's shown only in bits and fragments with the nasty stuff (political views, educational views, philosophical views, views on war) pretty well cut out.

The interviews did at least provide some animation; it was interesting to see a library corner of McMaster with Ken Blackwell (neat suit, specs, Canadian voice) and Nick Griffin (casual, partly rebuilt northern England voice); and Christopher Farley (who reminded me of an English TV comedian whose name would mean little to most readers of this). He was described as Russell's secretary; Russell's Foundation so far has been omitted. And Russell's kids and various relatives (and others - I couldn't work out who Frances Partridge is). Russell once wrote that he advised his kids not to marry novelists, in case they were misrepresented. Perhaps he should have generally warned that, if you're famous, you should try to have intelligent kids. I confess to not warming to either Conrad (hereditarily titled - surely a bit of Russell hypocrisy here) who came across as pompous, and Kate, now in her 70s I think, who seemed spry but not at all reflective. I didn't think much of Ray Monk (denim shirt and what might be a facial tic) pontificating on stuff surely inaccessible to objective evaluation.

Martin Jarvis' voiceover was presumably a hireling job rather than one done through affection for Russell. He had to read out an awful lot of feeble stuff. Incidentally my predictions about this programme were almost exactly right; for example, we have b/w film of field guns, and 'the first world war broke out', with no suggestion that this was anything involving human volitions. His opinions on China, and the Russian revolution, were given zero space. The legalities of Trinity's expulsion weren't mentioned. The Russells' school having too many problem children wasn't mentioned; its intellectual ideals were ignored. Poor Bertie was represented as a journalist turning out articles; his output of books was virtually ignored, apart from shots of a row of spines of 'The Analysis of Mind', and for 'Marriage and Morals', described without evidence as a bestseller, and treated, as I'd again predicted, with absolutely no examination of its scholarly stuff & vague implications that it was only to do with free love, not supported by even a single quotation. Most people reading this will know something about Russell's books; but this programme gave the impression that his writing was completely ephemeral: I recall a friend of mine, with no knowledge of Russell, trying to situate him mentally, and describing him as a 'mathematician and journalist'.

Sadly, there was nothing pathbreaking or new. In inquisitive mode, it would be interesting to know what happened to Russell's first son, John, a story successfully hidden, - but there was nothing much on him. And what about his brother Frank? And Patricia, still (I think) alive? It would have been interesting to find out about Russell's finances; how well/badly off was he, in fact? Despite occasional shots of letters mentioning sums for ex-wives, nothing on this. For that matter, it would have been nice to know what he ate and drank; how did he live so long? It would have been nice to see or hear something on Moore and Keynes and other Cambridge associates, perhaps Vaughan Williams, and (say) Wells and Shaw; but absolutely nothing. Poor Alys was described by Ray Monk as timid; he said her sister would have been a better choice. It's true she never found a career, but nevertheless she did spend time lecturing on topics like free love, so presumably couldn't have been all that retiring. I recently came across a short article written by Alys in about 1890, which, while admittedly not saying much, was the sort of thing omitted from the programme.

The sex stuff was quite interesting (e.g. Dora getting pregnant by an American journalist called Barry, who lived with the Russells, Bertie simultaneously looking elsewhere, while Kate and John played. The resulting daughter was interviewed at her kitchen table). Whether this was atypical of the time for elderly aristocrats was another unprobed question. Frank Russell's autobiography's title suggests it might not have been.

On philosophy, there were shots of PM manuscript (close up on words like 'false') with - as I'd predicted - a silly comment on computers, and with notation falsely ascribed to Russell. Poor old Whitehead barely got a look in; perhaps he's just too unphotogenic. Roger Scruton, wearing a pullover and shoeless socks, in fact said some quite reasonable things, though whether in parrot mode or through genuine understanding is impossible to say. Naturally there was nothing on relativity or science generally. We were shown a faded printed copy of 'The Theory of Types' with a voiceover saying it may be the most complicated intellectual structure created by the mind of one man - this shows what you can do if you deploy an inscrutable notation!

On balance, people who know about Russell will find this of some interest, but it will add little to what they already know and do nothing to indicate to all the rest why they might do well by dipping into Bertie. So I hereby pronounce a ritual curse on the BBC, Ray Monk, and the whatever-it's-called production company: may all their works curl up and die; may they drown in the vomit of advertisers, advocates, and propagandists; if they ever have a transcendent moment, may it be splintered, smashed and denigrated by hordes of grinning hacks.

Rae West.


The TV film includes Joseph [sic] Rotblat 'Nobel Peace Prize Laureate' and footage of fake bomb tests. There's no reference anywhere to war crimes or his campaigning, apart from nuclear weapons, now of course known to be frauds. He's continually described as "this man of genius", but also as influencing the thoughts of many, the correct Rothschild remark.

Consultant Ray Monk.

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Your Faithfully, Bertrand Russell

(2002) published in USA, selected and with notes by Ray Perkins, Jr. I heard of this book, and bought it, in April 2021. My review is also Yours faithfully here, as a standalone.

Review of:   Yours faithfully, Bertrand Russell notes by Ray Perkins Jr. (Published by Open Court Books 2002)
Review by Rae West.   24 April 2021.

I liked Russell, and collected most of his books from bookshops and second-hand bookshops; and took an interest in his work on the Vietnam War, and donated to it, quite a lot in fact, a long time back. So I was amazed to find a book essentially by Russell, which I'd never heard of before. It is Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell consisting of letters to the editor, as Ray Perkins Jr refers to them. These are not letters to one editor, but letters to the editors of many newspapers and magazines. I thought at first this must have been a different title for Dear Bertrand Russell, much less detailed book, edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils, both of course Jews who were involved in Jewish actions in South Africa. However, this seems to have been an American publication.

Feinberg and Kasrils helped with this book too, thirty years later, as Perkins says in his introduction. His notes recapitulate Russell's life, as it appeared to some conventional thinkers in about 2000. ('A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth' — '... one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers'. Only J K Galbraith, and Rotblat the Jewish physicist and, no doubt, liar, are quoted on the cover blurb. Perkins' high praise of Russell, entirely typical of the absurdly high praise Jews give to their sidekicks, is a bit embarrassing.) I estimate this book is at least three times the length of Dear Bertrand Russell, and I think was produced by word processing or print-on-demand technology. The letters were typed one at a time, by a woman (of course). They are almost all in date order. Russell wrote about 400 such letters, we are told. In view of his vast output, I thought at first this must be wrong, but given roughly an epistolatory span of 80 years, we get about five a year, or roughly one every ten weeks, which seems about right. About 300 have been selected for publication here. Perkins' book's index is of course revelatory: War Crimes, German is one. There's nothing on Freemasons. Letters [189] and the following discuss Christianity, but with nothing on its symbiosis with Christianity and Islam, though I suppose this is asking a lot. At the time, the British or (((British))) Empire was a serious force in the world, but it's not even indexed. Russell was ambivalent about it, at one moment referring to it as something no honest person could support, and at another something vital to Britain. Sigh; there's no way to easily assess Russell's opinion and the evidence he relied on, if any.

Ray Perkins, Jr. is credited with only one other book, Logic and Mr. Limbaugh, which has a brief comment 'Anything that teaches a valuable lesson about fallacious reasoning and at the same time pokes fun at a ridiculous man has to be great!', on a secular website. Google, now, says he is, or was, professor of philosophy, emeritus, at Plymouth State University and vice chairman of the Bertrand Russell Society.

Intellectual changes in the 20 years since publication.
Since 2000, the Internet has facilitated the spread of ideas, so much so that widespread censorship has followed, which seems likely to go further. Russell belonged to a non-digital world of fairly expensive books, slow mail by today's standards, with opaque editorials, unquestioned decisions, company-owned newspapers, and top-down film, radio and TV structures.
      That has changed enormously, both for evil—it's far easier to mass-produce lies, frauds, and myths than it was; and for good—exposure, if not easy, is at least possible. The turnover of liars has increased hugely; people such as the Dimblebys could have an entire lifetime spreading Jewish lies, but I doubt if this could be possible, now.
      Some attitudes have changed: I doubt whether most people would accept Perkins' description of Cyrus Eaton as a 'philanthropist', any more than Soros is a 'philanthropist'. Many people now understand that Jews are full of hate; perhaps Perkins, based in Illinois then, will be caught in riots, or fake riots.

Perkins was unaware of any of this in 2000. His book almost represents the last gasp of a fading system. Perkins and Russell knew nothing of:

Perkins' failed to anticipate anything like this. He simply reiterates mistakes.
Perkins' logical book on Limbaugh is a perfect example. Perkins assumes that logic is the way to identify mistakes. This of course is part of the 'secular' outlook of Jews, who say they are anti-Christian while keeping completely silent about Jews. (South Place Ethical Society in London is another perfect example). In fact, truth needs accurate foundations. No system of pure logic can reveal that the Coronavirus 'pandemic' is a fraud based on errors.
      Teaching thinking is a set of reviews on books of the 'logical thinking for you' type. I'd guess they are out of fashion now, replaced entirely by Jew rants.

Russell's letters reveal failure to grasp Jewish policies. His letters are very long, as befits someone regarded as very intelligent. The result is that he was often disregarded, or regarded as a farceur, as he said Mrs Webb viewed him. He often strains to clear up some point or another, often quoting from several sources to show how right he was. For example, in letter [126] Britain's Bomb - Can We Defend Ourselves? Russell wrote '... I am amazed to find that the British Government is so completely ignorant of things known to all well-informed persons'. His information was supplied by Jews such as Herman Kahn.
      There was probably not much option, but in a world with millions of people all acting is assorted ways, Russell showed something like tunnel vision. Where other people could see the Church of England had lots of money and could pay vicars for life, Russell could only see their creed was largely nonsense. Another problem is that most of his letters are in reaction to some events which he has only picked up from the media. I don't think there is any subject he originated: was China being quietly corrupted by Jews into 'Communism' for example? He must have disliked some of the Monarchy's actions; did he say anything? As regards India, he mentions Gandhi, freedom, and independence, standardised clichés. There's no indication here about the history of India, the various East India Companies, or the wartime Bengal famine. He seems not to have investigated Jews and opium wars. On France, he, or perhaps Perkins, is disappointing: he accepted the 'French Revolution' myths, had no sensible comment on 'Franco-Russian' alliances, and never sorted out the Jewish undercurrents in north Africa and Dien Bien Phu and the rest of it.
      Generally, Russell was reactive, not proactive. He got onto bandwagons: suffragettes, for example, Freud, belief in the love of war—he gave a striking description of the start of the Great War, but did not appreciate the facts of hired actors. I think (but may be wrong) that the Vietnam invasion may have been to conceal war in China, but Russell would not have looked into that possibility. His attitude to the announcement of the supposed atom bombing of Hiroshima was another example. As an obvious extension of this principle, Russell nearly always followed the Jewish vocabulary: the "Russian Revolution", mention of Baruch but only as proposals on the supposed nuclear issues, [230] the JFK unexamined 'assassination', McCarthyism as a bad thing, supposed nuclear spy cases.
      Probably, British people born in Victorian times believed what they were told, that they ruled the waves. The output from Oxbridge believed they had achieved a summit of learning. I think Russell believed the maths he'd studied was a peak; his subsequent work embroidered it. Just as Bachelors of Divinity thought they understood religion, and Oxbridge philosophers believed they'd read every important book.
      I think his character gave little space for appreciation of others, whose lives he did not penetrate. He often refers to a person in the news by a simple label: a Nazi, a pacifist, a Buddhist, a militarist, a communist, a socialist. This seems to have debarred him from identifying Jewish secret liars; an obvious example is Jews calling themselves 'communists'.
      With complicated events, he was doomed not to be successful: in the 'Cuba Crisis', Russell didn't know that Castro was a Marrano Jew, with presumably no desire that Cubans should be rich; or that the US had a base in Cuba; or that the ships had no nuclear missiles—they had literally no nukes; or that the USA and USSR were both run by Jews.
      An older example is Russell's essay The Ancestry of Fascism (1935?) which fails to grasp anything of Jews in Europe, money in the world, Jews as existing as a distributed nation, events in Italy ('fascism' being an Italian word), or secret co-operation between Jews and Freemasons.

      But as far as I can tell Russell genuinely responded to the American genocide in Vietnam. It's no wonder he was surrounded by a guard of Jews. Even at his very advanced age, they must have worried.

Perkins of course has no interest in establishing truth; he's just another fake academic, much like a vicar in the Church of England, glad to be paid but uncreative, taking no moral position, and able only to do ordinary things. Whether he's a crypto-Jew, or just another shield for Jews to hide behind, I don't know. At the bottom of this page I include an email exchange, including Louis Greenspan and Charles Pigden, on the subject of Russell's reticence on Jews. (Perkins is not included, though this was in the late 1990s.)
      Russell attracted an absorbent coating of Jews, who presumably controlled his information. Consider for example whether Isaac Deutscher, Jew supported of Stalin, would help Russell with the finer points of Jewish attitudes. Jewish penetration and saturation was and is so large that nothing can be assumed safely untouched. For example, here's an online post ten years after Perkins, wonderering if world population figures can be correct.


Herman Kahn on Thermonuclear War

Herman Kahn On Thermonuclear [sic] War (1961).   Very obviously a Jewish attempt at Jewish world government, though this was missed by Russell
The Real Interest: Russell's Letters
Russell's letters are the real interest, though of course they are disappointing to modern people in view of his subservience to, or collaboration with, Jews. They are much better than those in Dear Bertrand Russell. Some day I may examine them in more detail; they offer many lessons on the First and Second World Wars, the harm done to Europe, the Jewish damage to America and the USSR, but not China. Meanwhile, here are some notes.

Letter [14] is a long reply to someone called Sorley, in 1915, who made much of atrocity stories in the ‘Bryce Report’ which was later apologies for, by Lloyd George, but of course not punished. An interesting letter which indirectly shows that Russell had not the slightest idea of the possibilities of gain, asset stealing, currency control, large-scale deaths. One has to concede that Jews think of little else, which can put them ahead.

[32] is Russell's smuggled letter to President Wilson, requesting US war to help Europe. He begins by praising Lincoln—Russell believed the free-the-slaves idea. Russell thought the British had fought long and hard for their freedoms; the facts about the 'Glorious Revolution' were outside his limits. He knew that Germany had not been invaded, and seemed strong, but never considered the possibility that the whole show was arranged. Much later, he compared Vietnamese resistance to that of his fellow countrymen who 'resisted Hitler's bombing'..

[50] 'The British Labour Party and Hitler' says it's all very well for Americans, a long way off and neutral, but that Party 'is anxious not to be hurried by indignation into support of war...' Russell has no understanding of the international Jewish underpinnings here; at the time, 1935, I think Hitler was being sold as 'socialist'.

[54] is a long letter on 'the Pacifist case'. Near its end, Russell says 'We are all descended from brigands', instancing William the Conqueror and Hengist and Horsa. (In Power, he said that if you go back far enough, everywhere was conquered at some point by a victor who held off everyone else. Characteristically, she supporting men, women, materials etc are subsumed under one man.) Russell's panorama of the past only goes back to about the 5th century, a tribute, I suppose, to weak archaeology and scholarship. He assumes the Normans were in essence one man, despite the evidence of detailed planning.

[68] Relief of the Russian famine may refer to Ukraine.

Letter [71] reveals that medicine has achieved some goals: he wrote several letters on contraception for women, which may be needed if she was 'medically unfit to produce another child.' One of his books instanced a vicar with a lot of children whose wife died in or after childbirth, as medically predicted. Incidentally, Russell took a swipe at someone who misread him on this point; Russell took a long, slow, sarcastic, swipe at him, which if of course understandable, but not very helpful.

[81] to [87] are collected together, on education, to ... the Rationalist Review, The Nation, Time and Tide, and The New Statesman and Nation. Perkins makes no comment on who funded these various things; no prizes for guessing. Topics include psycho-analysis (Russell says that Freud hid under cover of the duty of medical confidentiality), women and science, free speech, and so on. Of course there's nothing on Judaism and Jews! They may have learned something.

I was pleased to find that letter [93] confirmed that his grandfather, Russell the Prime Minister, helped repeal the Test and Corporation Acts which reduced the monopoly of the Church of England. See Bertrand Russell a dupe of Jews.

[98] letter on History of Western Philosophy to a Zionist, explains that he ‘read acknowledged authorities’. And if he gave ‘.. too little space to Jewish philosophy... [it was] due entirely to my ignorance of Hebrew..’ Reinforces the idea that Russell had no idea about the Talmud and similar texts.

Letters [149] on Edward Teller, and [232] on Herman Kahn, suggest Jewish policy at the time was to fake or threaten nuclear war—there would be nuclear war, followed by world government, presumably of course Jewish. (The COVID fraud seems another try).

Letter [162] deals with Suez, Egypt, Britain, France, Israel.

Letter [252] says 7.8M Vietnamese were put into 'strategic hamlets'. It is rather astonishing that that war is so invariably not reported. Ten years after this book, we see questions about the airplanes shot down in Vietnam, supposedly with primitive weapons; was LBJ trying to waste money, indirectly supporting the Federal Reserve?

[267] 1966: 'The recent outcry [viz. in the Jewish media] in the United States is revealing. These pilots have chosen consciously to bomb civilian areas and, in doing so, have killed agonizingly thousands of people. Not only do they know their targets, but they are fully aware of the weapons they employ. These are weapons of sheer evil, including canisters containing ten thousand slivers of razor-sharp steel (the lazy dog), and napalm, which turns the victim into a bubbling mass. The vast bombardment of a small people, unable adequately tp defend themselves against 650 sorties a week involving 1500 tons a day, is the supreme atrocity. [... and so on... Followed by list of some people in the War Crimes Tribunal, including many Jews—though not Kissinger!]
      Against the Crime of Silence is available on archive.org, but in a restricted form

Looking at Russell on Americans who hate the word 'Empire' and regard England as an enemy. Part of the skill of Jews is the use of atrocity divide-and-rule. For example, US troops were told to commit atrocities against the Vietnamese, which they did with pleasure. Vietnamese to this day have hatred for whites—I doubt they know about the Jew connection. Maybe this will be used in USA against whites some time; the option is there. Similarly, Germans and British often have hatred for each other—a deliberate effect of the world wars, distracting away from the possibility that Jews will be suspected of controlling both sides.

Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell is in its way a fascinating book; like most people at the time, Russell is entangled in mythologies of the past and of the then-present. Present-day Americans, Russians, French, Chinese and others can see, with necessary imagination, how Russell was sucked in and moulded by the fantastic propaganda and money power of Jews and collaborator. Let's hope people will discover how to understand the genetic bases of these groups, decode their methods by logic and studying the past, and carry out a worldwide fight back against them.

 


Finally, some E-mails looking at Russell's Practice and Theory of Bolshevism. Late 1998. These are from russell-l, a group closed in May 2000. All emails (except for the first) unedited and unaltered, except for formatting and cutting of header info. I've colour-coded them in the hope of improving clarity.—RW

Delivery-date: Mon, 31 Aug 1998 02:48:39 +0100
From: Kenneth Blackwell [blackwk@mcmail.cis.mcmaster.ca]

On Sun, 30 Aug 1998, Raeto West wrote:

.... [3] Dora also contributed a chapter on women to 'the Practice and Theory of Bolshevism' which was dropped unceremoniously in the next edition by BR of 1949. On this book, I have a query which perhaps someone could help answer. In BR's autobiog vol II, he says in a letter to Ottoline M, 'Bolshevism is a close tyrannical bureaucracy, with a spy system more elaborate and terrible than the Tsar's, and an aristocracy as insolent and unfeeling, composed of Americanised Jews. No vestige of liberty remains..' Yet in 'The Practice and Theory..' there is no mention of this at all, apart perhaps from hints such as a mention of 'Solomon's splendour' somewhere. What on earth was going on here?
Perhaps the soon-to-be-completed Papers 15: Uncertain Paths to Freedom: Russia, China and the West, 1919-22 has an explanation. As Moorehead is at pains to show, Leonard Woolf was very upset at this private remark published 46 years later.

KENNETH BLACKWELL
Research on Bertrand Russell

X-From: russell-l@informer1.CIS.McMaster.CA
Mon Aug 31 07:54:38 1998
From: "Charles.Pigden" [charles.pigden@stonebow.otago.ac.nz]

Re Leonard Woolf, It is clear that Leonard Woolf had to swallow a good deal of low-level casual anti-semitism from his Bloomsbury friends and even his wife. He claimed otherwise and obviously tried not to notice (after all, they WERE his friends and were too decent to be anti-semitic in any deep or serious sense). But he seems to have harboured some subconscious resentments. When Russell was revealed as making similar comments in his letters to those that Virginia had made his diaries this resentment boiled over in what was probably one of his last reviews.

Re Russell. I think we have already remarked on the low-level, casual anti-semitism in Russell's early correspondence. About 1930 he seems to have decided that anti-semitism and other forms of racial and ethnic prejudice constituted a serious problem. Thereafter he was a campaigner against racial and ethnic prejudice, both in his writings and in his personal conduct. There is some good stuff about how to combat prejudice in oneself and others in 'The Importance of Keeping a Wide Horizon' (CPBR 10), NEW HOPES FOR A CHANGING WORLD and elsewhere and I believe Russell refused to join anti-semitic country clubs when invited to do so. (I'm not sure whether he cleaned up his act with respect to his private correspondence—perhaps Ray or Nick Griffin could tell us.). But the interesting question is what brought about the change. It was, of course, a change of emphasis not a change of fundamental doctrine. Russell had admired jews (Spinoza, Einstein) befriended jews (Horace Kallen, various students) and defended jews (Sheffer of Sheffer's stroke fame) before, and he was always proud of Lord John's record on jewish civil rights. But the change of emphasis was quite considerable. So what made him take the matter seriously? The rise of Nazism? A growing awareness of the importance of prejudice in American society? What?

Re BR's attitude to Bolshevism. Rae West writes:

In BR's autobiog vol II, he says in a letter to Ottoline M, 'Bolshevism is a close tyrannical bureaucracy, with a spy system more elaborate and terrible than the Tsar's, and an aristocracy as insolent and unfeeling, composed of Americanised Jews. No vestige of liberty remains..' Yet in 'The Practice and Theory..' there is no mention of this at all, apart perhaps from hints such as a mention of 'Solomon's splendour' somewhere. What on earth was going on here?
Surely there is not a problem here. The letter to Ottoline represents Russell's immediate—and raw—reaction. (A reaction he felt free to express to someone of his own age and class.) The book represents his attempt at a balanced view. Moreover it represents an attempt to tell the truth about Bolshevism without raising leftist hackles including those of his wife. We now know that (setting aside the anti-semitism) his raw reactions were more nearly correct than his attempt to take a balanced view. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BOLSHEVISM is unduly charitable towards the Bolsheviks. But if it did any good at all in sensitizing the Left to the evils of Bolshevism, it did it because of its studied moderation. A serving of raw reactions would only have been counterproductive.
Regards
Charles Pigden

Delivery-date: Mon, 31 Aug 1998 10:20:58 +0100
From: Louis Greenspan [greenspn@mcmail.cis.mcmaster.ca]

Dear Charles,
I have been thinking off and on,of writing an article on Russell and the Jews. Russell's contacts with Jewish life is more extensive than one would think-over twenty articles for Jewish Daily Forward, first recipient of Israel Prize, early champion of Soviet Jewry etc. In connection with this I asked Katherine Tait when he stopped making antisemitiv remarks. She told me that they ceased with the rise of Nazism.
Louis

Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1998 09:57:38 -0400(EDT)
From: "Charles.Pigden"

Dear Louis,
A. I rather thought it was the rise of Nazism which sensitized Russell to the issue anti-semitism and led to the change of style. ('Change of heart' isn't quite right for the reasons I mentioned in my last missive.) But another—perhaps complimentary—alternative occurs to me. Russell spent a lot of time in the States between the wars and made the acquaintance of a number of Jewish intellectuals, principally philosophers. This may have made him aware of the existence of institutionalized and semi-institutionalized anti-semitism. 'On Keeping a Wide Horizon' (CPBR 1, p. 456) contains some pertinent material. Russell is giving advice on how to be a good citizen. I quote:

'1. 'If you are at a party and someone begins to disparage the Jews, or any other race, do not let them get away with it. Remember that it is from such small beginnings that terrible persecutions grow.

2. If you share such a prejudice struggle against it. [There then follows some advice on how to conduct this struggle, together with the comment that Hitler has won a victory in making us 'race conscious'.] if you have such a prejudice that you are unable to conquer, at leastkeep it to yourself. Remember that other people less responsible than yourself may think dislike a reason for persecution.'

I suspect that when Russell realized what dislike could lead to—including the mild social dislike manifest in his own asides, conversation and private correspondence—he was forced to reexamine his own attitudes. But it would be nice to have some more explicit documentary evidence.

B. Do you think I am right about Leonard Woolf? He SAID that anti-semitism 'had not touched him personally and only very peripherally' (Letters p. 566) but I just don't believe it. There was plenty of low-level casual anti-semitism of the kind that characterized Russell's conversation and correspondence in the conversation, correspondence and diaries of the leading Bloomsberries. Of course, it was not SERIOUS in a certain sense. After all, LW himself was elected to the Apostles and Virginia married him. Nor was he the only Jew to be on intimate terms with the leading Bloomsberries. (Keynes chief disciple, Richard, Lord Kahn was jewish.) But I can't help thinking that the constant drip-drip of the low-level stuff must have hurt. (See the Letters p. 470 for details.) He could not take it out on on his wife or his friends so he took it out on Russell, accusing him of an 'aristocratic' anti-semitism, when the truth was that it was an anti-semitism shared by the upper middle-classes, including many of his closest associates. (Lest anyone misunderstand I should add that LW is one of my minor heroes. His autobiography is excellent.]

C. I look forward to your mooted article.
Regards
charles

From: Self
To: russell-l@informer1.cis.mcmaster.ca
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1998 21:41:42
In BR's autobiog vol II, he says in a letter to Ottoline M, 'Bolshevism is a close tyrannical bureaucracy, with a spy system more elaborate and terrible than the Tsar's, and an aristocracy as insolent and unfeeling, composed of Americanised Jews. No vestige of liberty remains..' Yet in 'The Practice and Theory..' there is no mention of this at all, apart perhaps from hints such as a mention of 'Solomon's splendour' somewhere. What on earth was going on here?
Surely there is not a problem here. The letter to Ottoline represents Russell's immediate—and raw—reaction. (A reaction he felt free to express to someone of his own age and class.) The book represents his attempt at a balanced view. Moreover it represents an attempt to tell the truth about Bolshevism without raising leftist hackles including those of his wife. We now know that (setting aside the anti-semitism) his raw reactions etc.
Thus Charles Pigden. But of course there's a problem. Why should BR suppress an important piece of information? (He explicitly states in his autobiography that he determined to say what he thought about the situation in 1920 in Russia. He wasn't afraid to be outspoken on most other issues.) So what happened?

Regards Rae

Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 02:04:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: Nicholas Griffin [ngriffin@mcmail.cis.mcmaster.ca]

Charles Pigden asks about the occurrence of low-level anti-semitic remarks in Russell's later letters: From the 1930's on such references disappear (so far as I can remember, completely). It's also true that Russell and Peter refused to join an American club which would not admit Jews. I'm sure the rise of Nazism was the cause.
Nick Griffin

Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 07:43:35 -0400 (EDT)
From: Kenneth Blackwell

On Tue, 1 Sep 1998, Nicholas Griffin wrote:

Charles Pigden asks about the occurrence of low-level anti-semitic remarks in Russell's later letters: From the 1930's on such references disappear (so far as I can remember, completely). It's also true that Russell and Peter refused to join an American club which would not admit Jews. I'm sure the rise of Nazism was the cause.
My recollection of BR's letters matches Nick's on this score.

Russell tells the club story in "Some Impressions of America" (RA1 220.018540), a typed essay of 1944-45 for which I have found no appearance in print:

"Almost all English people, when they go to America, are amazed by the strength of anti-semitism. I could hardly believe it when I first discovered that there are hotels and summer camps which will not admit Jews. At one time I wanted to join a swimming club for the benefit of my children. I found one which seemed admirable, but when the management explained that no Jews were admitted, my principles forbade me to join. I failed to find one in my neighbourhood that would admit them."

Patricia Russell protested in a letter to the editor of an old New York liberal daily in "`Juden Verboten'", PM, 8 Dec. 1942, p. 21. Guilt by association is a nasty device, but it is true that 20 days later BR was fired from the Barnes Foundation.

There is a fair amount on the evils of anti-semitism in Vol. 22 of the Collected Papers.

KENNETH BLACKWELL

Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 09:26:36 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Richard A. Rempel" [rempelr@mcmail.cis.mcmaster.ca]

Dear Nick,
Don't you think that more needs to be made of BR being of the late Victorian mind set of so many British intellectuals—much milder that the Continental equivalents—. Look at J. A. Hobson's anti-semitic statements during the Boer War or Henry Labouchere, the old radical editor of *Truth*. It was knee jerk and related to the distaste many Britons felt for the flood of Jews into the country from the 1870s on.—especially into the East End, Moss Bank in Manchester, parts of Liverpool and Leeds. BR and others like him were not like Houston S. Chamberlain, or Stocker or Lueger. The Brits just talked loosely about Jews—but did not call for ill treatment of them. Not trying to let them off—just differentiate.
Yrs., Dick Rempel.

Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 11:50:07 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Richard A. Rempel"

Dear Nick,
I neglected to mention the dislike/loathing that Hobson—perhaps BR—had for Jewish financiers who, they alleged, had been instrumental in conniving to bring about the South African War. BR's allusions to Lady Ottoline (25 June 1920)about Rufus Isaacs(later Lord Reading) surely relates to his involvement with his brother Godfrey and Lloyd George in the Marconi Scandal of 1913, when they were accused of financial corruption in transactions of the Marconi Co. of AMERICA. They were acquitted, but the stain would not wash out. Also, BR was repelled by Lenin's interest in "Taylorism"—Yankee assembly line industry...
Yrs., Dick Rempel

Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1998 12:14:39 -0400 (EDT)
From: Kenneth Blackwell

On Mon, 31 Aug 1998, Raeto West wrote:

In BR's autobiog vol II, he says in a letter to Ottoline M, 'Bolshevism is a close tyrannical bureaucracy, with a spy system more elaborate and terrible than the Tsar's, and an aristocracy as insolent and unfeeling, composed of Americanised Jews. No vestige of liberty remains..' Yet in 'The Practice and Theory..' there is no mention of this at all, apart perhaps from hints such as a mention of 'Solomon's splendour' somewhere. What on earth was going on here?
Surely there is not a problem here. The letter to Ottoline represents Russell's immediate—and raw—reaction. (A reaction he felt free to express to someone of his own age and class.) The book represents his attempt at a balanced view. Moreover it represents an attempt to tell the truth about Bolshevism without raising leftist hackles including those of his wife.
        We now know that (setting aside the anti-semitism) his raw reactions etc.
Thus Charles Pigden. But of course there's a problem. Why should BR suppress an important piece of information? (He explicitly states in his autobiography that he determined to say what he thought about the situation in 1920 in Russia. He wasn't afraid to be outspoken on most other issues.) So what happened?
    I think you are fastening on the phrase "Americanized Jews". Where BR put the emphasis, or where you do, is unknown to me. What can be made of it for a book? It is true that some of the Bolshevik leaders were Jewish, and that some of these people -- including Trotsky -- had spent time in the US. (This I learned from R.A. Rempel.) Indeed, Trotsky arrived in New York with his family in Jan. 1917 and left in March -- only to be taken into custody by *British naval authorities* when his ship docked at Halifax.
    If BR put the emphasis on "Americanized", there will probably be parallels drawn in some of his public writings between Soviet Russia and the USA.

KENNETH BLACKWELL

Date: Wed, 2 Sep 1998 02:47:55 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Charles.Pigden"

Two more remarks on Russell's 'Americanized Jews' comment and then, perhaps, we should have done.

Rae West seems to think there is a puzzle about Russell's dropping the comment about Americanized Jews from his published account of the Bolsheviks. There is none. Although Russell was outspoken he did not feel the need to express every private opinion—let alone every raw reaction—in public. For example, in 1922 he held the Nietzschian view that all moral judgements are false. He reserved this opinion for his brethren in the Apostles. Since he had alredy been imprisoned for opposing the British Empire there was no need to bring more trouble down on his head by attacking the eternal moral verities. THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF BOLSHEVISM was an attempt to convert the Left to a more critical view of the Bolshevik Revolution. It would have been an act of folly—not to mention downright rude—to needlessly offend potential Jewish readers. Another consideration may have influenced Russell. There WAS someone on the left who agreed with him and she was, quite literally, an Americanized Jew , namely Emma Goldman. (She was born in the Russian Empire and emigrated to the US as a teenager, but was deported back to Russia during the war.) Since her life was probably in danger during 1920, he would not have wanted to add anti-semitic insults to the injuries she was all too likely to sustain.. (Though he did not go as far as she would have liked, her autobiography makes it clear that he was the one member of the Labour delegation for whom she felt any respect.)

As to the comment itself, did Russell have anyone specifically in mind? Ken obviously thinks it was Trotsky, but a much more likely candidate is Zinoviev. As head of Comintern and satrap of Petrograd, Russell is likely to have had more to do with Zinoviev than Trotsky who he only met once. Zinoviev was a flashy orator, but lacking in 'bottom' (indeed Trotsky thought him a coward). In his personal manners he resembled certain anti-semitic stereotypes that Russell would have been aware of. He was arrogant and bullying towards his subordinates and was prone to swanning around Petrograd surrounded by an entourage of bodyguards and prostitutes. (See Figges) Just the other day I was reading Hornung's RAFFLES: AMATEUR CRACKSMAN, which features a vulgar, bullying, arrogant south African millionaire named Reuben Rosenthal, who swans around London in the company of a retired pugilist and several ladies of easy virtue. Hornung is nothing if not an exploiter of the cultural stereotypes of the ruling classes. Under the circumstances Zinoviev was just the sort of person to arouse BR's visceral anti-semitism (visceral, because even then he was probably a bit ashamed of it.) The only snag is I don't think Zinoviev spent much time in America.

All this, as Dick Rempel puts it, is explanation rather than excuse.

Never let it be said that the subscibers to this list are a collection of hagiographers who avert their eyes from the darker side of Russell!

Charles

Date: Wed, 2 Sep 1998 11:52:43 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Raeto West" [prsjlv1n@hen.scotland.net] To: Multiple recipients of list [russell-l@informer1.CIS.McMaster.CA]

Both Ken Blackwell and Charles Pigden seem unable to understand the simple point I'm making. BR, who visited Russia, found a 'close tyrannical bureacracy' of 'Americanized Jews', an 'insolent aristocracy'. That's his opinion of what he found. Pigden seems to think BR was referring to perhaps a couple of men. Ken Blackwell seems to think a few more. But what BR wrote is perfectly clear (except for the possible doubt over the meaning of 'Americanized'). Why should he not mention this in his book? The only replies from russell-l seem to be that it would offend Jewish readers and be 'an act of folly', that it was a first reaction & not considered, and that it would be 'counter-productive'. But BR had little hesitation in offending other types of readers. Moreover there are possible philosophical/history of ideas implications, which BR often liked (cf. e.g. his comments on ex-Catholics and ex-Protestants). So why (part from possible rather concealed remarks e.g. on Solomon's riches) didn't he mention this?
Rae

Date: Wed, 2 Sep 1998 21:57:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Charles.Pigden"

OK Rae. Here is another reason for Russell NOT to say in public that Russia was run by an insolent aristocracy of Americanized Jews. IT WAS NOT TRUE. The Bolsheviks may have been an insolent aristocracy, but only a minority were Jewish. Though there was a disproportionate number of Jews in the higher echelons of the Party they never constituted the majority. Lenin's politbureau (if memory serves me correctly) consisted of Lenin himself, Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky. Only the last three were Jewish. And the proportion of Jews at lower levels in the Party hierarchy was LOWER than on the Politbureau and on Sovnarkom. In fact, the Party was not so much remarkable for its Jewishness as for the high proportion of leading members from the MANY ethnic and racial minorities, Jews, Latvians, Poles, Georgians etc. Only three members of Lenins's Polibureau were of authentic 'Great Russian' ancestry: Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. Stalin was a Georgian, and Lenin himself was a mixed bag with Kalmyck, Swedish, German and Jewish antecedents. (The Kalmyck predominates in his physionomy.) Why then did Russell tell Ottoline something that was not true? Because he was reporting his raw reactions rather than trying to give a sober acount of the facts.

Let me suggest an analogy. Suppose I boldly go where no philosopher has gone before and give a seminar to the Englsih Department at my university. Afterwards I send a splenetic email to a friend: 'The whole place was crawling with post-modernists whose half-witted drivel made me want to vomit.' Subsequently I am invited to chair the academic audit panel for he English Department and end up writing the report. There is no mention of half-wittedness or vomiting and I either say nothing about post-modernism or blandly report that it is an influential view. (It turns out that the post-modernists were in a minority anyway. My prejudices agaisnt postmodernism and the fact that some of the local postmodernists have a propensity for self-advertisement made them stand out in my recollection of the seminar.) Instead of rantings about postmodernists my audit report is full of dull stuff about teaching evaluations, publications, assessment policies and so forth. Now, suppose too that I become (let us say undeservedly) famous and that my email correspondence is published. A latter-day Rae West notices the discrepancy between my email and my report. He starts a controversy on the Pigden-l list. Various people try to explain to him that a private email is one thing and a public document another, and that there is a difference between voicing one's raw reactions and giving a considered judgement. But the latter-day Rae is not satisfied.

'Pigden, who visited the English Department, found it to be 'crawling with post-modernists whose half-witted drivel made him want to vomit'.. That's his opinion of what he found. Why should he not mention this in his report? The only replies from Pigden-l seem to be that it would offend post-modernist readers and be 'an act of folly', that it was a first reaction & not considered, and that it would be 'counter-productive'. But Pigden had little hesitation in offending other types of readers (or indeed post-modernists on other occasions). Moreover there are possible philosophical/history of ideas implications, which Pigden often liked (cf. e.g. his comments on the Catholicsm of G.EM. Anscombe). So why (apart from rather concealed remarks e.g. on the 'influential voice of post-modernism') didn't he mention this?'

Not to put to fine a point on it, wouldn't such a reaction from a latter-day Rae be GROTESQUELY SILLY? And aren't the similar remarks from the present-day Rae equally so?

In fact, there IS a serious issue here which brings me to yet another reason for Russell to keep his comments about Americanized Jews to himself. Though they were always in a minority, there is no denying that there were a number of prominent Jews amongst the Bolshevik leadership. Their propensity for self-advertisement (I'm thinking of Trotsky and Zinoviev here) together with the anti-semitic prejudices of the age made them all the more noticeable. The result was that many of the Whites came to see Bolshevism (which was certainly an insolent, and indeed, a cruel aristocracy) as a Jewish conspiracy. Thus they took out their anger towards the Bolsheviks on the hapless and largely innocent Jews in the areas they controlled. (Only a minority of Bolshevks were Jews and only a minority of Jews were Bolsheviks.) There was a series of savage pogroms. The irony in this was that the leading Jewish BolshEvIks rejected their Jewish heritage and preferred to see themselves as revolutionaries, workers or cosmopolitan intellectuals rather than Jews The point was well put by a rabbi alluding to Trotsky's original and Jewish-sounding name of Bronstein. 'The Bronsteins are paying for the crimes of the Trotskys'. If Russell was aware of these facts (and I suspect he probably was) he had an excellent reason not to stress the Jewish element in the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, particularly when criticizing the Bolsheviks' tyrannical propensities. He would be stoking the flames of an anti-semitism which was already consuming numerous innocent lives.

If Rae West does not consider himself answered by this I don't know what will satisfy him.

Charles Pigden

PS. My sources for all this information are the books we have already discussed on the list in connection with BR and the Bolsheviks: Pipes' THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION and RUSSIA UNDER THE BOLSHEVIK REGIME and Figes' A PEOPLE'S TRAGEDY: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1891-1924, also Dmitry Volkogonov's biographies of Lenin and Trotsky. I haven't checked with the texts to verify my assertions but I have a pretty good memory for this sort of thing. Anyone interested should consult the indices of these books under such headings as anti-semitism, jews, pogroms etc.

Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1998 02:03:37 -0400 (EDT)
From: Nicholas Griffin

Dear Dick,
I'm sure you're right. These remarks (like all remarks) have to be read in historical context. The context changed dramatically in the 1930s and Russell's language changed with it.

Ken's remark about the timing of Russell's dismissal from the Barnes Foundation and Peter's letter about anti-semitism is very interesting. Was Barnes known to be anti-semitic? Is anything known about the Foundation's attitude to Jews?
Nick Griffin

On Tue, 1 Sep 1998, Richard A. Rempel wrote:

Dear Nick,
Don't you think that more needs to be made of BR being of the late Victorian mind set of so many British intellectuals—much milder that the Continental equivalents—. Look at J. A. Hobson's anti-semitic statements during the Boer War or Henry Labouchere, the old radical editor of *Truth*. It was knee jerk and related to the distaste many Britons felt for the flood of Jews into the country from the 1870s on.—especially into the East End, Moss Bank in Manchester, parts of Liverpool and Leeds. BR and others like him were not like Houston S. Chamberlain, or Stocker or Lueger. The Brits just talked loosely about Jews—but did not call for ill treatment of them. Not trying to let them off—just differentiate.
Yrs., Dick Rempel.

Date: Sat, 5 Sep 1998 15:36:10 -0400 (EDT)
From: Kenneth Blackwell

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 08:46:13 -0400 (EDT)
From: CHARLES.PIGDEN@STONEBOW.OTAGO.AC.NZ follows.

Rae West writes:

Charles Pigden still seems unable to see the point. He comments on proportions of racial minorities etc (in my view probably incorrectly; there are plenty of reports of the domination at the top levels by Jews, nor would this be surprising, in view of their numbers in W. Russia. Moreover because of name-changing of the Bronstein-Trotsky type, it's difficult to be sure). However, the issue isn't what Pigden thinks, or what I think, but what BR thought. I can see why conventional people at the time should have not mentioned this, as the feeling was presumably that Jews had in effect been allies in WW1. But BR was happy to describe whole classes of people as evil and despotic etc, and to discuss the effects of philosophical beliefs on peoples' mindsets, and to shock people about sex, bishops etc. This is why I think his suppression of 'Americanized Jews' needs an explanation. I'd hoped someone might have read what survives of BR's correspondence in detail and have a few serious comments.
Rae.
I am going to have one more go with Rae West and then I shall stop.

In a letter to Ottoline BR writes that the Bolsheviks were an insolent aristocracy of Americanized Jews. THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF BOLSHEVISM contains no such remarks. Rae West thinks this 'suppression' needs an explanation. Perhaps it does, but explanations of this 'suppresion' [sic; & others sic] are not hard to come by. There are plenty of good reasons why Russell might have chosen to 'suppress' this remark.

1. The remark was not true and Russell may have come to realise this. Though Jews were both numerous and prominent in the upper echelons of the Bolshevik Party they did not constitute a majority. For example, only three out of seven members of Lenin's Politbureau were Jewish. And the proportion of jews at the very top was higher than the proportion of Jews at the second and third levels. At the beginning of 1917 only 959 out of 23,600 Bolshevik Party members were Jews. (Se Pipes RR, p. 511 and RUBR, p. 113.) This is an important point becasue the 23,600 veterans consituted the core of the vastly expanded Party in 1919 and occupied all the senior positions. Less that 5% were Jews. But if Russell's remark was not true why did he make it? Because he was reporting his raw reactions which were fuelled by anti-semitic prejudice. This led him to inflate prominence into prevalence, a not uncommon failing. (Two Asian families buy houses in the street and suddenly its little India.) It probably did not help that some of the prominent Jews (eg Zinoviev) conformed to BR's anti-semitic stereotypes. When writing up his experieinces for publication, BR may well have decided that his initial reactions were somewhat exaggerated and that an insolent aristocracy CONTAINING many Jews is not the same thing as an insolent aristocracy COMPOSED of Jews.

2. Even if BR continued to believe that the Bolshevik leadership was largely Jewish, he had plenty of reasons to play this down in his published writings. His mission was partly to alert the Left to the evils of the Bolshevik Regime. To do this he had to adopt a tone of studied moderation. In particular he had to avoid anything that might sound like White propaganda since this would destroy his credibility with his intended audience. But it was the common cry of the Whites that the Bolsheviks WERE an insolent aristocracy of upstart (I don't know about 'Americanized') Jews, and that Bolshevism itself was a Jewish conspiracy. (Wild claims were made eg that of the 36 commissars resident in Moscow, all but Lenin were Jews. These claims were simply false.) If Russell wanted to persuade—especially if he wanted to persuade those on the Left—the last thing he needed was to come on like a rabid apologist for Kolchak or Denikin (Even if, on this point, he secretly agreed with them.)

3. He may not have wanted to needlessly offend Jewish readers with what would have sounded like anti-semitic cracks.

4. Remarks about 'Americanized Jews' may have seemed out of place given that one of his few anti-Bolshevik allies on the political Left was herself an Americanized Jew, namely Emma Goldman.

5. The belief that the Bolsheviks WERE an aristocracy of upstart Jews and Bolshevism a Jewish conspiracy was being used at the time to justify a series of horrific pogroms on the part of the Whites. (Figes estimates up to 150,000 dead. ) Russell's mild anti-semitic prejudices were as nothing to the virulence of White feeling. Like Russell, the Whites were inclined to conclude that because Jews were prominent in the Bolshevik Party, they must be prevalent. Unlike Russell they seemed to think that because most Bolsheviks were Jews, most Jews were Bolsheviks (or at least Bolshevik sympathisers) and should therefore be treated accordingly. If Russell knew about this—and I presume he did, though not perhaps the extent of the carnage—then he may have been reluctant to say anything that could be construed as excusing such crimes.

6. Russell's subsiduary [sic] purpose in writing THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF BOLSHEVISM was to end Allied aid to the Whites. (He thought the Bolshevik excesses were partly due to the Civil War and that if the Civil War ended so would some of the excesses. Moreover, he thought the Civil War had to be ended to save Russia from economic catastrophe.) Parroting White propaganda by talking of an aristocracy of Americanized Jews would not have served this purpose.

7. Rae West seems to think that because Russell was outspoken, that he spoke his mind on every subject. (Or almost every subject) This is just a mistake. As I explained in a previous missive, Russell kept some of his opinions to himself or to a narrow circle of friends. In 1922 he was briefly a convert to what is now known as the error theory.. Nobody besides his Apostolic brethren knew about this till Alan Ryan published the paper in 1987. Everyone familiar wth the CPBR will be aware that Russell's book reviews, which usually end with some words praise no matter how faint, are often at odds with his virulent marginalia. Russell could be circumspect on occasion and was sometimes willing to moderate or even 'suppress' his opinions. His private thoughts were not always for public consumption. [Note: Russell in his Autobiography wrote: 'To say anything against Bolshevism was, of course, to play into the hands of reaction, and most of my friends took the view that one ought not to say what one thought about Russia unless what one thought was favourable. I had, however, been impervious to similar arguments from patriots during the War, and it seemed to me that in the long run no good purpose would be served by holding one's tongue. ...'—RW]

Thus there is no problem explaining why Russell 'suppressed' his comments about 'Americanized Jews' especially as these comments probably did not express his considered opinion.

Regards
Charles Pigden

Date: Sat, 12 Sep 1998 19:27:20 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Raeto West"

I'm delighted that Charles Pigden will say no more on this topic—let's hope he means what he says. Since (e.g.) he used the expression 'Vietcong' I've resigned myself to the perhaps obvious fact that he has nothing to contribute.
        But maybe some others can address my serious question about BR's book 'The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism' and the fact that in BR's letter, published by BR, voluntarily, 45 or so years later, he described the system as (let me repeat, plus a bit more:) '..a close tyrannical bureaucracy, with a spy system more elaborate and terrible than the Tsar's, and an aristocracy as insolent and unfeeling, composed of Americanised Jews. No vestige of liberty remains, in thought or speech or action. I was stifled.. Yet I think it the right government for Russia at this moment. ..'
        The question is, why should Russell not mention this in his book, given that generally he had no objection to insulting and/or analysing (e.g.) monarchists, aristocrats, bishops, women, Islam, Catholicism and so on?
        The passage, the only passage, I found in his book vaguely referring to this (p. 73) is '..the desire for Asiatic dominion, which is probably accompanied in the minds of some with dreams of sapphires and rubies and golden thrones and all the glories of their forefather Solomon.'
        Another odd feature of this book is the concern BR shows for the British empire and for the possibility that Bolshevism might become a force that might acquire the whole of Asia within ten years (70), showing a concern for the British empire which seems out of place and which he states without any other comment would 'mean utter ruin'. (A similar concern shows up in some of his other books, e.g. where he predicts or fears that stupidity caused by silly education systems may well lose the empire). I wonder if this represents an ambivalence as also found in A J P Taylor, for example?
    There are other odd features (e.g. the absurd contradiction in which 20 he talks of years of persecution and Puritan morality; then on 21 'Most of them.. have better food than other people.'
        No doubt some of this is caused by the loathing BR felt for the Soviet Union—what he always insisted on calling Russia—and perhaps by a deadline being imposed for this book. (Moreover it seems not to have been popular and seems not to have had a second edition until 1949, if I read the publication information correctly, and so seems never to have been revised except in the sense of dropping Dora's chapter). However, I still seek a convincing explanation for this self-censorship by BR in not discussing Jews at all here.
Regards, Rae West. (PS I imagine the page numbers quoted above apply to all copies)

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