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D-Day Landing, examined

mercredi 4 mars 2015

D-Day was staged too (part 1/2)

Since the result of the landing could be quite random, once again, Jewish leaders had to stage the event.

A failure of the landing was out of the question. Indeed, the USSR was about to crush Germany. And as it would have taken a year or two to repeat a similar operation, it would have been very difficult to justify a stagnation of the Eastern Front during all this time. And without a stagnating front, the USSR would have conquered most of Europe, and would have put communist governments everywhere. And such a thing was not part of the plans of Jewish leaders. And if Stalin had put communist governments in some countries and not in others, again it would have been difficult to justify.

So, Hitler and the German High Command had to help the Allies win, by reacting too slowly and inadequately. That's why, once again, we see the presence of many quirks, inconsistencies, "errors" too numerous and too big to be honest, as well as hazards a little too good to be true; all this, mainly on the German side of course, but not only.

1) Before the landing: staged disagreements between Rommel and Rundstedt

The failure of the Germans against the landing comes not only from mistakes made during June 6, but of course also from those made before. The Jewish leaders had to set up a losing strategy before the events happen. That makes sense. Sabotage organized by them on D-Day was in the right direction, but it was not enough. They had to optimize far more the organization of the German failure. And for that, they had to organize things in advance.

One of the most significant errors comes from Hitler's arbitration of the disagreement between Rommel and Rundstedt regarding the strategy; disagreement certainly also staged.

Rommel argued that everything would happen on the D-day, and that after, all would be lost, particularly because of Allied aircraft. He therefore recommended maintaining the German divisions closer to the beaches, in order to crush the landing in the bud.

Rundstedt, his superior, argued instead that it was impossible to defend the beaches, because of the power of the allied naval artillery. He also thought that at one moment of their advance, the allied forces would be more or less disorganized and therefore winnable. As a result, he advocated attacking them soon after their first attack, once the Navy could no longer support them.

So it was for Hitler to decide. And of course, he made sure to take the worst decision possible in order to make allies win.

Indeed, he chose to compromise and take a bit of Rommel's plan and a little from that of Rundstedt. Thus, he left some divisions on the beaches and put some other ones behind, in the inner land.

Thus, the troops on the beaches were not powerful enough to repel the Allies to the sea, and the remaining troops in the back were not able either to defeat them once bridgeheads created. So the troops near the beaches were sure to be defeated and those located further inland too.

But that's not all. Hitler also complicated the decision circuit for his armies located in the west of Europe. Indeed, he insisted that the Panzer troop's reserves be placed under his direct orders. They therefore could not move without his approval.

click for larger image

It already posed a problem in itself, since managing divisions located 1,800 km away makes necessarily the commandment less effective. But above all, because Hitler was asleep during the early hours of D-day, and after that, because he was slow to give the order to move them, they remained stuck for hours before being able to intervene, letting the allies quietly create their bridgeheads. Obviously, this too was wanted. Hitler chose this organization to ensure that critical units would be paralyzed during the D-day in order to let the allies win.

Incidentally, some of these armored divisions will be put very far back, as the Panzer Lehr, which will be located about 130 km from the landing beaches, the 116th Panzer Division, located 130 km away, near Rouen, and especially the second panzer division (320 km); too far away to intervene quickly enough on D-Day. It happens that, among these units, there are two that belong to the reserve of Army Group B, and are therefore immediately available, without having to refer to Hitler. If for the 116th, one can understand the need to cover the area near Dieppe, the placement of the second division is completely illogical.

2) Maps of German troops and airdrops areas

Before going further, here is the map of the German troops.

To understand the map, here is the signification of the symbols. From the highest level of command to the lowest, we have:

OB West (commands the army groups located in Western Europe. Directed by Gerd von Rundstedt)

xxxxx = Army Group (for the area going from Brittany to northern France: Army Group B, led by Rommel)

xxxx = Army (here 7th and 15th armies)

xxx = corps (the one that concerns us here is the LXXXIV or 84th corps)

xx = division; this is where the troops are. The higher levels are usually only HQ. A division consists of about 12,000 men in 1944 and is divided into regiments (2,000 to 3,000 men) battalions (750-1000 men). For panzer divisions, there are about 15,000 men (added to this: 90 Panzer IV and 70 Panthers).

The divisions with a cross inside the rectangle are infantry divisions, those with an oval are armored divisions, and those with nothing are static divisions.

Infantry

Tanks

Allied airdrops zones are here:

3) Many high-ranking generals were absent

Jewish leaders have therefore planned the German defeat upstream of the D-Day. But, as the landing still contained a large amount of uncertainty, it was necessary to organize the defeat also for this day.

For that, Jewish leaders ensured that many Germans officials would be absent June 6 (until noon or even until late evening), and essential information about the landing would not be transmitted to or not believed by German HQ.

The main reason that will justify officially these absences will be that the weather was extremely bad the days before June 6 and that the Germans then thought that the landing could not be made before June 10.

Thus, about the navy, Admiral Krancke leaves his headquarters in Paris to make an inspection visit to Bordeaux.

Colonel Mayer-Detring, the intelligence officer for the entire western front, goes hunting with his mistress.

More importantly, General Rommel who heads the Army Group B (15th and 7th armies) is authorized to be absent for 36 hours to celebrate on June 6 in Germany, the anniversary of his wife. Army Group B, it is precisely the whole group of troops located in the northwest of France. Its operations officer, von Tempelhoff, left too.

Dollmann, Commander of the 7th army, must make a Kriegspiel (a war game) in Rennes, June 6, at 10 am, with the following theme: exercise on maps about air landing. All division commanders are summoned, each with two corps commanders. All are invited to sleep at Rennes on the night of June 5 to 6. Thus, it's almost half of the division leaders and a quarter of the regiment leaders who are en route to or are already in Rennes as Operation Overlord begins.

And the 7th Army is the only one present in Normandy. The 15th army is in the north of France, about 200 km from the landing beaches; that is to say, much too far away to get there in time during the D-day.

And even if the cause is different, the general Wilhem Falley, commanding the 91th Division, is killed shortly after 4 am near his headquarters, that he tries to reach. We can also think that his death was staged so that the functioning of this very important division is idle for the few crucial hours before landing.

General Feuchtinger, commanding the 21th Panzer Division, is in Paris for a rendezvous with his mistress. So this crucial division is also without its official chief.

So, the only army that can deal with the allies during the first day of landing is partly decapitated at the crucial moment. Of course, there are substitutes, but it is not exactly the same.

In summary, for the area of the 7th Army, we had, from the highest to the lowest ranking (those who were there are in bold):

So, only 3 of the 7 divisions are commanded in the early hours of the landing. 57% have no commandment. And part of the regiments leaders are also absent.

The thing is not very well documented, but inevitably, it had to have an impact on the responsiveness and the quality of the German defense during the landing.

That said, here, it is said, regarding the death of General Falley: "This action will have a direct impact on the course of events in the Utah Beach sector, as it will cause a significant fluctuation in the command of the division during several hours and significantly delay the German counter-attack".

Perhaps also that some of the generals sent to the war game were not informed about the sabotage and were kept away for this reason. Had they been present, they would have been able to think that there was a betrayal from the high command.

Here is the German organization chart in Normandy for the period of the 5/6 June 1944:

4) The probable goal of Rommel's absence

The absence of Rommel is not negligible for the failure of the German defense. Insofar, as he is the one who recommended the defense of beaches, had he been present, he would have greatly accelerate and energize things. In particular, it would be logical that he bring back as soon as possible the 116th and 2nd Panzer Divisions; and that he make the 21st Panzer rush at the beaches.

Also, Jodl refused that Rundstedt use the 12th Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr and also refused to wake Hitler. Probably if Rommel had been there, as he was supposed to be one of the favorite generals of Hitler, it would have been difficult to justify Jodl's inaction.

While as Rundstedt was neither convinced of the strategy of stopping the Allies on the beaches nor of the fact that the Normandy landing was the real one, it was easier to justify a lack of insistence from him toward Jodl.

Incidentally, Rommel was most likely in the conspiracy too. This photo of him doing a masonic handshake with Hitler shows it:

Casting of the TV series "Band of Brother"

So, anyway, he would have done nothing. But it would have been more difficult to explain. It was therefore better to keep him away.

5) The advantage of the absence of the divisional generals

In my opinion, the usefulness of the thing wasn't necessarily about the action during the time of the landing, but about what was to happen overnight. It was necessary that the German units near Utah Beach (the 709th, 91st and 243rd) can't react fast enough to get rid of paratroopers. Because then, they could have intervened on Utah Beach the next day and prevent a successful landing at this location.

You have to consider that behind the beaches in question, the area was mostly marshland. And there were very few routes crossing it. If the Germans had managed to keep the roads and therefore the beaches, the landing would have been much more complicated. But, precisely, the roads have been taken by the Allied paratroopers overnight.

Map 1

Indeed, we can read on Wikipedia about the Utah Beach battle:

"The most significant difference was the 13 000 men of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Division already fighting in the interior at the beginning of the landing. Five hours before the first wave of assault, the troops who have been parachuted or have arrived by gliders fought beyond the beaches, eliminating the enemy positions along the beach exits and creating confusion among the Germans, preventing any organized counter-attack from the enemy toward the landing areas."

Or on this other Wikipedia page: "Although the paratroopers are quite dispersed and suffer heavy losses, they manage to take over and keep most of the roads necessary for the exit of the 7th US Corps from Utah Beach."

We must also see that there were only 10,000 paratroopers in this area, facing almost two German divisions (91th, part of the 709th and 352nd,); which represented around 20,000 men. And if things had been done well, part of the 243rd could have been brought on site. The allies were clearly outnumbered. And of course, a night drop in bad weather tends to induce disorganization. Allied divisions were even more disorganized, because a part landed in fairly deep swamps. And besides that, the Germans had had time during the previous months to strongly reinforce the points they controlled, making them very difficult to be taken by the paratroopers. So, if the chiefs of those three German divisions had been present during the hours before the landing, the reaction of the latter might have been faster, more coordinated and more powerful. And then, maybe the landing on Utah Beach in the morning would have been a failure.

And Utah Beach was very important because it allowed taking faster the port of Cherbourg, located about thirty kilometers away (north-west). Without the taking of this beach, the port was located at 60 km. And it became much more difficult to conquer.

There are only two ports in deep water allowing to transfer huge amounts of material in Normandy: Cherbourg and Le Havre. Without the taking of Cherbourg, the allies could have been without a single major port for a long time; which would have led to a much slower arrival of the supply. Since one of the two artificial harbors built by the Allies was destroyed on June 19, there were only 10,000 tons of material that could pass through the second port daily. Imagine that both artificial harbors were destroyed on this occasion, it could have been a disaster.

Incidentally, you can notice that after the landing, Hitler will still make decisions leading to the rapid defeat of the troops located in this area. By ordering them to not retreat at any cost, Hitler hastened their surrender and thus the fall of Cherbourg. The city fell on June 30, while apparently they could have resisted much longer without the huge losses caused by the order of not retreating. If in the meantime, the last artificial harbor had been destroyed by a storm, there again, it could have posed enormous logistical problems to the allies.

Moreover, not only Utah could have been not conquered, but it could have been the case for Omaha. With German troops in number near Utah, some could have reinforced Omaha. And as the Germans have been very close of keeping the control of the beach, it could also have been a failure for the Allies.

And of course, this idea about Utah Beach area is valid, to a lesser extent, for Sword Beach. The absence of Feuchtinger at the head of the 21th Panzer (and the hesitations of the high commandment of course) has probably decreased the effectiveness of it. Maybe Sword Beach could have been held if he had been present.

So, for the Jewish leaders, there had to be some confusion on the German side during the early hours. Without that, the success of the operation on the side of Utah Beach became much more random; and possibly also on the side of Omaha and Sword Beach. And Jewish leaders don't like hazard. And to increase the confusion, they made sure that the chiefs of divisions be not there. It helped to have some more few hours of mess; enough for the paratroopers to hold the area and ensure the success of a part of the landing.

6) The advantage of not waking Hitler

One of the biggest quirks is of course the fact that subordinates of Hitler did not dare to wake him.

The landing began at 6am. At that time, things were already perfectly clear. And if there was still any doubt, at 7am, it no longer existed. Even at 3 o'clock, things were already quite obvious. Yet Hitler was woken at 10am. Many hours during which nothing was done.

It happens that panzers could only move on his order. And everything could be played within hours. It was an absolutely crucial moment where the reaction had to be as quick as possible.

The justification for not waking Hitler is based on the fact that he is supposed to have required not to be woken up and had taken a sleeping pill. This explanation is ridiculous.

If you had been the subordinate of Hitler at that time, above all, you would have been terrified of being court-martialed for not having warned him in time about the landing; and certainly not for having awakened him. Not warning the supreme leader at such a crucial moment is indeed clearly liable to the death penalty. Such failure is unforgivable. And Hitler was especially not known to be a weak or a tender person. Thus, subordinates knew they were risking their head. Even without considering the possible punishment from Hitler's, his near entourage of generals knew that a successful Allied landing would mean the end of Germany in the short term, and then their possible judgment and execution. Therefore, the decision not to wake Hitler is extremely fishy.

Of course, Hitler had repeatedly said that the first landing would only be a diversion. But at 6am, even if it was a trick, it was necessary to react as quickly as possible. Otherwise, diversion or not, the allies would progress farther in the French territory and it would quickly become impossible to throw them back to the sea. And neither Hitler nor the other generals were soothsayers and really knew what was going to happen. So they could not play the fate of Germany on a simple presume. In the absence of certainty, it was absolutely necessary to react as soon as possible to prevent the success of the invasion of Normandy. Obviously, it was a major operation. And even if it was not the main landing, if the German didn't make it fail, then it might well have become it. So the German high command could not handle this in an offhand way, as a secondary issue. They had to react as quickly as possible and awaken Hitler. This, a 10 year old child would have understood.

The fact of not having awakened Hitler therefore represents an obvious sabotage. With what we have seen above, we understand the advantage of not waking him. His permission was needed to use the panzer divisions located far away from the coast of Normandy. With Hitler asleep, the authorization relied on Jodl (apparently, since generally you don't heard about Keitel, his superior). Then, Jewish leaders just needed to present him as servile follower and a very prudent person (this is also how Keitel was portrayed) to justify that he has not woken up Hitler and not authorized the use of panzers. Thus, the Jewish leaders were able to ensure that these units would be locked during the crucial moment; whereas if they had been available during the early hours of the landing, it is quite possible that they would have been able to reject the Allies into the sea.

With Hitler woken up, it would have been hard to justify that these divisions were not sent sooner, especially the 2nd and 12th Panzer and the panzer Lehr.

So the fact that his subordinates did not dare to wake him was clearly intended, planned. It allowed the allies to gain enough time to make the landing a success.

Of course, we can say that anyway, air units would have massacred the panzers and making them intervene earlier would have changed nothing. But until about 16h, the clouds did not allow allied airplanes to intervene. So, throughout the main part of the landing, the panzers would have had free rein and could have rejected the Allies to the sea.

7) Hitler's behavior during the day

After waking up, the behavior of Hitler evidently continued to drive the German army to defeat. Once informed of the situation, he refused to involve the panzer divisions and other available reinforcements in order to, supposedly, wait until the situation is clarified on the north of France. In doing so, the allies could continue to gain a foothold in the Normandy countryside without meeting serious opposition, becoming increasingly entrenched.

Finally, seeing at the end of the afternoon that the North was not attacked, he decided to involve the panzers to "clean up the beaches during the night." But it was obviously too late.

Some could say that since he did nothing during a big part of the day, the fact of not having been awakened quickly was finally not important. He could have been awakened at 6am and Jewish leaders could have made him do nothing during almost all day with the same phony justifications. But first, it doesn't remove the illogical behavior of Jodl. And also, yes, it was still important. If Hitler had been woken up at 6am to be notified of the landing, it would have still been much more complicated to justify his inaction for 4 or 5 more hours (5 hours, because, in addition, he has not been informed of the situation right away). The few hours of Hitler's inaction are already very difficult to justify; so during the whole day, it would have been extremely suspicious. It would have been particularly difficult to explain that he has not released the 12th Panzer and Panzer Lehr much earlier.

By the way, here is the reaction of Hitler when he learned that the landing took place.

His first statement was: "the news couldn't be better". "As long as they were in England, we could not reach them. Now, they are in a place where we can destroy them". Later, at a reception at which he was to attend, his face was radiant and he exclaimed, "it began, finally ...".

Such a reaction is more than strange. He knew that the opening of a second front could be fatal and that he was far from being sure to be able to push back the allies to the sea. And when he learns that the landing occurred and that solid bridgeheads are already in place, rather than feeling anxious and saying that this is probably the end in the short term, he is joyful? This is nonsense.

In my opinion, this reaction was used to justify the decisions of Hitler during this day and the following days or weeks. If he had shown panic or even just anxiety, then, delays in sending panzers to the beaches would have seemed much less normal. So he had to appear satisfied with the situation. It showed that he wasn't panicked. It also showed that he believed it was a diversion. And since this was a ruse, he had all the time to organize the counter-attack. Therefore, the various delays became logical. And as Hitler was supposed to have become half mad with the years, this aberrant reaction could pass without problems.

8) The idea that the real invasion would be located elsewhere: Operation Fortitude

The idea that the first landing would be a diversion, or that the real invasion would necessarily take place in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais helped justify most fatal delays on the part of Hitler and the German High Command.

This idea was largely created and maintained by the allied operation "Fortitude". The allies used their very efficient intelligence services to deceive Germans by all possible means and make them believe that the real invasion would be in the Pas-de-Calais. They also created a false army, giving the impression to Hitler that they had 42 more divisions than they had in reality. After landing, he will believe that an army of 57 divisions was still available in England, ready to pounce on the Pas-de-Calais, while there were only 15 divisions left.

And hesitations caused by the Operation Fortitude lasted very long. It's only at the end of July that Germans will accept the idea that the invasion of Normandy was the only one which would happen. So, the German units in the north of France were not sent to Normandy, or so in dribs and drabs. It was not until August that Hitler finally decided to redeploy the 15th army to Normandy, obviously too late.

Of course these hesitations can be justified. Indeed, there was a very long coastline to defend. And indeed, the Pas-de-Calais is the closest place of England.

But precisely because the coast of Pas-de-Calais was very well defended, the probability that the Allied attack elsewhere, in more accessible areas, became much more important. Even if the Allies were in a strong position there, a landing is still always dangerous. So attacking where the enemy is stronger and better prepared greatly increases the risk of failure during the first hours.

And, after the first few days, it was clear that the landing was going to take place only in Normandy. It was then necessary to massively repatriate units present in the north.

Moreover, once the landing in Normandy started, if Allied forces were not eliminated, it was over; it then became the main landing. So anyway, it was essential to counter it.

But, it would have risked making the invasion unsuccessful. And, precisely, the goal of the Jew Hitler was then to make Germany lose. So, reinforcements had to arrive little by little. German "hesitation" had to be maintained, even if it became more and more ridiculous as the days and weeks passed.

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