lundi 17 juin 2013
At this time, there were only 36.000 British soldiers in North Africa, with 250 airplanes.
So, Hitler had a free hand to be able to defeat them and to get the oil of the Middle East. And oil of the Middle East was very important for Hitler. Officially, this is why he attacked the Russians in the south in 1941, instead of attacking Moscow, and thus, lost the war against Russia.
Hitler knew that British wouldn't be able to send reinforcements. And during the following 10 months, his armies wouldn't do anything. So, in August 1940, the moment was perfect to send troops in North Africa and beat the British armies. He didn't have to send tons of soldiers; just 100.000 would have been enough.
But no, Hitler didn't do anything until the beginning of 1941 (of course, it was already almost too late). And he sent only few forces. Thus it wasn't enough to make the decision (he did something only because Italians had big problems against English forces).
Once again, if you think that Hitler was for real, you don't understand. Ok, there are the arguments that Hitler relied on Italian forces at the beginning, or that he was concentrated on invading England, and then on invading Russia.
But Italian Forces had proved to be inefficient. The battle against English forces of North Africa was constantly delayed. And even for Italian generals themselves, it was obvious that this offensive was doomed to failure. They didn't have enough heavy tanks, enough anti-tank material, enough trucks to transport troops, etc... And Italians had proved to be quite inefficient during the Battle of France. So, Hitler had to know this, obviously. Thus, as the objective was very important, he should have wanted to help the Italians; for example by giving them material and some troops (let's say, at least 50.000 soldiers), in order to have a quick result.
Ok, he was concentrated on England, and after that, on Russia. But, not even one year before, he was not so concentrated on the Battle of France that he forgot to invade Denmark or Norway. Also, it didn't have to distract him very much. He just had to ask one of his generals to plan the attack. And it is said by historians that in fact, he didn't take the invasion of England too seriously. So, in August, Germans should have been able to plan and organize an attack in North Africa.
All those excuses sound clearly phony. But when you know that Hitler was a jew working for more powerful Jewish leaders, you can understand what happened. Hitler had no intention at all to vanquish British forces in North Africa. For Jewish leaders, it would have been very problematic.
If Hitler and Mussolini had won in 1940 or at the beginning of 1941, then all North Africa would have belonged to them. They also could have blocked the strait of Gibraltar. Thus no more exhausting war in North Africa, no invasion of Sicily; no invasion of Italy; no need to have tons of soldiers and material stationed in the south of Europe in order to prevent an invasion; the possibility for Germans to get the oil of the Middle East; thus, no necessity to attack in the Caucasus instead of Moscow.
The landing in Sicily and in Italy, and the threat of a landing in the south of France allowed to partly explain why Hitler lost against Russia. Otherwise, it would have been more difficult to explain. With those landings, Hitler had to take precious troops from the Russian front, which participated to his final defeat. The error of trying to get the oil of Caucasus was another explanation of the defeat of Hitler against Russian. Without it, it would also have been more difficult to explain why Hitler lost against Russians. Thus, with the possession of North Africa, losing the war against Russia would have seemed much fishier. And Jewish leaders, who had staged all the war, didn't want to have big discrepancies (and of course, a victory of Hitler against Russians was out of the question). So, North Africa had to still be controlled by Allied forces. No way could Hitler win there.
That's the general idea. But studying closer how things happened brings us interesting details and new discrepancies.
What happened is that since June 1940, British forces under the command of O'Connor had made small attacks against Italian forces. Thus, Mussolini had been preparing an attack against them. It had to take place near the 15th of July, and be conducted by marshal Italo Balbo. There were already a lot of Italian troops in North Africa (something like 250.000 soldiers). So, an attack could be made quickly. But things took a long time. Balbo was aware that the equipment of Italian forces was very insufficient. He was awaiting better armament and equipment. Then, Balbo died. He was killed by friendly fire when his plane was shot down over Tobruk by Italian anti-aircraft guns. Thus the attack was delayed until September. At this time, the Italian army still almost didn't have the equipment demanded by Balbo. But Mussolini ordered to launch the attack right now.
With our revisionist way of considering things, we can think that in fact, this slowness was voluntary. Jewish leaders wanted Italian commandment to lose time in order to delay the intervention of German forces as much as possible. The death of Balbo was probably not an accident (or maybe was faked). It allowed losing a little more time. And once again, there is a discrepancy about the behavior of Hitler. As the goal was very important, he should have wanted to help Italians by giving them at least dozens of medium tanks, airplanes, some anti-tank weapons and other material. It would have been nothing for him, but would have helped a lot the Italian army. But of course, when you know he was in fact a Jewish shill, and that winning this battle was out of the question for Jewish leaders, it isn't a discrepancy anymore.
The first real operation began on September 9 1940, and lasted until the 16th of September (Italian troops entered Egypt). Then 150.000 Italians attacked 36.000 British soldiers. But there was almost no battle. British troops just retreated of 80 km on better defensive lines. After that, all operations were delayed until the beginning of December (the 8), that is, three months. Once again, the Axis had lost a lot of time. Of course, here also, it was made on purpose. And of course, during all this time, Hitler still didn't help Italians by giving them anti-tank weapons and other material. It is also said that the position of the Italian army was worse after the advance of 80 km than before. Thus, maybe this advance was planned by Jewish leaders in order to weaken the Italian forces.
In December, you would think that after those 3 months, Italian forces had got a better armament and material at least from the Italian army itself, and thus were on the verge of attacking the English forces. But, no, to the contrary, the 8th of December 1940, it's the British army which, with only 36.000 soldiers, attacked the 150.000 Italian soldiers, who were still lacking appropriate weapons and material. And not only they attacked, but it was a disaster for the Italian forces. In two months (until the 7th of February), they lost 130.000 soldiers (most were made prisoners), 1.300 pieces of artillery (on 1.600 they had at the beginning), and 400 tanks (on 600). And they were forced to retreat on 800 km. British forces could have thrown them out of North Africa. But the attacked was stopped because the British government forced them to send troops in Greece.
Once again, you have something strange here. During all the war, British weren't very known to attack without having an important superiority. They were quite cautious. But here, they were suddenly super audacious, almost disciples of Alexander the Great. They had only 36.000 soldiers, few tanks. But they didn't hesitate to launch an attack against the Italian forces. Ok, they could think that without heavy armament, Italians were beatable. But still.
If you have in mind that the war was staged, you can think that Jewish leaders were forced to make Italians retreat on 800 km. They had to produce movement on the front and to create quite a disaster for Italian armies. If the front had stayed immobile, thus, there would have been no reason for Hitler to intervene. Even if the front had finally been stabilized by Italians, Hitler would have had a reason to stay out of this affair. Same thing if the Italian forces had been almost intact. If they had lost only 20.000 or 30.000 men, Hitler could have say that things were not so bad. But with tons of losses, a retreat of 800 km, and a high probability of being expelled from North Africa, it was not the same thing.
Without this retreat, the front would also have been too close from Egypt (or in Egypt). Thus, when Germany would have sent troops, Jewish leaders couldn't have made them win (temporary). Otherwise, they would have been too advanced in Egypt of even in the Middle East.
It's true that Hitler sent only 13.000 soldiers at the beginning. So, you can think that, after all, Jewish leaders could have made the front to stay immobile. They would have justified this by the fact that there weren't enough German troops. But, once again, if the front hadn't moved why send German forces? And if the front hadn't move, then, there still would have been the 150.000 Italian soldiers. With the reinforcement of German soldiers and equipment, it would have been difficult to explain how they weren't able to beat the British forces. So, British had to be able to destroy almost entirely the Italian army and to make them retreat on 800 km. Then, when the Germans would come, with only 13.000 soldiers, it would be possible to make them win at the beginning, but not definitively because of a lack of soldiers and equipment. But the Germans should not send 40.000 or 50.000 soldiers at first. Otherwise, they would have won quickly.
The other interesting things are: 1) Italians weren't expelled from North Africa; 2) the reason why British didn't do it.
They weren't expelled because the British government sent a part of the British army of North Africa to Greece.
So, British forces were about to throw the Italian forces out of North Africa. Nothing could have prevented them from doing it. And it was a very important victory, because it would have been difficult for the Axis troops to come back. Thus, North Africa could have become a base for the invasion of Sicily or Italy much sooner than what happened historically. But, suddenly, they stopped. And why did they stop? Because they wanted to send troops into Greece.
The problem is that it was completely stupid. They could send only little forces in Greece (only 58.000 soldiers; soldiers who would have been much more useful in North Africa). And they knew that very soon, Germans would send his armies in Greece. So, this help was useless. And indeed, British forces were forced to retreat almost without fighting.
So, we can think that in fact, the war in Greece was once again staged. It had three goals:
1) to cause a delay concerning the war against Russia. Delay which would explain partially that Hitler didn't win in 1941.
2) to justify that British troops were stopped when they were on the verge of throwing Italian forces out of North Africa.
3) to give another reason to explain why Hitler still didn't try to send troops in North Africa (the explanation was he was too busy preparing and managing the assault against Greece, and after that, Russia).
If the British troops hadn't been stopped by their hierarchy when they were about to expel Italians from North Africa, then they would have controlled North Africa. And then, they would have become an important threat for Germany. Thus, Hitler would have probably delayed the invasion of Russia in order to get rid of this threat. He would also have sent a lot of troops in order to defeat them once and for all. And he would have very probably tried to control the strait of Gibraltar, with or without the authorization of Franco.
So, in the plan of Jewish leaders, British forces had to be stopped in their victory against Italians. And they had to still have just a little amount of soldiers in North Africa in order to keep being just a little threat for Hitler. Thus this threat wouldn't require sending many German troops in order to be controlled. It had to last until the invasion of Russia from Germany. Then, British would be able to send much more troops and Germany would do the same. This would enable to explain partly the defeat of Hitler against Russians.
So, Hitler sent only 13.000 soldiers between March and June 1941. In front of them, there were 20.000 British soldiers. The 22nd of June 1941, Hitler declared war on Russia. Then, the period of time were the lack of a strong German intervention in North Africa was very fishy was finished. After June 22, Jewish leaders were able to explain why, each time, Hitler was not sending enough troops to be able to destroy definitively the British forces. They could say it was because of the war against Russia. The period of the big discrepancy about the behavior of Hitler regarding North Africa was over.
And the fact that Hitler sent only 13.000 soldiers between March and June 1941 was still a big discrepancy. He knew that once he would be fighting against Russians, he wouldn't be able to send enough troops against British, and, to the contrary, that the British high command would be able to send much more troops to North Africa (since they wouldn't have the threat of an invasion anymore). So, he knew that there was a high risk of losing North Africa. And he was conscious of what it meant. With almost all his forces in Russia, he would then be very weak in other parts of Europe. He already had to protect France. So, the risk of an invasion in the South of Europe would become high.
And in March, it was a very good occasion to defeat the British, since these were busy in Greece, and there were only 20.000 British soldiers remaining in North Africa.
But, no, once again, he didn't do anything which would enable him to get rid of the British in North Africa.
So, at the beginning, we had already this big discrepancy about Hitler not attacking (or with very few forces) between July 1940 and March 1941, and not helping the Italians. But by exploring details of this affair, we have three other discrepancies: 1) The fact that British, who were known to be very cautious, attacked the Italian army with five time less soldiers. 2) The fact that British stopped their attack while they were crushing the Italians. 2) The fact that British sent 58.000 soldiers in Greece whereas they were almost sure to be defeated with Greek armies.
But when you know that the war was staged by Jewish leaders, and why, you can explain those discrepancies easily.
Publié par hexzane527 à 14:12