• Projecting Revisionism Backwards: What Can We Learn From Napoleon and the Nineteenth Century?
[ This short introduction was published online in The British Resistance site; because of its relevance I've copied it, from https://big-lies.org/jews/articles-on-jews.html
Miles Mathis has written ingeniously on Napoleon. He pursues evidence that Napoleon was a Jew from Corsica, intermingling this idea with geopolitical material on seas and islands. He takes the view that Napoleon bringing "freedom" in effect was bringing freedom for Jews, but not for non-Jews, probably in some financial sense. He rejects the standard interpretation on Napoleon's actions, considering the descriptions to be implausible; some wars are genuine, others analogous to a psyop. Napoleon had designs on the Middle East, and the intention of changing France, in a similar sense to the Jew war on Russia in the 20th century. This of course was successful, and one has to wonder whether the conversions of weights and measures and seasons were to distract from other changes, such as (I assume) the Banque de France. Mathis is suspicious of Napoleon's supposed imprisonment on remote islands.
The Victorian era is of course outside living memory, but enough survives: family stories and memorabilia, Gothic revival buildings and brick suburbs, old newspapers and adverts, the railway era—to make it feel familiar to Britons: Sherlock Holmes, music halls, Bradshaw's Railway Guide, horse races, Henley Regatta, Dickensian pubs with fires and crowds of people, industrial towns which were villages a generation or two earlier ...
The Napoleonic era, the first half of the nineteenth century, has slipped out of most people's consciousness: starving people while the navy's wooden ships blockaded Napoleon, battles against Napoleon, old soldiers with amputated limbs, redcoats, aristocrats running things ...
Now, every serious person reading this site will be aware of revisionism over the last 100 years: the Fed, in the USA, the war against Germany, deliberately prolonged for two years, the Jewish coup in Russia which for the first time showed how dispersed financial power based only on laws (fiat currency) could take over an entire country, the reaction by Hitler, and the post-1945 consolidation of the new religion of 'Holocaustianity' (including Kennedy's murder to put the Jew Johnson into power), which still (2013) rules much of the world, and which has caused immense suffering with worldwide wars, and immense frauds of the NASA type and also (though this is still controversial) the 'Cold War' and nuclear frauds.
Important note on genetics, easy for forget: in the 19th century, not much was known about theoretical genetics, except that offspring usually resembled parents. The belief in 'blood' in aristocrats and kings and Jews and others has weak points. For example, maybe if inheritance over many generations were better understood, much of the parroting by Jews would start to fail.
To see how we got to where we are, let's push the process of revisionism back to the 19th century, and see what we find; and compare it with 20th century events.
• The 'French Revolution'. Looking back, it's easy to see how this was done: France was rich, and therefore had surplus - not everyone had to work all hours. It had intellectual traditions: Roman Catholicism, Voltaire, Rousseau, Chauvin. It had an ineffectual monarch. All that was needed was serious opponents making sound points (modern-day socialists, NOT the Jewish red counterfeit, come to mind). The funded movement - funded presumably by Jews - included traitors (today's ugly anti-woman 'feminists' and ugly 'reds' illustrate), people who wanted personal influence they felt they'd been deprived of (some modern whites illustrate), and many ordinary career and employment minded people ('Common Purpose' and trade unionists etc illustrate). The result was hyperinflation and chaos.
• Napoleon as a Great Man and Soldier of Fortune. This myth and variations was propagated all through the 19th century. In fact, his role was to grab money from small kingdoms in Europe. A short-term policy which predictably (if you do the sums) led nowhere. The pretence he worked on his own as a sort of power of nature is echoed in myths about Lenin, who of course was just a Jew slipped money from abroad. A better comparison with Napoleon may be Trotsky, energetically leading his bands of killer Jews. In both cases, the mythology was needed to hide the truth, and many versions were emitted, for example the 'toy soldiers' accounts of uniforms, regiments etc; the romantic man of action; the man with an inconceivable genius for detail.
• Rothschild money. The best-known event is the post-Waterloo coup at the London Stock Exchange in 1815 - sales of government stock followed by buying back when the news of Wellington's victory finally arrived. Presumably some, or many, patriotic English families were ruined, but there is, as far as I know, not one single novel of the time dealing with this, which gives an idea of the power of censorship even then. Belloc's Belinda is a later novel including this theme.
I've left the above paragraph unchanged, but note there are many questions over the events. For one thing, the British Army, Navy, Wellington and so on should have informed the country of victory, but seem to have not been urgent; maybe they stood to gain from it? Were there any reactions against the war profiteers—and/or were patterns established for the conduct of Jew-funded wars? In fact the paper assets held by some wealthy people may well have been government stocks, not for example mortgages or company shares, so the government may have wanted their owners to sell them for little; perhaps Jews co-operated?
[A Short History of the Jews in England by H P Stokes (Fellow of Corpus Christi, Cambridge, 1921; published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge) has two appendices on 'The Jew in English Literature', the first from Chaucer to Walter Scott; the second from Addison and Dryden to about 1900. The brief accounts say nothing about any Rothschild in any literary work. And nothing about Napoleon, Opium, the Ottomans, or 'Great War', except Jewish loyalty, including the 'South African War', with figures for deaths. However, there is a chapter on Cromwell, and Menasseh ben Israel, 'a learned Portuguese jew of Amsterdam', i.e. presumably Portuguese Marrano who moved to Amsterdam, but omitting the part about the learned Jew's support for King Charles' death. The entire book is post-WW1 evasion. Of course. What else.]
•David Ricardo was a Jew, who appears in economic history textbooks, usually as a minor theoretician on agricultural land rents and labour costs. (This material may be an irrelevant distraction). In fact Ricardo made a fortune, through loans to the British government, reminiscent of loans by Jews in the USA to fund wars; I'd guess he made money through inside Jewish knowledge, though I know of no technical biography—as of course is usual with Jews.
• British supporters of Napoleon. Clearly, there was considerable support for Napoleon, probably from recipients of Rothschild money. Despite the fact Rothschild had funded Napoleon - an issue brought up in Parliament - Jews were increasingly favoured. As an example, Lord Holland did his best to ensure generous treatment of Napoleon in exile, and led the campaign for his body to be returned to France in 1840. So far as I know, he made no effort to return any of the stolen bullion from Europe's cities. Napoleon was treated in the opposite way to Hitler - every effort was made to praise him.
• Jewish 'emancipation'. Throughout the 19th century there was pressure, for example by Lord John Russell, to encourage Jews (the rich variety). Even the language—'removing disabilities', 'free thought'—shows parallels with today's phrases—'minorities' (when whites are a world wide minority), 'deprived' (of people being given British assets far in excess of anything of their own). There was removal of accounts of Jewish ritual murder. There was concealment of Jewish intermarriage.
There's plenty more, including the debasement of military honour so that theft and rape were barely remarked on. And there are very suggestive points which 'social scientists'/ 'historians' to their eternal discredit have avoided: population issues; power struggle theories with interlocking subsets of people; facts about money; the influence of the human lifespan - 1848 and other events suggest a 50-year interval while forces gather and manoeuvre; whether societies affluent beyond a certain point start to decay.
Paul Johnson's book Napoleon (2002), available as a cheap remaindered paperback, suggested to me the idea of trying deep revisionism on the Napoleonic era, and its impact on the 19th century. Where possible I've drawn comparisons with what's been discovered by revisionists of the 20th century. Johnson's book is a convenient starting-point. (It is unoriginal. Conrad Black, the Guardian and the Economist praised it; so it can reliably be assumed to repeat conventional wisdom, and unwisdom, and not to mention Jews). My conclusions are placed first; the source book review and chronology are placed at the end.
Let me bullet-point some lessons which can perhaps be teased out. It's clear that the 20th century was dominated in the white world by usually unchallenged attitudes on such issues as finance, the First World War, Hitler, the USSR, nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War, Iraq, all ultimately based on Jewish propaganda; attitudes to Germany, France, Russia, Japan and so on have been controlled by the same source. Many people unthinkingly parrot past slogans—German cruelty, French cowardice, our ancestors nobly fighting for freedom. The whole vocabulary—democracy, socialism, money, education, legality, nation, banking—has been deformed by Jews. This article looks at evidence that the pattern was established earlier, and that the 19th century has a similar structure to the 20th.
My conclusion about Napoleon is that he was a front, as virtually all Jew operations are fronted; and they inaugurated war as a sort of game, mostly making money for 'Jews' both by finance and from weaponry and supplies, covering up theft, rapes, murders etc by propaganda. It's a similar mechanism to genocide in the Belgian Congo (1890ish), the war against Germany under Hitler, the Vietnam War etc etc down to Iraq and Afghanistan. The warmongers are instructed who to kill and a few million deaths is normal. What actually happens is hidden by censorship, but also the mechanism of careers - Lt Calley complained on TV that his career was damaged by his Vietnam murders; but of course he was one token out of thousands. It's an extraordinary triumph of propaganda that Napoleon, like Trotsky and Stalin, is still regarded as some sort of hero.
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• The real First World War
Allowing for changes of scale with available human techniques, the wars of Napoleon can be regarded as a world war, a couple of centuries before 1914/ 1917. Projecting today's hard-won knowledge back in time, it's relatively easy to identify (1) Initial promotion of violence, funded by Jews, in France, with accompanying verbal concealments: 'revolution', 'right vs left', 'Liberté, égalité, fraternité'—but on both sides. With accompanying propaganda. (2) Taking over of assets for Jews; notably the Catholic Church in France. (3) Careful avoidance of details of finance, its security or otherwise, and war materials. (4) The centrality of a discord in which both sides feel they may triumph. But note—something which the participants are usually unable to understand—the significant Jews have a different set of supposed self-interests, and are completely indifferent to the outcome, but simply hope to gain either way. (5) Here, the central point was a contest between Britain and the USA and their sea empire, vs the Mediterranean and points east, largely a land empire. What would follow was of course not really discussed; it was too remote, and too difficult to imagine.
(6) '... Napoleon was the first world leader to promise the Jews a homeland in 1799. ... during the Syrian campaign of Napoleon's Oriental expedition, ... [vs] the Ottoman rulers, [he aimed to] cut off Britain from its Empire, and recreate the empire of Alexander from France to India... [and] became the first political leader to propose a ... Jewish State in Palestine.' [I quote Stephen Sizer, a Christian official who doesn't seem to understand the intimacy between Jews, Christianity, and Islam].
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• “Everyone knows Napoleon was brilliant. A Great Man, he was the supreme soldier of fortune, an astonishing individual, who came from nowhere and shaped the entire world. His uniqueness proves that individuals affect the world in the way mere masses do not.”
Well. Let's try a comparison with Lenin, about a century in the future, who was worshipped as the embodiment of Communism, a selfless worker for the proletariat, or at least for the greatness of the USSR. It's now known of course that Lenin was just another Jew, funded more or less secretly by Jews in New York and Europe. His job was to kill educated Russians and build up a Jewish-controlled military-industrial complex. There was nothing in any way magical or mysterious or supreme about Lenin. It is possible the same sort of thing is true of Napoleon. Let's see ...
Johnson recites a number of tales about Napoleon, which must surely by myths: the precise knowledge, to the day, of movements of troops. Another example is the account (p 101) of General Daru on Austerlitz being given full details beforehand. These stories sound made up—they are the sort of thing repeated by credulous people. A more plausible explanation seems to be that they were the work of his army of bureaucrats.
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• The 'French Revolution'
France was supposed to be richest country in Europe, before the Revolution; this of course depends a great deal on estimates, and on what you choose to look at. However, France was targetted—denigrated throughout the 18th century, culminating in the 'French Revolution'. (Note as a parallel that Russia was denigrated throughout the 19th century by Jews, a process culminating in the 'Russian Revolution'; this was easily done, as newspapers were the only medium for news; occasional anti-Russian pieces could be inserted, just as occasional anti-German pieces could be, and were, inserted, later in the century. The typical newspaper reader would absorb attitudes entirely unconsciously, in the way people in the USA absorb attitudes from their local Jewish media, and people in Britain from the BBC, without any thought process). It's now known (I suggest Nesta Webster as a full-on alternative source) that the 'French Revolution' was something like the later 'Russian Revolution', fomented and funded by Jews, and marked by large-scale social, religious and cultural changes. Paul Johnson doesn't say this, but here are some things he does say:
... the Revolution left behind huge .. administrative and legal machinery .. centralized power to organize national resources
that no previous state had ever possessed; ... (p. 81)
... 8-12000 clerks at French war office [i.e. working for Napoleon]; Wellington said he had 150 ....
Wellington: "... all [France's] institutions were framed for .. forming and maintaining its armies with a view to conquest.
All the offices and rewards .. were reserved in the first instance ..
for the army. ..' (p 55)
'.. subservient press .. propaganda .. central importance in war ... steam-produced
newspapers .. state semaphore and posting systems..' (p. 56) [nothing on Le Moniteur's sales or importance]
directors 'hated' - inflation soared, conscription law, food shortages (pp 44-5)
English people were puzzled by the French Revolution, after what was regarded as 18th-century rationalism and enlightenment. Two easy 'scapegoats' were Voltaire and Rousseau: not that they were laden with sins and driven away, as 'scapegots' were, but they were diversions from the real causes. Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy blames Rousseau for sentimental laziness and refusal to face facts, and many other Victorians hated Rousseau for, they thought, introducing dangerous ideas into the French psyche. Bertrand Russell, a firm believer in the lies of the 'Jewish Holocaust' believed that Rousseau's thought 'led directly to Auschwitz'; Russell believed the mythology of the Churchill-as-Prime-Minister era, and no doubt Rousseau provided a conveniently simple and unrevealing causative mechanism.
It's worth bearing in mind the 'Illuminati' and Bavaria, in 1776; this seems to be a fully historically validated event. The evidence of course is hard to find, because of Jewish and other connections; however, it's possible (i) that similar groups existed throughout Europe—notably in France— and that (ii) Napoleon's tasks may have included funding them, guarding them, and controlling evidence, for example by removing documents; interested people might try to investigate Napoleon's armies and Bavaria.
And bear in mind Franc-maçonnerie, translated as Freemasonry, though the word formation suggests something more French and money-oriented. This organisation was anti-Roman Catholic, and disliked by French people who were Jew-aware. Rather than advertise themselves as Jewish, they claimed to be 'anti-Clerical'; a similar technique to the British equivalents' claims to be freethinkers, rationalists, progressive, modernists, and so on.
Jews, the 'French Revolution', Edmund Burke, Tom Paine, Godwin, Wordsworth, de Maistre... need a revisionist review. The cauldron of confusion surrounding the American Revolution, Conservatism, the French Revolution (and its name), Burke's Irishness and money and letter 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' (written when he was about 60), Tom Paine's anti-monarchism and careful calculations, plus naked violence, makes a heady brew. And of course the confusion is deliberately designed to conceal the part played by Jews.
The name 'French Revolution', rather than, say 'French Civil War', was doubtless modelled on the American Revolution, which had fairly impeccable logical bases. This was enough to deceive Tom Paine, Wordsworth, and others. Tom Paine's The Rights of Man has (arguably) been re-formed as the 'human rights' movement, mostly reworded as 'human rights' to provide a fake justification for immigration into white countries. Burke's Reflections, a long letter, dated 1790, must have been difficult for Burke, who had city of London interests in silver. He wanted money; Jews wanted violence as well. Burke is a well-established figure in official histories of politics. There must be roomfuls of essays by history students on Burke; stuff like this: '... magnificent oratory ... leading Conservative figure ... long experience of men ... great statesman ... not always easy to follow his thoughts ... French nobility ... predicted Napoleonic adventures ... grasp of human nature ... disliked the far-fetched property ideas of Godwin ... ' Tom Paine deserves some examination here. Common Sense (1776) and Rights of Man (1791; also in French translation) seem to be his best-known works. Possibly worth noting is his birth in Thetford, in East Anglia; this may conform to Kevin MacDonald's perception that Scandinavian settlements on England's east coast may be responsible genetically for the egalitarian cast of mind of Paine). Paine is something like controlled opposition: he seems to have thought the British monarchy was the oppressive force against the new United States; he did not perceive the Bank of England money connection with its Jewish link. (And therefore did not predict the British invasion of 1812, and the 'forgotten war' aspect of those events, in which censorship smothered the war). So Common Sense helped the U.S. colonies to fight and win; but failed to warn them what might, and did, befall. Rights of Man had a similar function in France: part of the propaganda battle against traditional France, while failing to warn the French about Jews—and failing to warn about the possibilities of someone like Napoleon. The Age of Reason (1794) set the stage for many 'rationalist' critiques; unlike Voltaire his mentions of Jews were Old Testament 'history'. What was left was ridicule of the absurd beliefs of Christianity. Fair enough, but the absurd beliefs of Judaism, Islam and so on were not ridiculed. Paine appears to have been, mostly, yet another useful idiot.
Here's a tidy summary by 'Armor', from the Occidental Observer, March 1, 2015:
In answer to: "It was the ideas of the French Revolution that empowered Jews"
The French revolutionaries were dictators and thugs, not high-minded philosophers. They shut down the provincial parliaments, they banned the trade guilds, they tried to destroy the Church and killed a few hundred thousand opponents, they terrorized everybody. It had nothing to do with favoring the White man’s natural aspiration to individualism, liberty and equality. The idea was to destroy any obstacle to their dictatorship.
The idea of giving French citizenship to the Jews had nothing to do with the Western ideal of individualism either. A few Jews simply bought up enough politicians to pass the law.
According to Lucien Pemjean (Les Juifs en France, 1941 - at the time of Vichy France), a group of rich Israelite merchants, among them Messrs Mardochée, Polack, Goldsmidt, Jacob Trenel, J. Lazard, etc. was set up to direct and finance the maneuver. ("Un groupe de riches marchands israélites, dont faisaient partie les sieurs Mardochée, Polack, Goldsmidt, Jacob Trenel, J. Lazard, etc. s'était constitué pour diriger et financer la manoeuvre.")
An excerpt from the French wikipedia entry, about the "emancipation" of the Jews:
On January 18, 1791, a new attempt was made [in the parliament] for the complete emancipation of the Jews. The Prince de Broglie opposed it, saying: "This whole intrigue has long been under preparation by four or five powerful Jews who live in the department of Bas-Rhin [=Lower-Rhine, in Alsace]. One of them (Cerf Berr), who has gained immense fortune at the government’s expense, has long been spreading considerable amounts of money in Paris so as to get support and protectors". [At present, French Metapedia has no content].
Note for Americans: "Jews in America did not drop from the moon." Their technique is to discreetly get a few of themselves in the right place. And then, through persuasive means, they start bringing in the whole tribe, without any assent from the general population.
Jews, and Business and Technical Changes need a revisionist re-examination. Judging by parallels in the English-speaking world, Jews would arrange the legal system, typically so that losses are offloaded onto others, as in the invention of limited companies. And they would take over land and assets for which rent could be charged: on obvious way is by a sort of cuckoo change of landowning aristocracies and other groups. But note also that Napoleon had an interest in technical matters. It occurs to me that Lavoisier may have been guillotined to get him out of the way: perhaps he knew which raw materials were potentially valuable, for example. Here we have a 50-year old man, certainly one of the leading chemists of the day, and with organisational skill; it's entirely possible he wanted discoveries and methods to benefit ordinary people. I don't know if this rather obvious idea has been explored. And he would count as one of the 'best of the goyim', a target for Jewish murder. Alfred Mond, 1st Baron Melchett, whose names was used in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, illustrates the sort of person Jews presumably had in mind.
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• Napoleon's Military Methods
As to Napoleon's methods, at least when successful, (p 73) he carried out lightning wars, with a large scale battle; he would destroy the defending armies, occupy the capital, and 'impose punitive peace' terms. The defending armies were (at first) decorative, changing-of-the-guards swashbucklers ruled by men of aristocratic traditions: they belonged to small states and city states (beloved of Rousseau, earlier in the century) and they were clearly very vulnerable. Savoy, Lombardy, Mantua, Genoa, Venice, Holland, were some examples. The 'Holy Roman Empire' and a concordat with the Pope, giving Napoleon influence in appointments, illustrate something similar. In simple terms, this meant violence or threats, theft, and extortion from towns and small states. The larger campaigns later, notably Spain and Russia, failed spectacularly and are conclusive proof that Napoleon was either incompetent or had some unannounced policy. One question we must consider is how normal decent people could regard this as legitimate activity. A few quotations:-
'..ten million francs in gold looted from Berne..' (p 38) In the Middle Ages, this sort of thing was called 'seizing the treasury'. But this might not have been as straightforward as the wording suggests. Could there have been collaboration? Johnson points out that on many occasions all that was needed for money to be handed over, not hidden, was the appearance of some French cavalry. This suggests some prior arrangement had been made with bankers.
French rule was 'rapacious and corrupt' (p 89)
'To the ordinary people... (p 89) the coming of Bonaparte's armies often meant the loss of their crops, stores, horses, and livestock, the torching of their farms and barns, the rape of wives and daughters, the billeting of rapacious soldiery, and the stabling of horses in their beloved local church. Bonaparte's orders ... were: You have the force, live off the land.' ... [1808 Spain may be meant here].
'... the French stole any valuables ... money as well as art was stolen. Trieste, according to one eyewitness, was left bare. Other towns were effectively sacked. (p 89).
'... turned the kings and reigning dukes out of their palaces and slept in their royal beds. He dragooned their soldiers into his armies, where they became military helots.' (p 120)
'The various new states ... functioned even more inefficiently and exactingly than those replaced. France taxed Italy mercilessly [punitive taxation to keep them weak] ... thousands of Frenchmen could get easy jobs as administrators, with large salaries...' but (p 76) '... new administrations, constitutions - none lasted more than a few years...'
[Note comparison with Common Purpose today in white countries. Hosts of nonentities - Ken Livingstone, Harold Wilson, the EHRC, black token promotees, numerous MPs, media hacks, people given supposedly high powered legal jobs, have got easy jobs at high salaries. 'La carrière ouverte aux talents'—'career open to all those with talent'—was perhaps a little joke in part, possibly analogous to the assumption that 'I.Q.' measures intelligence.]
• Reprise of 'Great Man' idea vs the 'Masses'
The 'Great Man' idea—more books were published on Napoleon than any other historical character; this fact may still be true, depending on how academic papers are considered. It's traditional to regard this as proof of people's interest in the subject, rather than evidence of propaganda promotion of a set of myths about Napoleon, after his convenient death. In contrast with the profound anonymity of Jews and their fronts, this undoubtedly functions as a distraction from Jews. There's a very accurate parallel with Lenin: both had huge relatively well-paid armies of bureaucrats, workers, police, and force, ultimately funded externally. Lenin was embalmed after death and put on display; Napoleon's remains were supposed to be in a catafalque in Paris. Both had innumerable images, paintings (or photos of Lenin), posters, books (and films of Lenin). Both had a nominal interest in art, at least as it could be used for propaganda; the looting of Egypt (p. 38) and 'socialist realism'.
The huge supporting casts apply in other similar cases. There were Freemasons (francmasons in France); in Europe now there is a newer bureaucratic type of Common Purpose 'graduates' (people who have to be told they are leaders). The same sort of impression accompanies other rather paler types: Rupert Murdoch's empire of bullshit is presented as though a one-man operation. The Queen in Britain is presented as uniquely special, though this is a bit of a tough public relations exercise as she has done less than nothing. Back to top
• Brief Note on the Influence of Napoleonic France
Napoleon is sometimes described as attempting to unify Europe, but not many will be taken in by this presumably Jewish-influenced idea. Attacking numerous small states and principalities, getting bogged down in Russia and Spain, losing all the loot taken, is nobody's serious idea of unification of Europe. And in fact it is strange at first sight to see the lack of a consistent historical picture: Victor Hugo was inconsistent (Les Miserables is a ludicrous confused product of the Jewish fantasy factories), Balzac produced nothing coherent, Daumier's works conveyed little, Napoleon III was odd, Tolstoy later in Russia was adamant that history had no meaning, the French 1918 b/w film of Napoleon was in similar style to Eisenstein... My best guess is that, as everyone intelligent can see in modern Hollywood and Jewish TV and publications, there was funding of junk on the one hand, and censorship of truth on the other. The official French view of their own history, because of this censorship, is a set of slogans, but not much else. France in the 19th century went on to be exceptionally bloody and vicious; see for example the popular book The Myth of France.
(The film Goya's Ghosts (2006) postdates the stage and film Les Misérables and, just like it, uses the device of an embedded sex-related micro-event, assuming filmgoers are unable to cope with anything large-scale. Goya's life included the whole of Napoleon's as a temporal subset, but there's virtually no feel for the place or the time: Spain's sub-tropical sunlight is replaced by brown dullness, perhaps borrowed from varnished oil paintings; Napoleon's armies are not shown collecting loot; their prolonged stay in Spain with looting and theft and starvation isn't shown; and the usual methods to save money—the filmic equivalents of cartoons using repeating backgrounds—give an amusingly constricted feel. There are Inquisition scenes—part of the Jewish propaganda against the Reconquista—and a Marrano is shown with piles of gold—source unspecified, but the Spanish dilemma when it imported bullion from the New World—hang on to it; or spend it?—isn't hinted at).
Another point, quite hard to make clear, is the difference between military and state strength and loot. Works of art and bullion appeal to private individuals, but are one-off, and don't always ultimately help states, as the examples of Spain in the New World and silver in India illustrate. This is more evidence that Napoleon had been charged with simple theft. By contrast, takeovers of states have needed long-term planning, secrecy, and violence: Mandela the vicious puppet, and Slovo the vicious Jew, plus large numbers of mediocre backups, along with Jewish propaganda over a long period, provide a modern equivalent. Napoleon was the equivalent of a set of soldier ants, and he was followed by a more permanent army of whatever bureaucratic and police ants might look like. At a guess, this threat may diminish: now, we have races of people, but also a freak variety which hates all others: it's as though there are packs of varied dog breeds, plus one inbred pack which is sociopathic, hangs together insanely on instruction from a few top dogs, and stops at nothing to obey orders. Jewish sociopaths, whose hatreds are so great they will spend entire lives without questioning them, took (say) 1,000 years to inbreed to their present-day freakishness; it seems unlikely that will happen again. So perhaps people will then try to make some sort of progress, rather than having to waste effort combating parasitism.
Liberté, égalité, fraternité was, it's now obvious, a Jewish obfuscatory slogan, like 'The Dictatorship of the Proletariat'. What many people still call 'left'. The words of 'La Marseillaise'—the War Song—patrie, gloire, bloody banner, warriors and all the rest point the same way.
Napoleon and his armies have left (I presume) a fallout of technical military expressions: general, major (majeur), colonel, lieutenant, corporal, aides de camp, manoeuvre, glacis, triage, field marshals, baton... etc, as distinctive as Italian musical terms. Incidentally, note that millions of horses died 'the struggle to replace them became one of his [Napoleon's] most formidable supply problems' (p 52)— which perhaps helps explain horse meat consumption in FranceBack to top
• Notes on Louisiana Purchase: Last Gasp of Louis' Dynasty? Problems with Jewish Financing? Haiti as Jewish Plot? Piracy?
This issue clearly needs a revisionist account—as do all modern histories. I don't want to try to deal with it here; this is just a marker of intent.
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• The 'Balance of Power' as a Misleading Slogan
The 'Balance of Power' is a phrase or slogan usually applied to Europe after Napoleon and before the 'Great War', the 'First World War'. Almost exactly 200 years. I'd like to suggest here that the expression was a manifestation of Jewish power, just as the 'Cold War' was a disguise for Jewish top-level, or at least financial, control of most of the world after 1945. Probably Jews learned from Rothschild to maximise their money—or more accurately maximise their power over rivals, by aiming against other leaders. The two prongs were probably to make money from armaments, which needed loans; and to lend to all the parties, ensuring some sort of guarantee that loans to defeated parties would be taken on by 'victors'. This, I think, was sold, promoted, taught, propagandised, as the 'policy of balance of power'.
There must have been numerous instances in Europe where the policy was not, in fact, followed. The hypothesis to be tested is: did the policies redound to the advantage of Jews, or to European peace? Back to top
• Money and Loot: Where Did It All Go?
There's a Latin saw Cui bono 'To whom go the good things?' or 'Follow the Money'. It's generally accepted that Rothschild fingers were stickiest, and there must be suspicion that they were behind machinations to increase their net worth—as the 20th century Russian equivalent proves to be possible. In other words, offloading the costs of plunder and war onto low-grade soldiers and civilians, while taking as high a percentage as possible.
Looters will of course do their best to camouflage themselves, to distract quizzical enquirers. One such distraction of course is the 'patrie', 'gloire', blood, descriptions of endless battles, uniforms, standards. Another is fashion: Paris fashions, Paris dancing girls, Paris gossip. Another is thrilling but unimportant military detail: the Barroso eagle, the only Napoleonic eagle taken from a French regiment by infantry, was taken by Irish soldiers!
Another is putting a spotlight on some individuals—leaving others very much hidden in the dark. Another is the trumped-up phoney justification, a variety of false flag, reminiscent of the claims at the present day to bring democracy to (for example) Iraq.
I suspect the cultural aspect of Napoleon's campaigns was just such a phoney justification. Money and works of art were looted together, the art probably intending to mask the treasure. Johnson lists art before gold, despite the fact that an art market had not yet developed, except for the Grand Tour. However many artefacts had local significance, for example the horses of Venice; probably this was a typically Jewish policy, through envy of creativity—similar to the wholesale destruction of Russian Orthodox Icons more than a century later in Russia.
The 'extinction of the Venetian Republic' was the 19th century term for the conquest of Venice in 1796/1797; this was early in the career of Napoleon, suggesting urgent priority. Byron and Disraeli and many others kept Venice's memory open: the Doge, the Oligarchy, the Arsenal contributed to discussions about democracy and other forms of government. But the money aspects as far as I know are kept obscure, suggesting of course that the Jewish policy was to both ruin Venice militarily and seize what assets were to be found.
Johnson is careful to avoid all Rothschild money issues: the famous quotation about the Rothschild sons, deciding to have wars, is omitted. The theft of three million from Prince William IX of Hesse-Hanau by Mayer Rothschild is not mentioned. The Rothschilds supply of bullion to both sides, British and French, on condition the debts of the losers were honoured, is not mentioned. The switch to paper money and government bonds isn't mentioned, or the need for legal enforcements. (Probably the Fuggers, in an earlier century, showed bullion was too risky). After Waterloo (1815) the selling and buyback of consols is not quoted; nor on what a bullet (or musket ball) might have spared Europe.
There's one aspect of Napoleon that Johnson quotes (no doubt more or less directly) at length: the costs and arrangements for Napoleon on Elba and St Helena. In 1814, Napoleon was sent to Elba (near the coast of Italy) as something like a petty dictator. On Elba, Napoleon had something like four million in gold—whatever that means; Johnson doesn't attempt to decipher quantities. Later, after more chaos, he was moved to the remote St Helena: the ' ... cost of keeping in St Helena squadron of frigates, inshore patrol of brigs, 2250 men 500 cannon—half a million gold Napoleons a year' (p 175) until his death aged 50 in 1821.
Johnson, like all writers on Napoleon that I know of, makes not the remotest attempt to calculate the costs of running a huge army. The extinction after a decade or two suggests the whole thing was unviable from the start. It looks similar to the Romans, short of cash, deciding to plunder Dacia. However, it would be nice to have some evidence.
The simple fact of the fawningly generous treatment of Napoleon when defeated is sufficient on its own to show that the wars were not purely nationalistic. There was a wealthy stratum in British society that was paid off, just as there is now in the USA.
NOTE ALSO the suspicion Napoleon was poisoned. I'd like to suggest he may have been poisoned by those wanting to promote his myth: after death, he would be suitable for apotheosis. Before death, Napoleon must have known many embarrassing details about gold, treasures, massacres, and the funding of his armies, and I suspect his multi-volume memoirs must have been censored; they appear to be infinitely dull, which adds weight to this speculation. After his final defeat, Napoleon spoke out about Jews and financiers, who must have worried that he might put together the pieces of the puzzle of weapons and wars. Compare the treatment of Germany after the First World War: the demand for reparations, the slogan 'squeeze Germany till the pips squeak'; there seem to have been, at least judging by the deluge of books on Napoleon, no suggestions for the return of stolen goods. Or compare the treatment of German Generals and other leaders after 1945: imprisoned, tortured and murdered as quickly as possible to ensure their silence.
Tom Gigliotti recommends: for a fantastic revisionist analysis of Napoleon, I cannot help but to recommend Owen Connelly's Blundering to Glory. The book gives an interesting account of how he rewrote the documents relating to his own battles in such a way as to make acts of incompetence look like genius. Back to top
• Comparisons of Napoleon with Hitler, Lenin,
Trotsky, Stalin, and the USA in the 20th Century - Including 'Cultural' Matters
Let's compare the entire nineteenth century; incredibly, up to about 1890 the Napoleonic legend ruled. There was systematic pro-Napoleon propaganda for about 80 years. It's very similar to 20th century pro-Lenin propaganda, and very similar to the negative of Hitler propaganda. After about 1890 there was a switch against Germany; and for 70 years now, after 1945, Hitler is universally defamed in the Jewish media. Or almost universally. I mention this obvious fact to prove that the propaganda task can be done, easily enough.
It's interesting to
examine in more detail the promulgated Napoleonic Legend as negative of the official Hitler legend. We might compare the Napoleon legend with Lenin, or more accurately Bronstein ('Trotsky')—similar myth of genius, tireless activity, and more accurate view as well-funded mass murderer ruthlessly consuming the lower orders.
Much of the 'Romantic movement' was based on Napoleon—Byron's 'bold daring'; Coleridge, Paisley (Johnson mentions a Paisley), Keats, Shelley, Lamb, Byron, Hazlitt, Jefferson. And we can see now that 'romanticism' was necessary, to dodge the issue of theft and violence, just as surrealism is necessary when there's a rain of lies, as in the Spanish Civil War for example.
On Shelley, There are a few pointers to a possibly subterranean set of interests. Without claiming expertise on Shelley (1792-1820), contempt for 'Ozymandias' (of the sneer and lost empire); York, and its Clifford's Tower site, and 'barbarism'; the oddities of the many-titled The Revolt of Islam; the supposed raising of the Devil; the tradition or quasi-tradition in Paul Foot's Red Shelley, possibly his name, might point to Jewish influence.
Walter Scott (1771-1832) who died as Napoleon's mythology was being forcibly revived, and whose Life of Napoleon includes material on Jews and others fomenting the 'French' Revolution—and for that reason is rarely quoted—gave voice to the anti-money sentiment: Breathes there the man with soul so dead
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land!
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned,
As home his footsteps he hath turned
From wandering on a foreign strand!
...
High though his titles, proud his name,
Boundless his wealth as wish can claim
...
And, doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonored, and unsung. A standard work on Scott is The Life of Sir Walter Scott by J G Lockhart. I have a 1906 edition (reprinted later), the Everyman edition, 675 pages plus 7-page 2 column index. Jews, Rothschild, Napoleon, Stock Exchange, Waterloo are not indexed! This is the heavily abridged version of the same author's multi-volume work. I would be very surprised if Lockhart referred much to allegations of Jews causing or manipulating the French Revolution.
Paul Johnson doesn't understand Bernard Shaw and the Webbs, and the Jewish link with Stalin. Nor does he understand Castro, regarding him as a vicious dictator, unaware of his Jewish Marrano 'Communism'. Nor Mao.
Naturally, Hegel, Beethoven, and Goethe are referred to; and Johnson seems amazed that invaded countries responded by becoming more unified and doing their best to arm, though he doesn't have the wit to query the economics.
There's an amusing comment (p 145) that Bonaparte 'continued to splutter out ... schemes for the improvement of humanity'. Just like Jewish liars on the 'Soviet Union'.
The 'Code Napoleon' (p 110) offers another comparison, this time with the Constitution of the Soviet Union. Johnson says there were 15,000 revolutionary statutes, taking 87 sessions up to the 1801 draft. The 1804 Code Civil; for 1807-1814 this became the Code Napoleon. Significantly, Napoleon played little part in this process, and did not create it. 'The more rational and popular parts became permanent' says Johnson.
Another analogy we might explore is 1800ish France with post-1945 USA: unwisely organised wealth, energy, overseas adventures and atrocities, with Jewish censorship and media bias, with a huge bureaucracy, but in the American case greater productivity allowed truly massive frauds and waste (wars, bombs, nuclear weaponry, Israel, NASA, AIDS, 9/11) to use up their surplus, plus the 'Holohoax' to direct money to Jewish immigrants. Back to top
• British Overt and Covert Supporters of Napoleon and Jews ...
There was ambiguity in Britain from the start. Wikipedia (100% Jewish in interpretation; read them on David Irving!) talks of the Napoleonic Wars as Britain against France, as though only Britain and France were involved.
Clearly Jews approve of Napoleon's tactics. This must be money-related.
An aspect which as far as I know is suppressed by all official historians is the fact of expulsions of Jews from European city-states and countries three or four centuries earlier. Various more or less fantastic possibilities for revenge suggest themselves, in ways analogous to the pillaging and mass-murders after the Jewish coup d'ét in Russia in 1917.
This may be to distract attention from Napoleon's battles all across Europe. France attacked Italian states, German states, Austro-Hungarian states, Egypt; they failed against Spain, Moscow, the Turks in Acre. Or it may be to emphasise the part played by Britain, which was damaged by the wars which must have been unpopular with most of the population: Wellington except as required by Parliament had no great concern for ordinary Britons. There's probably a parallel here with Churchill: ordinary Britons in both was were deprived in the genuine sense. It would not surprise me to find Wellington, like Churchill, had strong links with Jews.
It's not easy to be clear on this point: Wikipedia for example states under 'Napoleonic
Wars' that France declared war on England and Holland in 1793, and/or 1803, and the niceties of the meanings of 'declarations of war' are difficult to exhume.
Lord Holland continually pleaded for the lightest of punishments on St Helena. (Pp 178-9). Holland House was something like a model of urbanity: Bertrand Russell said the conversation was still worth reading (in his book Freedom and Organization, in the late 1930s), but Russell notes he lived off the labour of little children in coal mines. Russell was puzzled by the contrast, which he refused to analyse as this would be 'unbearably cynical'. At last, in 1840, a magnificent funeral by the Seine of Napoleon was finally agreed (pp 188-9) with Holland. I would guess (I haven't attempted to check) that Dutch Jews, imported by Cromwell, were part of this story. The supply of cannon to Cromwell is analogous to the supply weaponry to Napoleon; and the 'New Model Army' to the supposed Citizens' Grand Armée.
On Holland House, an interesting account is the chapter The Aristocracy in Freedom and Organization. Lord and Lady Holland entertained Melbourne and Talleyrand, amongst many others. Russell gives no details of these people; it's arguable the whole aristocratic nomenclature was taken over from earlier landed aristocrats as a form of disguise. There's an account of Macaulay; despite his unprepossessing appearance, and lack of 'birth and fortune', Russell says he was tolerated because of his 'wit and learning'. Not because he was a paid liar! The chapter is interesting for its continuism—e.g. Whig and Tory aristocrats as enemies and friends respectively of the Stuarts, and for its complete omission of Jewish intrusion into the British aristocracy. Very likely the 'Liberal' Party was a disguise for Jews, in a similar way that the 'Labour Party' later was a disguised Jewish party. Macaulay no doubt was a hired propagandist; but Russell, as seems to have been entirely typical of most of Britain up to and after the Second World War, had no understanding of Jews.
The 'purchase system' (where the post at the head of a regiment was paid for, usually of course by an aristocrat) may well have been entangled with loot, a land version of sea piracy against treasure ships. Or they may have been a species of mercenary, fighting (for example) the Chinese to force opium on them, or fighting for Maharajas and other princes or despots in provinces of India. The 'purchase system' begs several questions, including the possible use by Jews of Britons, Frenchmen etc as mercenaries.
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Here's a Youtube video by 'History Reviewed Channel', who is a Jew-aware ex-Rhodesian/ South African. He details email exchanges with Dr Peter Hammond, on Europe, Napoleon on Jewry, and Napoleon's Third Decree (called the 'infamous decree' by Jews), his Third Decree, which annulled many loans from Jews: HRC says loans to married women, minors, soldiers, and loans with interest rates greater than 10%.Here's part of HRC's comment on 'British' policy, described in Britain as 'maintaining the balance of power':--
BIG DISASTER ... The British and the Russians defeated Europe. The Peninsular War was "the ulcer that bled Napoleon".
The British are a confused white people .. their aristocracy has been infiltrated by Jews .. they've forgotten what whites are .. in many ways Christianity has taken them away from what they are... they have fought Europeans... Europe lost half its land area to the USSR in WW2... Britain's role has been to disunite Europe ...
The Europeans inside Europe have been defeated every time by the British and Russians. [I take it he includes Jews behind the scenes in both Britain and Russia-RW.] Europeans are not a free people ... each time it was Britain and its Jewry who have come to fight in Europe ... Every time Europe was united .. Britain arranged the invasion of Europe by outside powers.. the USA [etc], the USSR ... for 200 years... Europe's empires have all been destroyed...
• ... Napoleon's Changing Attitudes to Jews ...
This is Stephen Sizer, a British cleric who was prohibited by Welby, the Jewish-descended Archbishop of Canterbury, from discussing modern Israel. I'll just quote on online extract:–
... [On] Napoleon’s campaigns in the Middle East [and] his relationship with the Jews. It is well known that Napoleon was the first world leader to promise the Jews a homeland in 1799. Jews were indeed scattered through the Ottoman Empire but during the Syrian campaign of Napoleon’s Oriental expedition, in which he had sought to defeat the Ottoman rulers, cut off Britain from its Empire, and recreate the empire of Alexander from France to India, he become the first political leader to propose a sovereign Jewish State in Palestine. This was part of his historic declaration:
‘Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the French Republic in Africa and Asia, to the Rightful Heirs of Palestine. Israelites, unique nation, whom, in thousands of years, lust of conquest and tyranny were able to deprive of the ancestral lands only, but not of name and national existence ... She [France] offers to you at this very time, and contrary to all expectations, Israel’s patrimony ... Rightful heirs of Palestine ... hasten! Now is the moment which may not return for thousands of years, to claim the restoration of your rights among the population of the universe which had shamefully withheld from you for thousands of years, your political existence as a nation among the nations, and the unlimited natural right to worship Yehovah in accordance with your faith, publicly and in likelihood for ever (Joel 4:20).’
Historians such as Hyamson and Baron show how Napoleon believed that with sympathetic Jews controlling Palestine, French imperial and commercial interests as far as India, Arabia and Africa could be secured.
[Sources:
Paul Merkley, Christian Attitudes to the State of Israel (London, McGill Queens University Press) p38.
Cited in Franz Kobler, Napoleon and the Jews, (New York, Schocken Books, 1976), pp55-57. See also: https://www.napoleonicsociety.com/english/scholarship98/c_jews98.html
See Albert M. Hyamson, Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1917), pp162-163; Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1937)
Many people and groups have changed their attitude to Jews. This makes a study in itself: Edward I in England, Luther, Cromwell, Walter Scott, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Stalin, Idi Amin are just a few of the varied historical types who became entangled. Napoleon's often-quoted phrase on bankers Lorsqu'un gouvernement est dépendant des banquiers pour l'argent, ce sont ces derniers, et non les dirigeants du gouvernement qui contrôlent la situation, puisque la main qui donne est au dessus de la main qui reçoit. [...] L'argent n'a pas de patrie ; les financiers n'ont pas de patriotisme et n'ont pas de décence ; leur unique objectif est le gain. seems to date from his later life. (I haven't been able to trace the exact quotation or a date). As with many debtors, there are few complaints at the start of the process; they tend to accumulate and emerge at the repayment times.
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• ... and Jewish Effects on Middle-Range Intellectual Life in Britain ...
[ Matthew Arnold | Jane Austen | Hilaire Belloc | Jeremy Bentham | Bolingbroke 1678-1751 | George Borrow | Brontës | H T Buckle | Edmund Burke | Byron | Thomas Carlyle | Coleridge | Charles Darwin | Charles Dickens | Disraeli | Edward Gibbon | William Ewart Gladstone | Thomas Macaulay | W H Mallock | Thomas Malthus | John Mill | James Mill | Moses Montefiore | Nietzsche | Thomas Love Peacock | Francis Place | E A Poe | Alexander Pope 1688–1744 | Winwood Reade | Rothschilds | Scofield | Samuel Smiles | Adam Smith | Herbert Spencer | Algernon Swinburne | Voltaire | H G Wells ]
The intellectual life of Britain, in retrospect, clearly understates international finance and wars, no doubt because such information was censored. And wars were displayed in reputable books as blocks of courageous but otherwise negligible males, ordered and directed by their betters—a public school outlook, from which money, supplies, profits and aims were omitted. Bolingbroke fell into political eclipse, and it may well be post-Cromwellian Jews whom he disliked; he was a Tory, and we must suspect that Whigs, were, in fact, Jews, with little respect for Tories (unless they married in). Nicholas Ennos believes he may have been published as Alexander Pope. Edmund Burke's oratorical smokescreen set the pattern as regards political theory.
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) was correctly accused on the Continent of Europe of NOT being about nations, but about personal wealth. At any rate, Adam Smith so far as I know never considered strategic raw materials: did Wellington aim to control sulphur, and mercury mines in Spain, essential for gunpowder and mercury fulminate? If not, why not?—Smith adds weight to the idea that warfare for profit of private companies was being institutionalised. It occurs to me that his famous pin factory example is oddly and perhaps deliberately underimportant: Smith might have considered printing, in which manual writing was replaced by a series of activities—cutting or casting individual letters, arranging these in formes, inking, pressing onto paper, binding, and so on, plus selection and editing of manuscripts. Smith might have considered a navy, similarly needing a range of activities. Or more abstract activities: legal structures, land holding systems, organisations. If Adam Smith had been broader and deeper, or perhaps have been permitted to be broader and deeper, ‘social sciences’ may have been by now something approximating to a science.
[ From my chronology of Jews:– 1776 Adam Smith Wealth of Nations published in chaotic economic conditions. May have been aimed subtly against non-Jewish currencies; laissez-faire obviously appeals to currently-powerful groups, and less obviously hides the Anglo-Jewish control of currencies. At the time, there were open newspaper discussions of currency in north America and its effects on living standards, which were seen to exceed any other variable. I don't know whether this was the first such observation in modern times, making it obvious how important currency control was. And Adam Smith avoided discussion of weapons and militarism and law, despite their obvious importance.
It wouldn't surprise me if 'Adam Smith' was a manufactured propagandist. Perhaps with a fake name. Note that Smith excluded Jewish material, for example the Bank 'of England' as a Jewish social construction.]
In a ghostly parody, two centuries later, Thatcher and Reagan funded similar even more lightweight people, for example the 'Adam Smith Institute'. This of course was what the Rothschilds loved: guaranteed money by backing both sides, profiting from the issue of money, and killing off of goyim.
Another supposedly stellar intellectual was Thomas Malthus, on Population. His 1798 book, nine years after the 'Revolution', says nothing on deaths by wars, but assumes food supplies are always produced in peaceful conditions. Malthus predicted misery into the indefinite future, as human population swelled to the limits imposed by food production. I suspect he may have been censored by Jewish publishers, who, as the Napoleonic Wars show, wanted white deaths. If Malthusian principles apply to all human populations, presumably either wars are inevitable, or some form of joint controls would be needed, if endless famine is to be avoided. The possibilities of race replacement on Malthusian-derived grounds was certainly acted on by the time Jews won the 'Second World War' in 1945. And I noted somewhere that the 'historian' Hobsbawm had a low, dismissive opinion of Malthus, which I suspect is a Jewish attitude—if there are too many goyim, why not kill off the surplus? In the following century, I believe this applied in the USSR, not just to Ukraine, but to the USSR, helped out by Lysenko, and in Africa, where white-owned farms may have been intentionally wrecked.
Let's add the Irish (or supposedly Irish) Oliver Goldsmith, whose Deserted Village (1770) says
... Amidst thy bowers the tyrant's hand is seen,
And desolation saddens all thy green:
One only master grasps the whole domain, ...
and not the usual conformist misinterpretation of Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.
Marginal figures from the Empire were sometimes intentionally 'boomed', for example Annie Besant. Another marginal figure was George Borrow who deserves a mention for his autobiographical Lavengro and The Romany Rye, which look mostly at 1825, though published nearly thirty years later, and, contrary to what might be imagined, do not use the word gipsy/gypsy anywhere.
Covert censorship set the stage for British education to retrogress: for example into Greek, Latin, military history as violent episodes, and history as tales of monarchs. Eighteenth century rationalism, Gibbon, Voltaire, were buried. The Church of England was the BBC of the time, with guaranteed money and once-a-week or more sermons (some servants at one time went six times on Sundays), set for its slow downward slide into its present-day nothingness. To this day, the rule of inverse importance applies to Universities: the more important a subject, the less attention it receives. 19th century Oxford University must have become affected by Jews, mostly of course in the censorship sense, which was essential if Jews were allowed more participation. But also in the propagandist sense: the 'Scofield Bible' appears to be an example. And conversely: we now have the era of PhDs as 'crawling ... on the frontiers of knowledge with a hand lens' and 'the transference of bones from one graveyard to another', and Jewish organisers appointing as many Jews as chutzpah permits.
Setting aside Oxbridge, an interesting new foundation was the University of London, established 1836, and including the then-new classical style building that's now UCL, King's College, the LSE, RADA, Goldsmiths, Birkbeck Heythrop College (religion), not picturesquely arranged as in Oxbridge, but dotted about London and remoter areas. I've never seen an explanation of exactly why this monopolisation was made. The big names attached to the new organisation include (in birth order) the utilitarians Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), Francis Place (1771-1854), James Mill (1773-1836). Bentham became famous and widely-quoted in France in 1788, just before the 'Revolution', as a writer on rational legal codes. He spent years on his architectural idea, the 'panopticon', which was not taken up in Britain. He lost money on this, though he received compensation in 1813. (It's hard to see how a system of mirrors could work, given the limitations on 19th-century mirrors). Bentham's source(s) of income are obscure (unless I've not read the right books). John Mill wrote his History of India between 1806 and 1818. He is described as anti-Christian, and a 'democrat'. When Mill's book was published, the East India Company employed him until his death. (Or so the story goes; the administrative information on the East India Co looks to me supplied by insiders, which suggests he may have been paid all along—annulling the surprise John Stuart Mill expressed at his father's inexplicably large household). Looking at all this with a cynical eye, and noting the utilitarian's apparent failure to address the Bank of England and Jewish support for Napoleon, and the Opium Wars, one has to wonder if these people were supported secretly by Jews, perhaps fixed by Francis Place, somewhat in the way that the 'Labour' Party, and Coudenhove-Kalergi, and 'freethinkers' were supported in the 20th century. Mill, anti-Christian and a 'democrat', provided he did not reveal mercenary motives of Jews in India, could be rewarded. Certainly UCL to this day (see their Youtube videos!) divides between technically-skilled degrees, and Jewish ideology soft degrees, with anti-white coloured ignoramuses given their puppet posts.
Here's H G Wells (born 1866) on education in Britain at the time: '... Fifty years ago [1880] they [private schools] were still responsible for the education, or want of education, of a considerable fraction of the British middle-class. Anyone might own one, anyone might teach in one, no standard of attainment was required of them; the parents dipped their sons into them as they thought proper and took them out when they thought they were done. Certain university and quasi-public bodies conducted examinations.. For the most part these private schools passed the middle-class youth of England on to business or professional life incapable of any foreign language, incapable indeed of writing or speaking their own language.., unable to use their eyes and hands to draw or handle apparatus, grossly ignorant of physical science, history or economics.. It is only when the nature of the English private school education is grasped that it becomes possible to understand why the enormous possibilities of world predominance and world control, manifest in the British political expansion during the nineteenth century, wilted away so rapidly...' (From 'The Shape of Things to Come', 1933).
No novel I can think of mentions the Rothschilds, or people ruined by wars or their wartime tricks; there's no English realistic fictional version of the type of Poe's Fall of the House of Usher. (Since I wrote that, I rediscovered Belloc's Belinda set about 50 years after Napoleon). The effects must have run deep: this for example is H G Wells on housing about fifty years before he was born. Post-Napoleonic expansion, before railways, with a system of 99-year building leases for ground landlords, and spewing of 'extremely unsuitable building all over London', with no bathrooms, assumption of cheap servants, steep stairs etc, 'the London house'.
Moses Montefiore, resident in Britain but going overseas to act against a 'blood accusation' against a fellow tribesman in the Damascus affair (1840), may be the first example of involvement in the middle east: a trader and banker, co-founder of "Alliance Insurance Company", and mayor of the City of London used the "Board of Deputies of British Jews" to intervene in the ritual murder of Padre Tomaso.
Instead we have Dickens with his Two Cities but no analysis. Macaulay's review of The Life of Byron (1830) said there was no 'spectacle so ridiculous as the British public in one of its periodical fits of morality', a comment obviously on propaganda in newspapers and periodicals, possibly about the Opium Wars with their Jewish direction. In the same, year Macaulay made his maiden speech in favour of Jews; his later historical works praised the 'Glorious Revolution' when William of Orange took over England. An interesting possibility is that Wuthering Heights (1847) warned of problems with aliens—Heathcliff, an abandoned mixed race child abandoned in the seaport of Liverpool, caused havoc in Emily Brontë's Yorkshire fictional family; I don't know if this was suggested by some local event, or how heavily edited her original book was.
The self-absorbed Jane Austen (published 1811-1817), is the subject of new revisionism, as far as I know starting with Nicholas Ennos in November 2013 in Jane Austen: A New Revelation, making the case for her cousin Eliza de Feuillide as a prolific author. Multiple topics include enclosures, the 'French Revolution', and arsenic poisoning. I hope this may be part of the revisionist movement—including her brother's failed bank. Note that de Feuillide, in female style, appreciated money but not how it was made—consider Darcy's sister on how odious she should think Darcy's business correspondence. Charlotte Brontë (Jane Eyre) shared this blind spot—Jane married the rich but damaged Rochester, but beyond something about Jamaica had little awareness of money apart from inheritance. Trollope's novels include money and Jews and English life, but not (I think) Jewish frauds. Dickens has Fagin, but not (I think) the summits of fraud; Eliot's Daniel Deronda (1876) had a sentimental theme related to Jews; Disraeli, who became Prime Minister also wrote novels, including one with the famous phrase 'The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes', and it must be the case that the supposedly thunderous debates with Gladstone were formalised, and excluded underlying issues. Gladstone was religious, and no doubt imagined 'Jews' had Biblical warrant.
It's worth making a note on 'self help' books: Samuel Smiles in the UK (1812-1904) and Horatio Alger in the US (1832-1899) presented a hopeful vision of success through effort. This may well have been connected to the idea of 'self discipline': the rather strange etymology of self-flagellation suggests 'discipline' is something unpleasant to be endured, and it's likely that persons tempted into the world of Jewish deception and frauds must have felt distress at their rather unnatural behaviour. And the idea of discipline imposed from outside is very much in keeping with Jewish aggression.
Satirists too said nothing about Jews. Thomas Love Peacock flourished at about the time of Jane Austen (Headlong Hall 1815-ish established his group of intellectual talking heads genre), almost coincident with the Rothschild's insider dealing on Napoleon's defeat. Unless I've overlooked references, there is almost no comment on Jews apart from Jews ('Hebrews') in Scotland and a few Byronesque remarks on financiers in Gryll Grange: all his characters, or to be on the safe side let's say most, are either British types, for example varieties of Protestant, or popularly identifiable characters such as Lord Monboddo, Mary Wollstonecroft Shelley, Coleridge, Byron, though paraded in discreet ways. Peacock was involved in a governmental capacity in war with China, and may have been aware of the atrocities and finances; and he received money from a literary society, so it's possible he may have been paid to keep quiet. He wrote Paper Money Lyrics (published 1837), fifteen poems on such subjects as panics and 'flimsters' and 'bubble-buyers'; and Scotch economists, Quakers, and Jews; and which include 'The Wise Men of Gotham' and 'Margery Daw'. [NB: An American correspondent suggests Peacock's name is a coded joke, presumably false, with homosexual references, of the sort Jews like. This seems likely enough—critics of his satires might like to examine the view that Peacock shows what Jews thought of Britons. Peacock held some governmental post at the time of the opium wars, suggesting a key place is wrecking China; it may be significant that J I M Stewart's book on Peacock (1963) was no. 156 in a British Council series].
Thomas Carlyle (b. 1795, in Scotland) from our point of view is an example of the type who sows confusion, and was presumably encouraged because of that: He was an avid reader, including of German (he translated Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, a novel which had something like James Dean status in Germany), and wrote in something like a speaking-in-tongues style crossed with previsions of Brewer's Phrase and Fable of 1870. His The French Revolution and his books on hero worship, Cromwell's Letters (Carlyle deplored the unindexed chaos of Cromwellian archives), a monk (taken from recently published historical documents), and Frederick II of Prussia ('the Great' - 1712; 1740-1786) deal with individuals, not their backup. Poor Carlyle tried in vain to extract truth from the unyielding stone of group secrecy. And note that 'heroes' are easily invented, by anyone controlling whatever media are available. Was Napoleon a 'hero' for example?—it depends what you've been told.
The next well-known satirist of this genre is W H Mallock's 1877-ish The New Republic with recognisable characters—Jowett, Walter Pater, Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, but also W K Clifford, Thomas Huxley and John Tyndall. Forty years later, a shadowy financier, shown as finding his efforts trivially simple and as a result suffering infinite ennui, appears in Bertrand Russell's then-unpublished 1912-ish work The Perplexities of John Forstice. In 1901, Swinburne wrote insulting material on Boers, part of the propagandist material which, however, didn't quite conceal the part played by Jews. Secretive, concealed, foreign, alien, oriental, cunning, wealthy characters mostly appeared with cheap printings in thrillers, for example John Buchan's 39 Steps.
Nietzsche (1844-1900) seems to be absurdly inflated. He thought society should have a rather ruthless aristocracy, but with a few heroes. He seems to have combined Jewish tribalism with the Jewish-promoted fantasy of a single hero, designed to throw goyim off the scent. There are no Jewish heroes, after all. Nietzsche, like a great many 19th century figures, studied classics, and so could pepper his work with erudite-sounding references to literatures which had barely survived, and, in my view, may have been subjected to very serious pruning.
An interesting writer was Henry Thomas Buckle, whose life was sandwiched within Darwins's life by about twenty years each way. He attempted a huge History of Civilisation in England (Vol 1 1857), a serious attempt to work out general laws of progress. This first volume pre-dated Darwin. He died young, about five years later, on an expedition in the 'Holy Land'.
Herbert Spencer's books on sociology (starting in 1860, and including anthropological information collected from territories of the British Empire) showed signs of awareness of hidden corruptions: the Jewish attitude is that power to Jews must be good: the whole question of competence is ignored, as is to be expected from parasites. There results are shown in Jewish Russia, the USA, black 'affirmative action', and of course myriads of other examples. Spencer's Man versus the State (1884) has an impassioned passage: '... difficult as he finds it to deal with humanity in detail, he is confident of his ability to deal with embodied humanity. Citizens, not one-thousandth of whom he knows, not one-hundredth of whom he ever saw, and the great mass of whom belong to classes having habits and modes of thought of which he has but dim notions, he feels sure will act in ways he foresees, and fulfil ends he wishes. Is there not a marvellous incongruity between premises and conclusion? ...' Spencer may (or may not) have been aware of the effects of Jewish activities; his works seem to assume Jews are Old Testament people, and he seems to have no awareness of Talmudic and other documents. He had no idea that hostile and aggressive parasitical secret groups could exist, and be influential. His self-assurance in discussing the 'State', Whigs and Tories, Liberals and Conservatives, the French Revolution, laws and contract and slaves, is that of a man so completely under the dominion of imposed ideas that he never rose to any theoretical understanding of the dynamics within and outside human groups. So Spencer (1820-1903), a significant Victorian thinker, seems to have had only the most superficial knowledge of 'Jews'. But he was aware that evidence was needed: he deplored the then-traditional British 'historians' who wrote mostly on the doings of monarchs. He invented the phrase 'survival of the fittest'.
An interesting more-or-less forgotten writer is Winwood Reade, who travelled in Africa, and whose book The Martyrdom of Man (1872; link is to my detailed notes) rejected religions, tried for a unified world history of mankind, thought war (probably in a chivalrous, conventionalised Victorian sense) led to progress.
As with non-Jewish writers on world events in the USA in the 1930s, these lines of thought largely petered out. Already by the 1850s, there were complaints that Jews controlled more than half of British publications.
In 1925, Jud Süß by Lion Feuchtwanger was published; it was translated into English. And In 1928, Hilaire Belloc's novel Belinda had clear reference to 'Rothschild'. However the domination of cinema, radio and television by Jews has, so far, stalled any accurate treatment of Jewish topics.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) was founded a decade or so after the defeat of Napoleon, and must have been an early example of a propagandist 'think tank'. It was essential for propagandists of the time to censor out the fact that Jews funded both sides in the Napoleonic Wars, and made huge fortunes from them, along with the deaths of many 'goyim'. And the process was needed to enable Jews to enter power positions without much protest. Today's organisation of the same name is the same old trash, unmoved by the entire 20th century experience of Jewish frauds and manipulations into wars. In effect, wars make fortunes for Jews, all the costs being offloaded onto whites. The authors of the material mentioned are just another gullible set of simpletons, when they aren't actually knowing collaborators. Military historians of course have followed the same desperately sad course. Let's hope realism increasingly takes over from schoolboyish quasi-history.
... Miles Mathis's Full Revisionism of Jews, Napoleon, and Lies
The most thoroughgoing modern Napoleonic revisionism known to me, at least that's publically available and not in some hidden Jewish archive(s), is Was Napoleon Jewish? by Miles Mathis, who investigated Jews in eastern Europe and their incursions into Europe, including Jewish groups in (for example) Genoa and Corsica, and decided that Napoleon was a crypto-Jew, most of whose exploits were propaganda and never happened, or were never intended to happen, such as the invasion of already-subjugated England, or wildly exaggerated, or, presumably, carried out for hidden purposes, no doubt seizing money or thrones or assets under pretext of heroic victories; in this view, Napoleon was part of the scheme to rearrange European assets and aristocracies into Jewish hands and those of confederates. Mathis states many of Napoleon's victories, for example in Palestine, could not even have taken place. He does not as yet attempt a grand before-and-after balance sheet, which of course seems a huge undertaking, but which would throw light on the whole scheme.
The 'French Revolution' preceded Napoleon's fame. Miles Mathis wrote on the French Revolutionnot a republican revolution, but a coup against the Aristocracy and Church by the financiers, hiding behind republican fronts and stories. Miles didn't find Walter Scott or Nesta Webster, but did investigate Brienne, Necker, Mirabeau, Lafayette and others.
The principal clash between the HRC (History Reviewed Channel) and Miles Mathis's view is Napoleon and Jewry. Questions up in the air include Napoleon's actual activities (Theft? Killing whites? Installing new elites? ...), the degree of covert support by Jews, for example whether the 'Grand Sanhedrin' was just aimed at anti-Jewish French and never was intended to enforce rules on Jews, the aims of the various parties and sub-parties, and the rest of the world (including the new USA and UK) and Jews.
• Other Reactions to Napoleon
Paul Johnson seems amazed other cities and countries united, after being invaded (p 141) whereas surely this is to be expected. He remarks on the 'explosion' in German thought and literature at end of 18th century, later called the 'Aufklärung'.
Johnson seems amazed that coalitions tended to fall apart; pages 65 and following list coalitions against Napoleon, all very variable and unstable, not surprisingly. It's easy to declare alliances, less easy to put them into practice when heavily-armed aggressors turn up.
However (surprise!) Johnson does note that a unified Germany might pose dangers in future. He has no idea of the forces behind the First World War, so his comments fall in the usual laughable category. He also has no idea why many countries were unable to unite strongly: Poland, Romania, Hungary.
Worth mentioning is von Clausewitz's book, translated as On War, which is more a collection of notes made over a long period of time, published in several volumes, than a consistent book. It's quite an odd work, discursive and vague. But the essential thing to note is that there is no mention of Jews, finance, or war profits. One has to assume it was promoted, and translated, and recommended, and referred to, precisely because of its limitations.
• Surprising attitudes to war, presumably as a
result of continued propaganda Deeper interpretations: many ideas obviously inconsistent with normal life perhaps come from the Napoleonic influence. Many people take for granted, and are totally perplexed if challenged on, such notions as the military being heroic and noble, and soldiers as duty-bound to follow orders. This must be the result of propaganda; to this day organisations devote themselves to inventing enemies, and then whipping up excitability against them, often very successfully, since propaganda works best against remote or barely-understood groups. So we have a domestic morality vs wartime morality: Paul Johnson mentions rapes, tortures, atrocities in Spain, extortion of food—doubt causing starvation—but shows no condemnation. Why not? Well, it's 'military'. Similarly with asymmetry of friend vs foe: to this day many people cannot understand that it's unsurprising that Afghans who weren't collaborators have a legitimate reason for anger. There are (presumably genuine) emails and letters from widows of dead soldiers showing this blankness. This attitude is perhaps natural with an overwhelming weapons advantage, or when easy victory or loot seems likely. And routine wartime lying may be a Napoleonic legacy: Prime Minister Cameron finds it natural to lie about Islam, pretending it's all about peace, just as he would lie about Judaism if anyone raised the issue.
Here's an interesting passage by Simon Sheppard showing how little is consciously known by many people about the ferocity of the Napoleonic Wars (and the US Civil War, Africa, etc later):– By about 1700 and for the subsequent two centuries, conflicts between European nations had become almost ritualized. Casualties were minimized, since the combatants of both sides consisted of temporary conscripts, conscious that their major role was to enable some nobleman to prove himself in courage and tactics to his peers. In the recriminations following the famous 1854 Light Brigade charge in the wrong direction the Earl of Cardigan said it was "no part of a general's duty to fight the enemy among private soldiers." Having led his cavalry into battle he had not been confronted by someone of equivalent rank with whom he could, according to the protocols of his day, engage. Central to the prevailing notion of "civilized warfare" was that civilians were respected: armies would buy supplies from local inhabitants and sometimes did without if purchases could not be made. This was the era in which Thomas Cook is reputed to have organized excursions to watch at the side of battlefields while sipping tea and eating cucumber sandwiches, an era which was all but over by the time the 20th century dawned.
The main point here is that these rather odd attitudes to war - [1] orders to be obeyed, including fighting to the death; [2] the supposed heroism and medals etc; [3] the anomalous attitudes to rapes, killings, thefts, [4] and absence of punishments [Nuremberg is a freak exercise in hypocrisy] ... All these attitudes are part of was as a matter of making money, from arms and supplies and financial control. The whole point is to acclimatise people to this process.
Part of the process of acclimatisation is, obviously, propaganda, and this includes appeals to vanity, pride, inability to understand mortality, and so on. This is Conan Doyle in a novelette:
I can see those great warriors stream before me—the green-jacketed chasseurs, the giant cuirassiers, Poniatowsky's lancers, the white-mantled dragoons, the nodding bearskins of the horse grenadiers. And then there comes the thick, low rattle of the drums, and through wreaths of dust and smoke I see the line of high bonnets, the row of brown faces, the swing and toss of the long, red plumes amid the sloping lines of steel. And there rides Ney with his red head, and Lefebvre with his bulldog jaw, and Lannes with his Gascon swagger; and then amidst the gleam of brass and the flaunting feathers I catch a glimpse of him, [Napoleon] the man with the pale smile, the rounded shoulders, and the far-off eyes. The appeal of this sort of thing, and tawdry medals and cheap honours and competition between otherwise rather indistinguishable men, was understood by Napoleon.
If national survival and genuine defence were at issue, would people be allowed to profit from it? This is the thorny point Napoleon's role was to establish: of course money-making by people away from the battlefield, making money from death, should be allowed! But never mentioned in polite company.
Comparisons come to mind with twentieth-century events: for example, at an easily-understood level, the media-driven Jewish move to miscegenation for non-Jews; the attempt to normalise Muslim gang-rape, Jewish use of prostitutes, paedophilia, homosexuality and other perversions generally.
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• Congress of Vienna 1814-15: setting the stage for the world after 1815The Congress of
Vienna is described (page ix) by Johnson as 'one of the most successful peace settlements in history'; this assessment is typical of conventional commentators; another similar remark is that it made the world dull and boring. He may have been thinking of Versailles... or possibly of Bretton Woods and the World Bank and IMF, if he could extend his mind to treat these as 'settlements'.
We must first see how completely wrong these assessments are; and try to explain how they may have seemed credible to propagandists.
Let's look at six countries post-1815:-
USA far from being peaceful, had huge stresses involving finance: 'Stonewall' Jackson did his best here, but ultimately failed. The US Civil War was a vicious and hugely damaging part related to this. Lincoln was murdered to kill his 'greenback' idea. I've never seen a convincing explanation of Britain and USA 'forced into war' against each other (p 94) by British attempts to circumvent the 'Continental System'; much more likely that, as with 1776, the British wanted to control US dollars.
Worth noting: Napoleon sold Louisiana, which was 'many times the area of the present State' (pp 94-5). Developing this area would have been a long-term project, and not a simple one, as the South Sea Bubble (1720ish) had shown. But it must add to the idea that Napoleon was only interested in short-term riches.
Britain is offshore from Europe. The British Navy blockaded Napoleon; it's strange to find that north African piracy from Algiers was opposed by US ships—and Swedish. It's worth noting the uninvestigated murder of Spencer Perceval in 1812; there's an obvious possible link with 'Britain' declaring war on the USA, and the funding of Napoleon by Jews, which, as far as I know, has not been presented in any published form. Jewish emancipation was supported by 'progressives'. Hansard of 1830 gives information on the Bill dealing with 'removal of Jewish Disabilities'. Note the wording; eerily echoed in 'deprived' or 'disadvantaged', suggesting something was unfairly removed. Several eminent Britons opposed remitting Jews to damage Britain: Sir Robert Harry Inglis, Henry Goulburn, Sir Edward Burtenshaw Sugden, Colonel Sibthorp. Worth noting the much-trumpeted 'Reform Act', 1832, ensured, among other things, that only men who could afford to pay to stand for election could be MPs. (NB persons trying to make sense of 'Whigs', 'Whiggism', the 'Whig interpretation of history' and so on, would to well to consider the hidden Jewish component in British Politics and power struggles). The rest of the century was taken up by varied events which might be taken as peaceful: the Times and news agencies biasing foreign news towards Jews; the Crimean War, aimed at damaging Russia by preventing it getting a Black Sea port; a British Empire in Africa, and continuing in India, opposed only by a few Little Englanders, the Boer War being a culminating, vicious, struggle. Britain fought more wars (if that's the right word; there's a convenient ambiguity here, analogous on a small scale to the Americans in Vietnam as to whether huge superiority and cruelty counts as 'war') than I think any other country, though this fact is so much censored that it comes as a surprise to many Britons when immigrants, brought to Britain by Jews, point it out. This inheritance has largely passed to the USA under its ZOG regime, just as the USA after 1945 is one haven for rich war criminals).
France's overseas empire grew: as with Belgium there were vast atrocities in the Congo. France's invasion of Vietnam and Cambodia were pitilessly cruel; this must have been influenced by Napoleon's 'culture', St Cyr, and so on. The foreign legion was a byword for cruelty.
Germany's Franco-Prussian War may have been revenge; a display of Prussia and its new technology based on study and hard work. Their hard work, it is not generally known, was plagiarised by translators into English. I mention it here just to point out that the period was not peaceful.
Spain became a byword for war atrocities, in the way that eastern Europe might have been with honest historians, or the Vietnam War with honest journalists. The events after the Siege of Badajoz (1812) (not mentioned by Johnson) and the works of Goya (mentioned by Johnson) illustrate the point. Nobody points out that Spain was an immediate neighbour of France, just across a few mountains; Napoleon should certainly have known of the problems of living off the land there, and of problems moving armies there. The instability and impoverishment damaged Spain and of course there was little respite; the 'Spanish Civil War' 120 years later was a Jewish replay, which Spain managed to win, or perhaps draw. (Georgette Heyer's book The Spanish Bride (1940) starts with the Siege of Badajos, and is of a genre quite hard to classify: she uses the Autobiography of Harry Smith, set within the Dispatches of Wellington and the History of the Peninsular War by Omar, and including the diarists of the Light Division, and other biographies, for realism of the period, but converts it into the rather constricting form of a romantic novel).
Russia is of course now synonymous with its revolution, the Jewish coup. Many observers became irrationally concerned with 'revolutions': Bertrand Russell made 'revolutionary power' one of his five or six forms of human power; many writers on Africa worried about 'revolutions', prospective revolutions, and so on; the 'industrial revolution' was Toynbee's phrase. In retrospect it is clear that the Tsars had been moderate and should have pursued much more active policies; and that the media had a progressive campaign against Russia. This was allegedly fixed by the Congress of Vienna; Napoleon's campaign, in which most of Moscow was burnt out by the Russians, was not calculated to please the Russians; the story is that the Tsar understandably refused to allow Jews to control their currency, which produced rage against him; Jews increasingly murdered Russian officials, exploited ordinary Russians, and funded wars, until the disaster of the First World War and the full-blown 1917 Jewish coup followed by the mass murder of whites.
China, Indo-China, Japan. The opium wars by the British at the instigation of Jews (to force China to deal in opium; they replied with a historically interesting dumping of chests of opium into water—as effective as the Vietnamese announcement of a declaration of independence). And the invasion of Indo-China by France were two wars fought by Europeans. Japan was, or became, different - I simply have no way to tell whether Japan was singled out geopolitically, or made its own way. Anyway, the 1902 Japan-Russia War was the first victory for the east—even if it was financed by Jews.
Switzerland was made forever neutral. The idea was to institutionalise profits from wars by fixing a place where war debts could be processed.
Paul
Johnson (let's survey him, briefly) was born in 1928 and therefore missed
active service in the Second World War. He studied history with A J P Taylor at
Oxford, presumably around 1948; see this link on Taylor as a Jew fellow-traveller. About 16 of Johnson's books have been
published, all I think on popular history. Obviously he must have passed the
Jewish publication criteria; we may as well understand that from the
start. This shortish book on Bonaparte
was written late in his life, very possibly as a potboiler, or at least
potwarmer. Poor Johnson was disliked by
many; his book on intellectuals said nasty things about many thinkers, or would-be
thinkers, accusing them of not paying bills and other evils: the Bertrand
Russell society reviewed that book, and so did Christopher Hitchens, both
reviews based stylistically on the religion of holocaustianity. Jonathan Miller supposedly described his
appearance as 'like an explosion in a pubic hair factory'. His style is an educated rather superficial populist:
'innumerable French hagiographies'. At the very end of his text on Napoleon,
after millions of deaths, he concludes with magnificent bathos, that greatness
is as nothing 'without a contrite and humble heart'—he's a Roman Catholic.
His book
(paperback version) has no illustrations; it has seven chapters, arranged as
would be expected; it ends with a mixed short bibliography, including French
and British titles (but no other languages or countries), opinions, battlefield
material including Wellington, some post-mortem medical stuff, marital and sex material
(e.g. detail (p 80) on marriage to a Russian princess which did not occur). Johnson
recommends biographies by H A L Fisher (1913) and Herbert Butterfield (1945),
perhaps remembered from his student days.
However,
there is nothing (in the bibliography, or the book's text) on Rothschild (the
'caring not which puppet is on the throne' quotation is from this era), or 'War
and Peace', or the post-1945 'Napoleon: For and Against' which A J P Taylor
professed to admire. There's little on
the 'French Revolution', though of course more than enough already exists, at
least in shelf space terms. Nesta
Webster's researches in France are ignored, as are the details of Walter Scott's
multi-volume life of Napoleon. There's nothing on Chauvin, the original French
Chauvinist, who surely deserves some comment for having some claim to have
unified France. At this point, we need
to examine a detail which Johnson doesn't address. Napoleon is still claimed to have had more
books written about him than any other person. And a ridiculous iconography:
paintings, busts, etc of Napoleon. Johnson doesn't query this vast output; he
accepts it as natural, like clouds or grass or rain. A more sceptical person might enquire whether this is an entirely
natural product of market forces and curiosity. For this was a period when Rothschild money consolidated itself, notably
in Britain, but also, after fits and starts, in the USA, and in Europe. Propaganda (Johnson mentions steam-driven
presses, an improvement on Gutenberg's methods) needed publications, and of
course Napoleon relied heavily on propaganda. We have to examine the idea that much of the Napoleonic legend was
intentionally manufactured, with variations according to local conditions.
Johnson comments on the Paris printing industry, and in effect dates the growth
of the mythology from Les Cases 'immensely popular' post mortem book on
Napoleon in Saint Helena. The persistent idea of 'Perfidious Albion' very likely reflects misunderstandings about Jewish influence:
Albion may well not have been the least bit perfidious, to Jews. The equally persistent view of Britain working for a balance of power in Europe may well equally be a misunderstanding! Making money by supplying money, then arms, to both sides, followed by war, theft, and debt recovery may prove a better explanatory device.
As far as I
can tell, most people to this day have a 'positive' view of Napoleon, in a
vague way, in the way advertisers encourage a 'positive' view of some brand or product about which people know very little in detail. Daring, brilliant, decisive, skilful, inspired. I'll develop the idea that the image of
Napoleon was a sort of negative of the image of Hitler about 130 years later, and
similar to the images of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, all these being images
promoted by the Jewish media of their time, and none being true.
Johnson strikes me as ignorant of many important issues. His book shows inconsistencies in historical understanding (proof: the various stories and accounts don't hang together and must be partly wrong), and in factual matters which underpin the whole of the 'Napoleonic' era. His book
is like a flatpack kit with missing parts, and it makes a flimsy and ramshackle structure. But this is due to censorship and collegiate idleness; Johnson is not willing or able to attempt real history, then or now—for example he accepts Jewish 'Cold War' mythology.
Let's first
look at the factual stuff. There's no
doubt this was an interesting period. Lavoisier wrote the first book recognisable as modern chemistry, though he was guillotined for his trouble. Cartesian maths applied to artillery was a military secret. Gunpowder must have been made, I think, from South American nitrates. Metallurgy was improving: zinc had been discovered; aluminium had been extracted, from an ore with a French name, at great cost in electricity—Napoleon had cutlery made from it. There were problems—the tin buttons on the soldiers' coats in the fierce sub-zero Russian winter changed
state, and turned to powder. Meanwhile
food technology improved. Medical science remained rather primitive; the best
instance of Johnson is Larrey's introduction of ambulances for
injured soldiers, (p 63) rather than the allegedly traditional sawbones treatment. There must be many
relevant things to say about such matters; but Johnson doesn't know or say them.
More in the
foreground, the actual work of the soldiery might have been described; but
perhaps historians disdain numbers as being too much effort. The battles are described with diagrams in rather
outdated text-books, and Johnson must have copied their descriptions. But Johnson barely gives any description of
the logistics of battles. These
generally lasted less than one day, preceded by many days' by marching (or
travel in horse-drawn vehicles, which Johnson regards as a sign of Napoleon's
genius). Ratio of 'work' to unemployment
is not stated. A rough count, looking at the period, gives one fairly *major*
war per year. The logistics of gunpowder, cannon, and ball are not stated;
there were 100-200 cannon at a battle, which must have needed very many horses
and a lot of equipment to trundle around. (Or 'whisked away', p 59). The
French had 'by far the best cavalry till after about 1808... and infantry with drums, bugles, war cries' and the ''old guard', with five or more years' experience. This applies only where battles were regarded as definitive; where this didn't apply, the state of things in Spain led to the 'guerilla' idea, small, localised, endlessly vicious fighting and mutual destruction.
Johnson says (p 54) '.. soldiers liked this [i.e. Napoleon's] high-risk
approach. .. Soldiers like action. High casualty rates mean quicker promotion and higher pay. .. promotion was usually on merit. .. Good
food.. high rates of pay, and loot ...were the material inducements...' This is his summary of the attraction of Napoleon's armies. And of course it's difficult to assess. The chaos of revolution left many peasants little choice; there was huge inflation; the propaganda of the Marseillaise,
mostly about blood and glory, must have had some effect; and as with Cromwell, Napoleon had big guns on his side. 'High
pay and loot' sound doubtful; 'shilling a day' sounds more likely; and the
main loot must surely have been taken care of by higher-up types. And Johnson says (p 53) four armies were
abandoned by Napoleon—in Egypt, Russia, Spain, and what he calls Germany. 'Abandoned' means Napoleon went home to France, usually in a series of horse-drawn carriages, as fast as he could; the soldiery, and the countries they were in, thus had problems. I'd *guess* typically men were hired for a year or so, for the next campaign; what happened next ought to be outlined by Johnson, but isn't.
Nor does Johnson attempt much in the way
of summary or overview of Napoleon's activities: p. 173 quotes or estimates
four or five million lives, and immense losses, but there were 'no precedents'—and Johnson considers that a serious argument for Napoleon on being kept on St
Helena at huge cost. Johnson doesn't survey the differences from the start to end; the net gain or loss to France, for example, or the numbers involved in wars, or the surplus of GNP
which was spare at their level of productivity. There's no survey of what happened to the looted money. Johnson's romantic novel approach—excitement, vivid incidents and sarcastic comment—is much easier.
1793 - 1814 British War Against France. 'France declares war on Britain and Holland' ... or 1803, Napoleonic wars?
1795 end of the revolution after Bonaparte used artillery against national guardsmen. (Johnson likes to use English versions] 1792-7
first coalition 1796 invasion of Italy .. rich provinces and great towns will soon be in your power .. loot ... spoils. Savoy, Habsburgs and small independent states gold silver 'valuable paintings': Milan Lombardy Mantua 1797 won battle of Rivoli - Habsburgs withdrew from Italy. More money - nothing on what happened to the impoverished; like the Britons presumably ruined by the Rothschilds, vanish from the story Genoa Venice -38 ten million francs in gold looted from Berne [NB in Middle Ages, this sort of thing was called 'seizing the treasury'. This might not have been as simple as the phrase suggests; couldn't much of it have been hidden, for example? Or was their collaboration? Tip-off from bankers stating exactly how much bullion was for the taking?] 1798 Malthus may have suggested war as a form on contraception 1799 18 Brumaire coup 1799 Consulate set up - new constitution 1799-1809 'seemed invincible and strode the land mass of Europe like a colossus' 1800 Alps
Marengo 2nd Italian campaign p 47 1802 Egypt (later, Denon's book on Egypt) 1803 plot (including duc d'enghien)
1803 sea invasion of Britain 'looked possible' NB 1803 start of 'Napoleonic wars' i.e Britain and others vs Napoleon 1804
emperor - 82 marriage to Marie-Louise, daughter of Habsburg emperor 1805 grande armee austerlitz 1805 Trafalgar 1805? Britain sole opponent 1806 in Poland 1808 Spain conquered 'live off the land' (p 87) 1809 Austria war battle of Wagram: victory for Napoleon - end of 5th coalition 1801-2 concordat with the pope [seems to have allowed French influence in appointments] 1812 Moscow '3/4 destroyed' 1813 Leipzig over 3 days - 200,000 vs 350,000 with 'casualties' c 100,000 [1812-13 Napoleon lost c 1M men; half French; 'full cost of any continued fighting carried by France, both in men and in money' [and horses]
disproved by absurd actions on trade/ absurdity of Spain and
Russia /
HTML Rae West - First (incomplete) upload 2013-06-10; conclusion 2013-06-24 Clausewitz 2013-07-10; others; RUSI 2014-10-28; Wells 2015-01-26; Venice, and the earlier introduction which appeared in the British Resistance site, copied here 2015-02-25. Balance of power note 5 Sept 2015. National flags note 6 Sept 2015. 'History Reviewed Channel' video note, and Miles Mathis note, both 2016-08-13. Steven Sizer on Napoleon and offer of Jewish homeland 2017-04-03. Hexzane527 alluded to 26 Sep 2020 [This is not a completed piece]. A few references to Miles Mathis added 2 Feb 2021
